Understanding Nepal's Civil War

The Maoist insurgency started as an innocuous law and order problem largely ignored by Nepal's politicians.  Over the last 5 years, it has transformed into a significant political and military force.  The Maoists, in achieving their objectives, will undermine Nepal's government, fledgling economy, and plunge the nation into a bloody civil war.  The article looks at the origins, influences, and supporters of the Maoist movement in Nepal.   It traces the movement’s evolution from a small band of agitators to the challengers of the Royal Nepalese Army.  The article also seeks to provide an insight into the national and regional dimensions of the Maoist insurgency.

 Setting the Stage

The seeds of disenchantment that led to the Maoist insurgency were planted in 1990, as the pro-democracy movement swept Nepal.  For 56 days, an agitated public demanded a return to multiparty democracy.  The transition from the Panchayat system was relatively smooth, notwithstanding violent clashes between protestors and authorities.  The decade of democracy brought poor governance.  There have been eleven  prime ministers in as many years of democracy due to inter and intra party squabbles.  Government corruption was endemic.  Political uncertainty negatively affected the economy.  Nepal's economic outlook remained anemic with annual GDP growth around 2%-3% and low foreign investment.  Compounding matters, about 42% of the population lived below the poverty line and the wealth gap continued to widen.  In short, the government failed those who had supported it the most.

The changes of the last decade were not just limited to politics.  Nepal's urban areas became increasingly westernized.  Middle class urbanites remarked that Nepal had gone from the Middle Ages to the 21st century in the span of one generation.  This culture shock was most acute in rural Nepal where about 85% of the population lives.   Here westernization and multiparty democracy made little or no difference.  Rural Nepalese felt increasingly disconnected from their urban countrymen and betrayed by the government.   Rural peasants distrusted the Nepali Congress Party as it reneged on promises of land reform and infrastructure.  Similarly, the Communist party of Nepal United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), chief rival of the Congress, also supported the landlords.  Rural frustrations regarding ineffective government, corruption, and widening wealth and social gaps manifested themselves in the Maoist movement.    

The Maoist Movement

The violence of the current Maobadi movement was preceded by a brief and bloody episode in Eastern Nepal.  In 1971, the Jhapa movement (named after the eastern district of Nepal) inspired by the Naxalites of Nakshalbari in West Bengal, India carried out a short-lived rebellion.   The violence was perpetrated by the Coordination Committee, which later evolved into the core of the Nepal Communist Party.  The rebels of the Jhapa movement went on a rampage, killing and mutilating the bodies of local landlords.  The rebellion was rapidly crushed by the Panchyat regime, which ruled Nepal till the early 90's.    

The immediate predecessor of the Maoist movement was the loosely formed Marxist Leninist Maoist (MLM) political group.  The leftist umbrella organization was hampered by internal squabbles over government reform.  In the early 90's, the group evolved into the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) with predominately Marxist - Leninist factions.  In 1994, the CPN-UML was able to form a government in Katmandu but ultimately failed due to inexperience, power politics and corruption.  In the following year at the fourth NCP conference, the Maobadis distinguished themselves from Marxist - Leninist factions.  The conference broke down as it failed to reach a consensus on best method of reforming Nepal's political system.  The Maoists saw themselves as strict interpreters of the MLM ideology and chided the CPN-UNL for being revisionist. 

The Maoists blended aspects of violent radicalism and political organization.  The Maoists displayed the violent leftist activism of the Jhapa movement with a larger and better-organized cadre.  Simultaneously, due to its roots as part of the MLM movement, a robust political organization, Samyukta Jana Marcha, (United People's Front) formed an integral part of the movement and Jana Awhan, the party newspaper, voices its ideology, goals and diatribes.  The blending of leftist violence and political organization created a unique movement that borrows from the strength of its predecessors. 

The Maoist movement is unique in the history of Nepal's leftist movements.  It was borne out of rural frustrations directed against the government coupled the disillusionment of the political left due to the failure and corruption of the “mainstream” communist party (CPN-UML).  The Maoist movement differs from the NCP-UML as it consists of lower caste and untouchables unlike the latter whose members are predominately upper caste leftist intellectuals.  Differing from the Jhapa Movement and the NCP-UML, the Maoists have allowed women to enter into the organization.  They constitute approximately30% of the total cadre.  The demographics of the movement changed, the initial members were rural peasants but as time went on, disgruntled youth increasingly entered the movement.  It is estimated that approximately 100,000 students annually fail exams or remain jobless in Nepal. These jobless individuals with bleak futures and angry at the government were attracted to messages of revolution and provided the movement with foot soldiers.  

The central committee forms the core governing body of the Maoist movement.  The exact membership of the central committee is not readily known but the top three positions include the President of the party, leader of the political wing and the leader of the military wing of the party.  Pushpa Kamal Dahal, 46, known as Comrade Prachanda, the "furious one", was the General Secretary of the NCP - Maoist from 1995 to 1997.   He was elected President in 1997, a year after the start of the Jana Yudha, People's War.  The former primary school teacher was described as a firebrand intellectual, and holds a degree in B Sc Agriculture from Rampur College.  The group's second in command, Dr. Babhuram Bhattarai, heads the political wing of the NCP-Maoist called the Samyukta Jana Marcha.  Bhattarai, 42, studied urban planning at Jawaharlal Nehru University and architecture in Chandigarh, India.  He was employed by the Government of Nepal for rural development.   The third member of the triumvirate is Rambahadur Thapa, known as Badal,   the son of a former Indian soldier.  He is currently the leader of the military wing of the party.   He studied Atomic engineering and acquired his leftist ideology in the former Soviet Union.  It is speculated that he was trained in guerrilla warfare by Libyan radicals while in the Soviet Union.

In the early years, the movement articulated political and economic goals such as an end to the constitutional monarchy, dissolution of parliament and promotion of socialist economic reform.  The political wing of the party regularly issued diatribes against the "reactionary" government for allowing multi national corporations into Nepal.  It issued statements against corruption in the government and   described the ineptitude of the political system as “flunkeyism”.  However as time passed, the movement increasingly stated nationalistic and cultural goals.  The Maobadis expressed a desire for uplifting not only the poor but also other ethnic communities and ending cultural "pollution".

The organization articulates a highly nationalistic foreign policy that borders on isolationism.  The Maoists advocate withdrawal from any “unequal” international treaties and propose regulating entry of  foreigners.  The Maoists propose an equidistant foreign policy regarding China and India.  Looking beyond this statement, the Maoist ideology and actions are heavily laced with anti India rhetoric, while similar rhetoric is non-existent against China .  The anti -India rhetoric is an integral part of nationalism and preys on Nepali sense of inferiority viz a vie a geographically and economically dominant India.   The Samyukta Jana Marcha repeatedly attacks treaties with India as unfair and calls for repudiation.  Comrade Prachanda claims that India seeks to weaken Nepal and has infiltrated its political system.  He further claims that India is trying to “Bhutanize” Nepal, (make it a protectorate) and subsequently violate Nepal's sovereignty and “Sikkimize” (incorporating into India) it.

Beyond the rhetoric, Maoists actions have confirmed their anti India stance.  Maoist cadre attacked Hindi movies as vulgar and called them a form of cultural pollution.  They threatened local cinema owners that play Hindi movies.   The resulting bandh (shutdown) hurt business.   Maoist cadre took advantage of recent riots (some claim that they started the riots) caused by  Hrithik Roshan's “alleged” anti Nepal comments.  They attacked cinemas and entrenched their anti India stance.  The Maoists attacked Indian schools, destroyed Indian owned business and stopped the teaching of Sanskrit in parts of Nepal.  They proposed a ban on the entry of Indian license plated cars in country.  The Maoists have also called for a reduction in foreign investment, aimed at curtailing Indian businesses, as they are largest foreign investors in the country.  Comrade Prachanda even predicts a confrontation with the Indian Army.   

The insurgency sustains itself thru the procurement of arms from ideological comrades, finances generated from smuggling heroin and cannabis and extortion of businessmen.  The Maoists have links with radical organizations in India and Sri Lanka.  In particular they have links to the People's War Group (Naxalites) of Bihar and Andra Pardesh, United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and similar organizations in India's Northeast.  Comrade Prachanda alluded to direct links with Indian communist groups such as the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) operating in Bihar and Jarkhand and called these leftist terror groups “liberation movements”.  Baburam Chaurasia,   member of the NCP-Maoist, was arrested in Northern Bihar.  This was a significant development as it pointed to ties but also because radical groups in the area have attacked police to procure arms.

Besides links to fraternal radical organizations, the NCP-Maoist has links to several governments.  The NCP-Maoist has financial links with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.  It is known to have procured arms and finances from the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.  Additionally, the ISI provides training for the insurgents.  Confiscated RDX found in Katmandu resembled the type used by Pakistani terrorist groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir.  The People's Republic of China, the origin of Maoist ideology, vigorously denies all links with the NCP-Maoist.  In the past, China has supported communist parties in Nepal and secessionist movements in India's Northeast (with whom the Maoists now have ties).  It is however interesting to note that the two governments (Pakistan and DPRK) supporting the Maoists have extremely close ties to China.  

Nepal's Maoists draw inspiration from varied sources.  They derive ideological strength from  organizations that fought violently against “oppressive” governments most notably the Shining Path of Peru and others in Turkey and Philippines.  Richard Andrew Nickson, a Latin America specialist and former advisor to the Government of Nepal, predicted in the early 90's, before the insurgency, that the outcome of Nepal's Maoist movement depends on the outcome of democracy in Nepal.   He further stated that Nepal's armed communist revolutionaries could parallel Peru's Sendoro Luminoso (Shining Path).  Both are breakaways from the existing communist parties, and have rapidly growing followers in rural regions.  Curiously, the Maoists have referred to and adopted a four-phase strategy similar to that of the Shining Path.  The Maoists strategy involves agitation and propaganda, followed by the creation of liberated zones, an armed struggle in rural areas and then an armed struggle in urban areas. 

The Insurgency (1996-2000)

Agitation, the first stage of the insurgency, began in 1995.  The Maoists distributed leaflets to gain publicity for their cause and alter political debate.  The agitation was successful and the NCP-Maoist established itself a political voice.  Building on newfound influence, the Samyukta Jana Marcha handed a list of 40 demands to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba.  The demands included nationalistic goals (withdrawal from treaties with India), social goals (land reform) and political goals (abolishing the monarchy).   Bhattarai stated that the demands were similar to those ignored during the pro-democracy  movement and warned if the demands were once again ignored a People's War will be launched on February 17, 1996.  He cited economic and political decline as a rationale for initiating the People's War.

The movement reemerged as a radical group in Nepal's western-central area of Rapti and surrounding districts and manifested itself through seemingly unconnected killings of Nepal's Congress party workers, village defense committee members and other government officials.   Nepal watchers initially dismissed the group as a terrorist organization without goals or purpose.  From 1996 to 1999, the Maoists were under the radar of the regional press and international media and reports of violence received attention only in Nepal. 

However in February 1999, on the third anniversary of the movement, the attacks increased in tempo, and occurred simultaneously in various regions of the country.  On March 2, 1999 the first Maoist bombing in Katmandu occurred at the residence of Padma Pokhrel, Nepal's Home Secretary.  This signified a major escalation, as previous bombings occurred in the rural districts and targeted local government officials.  Jana Awhan, newspaper of the NCP- Maoists, declared the recent escalation of violence as a War of Liberation.  Later that year, the Maoists called on the oppressed classes and other ethnicities and religions to join the struggle.  The Maoists widened their base from the rural peasantry to include broader economic, political and ethnic issues and transformed their movement into a leftist - nationalistic revolution. 

As the agitation gained strength, Maoists claimed the district of Rolpa and neighboring ones in central-western Nepal as strongholds and base of operations.  These strongholds   would serve as future liberated zones.   The Maoist specifically targeted police stations, banks and other representations of governmental authority in these areas.    Travelers to the central districts, remarked at the absence of police in the area.  Maoists freely roamed and had defacto control over the region.  The insurgency spread into other areas of Nepal.  The Maoists gained strength in the Terai region bordering India.  This region is populated by Gurkhas, a sought after population recruited by the Royal Nepalese and Indian Armies. 

The year 2000 was marked by several ominous signs regarding the insurgency.  Comrade Prachanda, interviewed by the Leftist magazine, Revolutionary Worker, in February 2000, advocated the declaration of a People's Republic of Nepal.  He stated that such a declaration would happen when the NCP-Maoist controlled certain regions of the country and had a strong presence in other areas.  The People's Republic would be used to further the cause nationwide.  In the same year, the movement tightened its grip on the western - central regions of the country and spread to the eastern districts.   In December 2000, the NCP - Maoist held elections in local villages of Rolpa and Rukum and introduced their national anthem.  This pseudo state or a state within another presented a direct challenge to Katmandu. 

Government response 

Initially the national government neglected the violence.  As the violence intensified in early 1999, Nepal's politicians assessed the situation as a law and order problem.  At the time Prime Minister Bhattarai threatened to wage and win a war of attrition against the Maoists.  Members of the government including the Prime Minister refused to take a realistic view of the situation.   They frequently blamed foreign powers, usually India and sometimes U.S.A for aiding the Maoists.  However, they were unable to provide any proof or convincing argument to back up the claims.

The national government primarily viewed the insurgency as an exclusively law and order problem and used police units.  The police trained to enforce the law against criminals was not equipped to handle a rapidly spreading insurgency.  Numbers of police personnel were increased from 5000 to 7000.  The police mounted multiple operations such as Operation Romeo, aimed at striking the Maoist movement in the rural regions.  Lack of anti insurgency training coupled with a desire to avenge the death of other policemen and the pressure from the government to crush the insurgency met with disastrous results.  The police were accused of torture, rape and custodial killings of suspected Maoists and villagers.   The brutal treatment further alienated the local villagers and transformed them into ardent Maoist supporters.  This hampered the formation of informant networks needed to counter the insurgency.  The Maoists attacked police stations; thus became protectors and furthered the bond with the villagers.

As the insurgency progressed, the government was forced to accept the political and economic dimensions of the problem.  The three-pronged strategy was based on political consensus across the numerous political parties for dealing with the Maoist problem.  The strategy involved the improvement of economic conditions and alleviation of  grievances that gave impetus to the insurgency.  The third prong of the strategy involved tightening the anti terrorist laws with an internal administration bill.  The bill gave the police sweeping powers of arrest and detention.  It was subsequently dropped due to criticism from the Left parties over potential abuse and impingement of  citizen's rights.  The three-pronged strategy was shelved due to lack of political consensus. 

However by the end of 1999, the burgeoning Maoist movement forced the government to take a more holistic look.  The Maoist Resolution Committee headed by former Prime Minister Deuba studied the problem and opened negotiations.  However, Comrade Prachanda demanded the release of all arrested comrades as a prelude to dialogue.  As a result, the talks never materialized.  A year after the formation of the committee, Bhattarai was removed due to his administration's failure to stem the insurgency and G. P. Koirala took over as Prime Minister.  This transition of power was a strong statement about the lack of political unity and Maoist influence in shaping political events.

As the insurgency showed no signs of stemming, the government decided to further increase the number of active police personnel to 10,000.  Gradually, the government realized the limitation of using the police in fighting the insurgency.  Government policy was constrained by the refusal of the King to involve the Royal Nepalese Army.  The wariness over involving the army is curious since the army was more capable than the police in combating the insurgency.  However, it has become known recently that the Maoists have been trained by former Gurkha soldiers of the Royal Nepalese army.  It is possible that the army may be wary of confronting former soldiers while battling the Maoists.  Additionally involving the army in fighting the Maoists would further the appearance of a civil war and damage an already fledgling economy.  Eventually, a compromise was reached; police weapons were upgraded and the RNA trained 1,000 police personnel.  The government used the army in limited roles of building highways thru Maoist held regions and locating abducted policemen.  All of this culminated in building pressure on the Maoists.

Insurgency 2001

The New Year continued the negative trend of the previous year.   Central Western regions successfully "sanitized" in the previous years became strongholds.  The Maoists held the "people' s court" in these districts.  Eastern Nepal, which had been free of Maoist violence, became the new focus of the Maoists.  The Maoists attacked police stations with bands of up to 300-armed rebels and looted arms.  They prepared for a confrontation with the Royal Nepalese Army.   The Maoists believed that if they defeated the army, they could then go on to capture Katmandu.  The third phase of the Maoist operations, struggle in rural areas had begun in earnest.

As the insurgency continued to engulf the nation, the assassination of the Royal Family on June 1, 2001 threw Nepal into a deeper political crisis.  Exacerbating the crisis was the general distrust of the official explanation.  In this charged environment, Babhuram Bhattarai's article in Kantipur, Nepal's widely read newspaper, inflamed an already tense situation.  The article claimed the massacre was a plot by RAW, CIA and the current monarch to subjugate Nepal.   The Maoist theory of the assassination was part of a recurring theme to raise the India 'bogey' in the minds of the Nepali people.   Furthermore, the article called the tragedy the "new Kot massacre" and equated it with a repressive period in 19^th century Nepal.  The article did not back up its claims, but was meant to rouse the anguish of a saddened country and further increase dissatisfaction toward the government.  The Maoists, who repeatedly called for the abolition of the Monarchy, used the sentiments surrounding assassination to further their goals.

The Maoists marred the birthday of Nepal's Monarch, King Gyanendra, by unleashing a reign of violence across the country.  The upswing in violence, after the assassination of the royal family, marked a renewed phase in the insurgency.  These new attacks demonstrated greater lethality and coordination.  The Maoists carried out multiple attacks in various parts of the country over a few days.  This indicated increased sophistication and communication between distant bands separated by hilly terrain with little or no access to main roads.

This recent escalation allowed the government to increase pressure on the Maoists.  The government of Prime Minister Deuba revived the stalled three-prong strategy.  The RNA was armed with improved helicopters equipped with night vision and set up bases near Maoist strongholds.  Longstanding proposals to create a paramilitary force of 15,000 personnel were approved.   Greater powers were granted to security and governmental officials in troubled areas.  Recently, laws regarding caste have been repealed.  This was a long-standing demand of the Maoists and used to partly justify their class warfare.  The government   renewed the call for talks with the NCP-Maoist and released captured Maoists in hopes of a truce.  The  government seemed to buy time so they could better handle the new wave of Maoist violence.

In the end of July, both Comrade Prachanda and Prime Minister Deuba called for a truce and negotiations.  Maoist violence declined but continued at a low volume.  There were sporadic events of agitation and occasional attacks.   The first meeting was held in late August between the respective negotiators.  As negotiations continued, both sides released prisoners but several Maoist attacks and provocative statements threatened to break the ceasefire.   As time went on, disconcerting reports of active training camps, new abductions, and restocking of ammunition pointed to the impermanence of the talks.   Despite these reports, the talks continued thru September and October amid tense conditions.

On November 21, 2001, Comrade Prachanda suspended talks and stated that the struggle for the liberation of Nepal will continue.  Two days later, the new Maoist offensive began with a simultaneous attack in nine districts.  On November 25, 2001, the Maoists attacked more districts, an airport and an army barracks in Salleri and Solokhambu (Eastern Nepal), near the tourist areas for Mt Everest.  The Maoists offensive was unique in its lethality, resulting in about 140 deaths, kidnapping of many policemen, and looting of more advanced weaponry.  It was also the first time the Maoists engaged the RNA.   The following day, a panicked meeting involving the Prime Minister's cabinet, the ruling Nepali Congress party and King Gyanendra declared an emergency and branded the Maoists as terrorists.

The NCP- Maoist announcement of a revolutionary government in Rolpa and other liberated areas and the creation of the people's liberation army resulted in a civil war.  The establishment of a separate government threatened the integrity of Nepal.  The attacks and the following announcement, forced the government to use the RNA in combating the insurgency.  This is the first time the RNA has been called to action within Nepal, it previously participated in U.N peacekeeping duties.  The start of a civil war in Nepal marks the end of the third phase of the insurgency.  The Maoists view the engagement of the army as a battle for Katmandu (phase 4).  If the army is defeated they will be able to capture power and establish the people's republic of Nepal.  

Summary and impact

The Maoist movement started in 1995 with political agitation and shortly after launched violent agitation to achieve its goals.  The initial movement started in 3 out of 75 districts located mainly in western - central Nepal.  Due to the ignorance of politicians, the movement grew unrestricted.  Even when the government sought to act, it did so clumsily, alienating villagers who sympathized with the Maoists.  This further encouraged the growth of the insurgency.  By the end of 2001, the effect of the insurgency had been staggering.  According to official reports about 2000 people have died in insurgency related violence, unofficial sources state a much higher death toll.  The NCP- Maoist ranks swelled from a handful of ardent supporters to an estimated 2000 dedicated members backed up by 10,000 irregular fighters.   Perhaps most shocking is the geographic growth of the insurgency, Nepal's government admits that 68 districts out 75 total districts have been affect by Maoist violence and about 32 are considered to be strongholds.  

The Maoist insurgency borne out of economic and political disaffection, wages a people's war due to a worsening economy, and political situation with the goal of correcting these negative trends.  It seems predictable yet oxymoronic that it has exacerbated the very same trends it set out to eradicate.  Maoist attacks on factories and extortion of business reduce foreign investment and confidence in the economy.  Maoist attacks on the police and recently on the Army, physically weaken the state.   These attacks (verbal and physical) have embarrassed the state and damaged the government's credibility.  At least two Prime ministers have been replaced over their inability to curtail the violence.  This moral weakening of the state is more dangerous as it extends beyond the limited areas of the physical attack. 

The long-term effect of the Maoist insurgency can be seen in the context of a vicious cycle.  In this cycle the Maoist movement capitalizes on disaffection.  Attacks on government and economic targets make the government seem inept and weakens the faith of citizens in political institutions and further disaffection.  The Maoists by weakening the government present themselves as an alternate and attractive option to the status quo.  Rural Nepal presents an ideal example.  Poor infrastructure in the rural areas encouraged the insurgency and simultaneously hampered government attempts to tackle it.  Developmental projects halted by the insurgency, further disaffection and strengthen the Maoists.  This allows the movement to increasingly challenge the government by attacking the police, army and established a separate government to directly challenge the national government.  While this situation currently exits in the rural areas of Nepal, escalating  Maoist violence and government inability to control the insurgency could  create a similar situation in urban areas.  Ultimately, the national government will lose the mandate to rule and be unable to enforce its writ, the collapse of  political institutions will result in state failure.   

 The Maoist insurgency though confined to Nepal presents India with multiple concerns.  The anti India rhetoric of the CPN-Maoist and its pogroms seek to weaken the India - Nepal bond to the detriment of both countries.  The crux of Indian foreign policy concern is the spread of anti India ideology.  The success of the Maoist movement in Nepal may encourage a similar movement in Bhutan, a rural monarchy and Indian protectorate.  An ascendant insurgency will increase the morale of the fraternal organizations, provide arms, funds and encourage copycat attacks.  Maoist links to radical organizations in India stretch from Chhatisgarh, Bihar, Jarkhand, Orrisa, Andra Pardesh and the Northeast.  Another troublesome aspect is Maoist links to the ISI and Islamic radicals in Bangladesh.  ISI influence will provide yet another opportunity for Pakistan to promote instability in India.  The Maoist - ISI nexus has startling implications, in light of Pakistani encouragement of terrorist activities in Northern India via Nepal and links to terrorist organizations in Northeastern India.

The Maoist insurgency provides India with an opportunity to cement Indo-Nepal ties.  Since the start of the civil war, India has provided sophisticated arms for counter insurgency and jungle warfare and loaned 2 military helicopters fitted with machine guns for counter insurgency operations in isolated regions.  Realizing the financial cost of the insurgency, India offered Rs 800 million in grants to improve social sectors of Nepal.  The Indian government can also provide other services to Nepal.  Settlement of border issues and other issues will stem anti India attitudes amongst Nepali citizens.  India, currently trains the Royal Nepalese Army, and should offer to train Nepal's anti insurgency force.   Aggressive Indian action against banned domestic radical organizations will reduce aid to the Maoist insurgents.  Increased surveillance of the porous Indo - Nepal border will decrease Maoist links to radical organizations in India, prevent Maoists from seeking refuge, and hamper ISI ability to use the Maoists as a conduit for anti - India operations. There have been recent reports of Maoist surrenders and successful counter insurgency operations undertaken by the Royal Nepalese Army. While these reports are encouraging, it is too early to tell if they represents part of long term ebb and flow pattern or a definitive decline in the insurgency.