Šumit Ganguly, Beyond the Nuclear Dimension: Forging Stability in South Asia, Arms Control Today, December 2001.  

The author's premise is that the dangers of nuclear instability in Pakistan are more likely due to the Kashmir conflicts. 2. He presses for a more long-term engagement by the U.S in the region than its traditional wont. 3. He does not believe that there is a real chance of vulnerability due to radical interest groups within Pakistan seizing hold of the nuclear weapons. He argues that there is no real danger of sections of the army doing so either because Musharraf's hold over it is firm. (it requires a majority of the corps commanders to go against him, which is highly unlikely.). Even in the event of security breaches, it is unlikely that the level of technical sophistication to use them exists.

He discusses the scenario wherein India carries out conventional preemptive strikes against Pak n-installations. He believes this is unlikely because a) of the existence of a bilateral treaty against such an event b) the likelihood that this would not succeed in preventing an assured Pakistani nuclear response against Indian population centres and c) because this would destroy Indian attempts at improved relations with the U.S and diplomatic opprobium from the rest of the world. Finally, he also says that ultimately India will have to handle most of the resulting refugee crisis and political chaos in Pakistan in such an event.

He states that the real danger is from the Kashmir problem, which is rooted in the different ideas of nationhood. India is predominantly secular and Kashmir was incorporated into India as a demonstration of this principle, while the Pakistani leadership has used Islam as a political device to mobilize its population and regards control over Kashmir as crucial. These conceptions of nationhood were questioned when Pakistan’s ideal of religion as a basis for unity was unable to prevent its split and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, while India failed to uphold its constitutional principles in the 1980's which brought into question its secularism.   The Kashmir insurgency was brought on by misgovernance and an assertive political class in 1989. This was seized upon by Benazir Bhutto's government in Pakistan to provide shelter, training and much material support to the Kashmiri insurgents. The consequent increase in violence generated a harsh response by Indian security forces. Pakistani control over the insurgent groups led to the marginalization of the main indigenous insurgent group-the JKLF. The insurgency degenerated into a Pakistani sponsored "protection racket" designed to bleed India. Consequent endeavors by India to restore normalcy by political means were undermined by Pakistan's sponsorship of the insurgency.

The author claims that the chances of a full-scale war between India and Pakistan in the near future are low. He says that the U.S has a significant interest in dampening tensions between India and Pakistan because Kashmir is at the root of the terrorism, aimed at India and the west, emanating from South Asia and especially Pakistan. The U.S must review its policies of supporting unsavoury regimes in Pakistan and China, while ignoring their domestic political arrangements. Over the last two decades, this has had the effect of worsening the local strategic environment for India as China proliferated nuclear and ballistic weapons technology to Pakistan. Indian concerns expressed to the United States about this were not considered, and in addition its legitimate security concerns about China were dismissed by the US, which persistently attempted to foist various multilateral non-proliferation regimes on India. This finally caused India to conduct nuclear tests in 1998, which were inevitably followed by Pakistan's nuclear tests.

There has been a fragile nuclear detente between the two nations since. Both seem to recognize the implications of possessing them, as was demonstrated by the restrained Indian military response to the Kargil intrusions by Pakistan. In earlier conflict in 1965, India had responded by attacking along other portions of the international border with Pakistan to relieve pressure on Kashmir, while in the Kargil conflict, the Indian response was localized to the intrusion and no attempts were made by India to escalate along other parts of the border, or to cross the Line of control.

The present deterrent is unstable and can breakdown due to various factors like human error, misjudgement etc. It is also not possible to rollback the nuclear programs of India, since Indian policymakers believe that it is necessary to discourage possible Chinese threats to security, since China has claims on substantial portions of Indian territory in the Northeast. Pakistan will not rollback its program as long as India doesn't because of its fears of Indian aggression. the United States needs to be engaged in this region to enhance long-term stability in the region. the US must first ensure a durable political dispensation in Afghanistan, to this end it needs to be engaged post Bin Laden to make sure that the forces that enabled his network will not reappear.

The U.S must also reengage Pakistan, this reengagement must take the form of targeted economic and technical aid aimed at rebuilding and bolstering civic institutions in Pakistan. As a start, the U.S can provide assistance to secular public education in Pakistan to ensure less reliance on the religious madrassa based education. it must devote some resources to help developing a free press and an independent judiciary.  The author believes that this will help towards a reduction in tensions with India and go towards undermining the privileged status of the military in Pakistan, which is the source of the uncompromising, hostile policy towards India.

He states that the U.S must pursue a less contentious and more productive relationship with India and also address its legitimate concerns about terrorism. At the same time, it must pressure India to reexamine its policy failures in Kashmir. India must restore the rule of law to Kashmir and punish members of its security forces responsible for gross human rights violations. It must also fulfill its pledge to grant Kashmir a good deal of autonomy within the Indian Union. The author also states that these measures will not satisfy the maximal demands of a large number of Pakistani leadership, but since they are no closer to their goal than they were 50 years ago, they might give it up. U.S counsel to this effect to Pakistan might help in this process. He states clearly that the idea that India will or can be made to give up Kashmir must be shelved. If the Kashmir problem is settled such that India manages to address the deep-seated grievances of its Kashmiri population, then it would be hard for Pakistan to revive an insurgency. This can provide a basis for more bilateral confidence building and arms and nuclear stability. 

Hafiz Faizi

Timothy Wallace Crawford, Playing the Pivot in South Asia: Kennedy's Attempt to Broker Peace in Kashmir, 1962-1963, Brooking Institution Working Paper, July 10, 2001

This working paper attempts to examine the Kennedy Administration's strategy for making peace between India and Pakistan in 1963. The strategy was based on a simple principle of "pivotal" statecraft: it was assumed that India and Pakistan's mutual need for US support would lead them to curry US favour by showing flexibility on Kashmir. The author Timothy Wallace Crawford is the current John M. Olin Post Doctoral Fellow at the Brookings Institution. The Brookings Institution functions as an independent analyst and critic, committed to publishing its findings for the information of the public. In the US it serves as a bridge between scholarship and public policy, bringing new knowledge to the attention of decision makers and affording scholars a better insight into public policy issues. 

The Institution traces its beginnings to 1916 with the founding of the Institute for Government Research, the first private organization devoted to public policy issues at the national level. In 1922 and 1924, the Institute was joined by two supporting sister organizations, the Institute of Economics and the Robert Brookings Graduate School. In 1927, these three groups were consolidated into one institution, named in honour of Robert Somers Brookings (1850-1932), a St. Louis businessman whose leadership shaped the earlier organizations.  

This author examines in great detail the policy followed by the Kennedy administration between 1962 and 1965. The level of US involvement in the Indian sub-continent presented in this paper was a surprise to this reviewer who had little knowledge of the diplomatic Indo-US relations in the 1960’s. This reviewer is also grateful for the restraint applied by the United States on Pakistan not to take advantage of the military debacle caused by the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Clearly if Pakistan under Ayub Khan had attacked across the Line of Control then in all probability Pakistan would have been able to alter the ground realities in Kashmir to the detriment of India. Pakistan’s reason for not undertaking military operations were simple, it thought that US military aid to India would, in principle, increase US leverage over New Delhi, and that leverage could be used to produce results in Kashmir. Ayub Khan thought that it was far better for Pakistan to get a Kashmir solution through the auspices of US friendship than at the expense of that friendship. Kennedy who issued public statements in support of Pakistan also encouraged this view.

As the author points out Kennedy took office in 1960 calling for better Indo-US relations. While the US was not willing to directly provide US jet fighters to India, in view of its ongoing relationship with Pakistan it was willing to subsidize the cost of India procuring UK built jet fighters. The Kennedy administration used its increased stature after staring down the Soviet Union over its attempt to base Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles in Cuba and the opportunity presented by the 1962 Sino-Indian war to attempt a rapprochement with New Delhi.

Kennedy's strategy for making peace between India and Pakistan in 1963 was based on a simple principle of "pivotal" statecraft. Once the US began to give India military aid against China in 1962, while continuing to arm Pakistan its archenemy, it seemed well positioned to play the pivot between them. Both sides were eager to enlist and maintain US support, and neither could face with equanimity the loss of that support. Accordingly, the Administration believed that India's and Pakistan's desire to secure US support, coupled with their pressing need for that support, would lead to an “ingratiation contest” in which both would try to curry US favour by making compromises on Kashmir. However, the viability of this sort of strategy depends on two things. First, that neither side becomes convinced that the pivot's support is guaranteed. Second, that both sides do not have attractive alternative sources of support. Neither of these conditions, were met during the bilateral talks on Kashmir that were initiated under US auspices in late 1962. The US undertook a “campaign in depth” approach by not only taking to Nehru but also too tier 2 & tier 3 leaders and opinion formers to convince them of the fact that US assistance could only be guaranteed to India is the Kashmir dispute was resolved.  US military aid was of such a quantity and quality that it could only be used to “hold” the Chinese and not to recover any Indian territory captured by the Chinese, as NSC staffer Carl Kaysen put it, the package was designed to "combine a respectable amount of aid to the Indians with a continuation of pressure on them to improve their relations with Pakistan".

Under US pressure and tutelage India and Pakistan held six rounds of negotiations, between December 1962 and May 1963, to settle the Kashmir issue. However due to the inflexible positions adopted by leaders of both India and Pakistan and interference by the Soviet Union & China led to the collapse of the whole process. The process ended in failure because as the author states, “In sum, US influence as a pivot in South Asia was undercut by two competitive dynamics. Specifically, India and Pakistan were able to tap the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and cultivate Beijing and Moscow as alignment options. In that way, they offset their dependence on the US. This allowed them not only to exploit the competitive dynamics between the Soviet Union and China, but also to put the US in ‘bidding wars’ with their respective Communist patrons. That forced the US to reduce the political conditions it attached to its military patronage. These two patterns help to explain how and why the US strategy for brokering peace in South Asia failed”.

 The collapse of the process did not cause any great damage to the international position of India however it did cause a rupture in US-Pak relationship, which in this reviewers view have still not been restored to pre 1963 levels. However the Kennedy administrations overture to India in 1962 and 1963 forced Pakistan to seek a strategic relationship with China. This relationship and the potential military threat that it posses in this reviewers view must be borne in mind by the Indian planners.

 n conclusion the author states that even though the cold war is over, but the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is as volatile as ever. Russia and China still have considerable competing security interests at stake in South Asia. Military cooperation between Pakistan and China has improved steadily since the 1960s, most notably in the area nuclear weapons, but in other military dimensions as well. India, much as it did in 1962, now sees China as its "enemy number one," and the military cooperation between India and Russia that flourished after 1965, far from evaporating with the end of the cold war, still shows signs of vigour. The US, meanwhile, is trying to maintain influence with the military dictatorship in Pakistan, while forging ahead with an improved security partnership with India. This too is strikingly similar to the basic dynamics at work in 1963. And in that regard, if Chinese and Russian efforts to promote "multi-polarity" mean anything, we must expect they will work hard to undercut US influence in regions like South Asia, where their vital interests are at stake. The author also cautions against US playing the mediator role because an activist American policy to broker a Kashmir deal may indeed be to set in motion dynamics that draw India and Russia, and Pakistan and China, closer together, while leaving America "holding the bag" of failed negotiations. Worse, by unsettling the status quo, without producing solutions, it could fuel tensions that lead to a South Asian war fraught with nuclear danger.

This reviewer felt that the paper was well put with sufficient reference material and should be read by all analysts who are interested in South Asia. Clearly since this paper has been written prior to the events of 11 September and 13 December 2001 it does not seek to address the implications of either of these two events. However this reviewer would recommend that all policy analysts in the US State Department and the US Department of Defence read this paper in order to get a fuller understanding of the past history of Indo-US relationships.