J.E.Menon

 Following the April 30, 2002, referendum in which President Gen. Pervez Musharraf received 97.71% approval, all indications are that Pakistan is heading for a period of turbulence with the potential to extend beyond the short-term. Violence has been steadily escalating since the weeks just before the referendum and has grabbed world attention, at the time of writing, with the May 8 suicide bombing of French naval construction workers in Karachi, Sindh province. No matter how things play out in the coming weeks and months, one of two possible outcomes can be broadly assumed:

1.     Musharraf will retain his position and continue adopting a co-operative posture with the US, and at the same time try to appease hardline generals by not co-operating to the extent that Washington can be truly successful in its campaign against terror; or

2.     Musharraf will be replaced either by coup or assassination, more likely the latter, and the new leader will end or dilute extensive co-operation with the US, with chaos most likely to ensue in Pakistan seeded by factors ranging from ethnic divisions, sectarian hatreds and separatist tendencies to political differences.

Musharraf sees himself as the saviour of Pakistan, and has on more than one occasion suggested that his dictatorship is divinely ordained. Essentially a pragmatist, and quite capable of bending with the prevailing winds, he is now extending full verbal support to the American global war against terrorism. This has resulted in a number of benefits, both for him personally (in terms of global stature and acceptability) and to Pakistan in terms of debt rescheduling and aid.

Naturally, Musharraf would prefer the first of the two outcomes. To achieve it, he has little choice but to strike a very fine balance between his alliance with the US and his need to retain the confidence and support of the hardline generals of the Pakistan Army. That balance cannot be achieved unless he is prepared to deceive one side or the other. This is because, eventually, such a balance cannot be sustained and he must be prepared to betray one side or the other.

In other words, ultimately Musharraf will either (a) betray Washington by not persecuting the war against the Taliban and Al Qaida to its bitter end – i.e. kill or capture Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama Bin Ladin, and decimate the lower ranks; or (b) betray the Pakistani Islamist groups, the Taliban and the Al Qaida leadership, with all of whom the Pakistani Army has had a decades-long incestuous relationship aimed at furthering Islamabad’s strategic interests in Afghanistan and the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Striking the balance, however, is necessary for Musharraf’s own continuity. Thus, poised dangerously at the epicentre of the Bush administration’s war against terrorism, he now faces a set of daunting challenges that could either guarantee his survival or speed up the end of his regime. The challenges are based on the following realities:

A.     Eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan together form the "operational headquarters" of a combination of the residual Taliban movement and the Al Qaida group. Media reports in recent months indicate that the leadership and lower ranks of the Taliban movement and the Al Qaida group have been smuggled across the Afghan-Pakistan border, with entry facilitated by monitoring deficiencies and by easily-bribed Pakistani border guards and soldiers. This is seen as one of the reasons why so few Taliban and Al Qaida leaders have been captured by the Western coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.

B.     The Musharraf regime, having hastily switched sides from the Taliban to the US soon after Sept. 11, 2001, has allowed US troops to use Pakistan as a staging point for offensive actions against the Taliban and Al Qaida. Musharraf has in recent weeks also permitted American Special Forces to carry out search operations for Osama Bin Ladin and his associates inside Pakistani territory. From the American perspective, Gen. Musharraf is seen as being indispensable - at least for the time being - if it is to succeed in crushing the Al Qaida network and ending terrorism emanating from the Pakistan/Afghanistan zone of terrorism.

C.     Musharraf’s legitimacy is increasingly coming under question in Pakistan, across the spectrum of society as well as within the armed forces. The referendum of April 30, aimed at bolstering his political credentials, had exactly the opposite effect. It is clear is that the referendum, intended to strengthen the president, ended up weakening his stature and giving his secular as well as Islamist political opponents more ammunition. In short, the referendum had the effect of shattering the notion that the “silent majority” supported Musharraf. In fact, the silent majority stayed silent.

The Immediate Future

Before October 2002, when parliamentary elections are due to be held in Pakistan, Musharraf will find himself coming under attack on all fronts. Those opposed to his political continuity and close linkage to the US include the radical Islamists, disgruntled retired military officers, disillusioned serving officers, and the opposition parties - namely the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto who shifts between exile in London and Dubai, and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Nawaz Sharif who is in exile in Saudi Arabia. The tactics applied to further undermine Musharraf's credibility will range from sectarian killings and attacks on foreigners - like the killing of journalist Daniel Pearl and the suicide bombing which killed 11 French citizens - to civil disruptions, strikes and political rallies.

The combination of opposition parties and Islamist networks, acting separately, could prove to be lethal. With Musharraf's legitimacy having been undermined by the referendum, Benazir Bhutto is threatening to return to Pakistan - virtually daring the regime to arrest her. The political impact of such a move will be strongly in her favour, especially in her home province of Sindh where public participation in the referendum was poor, and where anti-regime sentiment has been building up over autonomy and water-sharing issues.

Simultaneously those opposed to Musharraf's alignment with the US are indirectly targeting him, and those parts of the military establishment that support him, by attacking Shiites and foreigners. If this persists for a few more months, the parliamentary elections would prove to be even more damaging to Musharraf's image - given that he has already ruled out the participation of Bhutto and Sharif in Pakistani politics. Information Minister Nisar Memon has said the parliamentary polls would be as transparent as the referendum, hardly reassuring to anyone concerned - given that actual turnout was probably no more than 10-15% judging from comments in the Pakistani media, while the official figure was over 70%.

On his side Musharraf has the US, which has been very restrained in its comments on the validity of the referendum. It has made clear through numerous leadership level statements that it regards the general as a key ally; and it is believed to have deployed various assets to ensure that there is no direct threat to his life. Meanwhile, the US will use Musharraf’s term in power – however long or short it may be - to maximise its penetration of the Pakistani security structure. Field officers have already been deployed with various security agencies, and observers have been posted in civilian bureaucratic bodies. Numerous FBI offices have been opened in the country, and several air bases have been taken over completely by the US military for its own use. Washington is reportedly also seeking a vast tract of Baluchistan as an American military zone.

In theory, Musharraf has all the tools he needs to survive the short-term challenges. He holds the top posts, the most important of which are his positions as the chief of army staff (COAS) and as the president. He has been wise enough not to give up the COAS position, because that would turn him into just another politician – a risk no army man would want to take given the penchant for coups in Pakistan. As COAS, he literally commands the loyalty of the Pakistan Army. Since independence in 1947, the army has proven to be the only stable institution in the country, and its tradition of obeying the leader has never yet been violated by the top officer ranks.

Long-Term Considerations & Implications

However, Musharraf is enough of a survivor to recognise that he cannot depend permanently on US goodwill, especially if American forces achieve the goal of killing or capturing Bin Ladin and Mullah Omar. Besides, US goodwill or not, he will need the support of the army if he is to bring about the changes he believes are required to “save” Pakistan. He will have to satisfy both Washington and domestic power-brokers if he is to keep his place. Therefore, he will continue with the comforting rhetoric of the anti-terror war, but will also pursue policies that are at least tolerable to the Pakistani military establishment.

This means Musharraf will only be able to partially deliver what the US wants, namely (1) the crushing of Islamic militant groups operating out of Pakistan and aiding the remnants of Al Qaida and the Taliban; and (2) an end to military support for groups that are in the State Department list of terror entities. But he will co-operate on a tactical level, where US generated intelligence leads provide specific information about terrorists and make it impossible for the regime not to co-operate.

On a strategic level, however, Musharraf will allow things to gradually go back to "normal" from the Pakistani military perspective. In other words, (a) the Pakistan-Afghan border will remain porous and accessible for infiltration and exfiltration by terrorists, retaining for the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) plausible deniability in its Afghan and Kashmir ops; (b) the terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan will lie low for the time being, but will continue their operations with much lower public profile, and with various adjustments to circumvent the State Department terrorist list (changing group names is the usual tactic) as well as to hide their financial trails; (c) the Pakistan military establishment, through the ISI, will continue to use these groups for their strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Jammu & Kashmir, applying lessons learned from their exposure to US intelligence capabilities post-Sept. 11 to conceal their involvement more effectively.

Keeping in mind these considerations, Musharraf has been telling the US that he cannot squeeze the Islamic groups (and their backers in the military establishment) too hard because that would lead to his ouster. He will continue leveraging the US need for a stable Pakistan in order to secure both his own future and the long-term interests of the military establishment. The regime will co-operate with US to the extent that it can do so without implementing major turnarounds; and so long as such co-operation can be packaged by the Bush administration as good news in the war against terror, Musharraf will remain indispensable.

Therefore a thin flow of positive results, like the capture of senior Al Qaida member Abu Zubaydah, will continue but the big players behind the scenes will not feel any pressure apart from having to lie low for the time being. Those Pakistani terrorists who have been arrested or detained by the regime continue to have communication facilities and living comforts, as well as access to individuals outside the detention list. These figures include people like Markaz al Dawa wal Irshad and Lashkar-e-Toiba chief Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, Jaish e-Mohammed leader Mullah Mohammed Azhar, Jamiat Ulema Islam (F) chief Maulana Fazl Ur Rahman, Jamiat Ulema Islam (S) head Maulana Sami Ul Haq, as well as serving and retired members of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other military officers with links to both Al Qaida and the Taliban.

These individuals are well aware that Musharraf cannot act against them to the extent that the US would like him to, for two important reasons: (1) there is a great deal of opposition within the military and its ISI branch to the way the US has been permitted to virtually occupy parts of the country and place its intelligence agents at ports, airports and government offices; and (2) Musharraf himself is not convinced that the Pakistani army should abandon its strategic and territorial objectives in Afghanistan and in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, and has repeatedly stated that Pakistan would continue to play a role in Afghanistan and that his regime would not end support for “freedom fighters” in Kashmir.

Musharraf is no doubt aware that if he strays too far from the beaten path and actually takes effective measures against the so-called "mullah generals" and the Islamic leaders with whom they have built close relationships over the past two decades, he may end up being overthrown or worse. Moreover, if he is to retain the capability to influence developments in Afghanistan and Kashmir, he can only do so with the help of these officers - and they in turn need the help of the Islamist leaders, who control the jihadis active against the Indians in Kashmir and potentially against the Karzai regime (or its Western protectors) in Afghanistan.

Concluding Observations

Due to these circumstances, Musharraf has little choice but to play a double game if he wants to survive in his current position and take his place in history as the “Ataturk of Pakistan”, bequeathing on the country a more durable legacy than that of the Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. This double game involves a subtle diplomacy aimed at keeping the US satisfied on the one hand, and at convincing the Islamists that by overthrowing him, they would end up facing the same fate as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Indeed, this was the justification that he used after Sept. 11, 2001, to join the coalition against terror.

Musharraf's efforts to convince the Pakistani side are not proving to be very effective. This is partly because, lacking any major success in capturing Al Qaida or Taliban leaders, the US is constantly pressing for greater access into the Pakistani security infrastructure and its territory. Intrusive American measures and the gradually expanding presence of Special Forces on the ground have given rise to concerns, within the military as well as the political establishments, that Musharraf’s regime is not much different from the Karzai interim government in Afghanistan.

More importantly, Musharraf’s sincerity – one of his main selling points since taking over in October 1999 - is becoming less convincing because of his attempts to control all the levers of power indefinitely. The crudely rigged referendum result has reinforced this viewpoint. Efforts to undermine the stability of the regime have already begun.

Much will depend on the dynamics at the top levels of the military establishment. The current situation is murky. It is conceivable that at least some of the top generals will press for Musharraf to relinquish his COAS post. But he is not likely to do that, for only if he gives up the post can any armed forces officer move to replace him without disturbing the strong hierarchic tradition within the Pakistani army.

It is also conceivable that sections of the officer corps are worried that Musharraf may undermine the military itself in order to secure his legacy in Pakistan with American backing. By assuming the presidency for the next five years through the referendum, and implicitly the COAS position as well, Musharraf has effectively bottlenecked promotions at the top-most segment of the army. In all of these moves, the general will have the support of the US and its allies.

Efforts to position pro-US officers in key positions will also lead to disgruntlement among the officer corps and could meet internal resistance. Those within the armed forces who continue to see the relationship between the Pakistani military establishment and Al Qaida as having long-term strategic benefits will do whatever they can to thwart efforts to de-Islamise the army.

There is a fairly powerful array of internal forces that see Musharraf as inimical to their own interests. Thus, even if he survives the short-term challenges likely to arise before October 2002, the chances that he would finish his five-year presidential term in office are low.

Still, Pakistan under Musharraf will remain key to the American war against global terrorism. Understandably, in order to satisfy the domestic political requirement of having to show results in the war against terror, the US will prefer to have someone willing to deliver at least partially, rather than an unpredictable successor.

From Musharraf's perspective, this means there is no margin in helping to capture Bin Ladin or Mullah Omar. If they are captured, American interest in his survival will decline, and Washington may then be ready to consider someone "democratically elected" in his place. For the general, therefore, the best option is to maximise US dependency on his regime, while making sure the real goals of the war against terror are never achieved. And his actions show that is exactly the option he has chosen to pursue.