BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR - Volume 4(3) November-December 2001

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New Regime in Bangladesh, Boom time for North-eastern Insurgent Outfits: An Assessment

Bibhu Prasad Routray

 

Insurgency in India’s northeast, over the years, has continued to thrive not only from the presence of its weak neighbours but also from active promotion by particular regimes in countries like Bangladesh. It is case in point that the new Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) regime led by Begum Khaleda Zia was instrumental in supporting the insurgent outfits in the northeast during its previous rule. Under the broader parameter of an anti-Indian plank, the Khaleda Zia not only went for a vivid description of the terrorists as freedom fighters, but also provided them with considerable logistic support at the behest of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. Thus, its thumping win in the recently concluded elections was a definite sign of encouragement for the insurgent outfits. It was also a sign of concern for the people of the northeastern region as well as the administration who have started looking at the developments with utter scepticism. The sudden outbreak of persecution of the minority Hindu community in the country only reinforced their fears regarding the motive of the new regime. However, in the following analysis, the article would argue that not withstanding the savagery that has been let loose on the Hindus in that country and the initial hullabaloo among the insurgents, soon an approach aiming at a normal relations with India would prevail.

India’s image of a regional super power has both its advantages and drawbacks. Where it has provided India the leverage to determine the course of events in the sub-continent to an extent, the insecurity and animosity, not entirely unjustified, from the smaller nations has created additional problems. To a layman, Bangladesh should have been India’s greatest ally, the latter being the cause of its creation. There were times, that too in the recent past, when India’s policy makers found their tasks less cumbersome while defining equations with the eastern neighbour. But curious combination of factors, at times difficult to comprehend, has made Bangladesh stand up as a challenge, which requires fresh attention.

The Northeast Jigsaw:

It is amazing to discover how many north-eastern insurgent outfits find their safe haven in Bangladesh. Beginning with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), a number of outfits based in Meghalaya, Manipur were reported to have enjoyed the safety of the territory of that country. The news of BNP’s victory was so reported to have infused a sense of relief and a new sense of direction among the insurgents. A newspaper report in the aftermath of the announcement of the elections results said, “Intelligence agencies are of the unanimous view that twenty four proscribed organisations operating in the valley and hill areas in Manipur have many good reasons to be happy with the election outcome in Bangladesh.”[i] Another report quoted the spokesman of the NLFT, major Yamrock saying, “We are very happy with the results. The BNP treats us as freedom fighters.” He further added that BNP…had in the past assured the NLFT that its sanctuaries within Bangladesh would not be disturbed.”[ii] Intelligence sources also suggested a renewal of insurgency on behalf of the ULFA after the new regime takes up the mantle.

Numerous camps run by various insurgent outfits continue to thrive in Bangladesh. These camps are not only function from the dense forests of the country but also in its busy business hubs. The NSCN-IM built up a huge arsenal of arms at Bandarban with secret depots in Boly Bazaar, Alikodam, Kalazira, Kumairam and Mariampara. The Naga outfit exploits the gun-runners and the sea pirates to ship in the consignments of arms and ammunition at Cox Bazaar near Chittagong port city.”[iii] Intelligence sources suggest that areas such as Khakhrasuri, Kadomtala, Diginala, Bogaihat, Longtor, Silchai Lungtian, Thangnong, Reza, Kassolong, Myami Reserve Forest, Zopui and Alikanda harbour a number of camps of different outfits.”[iv]

Manipuri outfits such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) have an estimated five camps at Sonarupa tea estate in Chotodhamai under Borolenha police station, Anarastuila near Bhanugarh, Ram Nagar in the Sreemangal area, Kajaldhara tea estate near Kullaura and Subitbazar in Sylhet town. Areas such as Mymensingh, Jaintiapur and Joydebpur house camps run by the Meghalaya based insurgents of the Achik Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA) and the Hynniewtrep Volunteers Council (HVC).[v]

According to recent media reports, ULFA maintains seven camps in Bangladesh. Official sources maintain that the outfit has set up a strong base in the country after the new regime assumed power. Following the arrest of Yeng Sangma, a second lieutenant of the outfit in Meghalaya recently, ULFA’s activities in Bangladesh has assumed renewed focus. ULFA hitman Drishti Rajkhowa has been put in charge of activating the Bangladesh link.[vi]

The ULFA not only maintains a number of camps in the country but also extends its activities into many financially lucrative ventures. The ULFA Commander-in-Chief Paresh Baruah runs a transport agency, a tannery, department stores, garment factories, travel agencies, a public school in that country. The public school is situated close to the Prime Minister’s residence. For a number of years, the top ULFA leadership is based in Bangladesh and oversees its operations in India from there. Since 1997, the outfit’s general secretary Anup Chetia remains locked in a Dhaka jail.

The Multi-pronged Threat

Even if one tends to exonerate the Bangladeshi regime from the charge of promotion of the insurgents and attributes the overall development to the extra-ordinary surviving techniques of the latter, the inherent passivity in denying these advantages poses multiple challenges to the Indian state. It ranges from an uncontrolled inflow of arms into the country to the development of a collusive set up that involves men in high positions in the Bangladeshi army and the bureaucracy.

The Indian minister for State for Home Affairs, I D Swami was reported to have said that insurgent outfits in the northeast are receiving arms from countries like Bangladesh. Reacting to a report about the arrival of a large consignment of arms at Cox Bazaar port in Bangladesh in the first week of April 2001 of which a major part was smuggled to India through the thick forests and reached the insurgent outfits, the Minister denied the report, but said in no uncertain terms that three countries, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand, from and through which the illegal flow of arms are taking place in north-east, have already been sensitised.[vii]   The minister’s denial notwithstanding, Cox Bazaar in Bangladesh has emerged as a major port for ferrying illegal arms to the insurgents of various places.

According to intelligence reports, the NLFT maintains 29 camps in Bangladesh. There were also reports, emerging from the Indian media that before the October 1, 2001 elections, BNP leaders ‘had reached an understanding with the NLFT chief to provide safe sanctuary to its insurgents, if the BNP was voted to power. BNP leaders had wanted the NLFT to mobilise the villagers’ support in their favour for the elections. Activists of both the NLFT and the ATTF participated in the electioneering for the BNP.[viii] Intelligence sources stated that the NLFT leaders and cadres were also allowed to enrol in the Bangladesh voters’ lists and a section of them even exercised their franchise in the October 1 polls.[ix] These are dangerous signals for India, as the BNP’s sympathy towards the insurgents coupled with its sense of obligation might lead to a situation where the presence of malcontents is not only tolerated but also promoted from that territory.

The interrogation of Chandi Pada Jamatiya, the commander of the NLFT’s Panther Battalion, who surrendered in April 2001, provided details of the outfit’s safe houses, hideouts and camps in Bangladesh. Reports suggested that some elements in the Bangladeshi army maintain regular contacts with the insurgents. An investigation into the recent bomb blasts in Bangladesh found that Col. Mehboob of the Directorate General Forces Intelligence (DGFI) in Chittagong and Major Arshad, posted in Manisha in Khagrachari district with DGFI, are the two contact persons who arrange regular meetings with the NLFT.

The involvement of Christian missionaries with the activities of the NLFT, which primarily is a Christian dominated outfit provides another angle to the story. The report said that, “Sukhamoy Das and Dipankar, in charge of the Rajendrapur Mission, are involved in the outfit’s clandestine activities in Bangladesh. They along with the Tripura Baptist Christian Union (TBSU) are helping NLFT preach in the tribal areas of Tripura. Not so long ago, a senior priest of the TBSU was arrested with a large cache of explosives in North Tripura.”[x]

For outfits like ULFA, the embassy of Pakistan in Dhaka has acted as the nodal agency for arranging fake passports and other forms of logistic support. A Statement laid on the table of the house of Assam Legislative Assembly on April 6, 2000by the Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta stated “Assam Police is in possession of plenty of evidence to show that the top ULFA leadership is in touch with certain officials of the Pakistani High Commission in Dacca. The ULFA leaders have been travelling to Pakistan regularly. Pakistani agencies have already imparted arms training to hundreds of ULFA cadres. According to the statement of scores of arrested ULFA leaders including their self-styled Vice Chairman Pradip Gogoi, the Pakistani officials in their High Commission in Dacca arrange for their passport in various Muslim names and send them to Karachi. From Karachi airport, they are whisked away in unmarked vehicles to the training centres. Specific evidence to such trips by dozens of ULFA leaders is already available.”[xi]

It further states “ISI has procured different passports for Paresh Baruah, the self-styled C-in-C of ULFA in different names. Assam Police has been able to procure a copy of one passport issued to Paresh Baruah in the name of Kamaruddin Zaman Khan. Documentary evidence suggests that this Bangladeshi passport has been obtained by fraudulent means with the help of an official of the Pakistani High Commission.”[xii]

The Threat: A Reality Check

Bangladesh, thus, remains a hub where anti-India elements are nurtured and their activities are promoted. The sympathy exhibited by the BNP regime in the past for the insurgents is also a matter of concern. The large-scale exodus of the minority Hindu community from that country to states like Tripura after being subjected to various forms of abuse by criminal elements claiming to be aligned with the ruling coalition could also be an indication of events to unfold. However, does all that amount to a possible adventurism on part of the new regime to promote insurgent outfits to continue their activities? Would the capability of Bangladesh translate itself once again into an actual situation of feeding anti-Indian forces from its territory? The following analysis suggest in the negative. A number of factors would actually prevent the anti-India elements in the current regime from playing their parts to the maximum extent.

One needs to realise that the world order has undergone a dramatic transformation in the aftermath of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre. The global resolve to ‘smoke terrorists out of their holes’ creates at least a transitory dilemma in the minds of promoters and harbingers of terror. The follow up campaign to eradicate the ‘symptom of terrorism’ hangs like a Damocles’ sword over the lingo that describes terrorists as freedom fighters. It’s a different world, it’s a different India and it has to be a different Bangladesh. One genuinely expects the prudent elements in the BNP-led coalition to appreciate this.

If the previous argument applies to the Bangladeshi regime, it would apply to the ISI in a similar vein. As a matter of fact the insurgent outfits, with or without their indulgence in financially lucrative ventures would find themselves gullible minus the support of the Pakistani intelligence network and logistical support. The Bangladeshi hospitality might keep them alive, but won’t certainly be sufficient to keep them going. In the continuing war against terror, the ISI is expected to maintain a low profile and refrain from going overboard in supporting the outfits like the ULFA and other Muslim outfits of Assam. As the war against the Taliban has already resisted signs of premature conclusion, the ‘lying low position’ for the ISI is also expected to be protracted. It can also be expected that the previously easy and unhindered flow of finance, arms for the insurgent outfits would tread a much exigent route.

There are reasons to believe that the BNP’s much-professed independent foreign policy largely accommodates an anti-India posture. The party fights the elections under such a plank and the reason that it has swept the polls gives it no reason to abandon its policies. However, international politics is a strange ball game. Begum Zia’s post-swearing in commitment of maintaining a friendly relation with India is an indication of that. Her government on October 14 said it would take up ‘on priority basis’ with India the issue of border clashes and the ganges-water sharing treaty signed by the former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.[xiii] Cooperation between India and Bangladesh has its obvious advantages for both the countries. While this realisation seems to have dawned upon India since long, the BNP regime would also realise this. After all conspiracy theories take root only after failed governments look for alternatives to stay in power. Development within Bangladesh within the broader parameter of South Asian development would nullify the need to indulge in such backbiting manoeuvres.

The election results, fortunately has been able to stamp a seal of authority over the BNP’s rule. The fact that BNP, on its own, has the capacity to form government would also have a deterring effect on the wacky elements of the Jamaat-i-Islami. The inclusion of the Jamaat in the government is only a pre-poll obligation, which is less likely to be carried to the field of key policy formulation. The nature of portfolios assigned to the Jamaat members of parliament is itself an indication to the fact. While the BNP retains key ministries, its partners have been assigned only minor departments. The much-publicised involvement of the Jamaat cadres in the attack over the minority Hindu community will also call for increased government control on their activities.

The fear of promotion of the insurgents by the BNP regime is also unfounded because of the very fact that the support provided to them by the Bangladeshi regime never stopped even during the Sheikh Hasina government. Even though there has been no reported examples of her government providing support to the insurgents, the latter continued to maintain their camps and safe houses within the country unhindered. It is also a sad commentary on the Indian government that it, in spite of a ‘friendly’ government in that country could do little in terms of neutralising the advantages the insurgents enjoy since a long time.

Need for a Cautious Approach:

While the above analysis concludes that various pulls and the counter pulls would prevent the new BNP regime from adopting an anti-India stance, there is however, need for India to adopt lot of caution. One element, which almost remains unaffected by the above mentioned deterrents are the hawkish and adventurous elements in the Bangladesh army. It needs to be emphasised that some of these elements had led the Bangladeshi Rifles (BDR) to attack the Border Security Force (BSF) Personnel in April this year. Thus, effective border management is one important aspect India would have to ensure on a continuous basis. It would heal the insecurity among the civilian population in those areas and also act as a check on the movement of the insurgents.

It has been observed that intensification of border control has not been able to put a check on the cross-border passage of the insurgents. Thus, in addition to equipping the BSF personnel with required amenities, the step to set up a people’s army in the lines of the demands made by the Syiems (traditional chiefs) of Meghalaya can be given a serious thought. The BNP government needs to given the benefit of doubt and India needs to believe in the former’s sincerity to resolve the bilateral issues through a process of dialogue. A ‘hot pursuit’ type of method can only complicate matters. It needs to be emphasised that without the help of the Bangladeshi authorities our regular raids on the safe houses of insurgent leaders is bound to meet with repeated failures.[xiv]  

A ‘wait and watch’ policy regarding the BNP government’s attitude towards the insurgents would be fruitful. Any deviation from its professed policy of resolving bilateral issues through dialogue is not likely to escape Indian attention. Adequate response can be devised keeping that in mind. All said and done, there seems to be no respite from a continuous monitoring of the insurgents activities in that country. In our own war against insurgency, we can hardly afford to be oblivious of even trivial developments. As the policy makers continue to assess the permutation and combination, the personnel manning the border would continue to pose in blink-less attention.


Notes

[i] ‘Manipur ultras happy with the election outcome in Bangladesh’, Sentinel (Guwahati), October 10, 2001.

[ii] Sarbri Majumdar, “Bangladesh in a bind over Indian rebels”, http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/CJ05Df02.html

[iii] “Will B’desh’s rough terrain soften ground for NE rebels?”, Sentinel, November 9,2001.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] ‘ULFA setting up strong base in Bangladesh’, Assam Tribune (Guwahati), November 12, 2001.

[vii] ‘NE ultras getting funds from Europe’, Sentinel, July 28, 2001.

[viii] ‘N-E insurgency up after Bangla polls’, Statesman (Kolkata), October 18, 2001.

[ix] ‘Militants turn voters in Bangla’, Statesman, October 5, 2001.

[x] ‘Terror in Tripura, Part-II’, http://thenewspapertoday.com/ntmobile/prinside.phtml?NEWS_ID=22915

[xi] ‘ISI Activities in Assam’, Statement laid on the table of the house of Assam legislative Assembly’, April 6, 2000.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] ‘B’desh to take up border issue’, Meghalaya Guardian (Guwahati), October 15, 2001.

[xiv] Assam police executes periodic raids on the safe houses of the ULFA leaders in Bangladesh. However, this has met with very little success in terms of eliminating these leaders or even arresting them. It is believed that the operations fail as a result of tip off received by the insurgents about the raids.

 

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