Securing the Indian North-east

Importance and vulnerability of Indian North-east somewhat go hand in hand. Blame it on the geography, history or the visionless policies of the Union government or the egotistical reign of political parties in the region- fact remains that the region of the seven states over a stretch of 2,55,000 square kilometre is vitally important to the Indian nation. Assuming that India cannot allow the region to secede, an urgent policy modifying ‘the old and the continuing ones’ needs to be put in place.

The Indian North-eastern region today is known for its mushrooming insurgencies rather than anything else. The Naga insurgency has been the author of armed struggle in the region in post-independent India. The example set forth by the Naga National Council (NNC) under the leadership of A N Phizo has been replicated in almost all the States with much more lethality and viciousness. Fatalities have broken new barriers every year. In past as well as currently, some of the regions in these States remain virtual strongholds of these outfits. They run their parallel administration, command allegiance of the people and pooh pooh the Indian authority. In spite of peace negotiations with two outfits, there has been little change in the ground situations.

The vulnerability of Indian authority is further accentuated due to the both geography and politics of the region. The region remains wedged between China, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh. The North-eastern insurgents have stood benefited from the Indian non-affability with at least China and Bangladesh. They have also exploited the weakness of countries like Bhutan. Even our neighbour in the western front, Pakistan has found the situation advantageous to design its disintegrative campaign. As a result, it has become a question of winning many wars before we can have a decisive control over the forces of disintegration. 

Internal Security

Within the first fifteen days of the year 2002, the region witnessed two bloody massacres. On January 13, 2002 the insurgents of National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) gunned down 16 persons at Singicherra market of West Tripura district. On January 15, 13 persons were killed by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) militants at Bijni in Bongaogaon district. Finally eight insurgent outfits sign off with a joint call for a boycott of the Republic Day functions on the 26th January. Nothing could have been a more decisive rebuff to Indian rule in these areas.

For years together we have been crying hoarse at the mindless acts of violence by the outfits. There have been a number of army operations against the outfits resulting in a momentary slow down in their operations. However, our quavering attitude has allowed them to regroup and restart their offensive. There have been assertions like that of the former Chief Minister of Assam, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta that the days of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) are numbered. However, ULFA not only has survived, but also continues its operations in parts of Assam, Meghalaya, North Bengal, and Arunachal Pradesh. All this raises few questions, which in them contain the solutions to the problems.

Sincerity in solving the Problem of Insurgency

In 2001, the Union government created a separate ministry for the North-eastern Affairs signalling a change in its attitude. It is too short a time to sit on judgement over the performance of the ministry. However, there are still signs of the continuing misdirected policies of the past.  Policy towards securing a peaceful India is clearly tilted in favour of Kashmir. In the post-December 13, 2001 period, the Indian government has shown decisive intent in nailing Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. However, such resolve is yet to mark its policy towards the North-east. There have been numerous reports suggesting Pakistan’s game plan in the region using the territory of Bangladesh. There have been reports of thriving camps of the insurgents in the territory of Bangladesh as well as Bhutan. However, the talk of a pro-active policy seem to begin and end with the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). 

Replicating Successes

Mizoram remains the only example of attainment of peace in the region. The signing the Mizo Accord on June 30, 1986 heralded peace in the State marked by a lingering insurgency. Since then there has been relative peace in that State. Unfortunately, that till date remains the only success story for the Union government in its fight against insurgency in the North-east. The ceasefire with the Naga insurgent group the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) is more than four years old. Yet, there is no end to killings, extortion, and abductions in the State. Every now and then the peace negotiation shows signs of breaking down. Similar is the story with the peace negotiation with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) in Assam. Negotiations go on endlessly without a result in sight. Now finally the Union government has decided to form the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) to meet the demand of the Bodos in the State. However, the government last minute move to involve the non-Bodos in the process has only complicated the matter. As it appears now, the issue would not be solved in near future.

Success in the fight against insurgency has been rare. Even then, the will to learn from past experiences and apply them to accomplish further successes seems to be lacking. The appointment of negotiator in the Naga talks is a case in point. There is a feeling all around that the negotiator should be well versed with the area and it history. Last year the Chief Ministers of the North-east region urged the Prime Minister to appoint a person in the negotiation with the NSCN-IM, who is familiar with the area. They also stated that there should be a three-member committee, which should negotiate the peace talks, rather than one man.[i]   Consensus seemed to be evolving around the choice of P A Sangma, former Lok Sabha speaker and a Member of Parliament from Meghalaya, for appointment as the Chief negotiator. In the end, however, status quo was maintained with K Padmanabhaiah as the negotiator. This, in spite of the fact that the latter was responsible for the ‘extension of ceasefire without territorial limits’ mess that resulted in the June 2001mayhem in Manipur.

Commitment to Good Governance

It is a generally held opinion in the region that insurgency suits different people in different ways. While the Union government can be blamed for its ad hocism and myopic policies, each of the State governments in the North-east are guilty of pursuing policies that seek personal aggrandisement. Time and again ministers and bureaucrats of various States have been found in collusion with the insurgents. The Chief Minister of Nagaland S C Jamir is believed to be close to the Khaplang faction of the NSCN. The former Chief Minister of Manipur Reishang Keishing, at one point of time, favoured the NSCN-IM. The former Chief Minister of Assam, Prafulla Mahanta of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) was in way promoted the ULFA in his earlier stint before the outfit fell out of his favours. The CPI-M regime in Tripura seems to be soft peddling with the All Tripura Tigers Force (ATTF) to counter balance the NLFT. Such collusion does not augur well for a region that’s fighting against the menace. It results in half-hearted measures that complicate and prolong problems.

 Disrupting the Allurement of Joining an Insurgent outfit

There are reasons to believe that insurgency in the region is now devoid of any commitment to ideology. The bubble of a pariah or Robinhood has been long burst. Movements that originated to seek betterment of the region and its people have been reduced to activities for self-seeking gains. Thus, most of the insurgencies in the region today are purely criminal in nature. Even then, recruitment drives for cadres have been found to be successful. ULFA, which has time and again faced the problem of depleting cadre strength, has been able to replenish its reserves. The answer lies in the under-development of the region. Insurgency for the unemployed youths of the region has become the only source of employment that guarantees regular and easy income. Army sources in August 2001 stated that the NSCN-IM is offering Rs. 500,000 each for new recruits.[ii]   There is an urgent need to disrupt this mechanism. Creation of employment opportunities would drive the youth away from a career in insurgency. However, this is easier said than done in view of the dismal performance of the State governments.

Maintaining Peace in the Region    

Maintaining peace in the pockets of the region unaffected by the hazard of insurgency needs to be given prime importance. Of late States like Arunachal Pradesh have experienced the overflow of insurgency from the neighbouring States. Outfits such as the ULFA, the NSCN-IM, NSCN-K have been engaged in setting up camps in the State especially in the Tirap and Changlang districts. Common people as well as bureaucrats have been subjected to large-scale extortion. The State has its own nascent insurgent outfit, the Arunachal Dragon Force (ADF) ADF, which has now been rechristened as East India Liberation Front (EALF) and is active in the Lohit district of the state. Similarly the Garo Hills of the State of Meghalaya is being used as a safe haven by the ULFA. The State has been in recent news because of the recovery of large-scale small arms and explosives believed to be belonging to the ULFA. These are potentially disturbing developments which might snowball into a large-scale problem. Non-securing of the peaceful pockets in the region allows the outfits to nullify their disadvantage of a squeezed area of operation. Their hit and run tactics acquire much more effectiveness.

External Security

On January 19, 2002 Defence Minister George Fernades addressing the Indian community leaders in New York said, Pakistan was abetting militancy in the North-east though its activities in Kashmir were in the spotlight.[iii] This was one of the many such statements implicating the role of our western neighbour in fermenting trouble in the region. In addition to Pakistan, a scenario combining active sustenance and unperturbed indolence by countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, China has posed serious problems. Even then Indian responses fail to go beyond indignant testimonies. Security of the North-east appears to have been sacrificed at the altar of a Kashmir centric policy. The indivisibility of peace needs to accommodate the concerns of the region while chalking out a policy to fight terrorism. The following description would detail the vast areas for improvement in this area.

Dealing with the ISI

On April 6, 2000 the Assam government presented a detail fact-sheet on ISI activities in the Assam Assembly. The then Chief Minister P K Mahanta said that their activities are confined in six different areas: (i) promoting indiscriminate violence in the state by providing active support to the local militant outfits, (ii) creating new militant outfits along ethnic and communal lines by instigating ethnic and religious groups, (iii) supplying explosives and sophisticated arms to various terrorist groups, (iv) causing sabotage of oil pipelines and other installations, communication lines, the Railways and roads, (v) promoting fundamentalism and militancy among local Muslim youths by misleading them in the name of jihad and (vi) promoting communal tension between Hindu and Muslim citizens by way of false and highly inflammatory propaganda.[iv] In fact, the role of the Inter services Intelligence (ISI) in propping up Islamic terrorist outfits such as the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA), United Liberation Militia of Assam (ULMA) is documented. Time and again terrorists of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen have been arrested in the state. The leaders of ULFA, NSCN-IM have reportedly enjoyed Pakistani hospitality. Surprisingly, India’s accusation against Pakistan does not seem to highlight this concern.

The Bangladeshi Connection

Bangladesh has been the key element in the ISI’s game plan in the North-east. This country since long hosts the top leadership of the ULFA who not only direct their activities from their safe houses but also indulge in economically rewarding business activities. The NLFT and the NDFB too are active in the country. Bangladesh’s Cox Bazaar are has emerged as the port of ferrying illegal arms to the North-east. The 2001 election results in Bangladesh that provided a thumping victory to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) regime in Bangladesh has been described as the time for resurgence for the insurgents. BNP’s antecedents in describing the insurgents as freedom fighters seem to be the origin of such assumption. However, Indian effort to neutralise ULFA’s presence in Bangladesh even during the Sheikh Hasina’s ‘friendly regime’ remained close to minimum. The ULFA general secretary Anup Chetia has been lodged in a Dhaka jail since December 1997. There has been no effort so far by the Indian authorities to extradite him. There has been little attempt to drive international attention on the arms hubs such as the Cox bazaar.

Bhutanese Predicament

The ULFA has all its three headquarters (the General Headquarter, the Central Headquarter and the Mobile Headquarter) in Bhutan. According to the Assam Government there are as many as 36 camps housing nearly 1200 cadres of the outfit. The NDFB too has a number of camps in that country. NDFB uses its presence in Bhutan to indulge in hit and run activities in the Bodo dominated districts of Assam. Thus, denial of a safe haven to the outfits in Bhutan should have been the government’s prime agenda. Bhutan has been guilty of a curious sluggishness in acting against the insurgents of ULFA and the NDFB. Both these outfits have defied the Kingdom’s pleas to vacate their camps. Even the so-called understanding with the ULFA whereby the latter agreed to vacate four camps has resulted in mere relocation of those camps. Even then, Bhutan claimed to have physically verified the spots and affirmed that ULFA has indeed shifted out of the four camps after demolishing them.[v] Given the friendly relations between India and Bhutan, it is expected that the Himalayan Kingdom would be asked specifically to act against the outfits. But things have not moved in the specified direction. There is an urgent need to hasten up the process.

Chinese Involvement:

On December 13, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, ID Swami told the Parliament that the government has reports that ULFA has been procuring weapons from Chinese Army.[vi] The confession of Lohit Deuri, a senior ULFA leader who surrendered in August 2000 is said to have blown the lid out of the nefarious activity. ULFA’s leadership reportedly crossed over to China from Bhutan to established contacts with Chinese Army and managed to procure huge consignments of arms from Chinese ship on high seas in March 1995. According to Deuri, ULFA again procured arms from China in 1997, which however, reached Bhutan only in 1999. Such pronouncements have been followed up with little activity.

Myanmarese Cooperation

The NSCN and the ULFA’s arms procurement was assisted by the rebels of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), a Myanmarese insurgent group. However, the cooperation between India and Myanmar has started showing results in terms of curbing insurgency in the region, especially in Manipur. The insurgents of Manipur Peoples Liberation Front (MPLF) are known to operate from the western areas of Myanmar for last several decades with the active assistance of the Chin Liberation Army (CLA), a Myanmarese terrorist group. Myanmarese army operations in the Tamu, Namphalang and Khunjao areas of Western Myanmar have been effective in checkmating these outfits. In the first week of November, 2001 the Myanmarese army seized a huge cache of arms and ammunition from the hideouts of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF). Reports suggested that as many as 26 terrorists were killed and 200 more arrested in these operations. According to its media reports, as many as 1,500 AK series rifles and SLRs were recovered in the aforementioned operations.

Regional Cooperation

The security arrangement with the neighbouring countries needs to be sealed off with a comprehensive economic arrangement that not only checkmates their designs but also creates opportunities in the region disrupting the lifeline of insurgency. Of the many such potential projects, one that is vital importance to both India and Bangladesh is the supply of natural gas. The total recoverable reserve of natural gas from 20 gas fields in Bangladesh has been reported as 13.74 trillion cubic feet (TCF), out of which 2.86 TCF has been extracted up to December 1996. The net recoverable reserve for the future use was estimated to be 10.88 TCF in January 1997. Some of the non-government organizations (NGOs) and the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) claim that, the natural gas potentiality of Bangladesh is much higher than the said official figure.[vii] Given India’s requirement of natural gas requirement, nothing would be more unfortunate if Bangladesh starts selling its gas to a Southeast Asian country rather than India.

Similarly the nascent effort by the North-eastern States that started sometime in June 2000 for an access to the Chittaging Port could be taken up with the Bangladesh government as a matter of policy. In addition there are efforts to build a highway linking Bangladesh with the North-eastern region. The greatest of the dreams is, of course, the Greater Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna Initiative (GGBMI) for an Eastern South Asian sub-regional economic cooperation.[viii]    

Conclusion

Both internal and external security needs to be addressed for a comprehensive policy for securing the North-east. Where as negotiations with individual insurgent outfit is likely to produce localised results, a policy that seeks to cut their lifeline and make them defunct needs to be put in place. Similarly the problem also can be tackled by a plan for regional cooperation. Economic partnership with Understanding with each of the countries in this effect would provide them with fewer reasons for tolerating any anti-India activity on their soil.