South Asias Nuclear Dangers
Mohammed Ayoob
It is not since the Cuban missile
crisis that the world has come so close to nuclear war. Rising tensions between India and
Pakistan following the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament have created a scary
scenario. Defusing South Asian tensions has, therefore, become an American priority.
However, these tensions can be defused and the world saved from the horrors of nuclear
confrontation if the Bush administration fully comprehends the political and nuclear
issues involved in the crisis.
There are basically two political issues that affect India-Pakistan relations. The
first is the territorial dispute over Kashmir. Without going into the history of the
dispute, it would be salutary to remind ourselves that the self-definitions of the two
nations are inextricably intertwined with this issue. India considers Kashmir to be a
touchstone of its secular and civic nationalism. The presence of 140 million Muslims in
India, of whom barely four million or five million live in Kashmir, means that New Delhi
cannot accept another partition of India on the basis of religion. Doing so would reopen
the issue of the status of Muslims as Indian citizens and refresh the wounds of partition.
Similarly,
Pakistan cannot afford to give up its claim to the only Muslim majority state in India
without forfeiting the "two-nation" theory-that Hindus and Muslims in the Indian
subcontinent form two different nations, on which it is founded. The corollary of this
theory is that no Muslim majority region can legitimately form a part of the Indian Union.
The separation of the majority of Pakistanis from Pakistan in 1971 and the creation of
Bangladesh has not disabused the Pakistani political elite from this idea. It has made
them even more strident in their demand that Kashmir should be detached from India and
attached to Pakistan.
The Pakistan-supported insurgency beginning
in 1990 and the subsequent infiltration of jihadist elements trained and armed by
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is the latest phase in Pakistan's attempt to
change the status quo in Kashmir. There is convincing evidence, known not merely to the
American intelligence community but to reporters of the national dailies and their readers
as well, of Pakistani complicity in the insurgency-cum-terrorism in Kashmir. The terrorist
attack on the Indian parliament on Dec. 13 has been the latest demonstration of this
complicity and has escalated tensions to the current high level. Terrorism, therefore, is
the second political component of the problem. Terrorist groups based in Pakistan and
armed by Pakistanis, with close ideological links to al Qaeda, have become the main
vehicle for the anti-Indian campaign in Kashmir for the past five years. The terrorist
attacks of September 11 have finally awakened the American administration to the threat
such groups pose, not only to India, but to the United States as well. This has led to
pressure on the Pakistani government by Washington. However, Pakistan's Gen. Musharraf has
attempted to get the best of both worlds. While cooperating under duress with the United
States in the latter's war against terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan has attempted to
build a firewall around jihadi groups operating in Kashmir. The attack on the Indian
parliament and the subsequent Indian military mobilization, however, has changed the terms
of the terrorism debate. Although Gen. Musharraf has taken cosmetic steps, such as
arresting the leaders of two terrorist outfits in Pakistan, to demonstrate his commitment
to the anti-terrorism cause and deflect Indian anger, this is not enough. Pakistan must
cut off all support to insurgents and terrorists in Kashmir before its sincerity can be
accepted.
Escalating tensions in South Asia have the
dangerous nuclear angle built into them, and this requires active American involvement.
This involvement has to go beyond the diplomatic for two reasons. First, the United States
must distinguish between the perpetrator of terror and its victim. Pakistan should be put
on a very short leash and should be threatened with sanctions if it does not reverse its
present very dangerous course of supporting terror in Kashmir and in other parts of India.
Second, the
nuclear postures of India and Pakistan are very different. India is committed to a no
first-use policy. An authoritative study by RAND published last year corroborated that
India's policy of no first-use is confirmed by its current nuclear posture. RAND's Ashley
Tellis, currently senior adviser to the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi, defined this posture
as one of a "force-in-being" which stops well short of the actual deployment of
nuclear weapons. Moreover, India does not need to use its nuclear capability in a war with
Pakistan except in retaliation to a Pakistani nuclear attack.
Pakistan,
on the other hand, is unwilling to subscribe to a no-first-use doctrine. Consequently, the
only way to make South Asia and the world safe is for the United States to have a strategy
in place to forcefully decimate Pakistan's rudimentary nuclear capability if the crisis
worsens to a point where war becomes inevitable. The existence of such a contingency plan
and the sending of clear signals to Islamabad that it may be put into operation should be
enough to persuade Pakistan to reverse course, both in terms of nuclear bravado and its
support for terrorism in Kashmir.
South Asia and the world would be a much safer place if Washington made it clear to
Islamabad that its support for terrorism and the deliberate uncertainty surrounding its
nuclear posture will be tolerated no longer. Furthermore, it must make clear that if
Pakistan continues down this road it may be faced with disastrous consequences. Averting a
nuclear catastrophe should take precedence over the hunt for bin Laden in American
strategic calculations.
The
author is University Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Michigan
State University. A version of this article appeared in the Washington Times on 4 January
2002. Reproduced with the permission of the author. |