China's Taliban Connection

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao expended the better part of a week deflecting attention from his country’s extensive dealings with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Zhu Bangzao described as "absurd" any suggestions that China had been involved in any manner with the Taliban [1]. For a state that habitually complains of being a victim to terrorism and “splittists” in Xinjiang, the People’s Republic of China courted the terrorists quite actively.

Ever pragmatic, the People’s Republic of China sought to nip the Uighur separatist movement in the bud by engaging its sponsors in Afghanistan. With the escalation of separatist violence across Xinjinag in 1998, China pressurized its Pakistani clients to rein in Islamic terrorists based in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan facilitated contact between the two sides. Five senior Chinese diplomats arrived in Kabul for talks with the ruling Taliban in February 1999, the first of a series of interactions. Chinese diplomats met with Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Interior Minister Mullah Abdur Razzaq and Deputy Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Zayef, Chinese food aid to the Taliban at the start of winter laid the groundwork for the visit. Following their first meeting, the Chinese announced they had agreed to start direct flights between Kabul and Urumqi, the capital of the troubled Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and open formal trade ties with the Taliban [2]. The Chinese also agreed to help provide the Taliban with arms and spares for its ageing equipment. Apparently, the two sides agreed to institutionalize military to military contacts [3]. In return the Taliban made it clear that they would not allow Afghan territory to be used against China [4]. The Taliban also facilitated the transfer of at least two unexploded US Tomahawks to China for $20 million each [5].

For the Taliban, its Chinese connection soon proved a commercial and strategic windfall. By 2001 China had become the biggest investor in Afghanistan, with ‘legitimate’ investments running to several tens of millions of dollars [6]. On the strategic front, the Chinese agreed to consider the Taliban’s position when UN sanctions against Afghanistan came up for discussion. In July 2001, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with a Taliban delegation whilst visiting Pakistan. A Chinese delegation headed by Lu Shulin, China’s ambassador to Pakistan, met with Mullah Muhammad Omar in this regard on December 12, 2000; becoming the first non-Muslims to meet with him. The Chinese trip came in response to a Taliban plea to Beijing to veto US-Russian moves to tighten United Nations sanctions against the Afghan Government. The fresh sanctions under discussion at the Security Council included travel restrictions against Taliban officials [7]. Earlier, in November 2000, a delegation from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, an influential think-tank run by the Ministry of State Security, visited Kabul and Kandahar [8].

In 2000, China's Huawei Technologies Co., the company that Washington has accused of helping Iraq to upgrade its military communications system despite Chinese denials, has other controversial interests in the region. It signed an agreement with the Taliban to install 12,000 fixed-line telephones in Kandahar. Meanwhile, another southern Chinese telecom firm, ZTE, had agreed to install 5,000 telephone lines in Kabul. The deal stalled until Pakistan could provide guarantees for the project [9].

Afghanistan's power grid, severely damaged by years of war, became the destination for the bulk of China’s investment. Repair and expansion work on the Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province began in early 2001. The Chinese Dongfeng Agricultural Machinery Company was hired to add 16.5 MW to its generating  [10]. Work was still in progress when the site was bombed in November this year [11].  Transmission lines from the Kajaki Dam to Kandahar were repaired in early 2001, along with a substation in the city, restoring supplies of electricity.  The Dahla Dam in Kandahar province also has been restored to operation, along with the Breshna-Kot Dam in Nangarhar province, which has a generating capacity of 11.5 MW.  The 66 MW Mahipar hydroelectric plant also is now operational [12]. The Chinese were also involved in refurbishing the Herat Cement Plant [13].

In July 2001 a Taliban delegation led by their Commercial Attaché to Pakistan, spent a week in China as guests of the government. Whilst the Chinese Commerce Ministry declined to accord them the requisite diplomatic protocol, it did facilitate their interaction with a group of Chinese industrialists and businessmen in order to explore business and investment opportunities [14]. The Chinese were dealing with the Taliban right up to the day of the WTC attacks. Indeed a new protocol on commercial relations was inked on the day of the attack [15]. The warmth of the China-Taliban relations can be gauged by annual felicitations conveyed by Mullah Omar (via Radio Shariat) on the occasion of China’s National Day since 1999, and by Osama bin Laden public proclamations of the need to cultivate ties as recently as August 2001 [16].

Notes

[1] ‘China Refutes US Reports on China-Taliban Ties’ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland September 16, 2001 http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk

[2] Ahmed Rashid ‘Taliban temptation’, Far Eastern Economic Review March 11, 1999.

[3] Tara Shankar Sahay ‘Taliban-China deal puzzles diplomats’ Rediff February 12, 1999.

[4] ‘Bin Ladin Calls for Taliban-China Good Relations to Reduce US Influence’ Ausaf (in Urdu) August 14, 2001. via FBIS

[5] China paid Laden for access to Cruise missiles AFP March 9, 2001.

[6] John Pomfret ‘China Strengthens Ties With Taleban by Signing Economic Deal’ Washington Post September 13, 2001.

[7] Munawar Hasan  'Taliban team to visit China to boost The Nation July 4, 2001. See also David Murphy and Susan V. Lawrence ‘Beijing Hopes to gain from US raids’ Far Eastern Economic Review October 4, 2001 and Dan Birstow 'China flirts with an independent pro-active Afghan policy' Central Asia Analyst January 3, 2001.

[8] Pomfret, ibid.

[9]‘China Firm Trades with Taliban’ Far Eastern Economic Review March 15, 2001.

[10] See ‘Afghanistan’ Energy Information Administration U.S. Department of Energy 2001.

[11] ‘US strikes targets around Kandahar’ AFP November 7, 2001.

[12] DOE, ibid,

[13] Pomfret, ibid.

[14] Munawar Hasan, ibid.

[15] Pomfret, ibid.

[16] Ausaf op. cit. and various broadcasts of Radio Shariat.