Laxman Bahroo 

Addendum to Understanding Nepal's Civil War

The events in Nepal over the last few months represent the ebb and flow Nepal’s six year old Maoist insurgency.  The latest cycle of violence started in November 2001, the Maoists withdrew from the ceasefire, increased the tempo of violence and declared a separate republic.  This forced a previously hesitant government to declare emergency and use the army against the Maoists.  In the following months, news of army victories became commonplace and demoralized Maoist supporters.  Reports of largescale surrenders (up to 10,000) indicated a decline in the popularity of the movement.  It is against this backdrop that the sudden and tragic events of February 16, 2002 stand in shocking contrast. 

Maoist rebels struck army and police camps in Achham, Western Nepal caused 140 deaths and brought the official death toll of the insurgency to about 2500.  The Maoists also attacked government offices and banks before receding to their hideouts.  The large scale of the attack and casualties indicated that politicians and security forces were unaware of the latent potential of the rebels.   It would seem that successful army operations lulled the government into a sense of complacency.  Though not everyone shared this false sense, local government officials warned Kathmandu of increased Maoist presence in the region and pointed to communication intercepts regarding the impending attack.  According to these officials, the national government did not respond to the provocative buildup.  This is particularly surprising since Nepal has always witnessed an upswing in Maoist violence in the month of February for the last 6 years.       

February holds significance for the Maoist movement.  On February 17, 1996, the NCP-Maoist launched the Jana Yudha (people's war) against the "reactionary" Nepal government.  In the same month in 1999, the rebels celebrated their third anniversary with an escalation in violence in the Central western regions of Nepal (which became their strongholds and later the People's Republic) and gained regional and international media attention. The Jana Awhan, Maoist newspaper, termed this escalation a "war of liberation". By design or by coincidence, Comrade Parchanda, in an interview to Revolutionary Worker in February 2000, raised the issue of declaring a People's Republic of Nepal coupled with increased violence around the fourth anniversary.  Continuing in the same theme, in 2001, the Maoists celebrated their fifth anniversary with a week of violence in various parts of Nepal and demonstrations in Kathmandu.  Given the history of a bloody February, it is shocking that Nepal's government was not prepared for increased violence especially four months after the Maoist withdrawal from the cease fire and battle with the army.

The Maoist attack has repercussions that extend beyond February 2002.  In the short term, it reinvigorates the movement by infusing manpower lost in surrenders and encounters with the Royal Nepalese Army.  In the longer term, it demonstrates the resilience and resolve of the Maoists to fight until the objectives are achieved.  The attack has implications for Kathmandu as well.  Besides stripping away a sense of complacency, it shows that despite heavy losses the Maoists movement has not been broken.  It also allows the opposition political parties to question the government's anti insurgency policy.  At its most extreme, it weakens the bond between the citizens of Nepal and the government, as the latter appear incapable.   It can also weaken ties with India since Nepal's politicians and intellectuals continue to scapegoat India for their inability to subdue the Maoist rebellion.  The Maoist attack has lessons for the world as well.  It demonstrates that when insurgents lie dormant in the face of a superior force, they often do so to bide their time and choose both the time and method of revenge.  It is a lesson that Nepal has bitterly learned and one that a world under threat from terrorism should take to heart.