| Article Reviews
India's Central Asian
Interests
Meena Singh Roy,India's Interests in Central Asia,
Strategic Analysis, IDSA, March 2001 Vol.
XXIV No. 12, pp 2273-2289
The main thrust of Meena Singh Roy's article India's
Interests in Central Asia is to highlight the fact that the five newly created Central
Asian Republics, after the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 90s, will play an
increasingly important role in the twenty-first century. This region enjoys an abundance
of untapped natural resources -- especially hydrocarbons -- which will play an important
role in the energy security of India. These nations are underdeveloped and are in need of
a lot of assistance to develop. This dovetails nicely with what the Indian industry and
technology firms can offer.
India is currently "under-involved"
in that region inspite of the fact that the region is accepted as India's "extended
neighborhood". India has had a deep and rich historical and civilizational link with
the region. In modern times, this link has developed to encompass geopolitical as well as
in economic spheres. Ensuring peace and stability in the region is of great strategic
interest to India. This region is currently undergoing a turbulent period with the
disruptive influence of radical Islam at its doorstep, bringing with it a culture of arms
and drug trafficking in order to finance the Islamic revolution. This article examines
what India's interests are in the region and how India can get involved and assist in
stabilizing the region and developing economic ties with the region. At the same time,
keep a firm check on the spread of radical Islam and the culture of guns and drugs in the
region.
The five newly created nations, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrghyzstan -- also called the Central Asian
Republics or CAR -- occupy an extremely pivotal geographic location. They are smack in the
middle of the region that connects Russia, the Middle East, South Asia and The Far East.
Currently major infrastructure projects like railways, oil pipelines as well as
development of Hydropower are underway in these republics with the assistance of countries
like Russia, USA, Turkey and Iran. Other countries like China, Japan, South Korea, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan are also competing to carve out an area of influence.
India, as an emerging regional power in South Asia is naturally interested in any changes
occurring within or close to the region, which may have implications for its security.
The CAR are a predominantly Muslim states
but, they are also moderate and multi-cultural. They are very vulnerable to attack from
the Islamic extremists currently ruling Afghanistan and running rampant in Pakistan.
Today, Afghanistan and Pakistan are involved in running camps that impart military
training to radical Islamic guerillas. These camps are state sponsored and are run under
the supervision of the state intelligence agencies, especially the ISI of Pakistan. The
sole aim of these terrorists is to destabilize large regions ranging from Bosnia and
Chechnya in Europe to Kashmir and Xinjiang in Asia. These radical Islamic movements have
affected the CARs and India very negatively.
A major side effect of these radical Islamic
movements is that in order to finance their nefarious activities, the extremists turn to
the drug trade. The area of Afghanistan and CARs are eminently suited for growing opium
poppies and hence they are flooding the world with heroin. Afghanistan produces 75% of the
world's illegal opium. This is transported to the US, Russia and Europe via the CARs. This
has made large parts of poverty-ridden populations of the CARs active participants in the
drug trade. It is estimated that the total drug trade brings in $50 billion annually. Arms
and drugs go hand in hand and the drug dealers are awash with money and hence they have
armed themselves with private armies and extremely sophisticated arms. The CARs are also
very rich in mineral resources and have vast deposits of Uranium. There is a serious
concern of proliferation of weapons of Mass Destruction to the Radical Islamists. Many
countries that have an economic stake in these regions are joining together to fight this
menace. India needs to take a very active role in these emerging alliances in order to
combat these extremists.
As mentioned earlier, India and the CAR have
a lot to offer each other and can pursue a perfectly complementary relationship. India is
a ready market for the CAR oil and Gas and the CAR could use Indian assistance for
developing their infrastructure as well are a ready market for Indian goods. The author
discusses several interesting initiatives that have been undertaken and are at various
stages of completion between India, Iran, CAR and Russia. All of these initiatives have to
do with developing trade and transit routes for movement of goods to and from India.
In conclusion, India has a great strategic
interest in participating in the development of the CARs in the twenty-first century.
There is a great interest developing a deep trade relationship between the CARs and India
with the CARs supplying Oil and Gas and India providing technology and goods. In order to
make this trade relationship come to fruition, India needs to actively assist in
preventing the spread of Radical Islam and the culture of drugs and guns from destroying
the nascent, moderate and multi-cultural CAR nation states.
A.Kolal
Gurmeet Kanwal, Safety and Security of India's N-Weapons,
Strategic Analysis, IDSA, April 2001 Vol. XXV
No. 1, pp 5-20
The title of this article is slightly
misleading. The author examines the complexities of command and control of nuclear
weapons, but also delves into civil-military relations, the credibility of India's
deterrent, management of anti-ballistic missiles systems, and the effect of a 20 kiloton
nuclear detonation over Delhi. As a result, the article ends without a conclusion, and
many of the important points the author tries to make are lost or partially obscured.
The key point the author appears to be trying
to make is the importance of balancing the requirements for civilian control and
operational efficiency in India's emerging nuclear arsenal. He states that "there is
no compelling reason for India to maintain fully assembled nuclear warheads, mated with
the delivery systems…(p. 1)" - a reasonable interpretation of the Draft Nuclear
Doctrine of 1999. But he also concedes that a robust and secure nuclear arsenal is
insufficient for stability in the subcontinent, and recognizes that "[A]n atmosphere
of mutual trust and confidence is a prerequisite for nuclear stability and
peace.(p.2)" The author is not clear exactly how to achieve this atmosphere, but this
point is a refreshing reminder that nuclearization alone is insufficient to ensure India's
security - a point many analysts either miss entirely or choose to ignore.
Kanwal then examines the public evidence
regarding the military role in the Indian nuclear program. He argues that "need to
know" may have justified its exclusion to some extent, but that the development of
actual nuclear forces requires military involvement in their design and deployment. He
argues that "…Pakistan's declared policy of employing a nuclear strike on Indian
forces to ward of imminent military defeat…(p. 2)" requires greater Indian
military involvement in the program to devise appropriate tactics, techniques, and
procedures for fighting nuclear wars - but does not provide a source for this assessment
of the Pakistani program, which might have been useful. His argument for preparation for
nuclear war as a necessary part of the deterrence function differs significantly from the
remarks of Jasjit Singh, and indicates the existence of multiple possible paths towards an
appropriate and robust nuclear deterrent (see review in the previous issue of Monitor).
The author then digresses into a discussion
of whether the lack of military involvement has undermined the credibility of India's
nuclear deterrent (pp. 2-4)- an important discussion, but one unrelated to the questions
of command, control, and safety. He does note that many of the tasks associated with
creating a nuclear deterrent fall into the hands of trained technicians and scientists,
but that others fall entirely in the domain of military personnel, thus sequeing back to
his original topic. He proposes a tri-service Strategic Forces Command, which would hone
its skills and preparations through constant rehearsal, drill, and training in order to
breed efficiency and pride. This training would also reinforce the credibility of India's
deterrent, according to the author.
Kanwal then initiates a useful discussion of
control and storage issues, distinguishing between assertive control (weapons firmly in
the hands of civilians and scientists, and only released when necessary) and delegative
control, where weapons are in the hands of the military but use must be authorized by
civilian authorities. The expansion of the nuclear arsenal, in the U.S. case, eroded
assertive control, as did the change in doctrine towards earlier use of nuclear weapons
and the theory of the escalatory ladder.
The author focuses on the U.S. literature on
command and control, arguing that electronic safety devices can substantially enhance
delegative control by ensuring a high standard of safety and a minimal threat of
unauthorized use. He argues that Protective Action Links (PALS) mean that
"custody" no longer requires "physical possession" - again permitting
delegative control. He states that PALS ensures that a nuclear weapon cannot be used
without the approval of the highest custodian. In an era of increasingly sophisticated
computer espionage and intrusion, this perspective may change rapidly. PALS have been
sufficient to date, but trusting completely in an electronic interface may no longer be
wise or certain. Kanwal does argue that the nuclear core and conventional high explosive
trigger assembly should still be maintained in separate locations, to ensure against
accidents and unauthorized use. He argues that storage sites must be dispersed and must be
in locations other than scientific and nuclear establishments in the interests of
minimizing the incentive for pre-emptive nuclear strikes by adversaries. Finally, the
author argues for creation of a separate organization to maintain the safety and security
of India's nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, which are likely to be increasingly
decentralized and mobile in the future. He states that the army is probably the most
likely candidate to provide this force, and outlines just some of the vast organizational
challenges that such a force will face.
T. Hoyt
Ehud Sprinzak, Rational Fanatics, Foreign
Policy, September/October 2000
This article examines the phenomenon of
suicide bombings giving an in depth account of its origin and development. It examines the
general perceptions regarding this type of terrorism and then proceeds to demystify some
of these perceptions. It also identifies in broad terms what are the options available in
combating this phenomenon which, at the surface level at least defies any effective
answers.
Origin and Development: The writer
regards the 1983 Beirut bombings as the starting point of the modern trend of suicide
bombings. He traces the level of helplessness expressed by governments and the media at
that time in preventing such attacks. It led to the perception that these bombers were
religious fanatics who were irrational zealots. These were termed as individual acts of
terror stemming from religious fanaticism and that it was virtually impossible to prevent
such motivated terrorists. Expert opinion however felt that suicide bombing offered
tactical advantage over conventional terrorism. It was a simple and low cost operation,
which could guarantee mass casualities and no fear of intelligence loss as the
perpetrators would normally perish. The author traces back the origins of suicide attacks
to the 11th century and states that even then the perpetrators never perceived it as a
suicide mission but as acts of martyrdom in the name of their community or God.
Myths Demystified: The author states
that contrary to popular belief, "suicide terrorism is not a product of merely
religious fervour, Islamic or otherwise." Quoting experts he argues that the mind-set
of a suicide bomber is no different from any dedicated terrorist who wishes to live after
an operation but realises that the chances are negligible. He states that it is merely one
type of martydom venerated by certain cultures or religious traditions but rejected by
others who favour different modes of supreme sacrifice. Such acts vary from culture and
also by specific circumstances. Studies have shown that suicide bombers do not fit into
any single psychological profile. Quoting experts, the author concludes that intense
struggles produce several types of people with a willingness to die. No organisation can
create a person's basic willingness to die. So the task of a terrorist outfit's recruiters
are to identify this predisposition in a candidate and not to produce it. He then has to
reinforce this predisposition. This is done by exploiting religious beliefs, patriotism,
hatred for the enemy and a profound sense of victimisation. This leads to the conclusion
that suicide terrorism is an organisational phenomena and has to be combated at that level
rather than trying to deter individuals. The auhtor states that the suicide terrorist is
the last in the chain. Once a decision to launch a suicide attack is made, there are at
least six operations involved: target selection, intelligence gathering, recruitment,
physical and "spiritual" training, preparation of explosives and transportation
of the suicide bombers to the target area. As a result, any operation involves a lot of
people who have no intention of dying but without them a suicide mission is not possible.
Organisations which adopt suicide
terrorism: The author proceeds to examine the motivation for a terrorist organisation
to adopt such a tactic. In the first group are those organisations, which do not practice
this on a regular basis or approve of its use. Even here there might be local affiliates,
who may initiate such acts for a variety of reasons. In this context, the author states
that this leads to a factor termed as "pre-suicide terrorism." Such acts may lay
the ground for creating an institutionalized policy of suicide terrorism. The author
states that many groups are skeptical of its strategic value but resort to it as a tactic
in exceptional circumstances. In another group are those organisations, which adopt
suicide terrorism as a temprorary strategy. The leaders obtain or give religious or other
sanction for its use, recruit, train and execute missions with some specific objectives in
mind. In such cases the policy is temporary and conditional. This generally happens when
the leaders are moved by extreme sense of crisis, convinced of the effectiveness of the
tactic, and endorsement and support of their community for such a policy. They are however
aware that the conditions may change and have no problems in calling off the policy. In
the last group are those organisations, which adopt as part of their long-term strategy
and institutionalize it on a permanent basis. The LTTE are the only example of this kind
currently. Here the suicide bombers are not a product of religious cult but a personality
cult based on their leader Prabhakaran. The formation of Black Tigers (suicide squad) was
a development of an early practice of carrying cyanide pills by the regular cadre.
Prabhakaran's fierce commitment to his cause, the repressive regime by Sinhalese resulting
in large scale sense of acute victimisation made it possible for the LTTE to develop this
into their war fighting doctrine.
Strategies to Combat Suicide Terrorism:The
author states that by examining the data, the perceived strength of the suicide bombers is
that they are lone, irrational fanatics who cannot be deterred. The actual weakness is
that they are merely an instrument of terrorist leaders who expect to gain certain
tangible benefits from such acts. The answer therefore is to make terrorist organisations
aware that their decision to embark on this course will incur painful costs. There is no
simple formula for countering this threat. However, the author suggests two complementary
political and operational strategies. Terrorist organisations can implement this policy
only if their community supports its use. Political and economic sanctions against such
communities, combined with effective coercive diplomacy against their foreign patrons may
reduce the chances of suicide terrorism. Such political counter terrorism takes a long
time to be effective and the results are never certain. Political efforts need to backed
up by strong operational campaign. Governments need not employ entirely new tactics but
intensify operations directed against the vulnerabilities of suicide bombers.
The Achilles' heel is that the suicide bomber
is part of a large operational infrastructure. Once it is established that an organisation
has adopted suicide terrorism as policy, security services can strike at commanders and
field officers who recruit, train and plan such attacks. It calls for an effective network
of informers, monitoring of potential collaborators and close cooperation between
international intelligence agencies. Consistent efforts to harass and attack on terrorist
infrastructure should be made. Ways to cut off financial networks like international bank
accounts, front companies are also recommended. The idea is to get the potential
terrorists on the run regardless of hard evidence of planned suicide attacks. The physical
protection of targets can also play an important role in minimising the effect of a
successful attack. Concrete barriers, check posts, road blocks etc can play a vital role
in this regard.
The solution suggested is to have
complementary political and operational strategies targeting the infrastructure that
support suicide terrorism. The author's view is that since suicide bombers are a product
of an organisational infrastructure and it is necessary for an organisational
infrastructure to be in place for a terrorist outfit to pursue suicide terrorism, it can
only be tackled with such an approach.
Conclusion: The author has written a
balanced article and clearly demystifies the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. It
represents a rational analysis of data and he has come up with an appropriate approach in
terms of combating the phenomenon. He concludes that terrorism has to be recognised as a
psychological warfare and suicide terrorism is the ultimate expression of this struggle.
Governments have to convince the people that they are doing their best to protect them and
make ordinary people realise that a psychological warfare is being waged. Free people tend
to become terrorism anti bodies once they believe that they are being psychological
manipulated by the terrorists with such shock tactics. The author's article represents an
objective study and the conclusions are arrived at in a logical manner. The hypothesis
that suicide bombers are not individual acts of terror and that it needs an organisational
backing is supported by a lot of data by the author. In my view, the author has built a
strong case for his hypothesis.
With regard to the strategies that he has
outlined, it may be a subject for debate given the fact that Israel, which has been
implementing many aspects of this strategy have not managed to curb the number of such
suicide attacks. It can however be argued that such a strategy can at least minimise the
impact on the general public and raise the stakes considerably for the terrorist
organisations planning to pursue such a policy. It would be interesting to compare the
efforts of India's anti-terrorism operations in Jammu and Kashmir especially against the
"fidayeen" groups. Some of the political and operational strategies being
adopted seem to be similar (is that an indication of increased Indo- Israeli dialogue) and
apparently it seems to be succeeding.
M. Rajaram |
