BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR: Volume 4(6)

The media material on General Pervez Musharraf presents extremely conflicting and contradictory pictures. Reporting from various sources with carefully inserted biases leads to utter confusion. This article borrows its title from a phrase used by Brig. (r) S. N. Sachadeva in his op-ed for the Daily Excelsior [[i]] and by Arvind Lavakare in his article for Rediff News Service [[ii]]. It adequately sums up the difficulty in assessing General Musharraf.

This article attempts to collate information that has emerged from various sources about the General and puts together a `composite’. This technique is routinely used in police work to convert a description of a suspect from many witnesses into a photograph. In the process of doing this it has also become possible to address some specific patterns in the coverage of General Musharraf so wherever possible a `composite’ has been built up on these topics.

We begin the article by discussing General Musharraf’s childhood and possible influences therein. In the next section we examine the information available about General Musharraf’s military and political career. In the section after that we briefly cover the views held by various commentators on General Musharraf. Then we look carefully at `composites’ on the following commonly seen motifs in writings about General Musharraf; `Musharraf: AtaPak v/s AtaTurk’, `Musharraf and the West’, and `Musharraf and the Pan-Islamist Clique’. Lastly we present our concluding remarks.

In our approach we are faced with severe limitations on the amount of information available about contacts between General Musharraf and the Chinese Government and the North Korean Government. Thus it is difficult to establish the exact nature of his impact on ties with these two nations. These are of importance as these nations have contributed heavily to making Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Childhood

August 11, 1943: General Musharraf was born at Kucha Saadullah Khan behind Golcha cinema in Daryaganj, Delhi [[iii],[iv]]. Pervez Musharraf was the second of three brothers born in an educated Syed family. After the creation of Pakistan the family chose to settle in Karachi. The journey to Pakistan was complicated by the fact that Musharraf's father was asked to transport a large sum of money at the behest of the Pakistani government [[v]]. Pervez’s father Syed Musharrafuddin [[vi]], a graduate of Aligarh University, worked as a cashier in the Directorate General of Civil Supplies in Delhi. Upon moving to Pakistan, he was absorbed into the Pakistan Foreign Service. General Musharraf’s mother hailed from a conservative family but with the support of her progressive father she was able to get an education. She graduated from Delhi's Indraprastha College with a Masters in English literature [[vii]].

1949 - 1956: Musharraf spent this part of his childhood in Turkey. His father served in the Pakistani Embassy in Ankara and later as the Pakistani permanent representative to CENTO. He also became the chairman of the Turkish-Pakistani Friendship Association. Pervez Musharraf came to Turkey when he was seven and spent six years in Turkey.

In Turkey Pervez Musharraf made some interesting friends including Ilhan Yigitbasoglu, the head of the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry now serving as Turkish Ambassador to Helsinki. Pervez (along with his brothers) also learnt Turkish here under the supervision of a German tutor [7 ]. His grasp of Turkish is reputed to be better than his grasp of Urdu, the national language of Pakistan.

(It may be noted at this point that Musharaff-ud-Din retired in 1974 as a Joint Secretary while his wife (Pervez's mother) devoted her time between her family and serving the International Labor Organization. She retired in 1987. It is said that Musharraf-ud-din (and his wife) took American citizenship at some point before his death in 1999 [[viii]]. )

1957-1961: After returning from Ankara, the Musharrafs settled in Karachi, then capital of Pakistan. Pervez attended Saint Patrick's High School, Karachi and Forman Christian College, Lahore. His exact grades in these institutions are not known, however many reports speak of him having average grades but an avid interest in sports [7 ,[ix]].

It is impossible to say what exactly influenced General Musharraf as a child but he repeatedly emphasizes the following:

“ I was strongly attracted to Kemal Ataturk’s model of leadership. He transformed Turkey from being the `sick man of Europe’ to being the a very advanced nation”

“When I was a child in Turkey, my father was in the Pakistan embassy. We had two defence attaches who used to wear these beautiful glamorous uniforms. I used to look at them and I was extremely impressed by their smartness. That was the time I also thought, I must wear such uniforms.”

The General also seems to remember events from the times of the Partition with some degree of clarity. These stories are very common among refugees of the partition (Mohajirs as they are called in Pakistan). It is unclear if these are real events or some kind of meta-narrative that he has latched on to.

The repeated reference to his `Syed’ (the highest level of the Islamic `caste’ system, comprising families tracing bloodlines to the Prophet of Islam) roots indicates that Musharraf is conscious of social strata. It is clear that General Musharraf is exactly where he craved to be, i.e. in the Army wielding power beyond the dreams of most others. The attraction to Kemal Ataturk goes back some distance. Meta-narrative or otherwise, the events of the Partition have left their mark on him.

The Pakistan army plays a very active role in politics. It is often impossible to segregate army careers and political activities in Pakistan. General Musharraf’s career is a classic case of this, i.e. the extension of a military position into a political career. It appears that in the early part of his career Pervez Musharraf was purely a soldier; where exactly his career entered the political sphere is impossible to pinpoint. There are some guesses and these are presented here. We have also attempted to portray plausible motivations for some of the events and patterns in his career.

1961: Pervez Musharraf joined the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Kakul (NWFP). He shifted his permanent residence to Gujranwala in the Punjab and declared it as his hometown. Some analysts see this as one more action in a pattern commonly seen among Mohajirs, i.e. the desire to project a `changed' status. Some Mohajirs affect virulent anti-India sentiments in order to gain acceptance in Pakistani society [ 24 ].

1961-1964: Somewhere in this period Musharraf is punished for indiscipline [[x],[xi]].

April 19, 1964: Musharraf completed the 29th PMA Long Course at Kakul and joined the 16^th (SP) Field Artillery Regt as a 2^nd Lieutenant. His PA number is PA-6920 [[xii]]. The 16 (SP) Field Artillery Regiment was commanded by Lt.Col. Akram Chaudhary and was attached to 1st Armored Division as the divisional artillery [[xiii]]. It is said that General Musharraf was second (passing out as Battalion Junior Under Officer) [[xiv]] in his class (29^th PMA) and Lt. General Ali Quli Khan came first and was therefore the sword of honor recipient [[xv]].

1965: The 16 (SP) Artillery saw action in three sectors; Khem Karan, Lahore and Sialkot. During the 1965 war in the Chawinda (Sialkot) sector in Punjab at night, Pervez Musharraf’s battery was bombarded by Indian artillery. Musharraf, then a Lieutenant however, off-loaded ammunition from the burning gun before it could explode and refused to abandon his position. For this he was decorated with the Imtiyaz-i-Sanad (Mention in the Dispatches). General Javed Ashraf Kazi (then most probably a Lieutenant in the Pakistan army), currently Musharraf’s Federal minister for Communications and Transport witnessed this event. General Musharraf himself considers his escaping death here a miracle [[xvi]].

1966: Musharraf most likely volunteered for a transfer to a formation known then as the 19^th Baluch Regiment. In those days this formation comprised the core of the Pakistan Army’s irregular warfare unit, the Special Services Group (SSG). It is here that he learns how to parachute; the training was done at Cherat in NWFP. It is in this period that Musharraf first came into contact with Americans in the CIA. Among those he probably met here are Robert Buckley, Chuck Lord, and Robert Dunn [[xvii]]. It is alleged that the Pakistan army patronized Sheikh Mubarak Ali Shah Gilani, a radical Islamist preacher to setup the `Climbers Club of Pakistan’. Some of this club’s facilities were used to train SSG people in mountain climbing [[xviii]]. If this were true then Pervez Musharraf would most probably have come into contact with Sheikh Gilani at this time. It is estimated that Pervez Musharraf served in the SSG for approximately 7 years. It may also be noted that Shiekh Gilani is seen as a sort of father figure to many Pakistani terrorists presently active in the Kashmir region.

1967-68: He was promoted to Captain and spent time on the East Pakistan’s border with India. As a Captain he headed the `Kamal’ Company of the SSG and participated in the reconnaissance missions aimed at planning offensives against Indian Lines-of-Communication in the region [[xix]]. On December 28, 1968 he married Sehba. In 1968, he returned to the Infantry School in Quetta from Chittagong. At infantry school he caused a serious instance of insubordination. He argued with a senior officer about the quality of the food in the presence of troops. This in turn caused an act of collective indiscipline on part of the troops. [[xx]] It is likely that for this he faced disciplinary action.

1971: It is said that Musharraf served as a Company Commander (Major) in the 2 Battalion of the SSG. This would be an unusually fast promotion cycle. It is likely that he served as a captain, and then was made acting company commander and subsequently promoted after the war. The activities of the 2^nd Battalion SSG in 1971 are not well profiled, sections relating to its functioning have been deleted from the Hamoodur Rehman report. It is however known from the report that the 2^nd Battalion SSG saw action either around Dacca or in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the 1971 war [[xxi], [xxii]]. In this period the SSG had come under severe criticism for carrying out heinous war crimes. It is unclear if Musharraf was ever mixed up in any of those. The selective deletion of the activities of the 2 Battalion SSG is nevertheless curious.

1972-1973: He finished his second tenure at the SSG. At this point he was most likely still a Major. Towards the end of his tenure his unit was deployed in Gilgit. He planned to take a plane back to Rawalpindi (so as to go on leave) but an avalanche caused him to postpone his visit. In the meanwhile the plane he was to travel on crashed and all lives on board were lost; this General Musharraf considers his second providential escape from death [16 ].

1973-1979: Musharraf attended the Command and Staff College, Quetta and the National Defence College. He also held various intermediate posts like Brigade Major in an infantry brigade. As a Lt. Colonel Musharraf commanded a Field Artillery regiment, he also served in the DMO [[xxiii]]. As a Colonel, he commanded two self-propelled Artillery Regiments.

In 1979 General Zia Ul Haq, the Pakistani Chief Of Armed Staff, conducted a coup toppling the democratically elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. After the coup General Zia tried Zulfiqar Bhutto in court and sentenced him to death. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is hanged on April 4, 1979. By this time Zia proclaimed Martial law in the country and awarded himself the title of Chief Martial Law Administrator.

1979-1985:Musharraf catches the eye of General Zia-ul-Haq (who is also a Mohajir) and Lt. General Mirza Aslam Beg (also a Mohajir with family ties to Central Asia and Afghanistan). It is said that General Zia-ul-Haq chose Musharraf for advancement as he was a devout Deobandi and was strongly recommended by other religious parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami [[xxiv]].

General Zia set up a series of martial law administration offices in the various sub-units of Pakistan. Musharraf served in a District Martial Law Administration HQ.

Musharraf became closely involved in the job of preparing the `Mujaheddin' for the Anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan. In this effort he worked closely with Mahmud Ali Durrani, Mohammed Aziz Khan, and officers of the CIA. At the Pakistani end the process involved identifying madrassahs for indoctrination, military training, and planning the logistics of the covert war. It is in this period that the Binori Madrassa (Karachi), the Darul Uloom Haqqania (Akora Khattak), and the Jamiya Ashrafiya (Lahore) began their meteoric rise. It is during this time that Musharraf came into contact with the Harakat ul Mujaheedin (HuM). The HuM developed as nodal body in the Afghan Jihad. There are also reports of contact with narcotics smugglers. [ 24 ]

It is also suggested that Musharraf secretly attended at least one course at the Green Berets training school at Fort Bragg. Accounts indicate Musharraf's performance in these courses was above average. Some regarded him as a `natural' in the field of Psywar techniques [ 10 ,[xxv]].

This activity most probably marked him out for a promotion, upon receiving which he served as Deputy Director Military Operations. He also served on the directing staff of NDC in this period. The Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) carries out the physical work of coordinating the various operations conducted by the Pakistan Army and the Directing Staff decide how best to train future generations of officers to deal with military situations. In some sense these two postings comprise the very core of the Pakistan Army’s operational philosophy.

1985-1987: He was most likely given command of the 323 Infantry Brigade at Dansam in the Northern Areas. Here under General Zia's encouragement he built up a `Special Snow Warfare Force’ at Khapalu and launched an attack on the Indian position at Bilafond Pass. The attack captured two intermediate posts but the Indian army retained the pass. General Zia was satisfied and rewarded Musharraf [24 ]. This action made him the Pakistan Army’s top mountain warfare expert.

Subsequently however the Indian Army dispatched its own mountain warfare giant (a recipient of the USI medal for reconnaissance) Brigadier Chandan S. Nugyal. Under Brig. Nugyal’s direction and with a display of stunning bravery by Subedar Bana Singh, the men of the 8^th Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (102 Infantry Brigade) of the Indian Army retook the positions at `Qaid Peak’ and thus once again dominated the Bilafond pass.

The Pakistanis never reconciled themselves to the loss of `Qaid Peak’ and the Pakistani Government does not publicly admit to its loss. Visiting dignitaries are often shown the peak and told that it is a Pakistani held position [[xxvi]].

May 1988: Using an SSG unit and some `spare Jihadis’ General Musharraf suppressed the Shi’ite revolt that demanded an independent `Karakoram State’. It is alleged that Musharraf transported a large number of Wahhabi Pashtun tribesmen from the NWFP and Afghanistan, commanded by Osama Bin Laden, to Gilgit to teach the Shi’ites a lesson [[xxvii]].

Musharraf then started the policy of bringing in Punjabis and Pashtuns from outside and settling them in Gilgit and Baltistan in order to reduce the Kashmiri Shi’ites to a minority in their traditional land and this policy continues to this day.

During these operations in the Siachen area and in the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), Musharraf developed a close personal friendship with Lt.General Javed Nasir, who was then Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He currently serves as Musharraf’s Advisor on intelligence matters. Musharraf also befriended Major General Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi (then a Brigadier). Major General Abbasi was later arrested and jailed during Benazir Bhutto's time for conspiring to overthrow her and establish an Islamic state. Musharraf also build strong ties to Lt.General Mohammed Aziz Khan and Mohammed Rafique Tarar. It is interesting to note that eventually Lt. General Mohammed Aziz and President Tarar helped Musharraf conduct and `legalize’ his coup against the Nawaz Sharif government. President Tarar however was later `retired’ from post of the President of Pakistan.

In 1988, Musharraf worked with an institutional policy that encouraged Anti-Shi’ite outfits like the Sipaha Saheba Pakistan (SSP) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in an effort to keep Shi’ites down. This error of judgment proved costly in the future as sectarian violence spiraled uncontrollably in Pakistan.

He was up for selection to the post of Military Secretary to then Military Dictator General Zia ul Haq. However he is not selected for the post. Oddly enough a few weeks later the man selected in his place perished in the C-130 crash that also killed General Zia. This according to General Musharraf is his third great escape [16 ].

1989-1990: He most likely commanded the divisional artillery at Bhawalpur attached to the 1st Armoured Division at Multan. He held several staff postings, which include Deputy Military Secretary at the Military Secretary's Branch, member of the War Wing of the National Defence College.

In 1989, he most likely gave an interview to an American scholar (Robert Wirsing) on sojourn in Pakistan, where he said

" It would be insane to attack India via the Siachin, it would make more sense to attack at a more southern point closer to their lines of communication.” [[xxviii]]

Some analysts feel it is in this period that Musharraf and his friend Mohammed Aziz first conceived the Kargil invasion.

1990-1991: Musharraf attended a course at the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS), in the United Kingdom. His course-mates General(r) Ashok Mehta and Major Gen (r) B.S. Malik recall him as a `sophisticated’, `pleasant’ and `affable’ man. Further they say that he was an `an extrovert’, and `not Islamic or fundamentalist’ [[xxix]]. At RCDS he studied for a year and befriended Colonel (now Lt. General) Ethem Erdagi of the Turkish Army [[xxx]]. He also chose a research project titled “ Impact of the Arms Race in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent”.

In his coursework he performed well, and earned the following remark on his report from then Commandant, General Sir Anthony Walker [[xxxi]]

"A capable, articulate and extremely personable officer, who made a most valuable impact here. His country is fortunate to have the services of a man of his undeniable quality".

1991-1993: Upon his return to Pakistan, He was promoted to Major General and given the command of the 40 Infantry Division at Okara (Punjab) on 15th Jan 1991. At this point the Afghan war was drawing to a close. There was a glut of `Mujaheddin’ in Pakistan. At the same time a series of operations by Indian security forces in Kashmir have driven the insurgency of 1989 on to the back foot. It is at this time that the Pakistan army made a decision to move the out-of-work afghan war veterans into the Kashmir Jihad. There was also severe infighting among the Mujaheddin factions and soon Pakistan’s Afghan policy became unworkable.

1993-1995: He served as Director General Military Operations (DGMO) at the General Headquarters. Here he aided Naseerullah Babar in the conduct of the Taliban Operation. He also conducted two crucial GHQ-level exercises; "Exercise Tri Star", which was aimed at exposing senior service officers and select civilians to the planning and execution of joint military operations, and "Exercise Zarb-e-Mujahid-II", which was evolved to test the concept of establishing a Field Army HQ and work out modalities for moving a number of division-size formations to their operational locations [[xxxii]].

He also persuaded his superiors to withdraw troops from an internal security operation (most likely Operation Blue Fox or some corollary to it) in the Sindh province. Some have attributed this in part to his ability to reach an `understanding’ with the target of the operations, Shri. Altaf Hussain, the head of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). The MQM is an organization representing the interests of partition refugees i.e. people of Musharraf’s family background.

1995-1998: On October 21, 1995 he was promoted to Lieutenant General and made CC-I Corps Mangla and possible moved later as the CC-II Corps in Multan. Whenever General Jehangir Karamat traveled abroad, General Musharraf was acting COAS.

By 1997 Nawaz Sharif returned as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. This period saw Musharraf jockeying for political patronage from Nawaz Sharif. As Corps Commander Mangla, General Musharraf claims he had another brush with death as he turned down an offer to take a helicopter ride from Mangla to Rawalpindi that eventually crashed killing the crew and passengers [16 ].

May 1998: The Pakistan government conducts its nuclear tests at Chagai in Baluchistan. Very little information is available about General Musharraf’s involvement in this process. All in all little information is available about General Musharraf’s connections to the Pakistani nuclear program. It seems plausible he came to know of the program during his postings to the Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) and that being an artillery officer he was probably indoctrinated into the raising of the Pakistan Army’s nuclear armed `2^nd Artillery Division’ in 1989. However as a corps commander in 1998 he would most definitely have been part of the nuclear decision making chain, and the 1998 tests would not have been possible without his approval.

After the nuclear tests, the US slapped sanctions on both Pakistan and India. The sanctions weakened the Pakistani economy. This added to the strain between Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his COAS General Jehangir Karamat. Talk of a military coup wafted through the air.

October 7, 1998: In a deft political move, General Karamat was retired and Musharraf was promoted to General and appointed Chief of Army Staff by PM Nawaz Sharif. It is alleged that Nawaz Sharif carried out this appointment on the recommendation of his father Mohammed Sharif, President Rafique Tarar, and Lt. General (r) Javed Nasir [[xxxiii]]. All three of these gentlemen are part of the Tabhlighi Jamaat, a Sunni revivalist order that is quite popular among the officers of the Pakistani Army.

The appointment was unexpected in most quarters. His course mate from the 29^th PMA, Lt. General Ali Quli Khan then Chief General Staff was widely regarded to be the 1^st in line for COAS. General Quli Khan felt slighted by the PM and soon resigned from the army. Lt. General Khalid Nawaz, another senior commander regarded by external observers as being second in line for the COAS also resigned. At the same time that General Musharraf was promoted, another PA officer Lt. General Khwaja Ziauddin (an engineering corps officer) was made the Chief of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) organization, General Ziauddin replaced Lt. General Nasim Rana, who was made Master General Ordinance. General Musharraf viewed this development dimly.

Upon becoming COAS Musharraf quickly promoted his friend from the Siachen days, Major General Mohammed Aziz (then serving as the DDG of the Afghan Bureau in the ISI) to Lt. General. He also subsequently moved General Aziz to the post of Chief General Staff. This choice stuck out because General Aziz until then had never commanded a corps formation, this is a pre-requisite for being CGS. As CGS General Aziz had oversight of the DG Military Intelligence and in very sly move, General Musharraf transfered the Afghan Bureau out of the ISI and into the DGMI. [[xxxiv]]

Soon afterwards it is believed that General Musharraf initiated covert military operations across the Line of Control in Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir. This was code named `Operation Badr’ and it utilized the same subterfuge commonly seen in other SSG operations.

It is said that General Musharraf got his appointment because he successfully convinced Nawaz Sharif that he (Musharraf) strongly supported civilian rule. As time passes on however the relationship between General Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif soured, and as a sign of this, Lt. General Khwaja Ziauddin (DG-ISI and reputed to be connected to Nawaz Sharif’s political party the Pakistan Muslim League) was not invited to attend the Corps Commanders conference.

February 21, 1999: The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration with the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The declaration commited both sides to [[xxxv]]:

At this point PM Vajpayee made a historic bus ride to sign the declaration. General Musharraf kept away from Lahore sending a strong message that the Pakistani army does not approve of the agreement. It is only later that the world learned that all this while General Musharraf was a busy slipping Pakistani irregulars and soldiers across the LoC in Kargil.

April 1999: The Pakistani troops from the SSG in mufti, paramilitary troops from the Northern Light Infantry and irregulars from Islamist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba had seized control of heights overlooking the National Highway-1A in the Kargil sector. This placed them in a position to interdict India’s lines of communication and supply to its side of the battlefield on the Siachen glacier. This glacier was the site of Musharraf’s earlier failure. Together he and his old friend from the SSG, Lt. General Mohammed Aziz were now determined to set things straight.

However before the logistics needed to support this deployment could be completed, the Indian army discovered the intrusions by pure chance. This discovery pushed the Indian Army into making more reconnaissance patrols and one such patrol under the leadership of a young 2^nd Lt. Saurabh Kalia (4 Jat Regt.) in Kaksar sub-sector made contact with the Pakistani troops. Lt. Kalia and his men were captured alive and in a manner reminiscent of the war of 1971, they were tortured and killed by the Pakistani soldiers and irregulars.

June-September 1999: In this period the Pakistani government repeatedly made attempts to make it appear to the international press that the intrusions were really the work of `indigenous Kashmiris’. This media stunt failed.

The Indian Army slowly gained the upper hand in the ground war in the Kargil Sector. The IAF dominated the skies and interdicted supply lines to the Pakistani posts. This put the irregulars in a bad tactical position. The Pakistani Prime Minister flew to Washington DC to gain American support after his nuclear threats failed to stop an Indian mobilization along the international border. In Washington PM Nawaz Sharif faced a very hostile President Clinton and had to hastily order a withdrawal from the positions held by the Pakistan Army soldiers and irregulars.

Pervez Musharraf was forced to recall his soldiers and the paramilitaries that went with them. This was a body blow. His image among the Islamists took a major beating. There were some incidents of indiscipline as Musharraf carefully brought the troops down from the Kargil heights.

Most political observers at this point remarked that the days of Nawaz Sharif were numbered. The Kargil War in India left bitter memories of a peace process betrayed. This marked General Musharraf in the eyes of most Indian policymakers as man unworthy of trust.

October 1999: Nawaz Sharif was well aware of the pressures building within the government. He attempted to curb the growing power of the generals and made swift changes to the top echelons. The changes were not well received and when Nawaz Sharif `sacked’ General Musharraf, and tried to insert his choice DG-ISI Lt. General Khwaja Ziauddin as the COAS, the inevitable coup was set in motion. General Musharraf was Colombo, Sri Lanka attending a military function. News of the changes reached him there. He rushed back to Pakistan on a PIA flight.

In Pakistan meanwhile the Corps Commanders revolted against the Prime Minister and on October 12, 1999 Musharraf was `brought’ to power by a coup orchestrated by his subordinates Muzzaffar Usmani, Aziz, and Mehmood Ahmed. Brig. General Salahuddin Satti (CO 111 Bde), a former Brigade Major from Musharraf’s Siachin days, assisted the plotters in their task. General took on the role of 'Chief Executive' of Pakistan on 12th Oct. and continued to hold the office of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC).

One of his first acts as CE was to set Major General Zaheer Ul Islam Abbasi free. General Abbasi then went on to form an organization called Hizbullah, which solicited support from serving and former army officers to set up an Islamic state in Pakistan. Musharraf also brought back former Director General-ISI, Lt. General Rana as Military Secretary. Apart from this he dressed his `coup’ as a `counter-coup’, even going to the extent of accusing the elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of having attempted to hijack the airplane that he (General Musharraf) was traveling in. This was carefully declared a `terrorist act’ under Pakistani law by his own ordinance, and then applied retroactively to cover the case of Nawaz Sharif [[xxxvi]]. To top it all off, General Musharraf claimed that this is the fifth time he has escaped death [16 ].

Among other things a USG sponsored initiative to get Osama Bin Laden using a specially trained squad, which was in the works with the approval of the Nawaz Sharif govt. was cancelled by General Musharraf [[xxxvii]].

General Musharraf also appointed his cabinet. Here he used a mix of former military officers he was comfortable with like his friend, the former Governor of Sindh, Lt. General (r) Moinuddin Haider, and people with contacts to media and foreign businesses like Shaukat Aziz (his finance minister). His internal style of functioning with its neurotic reliance on `Army Monitoring Teams’ to monitor the working of bureaucrats alienated the Civil Service of Pakistan. Matters were made more complicated by his insistence on a change in the equivalence scheme for postings in the civil service and military service. He routinely posted junior officers into position earmarked for higher-ranking civilian officers.

2000: Musharraf worked feverishly to build up Pakistan’s image among international lender agencies and to rebuild ties with the United States. He shuffled his top commanders in order to keep up appearances, moving Lt. General Aziz Khan from CGS to CC-IV Corps (Lahore). He also rewarded his loyalists with plum postings. He revamped the `Ehtesab Cell', making it into the `National Accountability Bureau' and initiated a campaign of loan and unpaid tax recovery. The `accountability’ process was accused of going easy on former military officers and pressure mounted on General Musharraf from political classes who were specifically targeted by the process.

This situation however took an interesting turn. So as to render credibility to the process in the eyes of the international community General Musharraf ordered the publication of the results of investigation into the wealth amassed by some former generals. Ultimately the list of the `Robber Billionaires’ of Pakistan reads like a page out of an old Pakistani army telephone book from the Afghan war days with former COAS General Aslam Beg and the former Corps Commander XI Corps, Lt. General Fazle Haq in Peshawar at the top [[xxxviii]]. Despite this his relations with politicians deteriorate.

Musharraf set up a secret task force in the ISI headed by Lt.General Mahmood Ahmed, the DG, and consisting of Lt.General (r) Moinuddin Haider, Interior Minister, and Lt.General Muzaffar Usmani, Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, to break the PPP, the MQM and the Sindhi nationalists.

In August 2000, Musharraf through track-II channels in the Kashmiri American community he initially promoted and then betrayed a ceasefire involving the Hizbul Mujaheddin (HM: the military wing of the Jamaat-I-Islami-J&K). A big byproduct of this `Hizb-ceasefire' drama was that Musharraf succeeded in finessing Syed Salahuddin's (Head of the Hizbul Mujaheddin) cards in the `Kashmir Great Game'. With the failure of the ceasefire, Salahuddin’s position in the UJC (United Jihad Council) was greatly weakened and HM cadres were left dealing directly with their Pakistani handlers [[xxxix]].

Late 2000 - Early 2001: He utilized the track-II channels developed by Shirin Taher Kheli, Major General(r) Mahmud Ali Durrani (the so called BALUSA group) and his brother Naved Musharraf to set in motion the `Agra Peace Summit'. He deputed Major General Ehsan-ul-Haq, DGMI to head up a special cell at GHQ Rawalpindi that prepared the ground for this. His COS (Late) Lt. General Ghulam Ahmed coordinated the effort from CE secretariat. Others including Abbas Sarfaraz Khan (Min. SAFRON) and Shaukat Aziz (Min. Fin.) are also involved.

On the cards at the summit is a proposal to install surveillance equipment on the LoC with a scheme for cooperative monitoring. This oddly enough appears very similar to an American proposal that first made its appearance during Dr. Robert M. Gates’ (Dy. NSA to President George W. Bush) visit to the region in 1991. Robert M. Gates was in the CIA during the Afghan War and later went to head the CIA.

General Musharraf used the opportunity to rebuild ties to the Pakistani political spectrum and met with elements of the POK political milieu.

June 20, 2001: He used this consensus to his advantage and eased out President Rafique Mohammed Tarar. He appointed himself President of Pakistan, but publicly restates his commitment to return Pakistan to `true’ democracy.

July 9, 2001: A car driven by Mr. Abdul Hafeez tried to drive into Musharraf's convoy. The car damaged either the pursuit car or the pilot car and Musharraf somehow escaped unhurt. What is interesting however is the absence of the any public remarks about having `escaped death’ for the sixth time.

July 15, 2001: The summit ran into difficulties but Musharraf used the assembled Indian media to launch a `Pyswar' attack on India. In the public eye, the summit is a failure, but it is also reported that Musharraf's delegation handed over a list of active Hizbul Mujaheddin `officers' to the Indian side. At least one member of this list was killed in an exchange of fire with Indian security forces in the next month.

July 30, 2001: He retired VCGS Major General Mohammad Anwar Khan and appointed him as President POK. This process marginalizes Sardar Abdul Qayyum, a veteran Kashmiri leader who supported the Hizbul Mujaheddin Ceasefire.

September 19, 2001: General Musharraf publicly announced a shift in the Pakistani policy. He ditched the Taliban and joined the American led coalition against `Al Qaeeda’ Terror. Soon after he dispatched his DG-ISI Lt. General Mahmood Ahmed to deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban. General Ahmed failed in his mission. Soon the US went into a shooting war with the Taliban. General Musharraf in exchange for debt rescheduling, and other massive cash infusions into Pakistan offered the US access to the bases it needs for the anti-Taliban operations. He justified this as being a strategic decision aimed at preserving the `national interest’ and informed the international press that opposition to his decision amounts to a small fraction of the population. Other observers however admit the General was basically threatened with annihilation by American negotiators.

In this period he orders an exfiltration of all serving Pakistan Army personnel in Taliban held territory. A vast number of officers including several brigadiers, some Major Generals and one Lt. General returned to Pakistan via land and air routes.

October 7, 2001: The Pentagon completed its war planning and soon the air campaign against Taliban targets in Afghanistan was due to begin. At this time a lot of information had also surfaced about links between the ISI and the September 11 suicide bombers [[xl]]. General Musharraf `sacked’ his DG ISI Lt. General Mahmood Ahmed, and his Dy. COAS Lt. General Muzzaffar Usmani (formerly Corps Commander V Corps-Karachi). He appointed Ehsan-ul-Haq (now promoted to Lt. Gen) as the DG-ISI. These actions found favor in the west.

October 9, 2001: He promoted his juniors Lt. General Mohammed Aziz and Lt. General Begami Mohammed Yousaf Khan to full generals made them Chairman JCSC and Vice COAS respectively. He also quickly shuffled his corps commanders around and replaced people in the XII Corps in Quetta and the XI Corps in Peshawar.

In this month he also made Lt. General Khalid Maqbool the governor of Punjab and moved Lt. General Jamshed Gulzar, (the man who as Force Commander Northern Areas, helped him launch the Kargil operation) to the post of Adjutant General. This set the ground for large-scale promotions deeper within the army.

First Row: Nishan-I-Imtiaz (Military), Hilal-I-Imtiaz, Taghma-I-Basalat 1^st Class, 1965 War Star (Istar-I-Harb 1385)

Second Row: 1971 War Star (Istar-I-Harb 1391), 1965 War Medal (Taghma-I-Jang 1385), 1971 War Medal (Taghma-I-Jang 1391), Imitiazi-Sanad(?).

Third Row: 10 years Service Medal, 20 years Service Medal 30 Years Service Medal, 100th Anniversary of Quaid–i-Azam(Taghma-I-Sad Saala Jashan-I-Wiladat Quaid-I-Azam)

Fourth Row: Hijri Medal, Jamhuriat Medal, Golden Jubilee Medal of the Pakistan Revolution, Pakistan Independence Day-Golden Jubilee Medal.

Section Summary

General Musharraf’s career in the Pakistan Army was fairly spectacular. He has consistently displayed an ability to function within the highly politicized Pakistani Army and utilize it to carry out aggressive tactical operations. All in all he seems well outfitted for a political life in Pakistan.

Throughout his career he has also displayed his ability to handle unconventional techniques of warfare. His tenure with the SSG, with the Afghan-Jihad and the 323 Brigade at Siachen, speaks volumes about this. His performance at the RCDS course especially the media-handling segment also in some way alludes to this.

How precisely he overcame the adverse remarks from two sets of disciplinary proceedings is unclear but General Musharraf has very close ties to the Pan-Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He has on several occasions made common cause with them and achieved personal advancement.

Comments on General Musharraf from various sources

“He remains a devoted family man and a loving father to their two children Ayla and Bilal, both happily married. They have a granddaughter, Mariam from Ayla. A natural sportsman, who has always loved the outdoors and spends most of his leisure time playing Squash, Badminton or Golf. The General also takes keen interest in water sports, is a enthusiastic canoeist and loves to sail. An avid reader he is well versed in Military History, being his favorite subject.”

“The personality sketch described Musharraf, writes General Malik, as "aggressive", "ambitious" with a tendency to "play to the gallery" and "to constantly prove himself." Immediately on taking over as COAS Musharraf carried out a major reshuffle, signs of a man who was "purposeful" and "impatient.”

"He (Musharraf) is also seen to be aggressive and ambitious and is considered to be one of the most experienced experts in mountain warfare in the Pakistan army."

“Behind the name is a personality known to be a professionally-bred, morally upright soldier with strong links with fundamentalists, who, at times, can be rash and dangerous… a well-trained officer with a wide-ranging mind…. hard working and appears to be thoughtful and shrewd in assessing future developments. To the outside world, General Musharraf’s expression appears stern and his manner often abrupt. He is hot headed and considered to be unpopular among his subordinates, says one intelligence report. The report adds that he can be rash and dangerous if he feels that a situation is going out of his control. He does not mix freely with officers, but prefers to interact with JCOs and other ranks… a strong personality, who came to be known for his capability for taking definite decisions as well as tremendous drive and tenacity…. His meteoric rise in the Pakistani army is attributed to his professional competence and his being a Mohajir. Stockily built and of medium height with a good soldierly bearing, the General is said to be keen on squash, golf and shikar. Reports say that he likes drinks, but is not over-indulgent. He is also fond of ghazals. His wife Saheba is well educated and holds modern views on world affairs. They have a son, Bilal, and a daughter. The family lifestyle is not known to be extravagant.”[xii]

“An avowed admirer of Kamal Ataturk of Turkey, the General has shown that he can act decisively in a crisis. The cigarette-smoking, pistol-toting image of the General that flashed across television screens initially is now contending with the Army Chief as a family man- with his wife, his granddaughter - at home. General Musharraf is no visionary. He is a hard-boiled soldier, who is aware of the damage Mr. Sharif and his associates were causing to the body politic. The Army Chief stood up to the civilian Prime Minister and sent him packing.” [[xliii]]

“The interviews and speeches of General Musharraf since October, 1998, show his thinking to be as follows:

· The acquisition of Kashmir by Pakistan can wait. What is more important is to keep the Indian army bleeding in Kashmir just as the Afghan Mujahideen kept the Soviet troops bleeding in Afghanistan.

· Even if the Kashmir issue is resolved, there cannot be normal relations between India and Pakistan because Pakistan, by frustrating India's ambition of emerging as a major Asian power on par with China and Japan, would continue to be a thorn on India's flesh. And, so long as it does so, Pakistan would continue to enjoy the backing of China and Japan.

When I asked him to explain, he replied: "Astuteness is the ability to apply intelligence in practice. If one took Zia and Musharraf to a cliff and asked them to jump down, Zia would have asked: "Why the hell should I?" But, Musharraf would have jumped, broken his bones and then only asked himself: "Why the hell did I?" [[xliv]]

* A plodder.
* A good listener.
* Very loyal to subordinates who are loyal to him.
* Encourages subordinates to speak out their mind freely & frankly.
* While continuing the ban on public political meetings & processions, have allowed his critics to let out steam through the media.
* Corporate style of decision-making. All important decisions taken in consultation with Corps Commanders.
* Poor in analysis & judgement. A typical commando-- brave, unyielding and unrelenting towards perceived adversaries and ready to be devious for achieving his objective. “ [[xlv]]

“In this highly polarized country where immigrants from India have formed a political party to demand more immigrant (mohajir) rights, it's a coup of sorts for this group that Musharraf, himself a Mohajir, has risen to power. Even his wife, Sehba, is nothing like a mullah's wife. Unlike Bhutto, she doesn't feel the need to drape a dupatta over her head, wearing it over her shoulders instead in elegant outfits. She is considered loyal and devoted -- and the woman behind this man's success. Even bolder, he's known to prefer Johnny Walker Black Label scotch.”

“By all accounts, the Musharrafs lived a modest life, not filled with fancy upholstered sofas. At one time, according to a family friend, their furniture included a simple padded low wooden platform with a red fabric over it and big pillows upon which to rest. Their furniture often had "MES" printed on the back, standing for government-issued stock from the Military Engineering Services. His eldest daughter, Ayla, pursued an unconventional field in Pakistan for women -- architecture -- going to National College of Art in Lahore. There, she was courted by a man she eventually wed in a "love" marriage, as opposed to an arranged one, also not the norm in this culture. Even more surprising: The Musharrafs are Sunnis, and their daughter married a Shiite. By accepting the marriage, they also transcended many of the hangups of families who don't allow their children to marry out of their specific group. “[[xlvi]]

8) Ahmed Rashid (who declined an offer to join Musharraf’s foreign policy adviser)

“He’s a liberal, he’s a secular man, and he grew up in Karachi, which is our most cosmopolitan city,” [46 ]

“He is keen to portray himself as a liberal with western sensibilities, reassuring Washington and London that this nuclear power is in safe pro-western hands. He is known to enjoy the occasional drink (behind closed doors so as not to offend Muslim sensibilities), a night on the town, and a game of squash.”[[xlvii]]

Apart from the General’s family life, which is portrayed to be the epitome of bliss and his love for sports, three basic characteristics stand out to most observers, these are:

a) An impulsive, somewhat rash nature, given to use of rough language, and quick decisions. Some analysts suggest that this is related to his Special Forces tenure.

b) A strong emphasis on maintaining appearances, so as not offend others in an Islamic Country. This includes drinking privately etc…

Other attributes that appear are an interest in `playacting’ and `putting on a show’. Those who have seen the General on TV should concur with these views.

Next we discuss three other issues that this `composite’ throws some light on.

General Musharraf makes frequent comments about his affinity for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, “Father of the Turks”. Here are some of these for easy reference.

“ As a model, Kemal Ataturk [the founder of modern Turkey] did a great deal for Turkey. I have his biography. We will see what I can do for Pakistan.''[[xlviii]]

“He did not influence my thoughts as such but I always respect him for what he did for Turkey. And since I am a soldier I read about him and about his campaigns to create this modern Turkey from the Sick Man of Europe. I am impressed especially by the campaign in Gallipoli where he, along with three hundred thousand Turks, opposed the allies. I respect him for both his military and political achievements in Turkey.”[ 5 ]

As most observers know however, that the key to being `Ataturk’ is to push hard for a transition from a theocratic state to a secular state. On that matter however General Musharraf’s utterances are more enlightening. In response to a question from the MEI: [[xlix]]

“Are you interested in seeing Pakistan in the model of a secular Islamic state along the lines of Turkey?”

“ No, not at all. This is not a secular state. As I said, our forefathers, the founders of Pakistan, created Pakistan as an Islamic republic. So this is not a secular state, as opposed to Turkey. Certainly not. And I am not going to change that at all. When I praised Ataturk, it was for what he did for Turkey - he converted the "Sick Man of Europe" into modern Turkey. We cannot follow exactly what he did for Turkey here in Pakistan. Pakistan has its own environment. Therefore, we need to do something indigenous for Pakistan, and that is what we are doing. But I respect and admire Ataturk for what he did for Turkey.”

As Kemal Ataturk’s methods left an enduring memory in the minds of impressionable Islamists of Pakistan, in an interview to Newsline, General Musharraf clarified his position on Kemal Ataturk [[l]]:

"Yes, I admire him. Now everyone thinks I am going to follow everything that he did. Obviously not, He did something in Turkey in a different environment. My role model is really the Quaid-e-Azam (Jinnah)."

Students of history in the Indian subcontinent probably do not find anything `new’ about General Musharraf’s love for all things Turkish. This falls well within a centuries old pattern common to Pan-Islamist leaders in the region. However a certain section of the western media, western public policy circles and some Pakistanis seem to have fallen for this [[li],[lii]].

The entire `AtaPak’ - `Ataturk’ symbolism rests on very carefully made public statements. To General Musharraf this may have a more direct meaning, one that perhaps dates back to something in his childhood, i.e. the need for absolute power. General Musharraf has long craved the power to change society on an arbitrarily short timescale; this symbolism is a way of expressing it in a `palatable’ (to western audiences) way.

Perhaps the most obvious contrast with Ataturk is seen in General Musharraf’s sense of dress. When meeting westerners the General prefers to wear an Armani three-piece suit, when meeting Pakistani politicians he prefers the military uniform, and when meeting the Pakistani public, he prefers the traditional sherwani or his SSG camouflage fatigues. For reference Kemal Ataturk completely abandoned his traditional garb, and wore only western clothes.

To exactly replicate Ataturk’s work, Musharraf will have to carry out very long and brutal campaigns to marginalize and physically eliminate the Islamists. This is impossible as the roots of Islam are embedded deep in Pakistan [[liii]].

It is possible that Musharraf may attempt to do something that mimics vaguely the form of Ataturk to satisfy western observers, but he is unlikely to ever stand up to serious scrutiny.

For Pakistanis domestically Musharraf is more likely to follow the footsteps of other Turkish leaders like General Kenan Evren, who dismissed an elected government and subsequently straight jacketed Turkish democracy.

As has been seen in previous sections Musharraf is conscious to project himself as being very liberal and modern. His personal life to some extent bears this out. In an article in the Washington Post, Pamela Constable and Kamran Khan write:

“Musharraf’s personal life is distinctive in a number of ways. He is a mohajir, one whose family migrated from India in the 1940s, in an army dominated by clannish natives of what is now Pakistan. He enjoys Western music and occasionally drinks alcohol, even in his Islamic country. He speaks precise English, his son and brother live in the United States, and both his parents are naturalized U.S. citizens -- all of which augurs well for his stated desire to develop "friendly relations" with the United States.”[[liv]]

Many western experts shared such a benign view during the Kargil war (1999), and in the aftermath of General Musharraf’s coup that toppled the elected government of Nawaz Sharif. Most notable in their endorsement of the General were his former colleague from the CIA-Afghan Jihad days and some scholars who had visited Pakistan numerous times during the same period.

Milton Bearden, a CIA operative from that period defended General before the sub-committee of the Senate foreign relations committee for South Asia, reminding its members that Pervez Musharraf had been a part of 19^th Baluch/SSG and had trained with US troops, and that he had rendered valuable service in the Afghan War [[lv]]. The same people also did enough to ensure that President Bill Clinton visited `Musharraf’s Pakistan’ as long as he visited India.

The most glaring example of General Musharraf’s backers is General Anthony Zinni (formerly the chief of CENTCOM). In his statement to CBS 60 minutes soon after the coup in Pakistan, General Zinni said:

“ Musharraf may be America's last hope in Pakistan, and if he fails, the fundamentalists would get hold of the Islamic bomb.”[[lvi]]

Post September 11, 2001 US officials rallied around General Musharraf. The basic idea of the `Last Hope’ was used to plead his case when doubts were raised in the US about General Musharraf’s ability to deliver in a war against terror.

Stephen Paul Cohen of the Brookings Institute and author of a book on the Pakistan army, went to the extent of comparing him to the former American President Harry Truman,

“His situation is like that of Harry Truman, a man of average abilities but placed in opportune circumstances.” [[lvii]]

This attraction for General Musharraf is shared by segments of the Pentagon and some in the British Defense establishment. This is at least in part due to the fact that General Musharraf has done a higher training course in the UK and at least one secret training course at Fort Bragg in the US.

However not everyone in the western establishments shares this liking. Shri. B. Raman points out that Narcotics Control officials of the US had reservations about him on account of his contacts with the drug barons.

Yet others see Musharraf as a high stakes gambler. Andrew Kennedy, Asia director of London's Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies says, [[lviii]]

Not all reporters are taken in by his style either. Mark Corcoran offers us this account of what happens when one accidentally scratches below the surface of `CEO’ Musharraf:

“Asked why he calls himself the chief executive, he answers matter-of-factly: “For your consumption – might I say it’s a very palatable name instead of chief martial law administrator, which is draconian in concept and name. I want to give it a civil façade.”

Instantly realizing the gaffe, he asks to “take my words back”. In the background, the brigadier-press secretary suddenly looks as if he is about to face a firing squad. For the next 15 minutes I am told the general did not really mean what he said. More contradictions.”[47 ]

However western observers and diplomats continue to feel that “Western goodwill is at the core of the Pakistani President's great gamble”[58 ].

General Musharraf has traditionally enjoyed support from sections of the US Govt. most notably from his friends in the military and the CIA. He also has caught the eye of at least a few academics in the US. These persons have vested agendas, and they seem to believe that Musharraf will prove an easy tool for them to achieve their aims. Perhaps Stephen Paul Cohen gives Shekhar Gupta, the editor of the Indian Express, the most interesting insight into this type of thinking in an interview:

‘‘If India had not been partitioned, I would have been sitting here not with you but with a Chinese and we would be talking about how to contain this mighty India that straddles all the oil routes, dominates central Asia and so on.’’

Media persons who have come into close contact with him have come away with wildly varying impressions of his nature. It seems very plausible that in the post 9-11 period, General Musharraf seeks to skillfully use the media catering to western opinion to generate the same feeling of bonhomie that dominated his earlier relationship with the west.

After Pakistan lost the 1971 war, the bulk of conventional war fighting ideas were discredited, as was most of the military. This created a vacuum in critical areas of strategic thought. This vacuum was filled with two types of thinkers, firstly those in favor of nuclear deterrence and secondly those in favor of unconventional warfare. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the birth of the American supported `Afghan-Jihad’, `unconventional warfare’ was enshrined into the doctrine of the Pakistan Army. It became very difficult for any reasonably ambitious officer to resist the temptation of participating in this sort of warfare. Money, power, and promotions came easily to those would help with this work [[lix]]. It is here that the bulk of the Pan-Islamist clique that sits atop the Pakistan Army today made their bones. Pervez Musharraf was no exception.

Former Additional Secretary (Govt. of India), Shri. B. Raman writes about General Musharraf [[lx]]:

"When Zia accepted this job of contract killing of the Soviet troops for the Americans, he chose for the task Musharraf and Lt.General Mohammad Aziz, now a Corps Commander at Lahore (presently CJCSC). They worked out a plan, which provided for a clear division of responsibilities---the Afghan Mujahideen and the Arab mercenaries including Osama bin Laden to be trained by the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment with American-British-French assistance, and the clandestine Pakistani Army of Islam to be raised and trained by the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment without any external assistance, but to be equipped by the CIA."

"For training this Army of Islam, Musharraf and Aziz, assisted by Major General (r) Mahmud Durrani, selected 100 of the then existing madrasas, almost all Deobandi, and introduced military training by serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army attached to them."

"The most important and the most active of these madrasas chosen by them were the Jamiya Uloom-e-Islami in the Binori mosque, Karachi, set up by Maulana Yusuf Binori soon after independence in 1947;the Darul Uloom Akora Khattak in NWFP, and the Jamiya Ashrafiya in Lahore. Most of the Mullahs leading lights of the clandestine Army of Islam, including Maulana Masood Azhar, graduated in terrorism from these three madrasas, with Maulana Azhar himself passing out of the Binori mosque madrasa. In the 1990s, many of the Taliban leaders also passed out of this madrasa. "

The direct result of this however was the arming of militant Sunni radicals in Pakistan itself. These radicals weren’t always occupied in fighting Soviet troops and in 1988 as Soviet operations weakened in Afghanistan, Brigadier Musharraf and the Pan-Islamist clique initially put these `spare-Jihadis’ to `good’ use. As per B. Raman [[lxi]],

"In May 1988, the Shi’ites, who are in a majority in Gilgit, rose in revolt against the Sunni-dominated administration. Zia put an SSG group commanded by General Musharraf in charge of suppressing the revolt. General Musharraf transported a large number of Wahabi Pakhtoon tribesmen from the NWFP and Afghanistan, commanded by bin Laden, to Gilgit to teach the Shi’ites a lesson. General Musharraf started a policy of bringing in Punjabis and Pakhtoons from outside and settling them in Gilgit and Baltistan in order to reduce the Kashmiri Shi’ites to a minority in their traditional land and this is continuing till today."

It is also believed that in this time General Musharraf came into contact with the various elements of the `Al Qaeeda’ and the narco-terrorist syndicates that operate in Pakistan.

"The first assignment given by Zia to him was in the training of the mercenaries recruited by various Islamic extremist groups for fighting against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It was during those days that General Musharraf came into contact with Osama bin Laden, then a reputed civil engineer of Saudi Arabia, who had been recruited by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and brought to Pakistan for constructing bunkers for the Afghan Mujahideen in difficult terrain."

"It was alleged that General Musharraf also developed a nexus with the narcotics smugglers of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Even though the CIA valued his services in Afghanistan, the Narcotics Control officials of the US had reservations about him because of suspicions of his contacts with the narcotics smugglers."

The end of Afghan-Jihad in 1991 created a glut of `Islamic Warriors’ in Pakistan. Rather then demobilize and disarm them, these `victorious warriors’ were channeled into the Pakistani sponsored Jihad against the democratically elected government of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India. In an interview to an Islamic news site, `Brother Salahuddin’ by his own admission an `Amir of the Kashmiri Mujahideen’ [[lxii]] says:

“There are strong links between the two, the Kashmiri Mujahidun have poured their blood in the land of Afghanistan in defiance of the Russian Imperialists. Hundreds of them had been martyred there, and after the liberation of Afghanistan from the grip of the Russians, they returned to Kashmir, as have many Afghan Mujahidun poured their blood inside occupied Kashmir. However, we are saddened by the fighting taking place amongst the Afghans, the underlying causes of which are the external imperialist, and some of the Mujahideen forces have been lumbered with. The enemies of this Umma are benefiting from this division, and especially India. The media continually comment that as soon as Kashmir is liberated, the same fighting as occurring in Afghanistan will take place in Kashmir. This misrepresentation has effect on the common people, we pray to Allah to establish a strong government in Afghanistan, and unite them in the light of Islam. We regard the Afghan Jihad as the mother of Jihad, many Jihad movements in the Umma have sprung from it, it has moved the spirit of Jihad inside Kashmir without doubt. “

The Pakistani government shared his concerns regarding the Afghan situation and in order to recover the mess created by infighting among the Mujaheddin factions in post-soviet Afghanistan created a military force comprised of Islamic super-radicals. This was the so-called `Taliban’ [[lxiii]]. In 1993 again as DGMO, Pervez Musharraf helped Major General (r) Naseerullah Khan Babar [[lxiv]] build the Taliban. At lot `taliban’ were graduates of the same seminaries that churned out the ultra-sectarian militants that comprised the Anjuman Sipah Saheba Pakistan [[lxv]]. At the time this must have seemed like a `good’ idea as it gave the `boys’ something to do.

Every thing seemed settled for a while but in the Kashmir theatre of operations, the fanatically Islamist groups created from the dregs of the Afghan war, for the Kashmiri Jihad, quickly alienated the Kashmiris. The locals initially welcomed them as guests (`Mehman’) but soon grew to intensely dislike them. This created a recruitment crunch in Kashmir and manpower had to be brought in from Pakistani-Punjab and NWFP. To this end organizations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed were raised with active support from the Pakistan army [[lxvi]]. Some analysts see this as a shift in Pakistani policy, from a `get-Kashmir’ objective to a `keep-India-off-balance”.

When Pervez Musharraf finally took over as the COAS in 1998, this policy held sway over GHQ Rawalpindi. In Afghanistan the Pakistani sponsored `Taliban’ were now making rapid progress against the last vestiges of resistance from other factions and they were in control of most of Afghanistan. This in turn created slight surplus of Jihadi manpower in Pakistan. This manpower was slowly bled into the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The strength of Force Command Northern Areas (until then a division sized formation) was raised by a factor of three. This increase in manpower and the `keep-India-off-balance-in-Kashmir’ policy led to the initiation of operation `Badr’ in the Kargil Sector by the Pakistani army.

`Operation Badr’ despite its initial successes was in the long run an abysmal failure. The failure of `Operation Badr’ in the Kargil Sector, caused a lot of problems. In order to avoid a serious revolt within the Pakistan Army itself, Musharraf shifted the blame for the disaster onto Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. This was not enough to stem indiscipline and in at least one incident a Pakistani Army captain accused his senior officer and the military High Command of betraying the Islamist cause, and shot the officer dead [[lxvii]]. Barring this it appeared as though Musharraf had successfully ridden out the Kargil debacle.

All this while however internally in Pakistan however there was a lot more trouble. Pakistan’s participation in the Afghan jihad had completely broken down gun control laws in Pakistan. To finance the war army officers like General Musharraf had become closely involved with drug smugglers and arms traffickers. This unwholesome marriage was labeled variously as `International Jihad Inc.’ and `the Guns-Drug-Jihad circle’ by international observers.

Sunni paramilitaries like the Anjuman Sipah Saheba Pakistan and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi ran amuck murdering hundreds of Shi’ites in the rest of Pakistan. This created a massive credibility problem for any Pakistani government (military or democratic). This was made worse by the fact that the violence between Shi’ites and Sunnis soon spread to violence between the Brelvi, Pakistani-Deobandi [[lxviii]] and Alhe-Haddithi sects within the Sunni pantheon. This was an incredibly dangerous and divisive struggle that shook the very foundations of Pakistan [[lxix], [lxx]]. With the passage of time, the Sunni radicals took to assassinating the Shi’ite professional classes [[lxxi]], this led to a flight of trained manpower from Pakistan and vitiated relations between communities at the highest level and brought sectarian extremism to the fore.

At the international level by 1998 with suicide bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the dangers posed by Osama Bin Laden’s International Islamic Jihad were becoming clearer. This in turn fueled an international hunt for Osama Bin Laden and his colleagues. In Pakistan however Osama Bin Laden was a welcome guest, and it is alleged that possibly on the orders of General Musharraf, a kidney dialysis machine was provided to help him overcome his difficulties [[lxxii]]

Musharraf was not unaware of the so-called `Talibanization’ of Pakistani society. In his tenure at COAS he had frequently spoken for sectarian unity but in Sindh province where the sectarian wars raged uncontrollably, little was actually done to stem the tide. A lot of hopes were raised after Lt. General (r) Moinuddin Haider, reputed to be a close confidante of General Musharraf was made Governor of Sindh Province and later Federal Interior Minister (after Musharraf’s coup), but there was absolutely no performance to show for it [[lxxiii]].

A similar lack of performance was also displayed in response to requests by Govt. of India to curb cross-border terrorism. The most glaring example of this was the seen in the hijacking of IC814 in December 1999. The hijackers and the released terrorists were secretly moved back from Kandahar into Pakistani Punjab while General Musharraf and the Pakistan FO denied their presence in Pakistani territory.

This sort of double-speak was seen again during the Hizb Ceasefire initiative and the Agra Summit of 2001. Internally in Pakistan, all attempts at gun control and disarmament of sectarian groups (after Musharraf took over as CEO of Pakistan) also failed completely despite public proclamations to the contrary.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, General Musharraf affected a complete shift in the Pakistan’s Afghan policy. He publicly `ditched’ the Taliban, and became an ally in the US led global war against the `Al-Qaeeda’ terrorists. Those that wanted to believe General Musharraf’s speech on 19^th September 2001, were left baffled by his drawing of the following analogy between Pakistan’s present situation and the `Migration of the Prophet of Islam’ [[lxxiv]]:

“ The significance of migration is manifested from the fact that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) went from Makkah to Madina. He (PBUH) migrated to safeguard Islam. What was migration? God forbid, was it an act of cowardice? The Holy Prophet (PBUH) signed the charter of Madinah (Meesaq-e-Madinah) with the Jewish tribes. It was an act of sagacity. This treaty remained effective for six years. Three battles were fought with non-believers of Makkiah during this period - the battle of Badr, Uhad and Khandaq. The Muslims emerged victorious in these battles with the non-believers of Makkah because the Jews had signed a treaty with the Muslims. After six years, the Jews were visibly disturbed with the progress of Islam, which was getting stronger and stronger. They conspired to forge covert relations with the non-believers of Makkah. Realising the danger, the Holy Prophet (PBUH) signed the treaty of Hudaibiya with the Makkhans who had been imposing wars on Islam. This was a no war pact. I would like to draw your attention to one significant point of this pact. The last portion of the pact was required to be signed by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as Muhammad Rasool Allah. The non-believers contested that they did not recognize Muhammad (PBUH) as the Prophet of Allah. They demanded to erase these words from the text of the treaty. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) agreed but Hazrat Umar (R.A) protested against it. He got emotional and asked the Holy Prophet (PBUH) if he was not the messenger of God (God forbid) and whether the Muslims were not on the right path while signing the treaty. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) advised Hazrat Umar (R.A) not to be led by emotions as the dictates of national thinking demanded signing of the treaty at that time. He (PBUH) said, this was advantageous to Islam and as years would pass by you would come to know of its benefits. "This is exactly what happened. Six months later in the battle of Khyber, Muslims, by the grace of Allah, again became victorious. It should be remembered that this became possible because Makkhans could not attack because of the treaty. On 8 Hijra by the grace of Allah glory of Islam spread to Makkah

What is the lesson for us in this? The lesson is that when there is a crisis situation, the path of wisdom is better than the path of emotions. Therefore, we have to take a strategic decision “

A few attempted to explain these comments as aimed at a `domestic audience’, which needed to be reassured in Islamic terms. Most analysts however saw a strain of duplicity in the choice of analogy. This strain of duplicity resurfaced when the State Department targeted the Rabita Trust as an entity supporting the Al-Qaeeda. General Musharraf was on the board of the Trust, and refused to resign from it. Similar such strains also appear in the context of General Musharraf’s utterances on the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, and Islamabad church bombing.

Most western analysts love to blame a `mysterious, rogue and radicalized’ Pakistani intelligence organization called the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) for all the `bad’ stuff in Pakistan. Perhaps General Musharraf’s recent comments as they appear in USA Today [[lxxv]] cast a very different light on the validity of these ideas:

“The ISI is doing whatever I tell them, of that there is no doubt in my mind."

Section summary

General Musharraf has been an inseparable part of the `Jihad Machine’, which has dominated the Pakistani Military for the past 20 years. He has helped build the Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin, which according to some analysts comprises the sinews of Osama Bin Laden’s international Islamic Jihad organization. A lot of the people in the dock for helping Al-Qaeeda operate in Pakistan and Afghanistan are associates and colleagues of General Musharraf.

The Islamist groups appear to share a synergistic relationship with the dictatorship of General Musharraf. By carefully planned acts of terror they project the Pakistani stake in Jammu and Kashmir, thus giving General Musharraf the leverage he needs vis-à-vis India. By steadily maintaining a state of sectarian violence in Pakistan, they hold the minorities and political classes in their thrall. It seems perfectly natural that these groups may play a similar role in keeping the American activities in check in Pakistan in the post 9-11 period.

General Musharraf for his part understands this relationship quite well. He is unwilling to do anything to disturb it. He therefore chooses the `easy’ option of keeping the `boys’ occupied. This makes him an unreliable `ally’ in the global war against terrorism.

The `composite’ created so far of General Musharraf, points in strictly military terms to an aggressive and sometimes rash commander with a flair for unconventional warfare. In political terms it shows a very skillful and agile manipulator. In both contexts he retains the appearance of unpredictability. Since international politics resembles a game of poker, it is unlikely that General Musharraf will ever voluntarily surrender this vital appearance of unpredictability.

The career chart of General Musharraf makes it impossible to see him as being distinct from the Pan-Islamist-terror syndicates of Pakistan. Throughout his career, two basic trends in his handling of armed Islamist groups that are apparent are:

1. He does not seem to exert complete control over their actions. This is evidenced from the vast number of terrorist actions that have had unfavorable results for him personally. In all probability Musharraf uses a `special forces style' of leadership with the Islamic groups. He discusses a wide range of policy guidelines with them, and leaves the operational aspects to them. The author feels that the act of giving guidelines is most likely done through a steering committee and to some extent a joint planning staff of some sort. It is also quite clear that he maintains a fairly open ended public posture that enables him to deflect criticism for the actions of the groups.

The closest he has come to addressing the responsibility issues about `human factors and costs’ was at the Agra summit when he said to the editors at the infamous breakfast meeting in the Amar Vilas Hotel [[lxxvi]]:

“ Well, these things are inevitable. In any struggle — innocent people die. As far as I am concerned that is that.”

2. On several occasions after the start of the Afghan Jihad, the Pakistani Army as faced a Jihad surplus, either in manpower itself or in the infrastructure ability to support it. In all cases rather then de-mobilize the Jihadis it has promptly dumped them into another conflict. This occurs first at points during the Afghan war, most notably in 1988 as the soviet resistance slowed measurably. At this point the spare-Jihadis were used to sort out the Shi’ites of Karakorum. It occurs yet again at the end of the Afghan war, in 1991 when there were a large number of `mujaheddin' with nothing else to do in Pakistan are shipped to Jammu and Kashmir. In 1993, the infrastructure of the madrassahs in Pakistan and their Saudi funding mechanisms built up from the afghan war was reused to build the `Taliban’. In 1998, when the Taliban’s hold on Afghanistan was growing pretty strong. At this time the Pakistanis channeled some of the extra manpower into the Kargil operations.

At all these times General Musharraf was a part of the decision making process. We are faced with a similar situation today as vast numbers of `former- Taliban’ are collecting in Pakistan and the infrastructure used to support the Taliban is lying fallow once again. Given Musharraf's weak political position and the fractious nature of Pakistani polity, it must seem very tempting to him to just shove these `former' Taliban into another zone of conflict.

At the very least these Islamist groups are to him what hounds are to hunters. Against this backdrop it is very hard to see General Musharraf doing anything serious to curtail their activities. What seems more likely is that General Musharraf may create a zone of conflict (like other Pakistani leaders in the past) that will serve as a `venting ground’ for these groups. He will most likely prefer (due to historical factors) to choose the `venting ground’ in the context of Kashmir. Other choices like Xingjiang or Iran would cause him deeply personal losses.

His admiration of Ataturk is more a worship of raw power. General Musharraf does not intend to carry out massive social or political reform. His `liberal’ personal lifestyle is merely a nervous expression of his personal likes-and-dislikes, which are often offensive to his fundamentalist associates and can be carefully hidden from public view by hundreds of armed guards. The same luxury however is not really available to millions of Pakistanis. As General Musharraf has stifled democracy and aggrandized power, we have no way of knowing if the rest of Pakistan wants to share such his brand of `liberal lifestyle'.

This tendency towards stylish `absolutism’ means that General Musharraf most likely personally holds the nuclear trigger with him at all times.

With a carefully sculpted public image and the use of Orwellian phrases like `counter-coup’, `dictatorship to restore true democracy’ etc… General Musharraf has achieved acceptance in the west. His skill and ease with the media has enabled him to carry out sophisticated media stunts and psywar operations. Post 9-11, this ability has enabled him to skillfully project himself as the ultimate powerbroker between `Islamists’ and `Modernists’ in Pakistan. It is unclear how long he will be able to perpetuate this two-timing style despite all the admiration from western sources.

In the west a great degree of ignorance about General Musharraf and Pakistan prevails. The bulk of the material presented to western audiences comes in the form of motivated statements from highly entrenched lobbies. The absence of any form of enlightened interest in the details of what General Musharraf is actually doing is sharply felt. Most western observers seem very attached to the notion of `South Asia’. It dominates their long-term thinking. They fail to grasp the intricacies of Musharraf’s position on issues, and a ravenous media has for their benefit turned Mr. Hyde into Dr. Jekyll.

All of these things cause an extraordinary reliance on double-speak. This reliance makes it impossible to maintain any sort of public posture vis-à-vis General Musharraf over any reasonable length of time. The damaging nature of any association (public or otherwise) with General Musharraf is a lesson some Indian policymakers have learnt the hard way. It appears that American policymakers are refusing to learn it any other way.

The events after 9-11 speak to an interesting aspect of Musharraf’s personality. Musharraf comes across as a survivor. From crisis to crisis he appears to make `hard’ choices and live out the consequences. The author cautions against taking this in a broader sense, as with his `liberalism’, `secularism’ etc… this `survival instinct’ is limited to his person alone. The other way of saying this is that the General only appreciates commitments that force the issue of his personal survival to the fore.

Ultimately to the author’s eyes, the enduring image, a sum of all the contradictions is that of an urban Mafioso commanding the nuclear-armed Pakistani Army, and allied with the Jihadi terror syndicates. In a `gentleman’ such as this, there is no Dr. Jekyll, only Mr. Hyde.

[i] Brigadier (Rtd.) S. N. Sachadeva, “Indo-Pak impasse: Theres only one solution”, http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/01aug13/edit.htm

[ii] Arvind Lavakere, http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jun/05arvind.htm.

[iii] http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/spedition/pak-india/pre10.htm

[iv] http://www.geocities.com/siafdu/musharraf.html

[v] Bharat Bhushan, “The interview with General Musharraf at Army House-in Rawalpindi Cantt” June 29, HT News Service

[vi] http://expressindia.com/ie/daily/19991028/ige28075.html.

[vii] http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/oct/22us1.htm

[viii] http://www.frontpagemag.com/columnists/ponte/2002/ponte04-30-02.htm

[ix] Pakistan News Service, "General Pervez Musharraf, A profile", Exclusive coverage of the visit to Washington DC, 2002-02-13, www.paknews.com

[x] Killam Jam “A Profile of General Pervez Musharraf” Chaman Times

[xi] B. Raman, “Buddha, Taliban and General Musharraf”, http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/regional/regional20010307b.html

[xii] Vijay Mohan, “Musharraf ‘can be rash, dangerous”, Tribune News Service http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20010707/main4.htm

[xiii] Agha Humayun Amin and Ravi Rikhye, “The Battle of Assal Uttar”, www.orbat.com

[xiv] http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/may/interview.htm

[xv] General Ali Quli Khan interview to D.H. Amin in the Defence Journal http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/december/alikuli.htm

[xvi] http://news.sawaal.com/02-Jul-2001/International/6.htm

[xvii] Ikram Sehgal, “Intelligence happenings”, http://nation.com.pk/daily/241101/editor/opi1.htm

[xviii] http://www.dawn.com/2002/02/23/top5.htm

[xix] Ikram Sehgal, various editorials in the Defence Journal

[xx] http://www.indian-express.com/ie/daily/20000108/iin08012.html

[xxi] Hamoodur Rehman Report, Courtesy of the Dawn Group, Pakistan

[xxii] Brig. (R) Zaheer Alam Khan, `The Way it Was’, as reproduced in the Defence Journal

[xxiii] Amarinder Singh, pp 20 `A Ridge to Far”.

[xxiv] B. Raman, “ General Musharraf, His Past and Present”, http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/military/img_1999_07_001s.html

[xxv] Milton Bearden, Testimony to the sub-committee of the Senate foreign relations committee for South Asia under Senator Sam Brownback, 1999.

[xxvi] Books by Eric Margolis, and other American authors to get an idea of this scam.

[xxvii] B. Raman, “Gilgit, Baltistan, China and North Korea’, South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper289.html.

[xxviii] Robert Wirsing, “Pakistan Security under Zia 1977-1988”, St. Martins Press NY 1991.

[xxix] http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/may/25ashok.htm

[xxx] http://meadev.nic.in/opn/2001july/3toi.htm

[xxxi] Interview with Ikram Sehgal, editor Defence Journal http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/january/90min.htm

[xxxii] B.Raman, “Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence”, http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper287.html

[xxxiii] http://www.saag.org/papers/paper85.html.

[xxxiv] http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/nationalsecurity/img_1998_12_18.html.

[xxxv] http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/lahoredeclaration.html

[xxxvi] The Daily Dawn, various articles.

[xxxvii] http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,2763,562901,00.html

[xxxviii] http://www.muslimedia.com/archives/world00/pak-billion.htm

[xxxix] Jaideep Menon and Narayanan Komerath, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/narayanan.html.

[xl] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-5/chosso.html

[xli] Ed Haynes and the International Electronic Phaleristic Encyclopedia

[xlii] Gov. Pak websites

[xliii] Features - Sunday Observer 31 October, 1999

[xliv] B. Raman, “A Skeptic’s View of General Musharraf”, www.saag.org

[xlv] http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/regional/regional20000828a.html.

[xlvi] Asra Noomani “My crush on Musharraf”, www.salon.com

[xlvii] Mark Corcoran, “Musharraf - Chief Executive Office in Command”
(as first published in The Weekend Australian, 26-27/2/2000) Published: 7/08/01

http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s342665.htm.

[xlviii] http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DA18Df05.html.

[xlix] http://www.mideastinsight.org/03_02/musharraf2.html.

[l] http://www.biblio-india.com/articles/ma00_ar19.asp?mp=MA00

[li] There are several examples of this: the article by Robert Kaplan titled “Forging Alliances; In War, Strange Bedfellows Welcomed”, LA Times Sept 30, 2001 is just one. To get more of this sort of thing, just type keywords: Musharraf and Ataturk in the search bar at www.google.com .

[lii] http://musharraf.20m.com/, http://www.pervezmusharraf.s5.com/

[liii] http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper405.html

[liv] Pamela Constable and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan's Coup Leader: Strongman or Statesman?;Which Is the Real Musharraf? Nation Asks” Washington Post Tuesday, October 19, 1999,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-10/19/047l-101999-idx.html

[lv] http://members.tripod.com/~INDIA_RESOURCE/nuclear2.html

[lvi] http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/171000/detFOR07.asp.

[lvii] http://www.indian-express.com/columnists/shek/20011110.html

[lviii] Johanna McGeary, “The World's Toughest Job”, Time Asia Oct 2001
http://167.216.192.98/indopaksummit/musharrafprofile.shtml

[lix] Killam Jam, “A note on the recent changes in the Pakistan Army”, Chaman Times, October 9, 2001

[lx] B Raman, “Jaish-e-Mohammed: A backgrounder” http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper332.html

[lxi] B Raman, “Gilgit, Baltistan, China and North Korea’ http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper289.html

[lxii] http://www.islam.org.au/articles/older/INT-KSHM.HTM

[lxiii] Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia”, Yale University Press 2000.

[lxiv] Barnett R. Rubin, “Afghanistan: The forgotten crisis”, Writenet (UK) feb(1996)

[lxv] Rory McCarthy, “Arrests rack up tension ahead of execution”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,443781,00.html

[lxvi] http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/terrorism/terrorism20001227a.html

[lxvii] Tariq Ali, “Bitter Chill of Winter”, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n08/ali_2308.html

[lxviii] Contrary to the constant claims by Pakistani Deobandi establishment’s of common heritage with their Indian counterparts, it is important to note that the Indian schools are in no way connected to the present establishments in Pakistan. The present establishments owe their shape and form to the policies of General Zia alone.

[lxix] Ahmed Rashid, “The Politics and Dynamics of Violent Sectarianism”, http://members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/chapter_2.html

[lxx] Eqbal Ahmad, “The Roots of Violence”, http://members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/chapter_1.html

[lxxi] Naziha Syed Ali, “Doctors under fire”, http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewslineAugust/specialreport.htm

[lxxii] http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper266.html

[lxxiii] A very interesting account of the `dashed hopes’ can be found in Ardeshir Cowasjee’s editorials in the Dawn newspaper in this period

[lxxiv] http://www.pak.gov.pk/public/president-address-19-09-01.htm

[lxxv] http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/04/03/musharraf.htm

[lxxvi] http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/290901/VIR35.asp.