Unstable regimes and nuclear terrorism

The attacks on the World Trade Center last September should serve to highlight the dangers of nuclear weapons held by fundamentally unstable regimes. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968 recognized five nuclear weapons states, namely the United States, Soviet Union, France, China and UK. The collapse and break up of the Soviet Union resulted in the creation of three states with nuclear weapons - Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Since Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s international obligations,Ukraine and Kazakhstan were prevailed upon to give their nuclear weapons. The Soviet/Russian case is instructive because it highlights the dangers associated with the unraveling of a nuclear state. The Apartheid regime in South Africa dismantled the nuclear weapons well before it began to unravel. Of the remaining three remaining de facto states (India, Israel and Pakistan), two are unambiguously out of the closet.

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 were greeted with censure and sanctions by the international community (or sections thereof). The easing of most sanctions since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, indicate a de facto acceptance of both India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states. However, the War on Terrorism has placed enormous strains on Pakistan’s already unstable polity and society. In order to deflect from its ties to international terrorists and its own internal problems, Pakistan has sought refuge in its nuclear weapons status by resorting to nuclear blackmail over outstanding boundary disputes. Whilst these threats are not new, a willingness to articulate such threats more often since September 2001 and well documented contacts between the Pakistani establishment and extremist organizations are causes for concern. Nuclear blackmail works in two ways. The first of these involves extortion - i.e. frightening the international community into doling out generous amounts of aid lest the Pakistani state be taken from the hands of the ‘moderates’. The second strategy involves the promotion of state sponsored terrorism, confident (in its view) that threats to resort to the use of nuclear weapons will keep it safe from retaliation. The infiltration of the Pakistani nuclear and military establishment by sympathizers of international terrorist organizations should now be clear to all. At least four scientists and several army officers later there should be no doubt that the extremist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear forces and to the world is very real.

So how does one deal with this danger? Until now the response has been to dole out large amounts of cash to the present ‘moderate’ regime in the hope of forestalling an extremist take over. Unfortunately, history is testament to the ultimate futility of such policies. Unstable regimes such as these do have a tendency to unravel. Hence, aid is no guarantee of security. Given the United State’s pre-eminent position in the international community, it can initiate a number of steps, jointly or unilaterally, to ensure that the Pakistani arsenal remains insulated from extremist elements. The United States could start by providing expanded deterrence and declare explicitly its intention to intervene in case extremist elements take control of nuclear weapons. It could also explicitly threaten certain retaliation against extremist elements in the event nuclear weapons were used. However, when dealing with policies underpinned by the logic of deterrence one must allow for the possibility of a breakdown in deterrence. To this a third, more desirable, option might be pursued by the United States. It can and should work jointly with Pakistan to create a system that ensures protective custody for the Pakistan’s nuclear weapons (either bilateral or multilateral). Such a move would not only allow the international community keep tabs on the number and location of weapons, but would also be a more efficient way of securing the arsenal. Such a proactive measure could only enhance the United States’ and international security.