Last Stand at Lagyala Gompa
L N Subramanian
In
January 1989 a jeep carrying a lady was winding its way through Tawang. As it neared a
bridge in Dirang the local people gathered around. The lady beckoned to a girl and asked
her if she knew a place called Lagyala Gompa. The girl replied " Yes we go
there for our spring festival and worship and there is tigers grave to which they
offer flowers". The lady asked "Why they worshiped at the grave of a strange
soldier". The girl replied "Wah sahib itna bara aadmi , itna bara Sher mara hai
wahan, to kya hum puja nahin karein". The tiger was Lt. Col. Brahmanand Avasthy of 4th
Rajput and the lady was Mrs Sushila Avasthy. In one of the last battles of the 1962 war,
the men of 4th Rajput fought a valiant battle to the last man last bullet. This
is their story.
Induction
of 4th Rajput
With
the setback at Namka Chu, fresh troops were being rushed to NEFA. 4th Rajput
which was in Belgaum was asked to move. It was without a commanding officer at this time.
It moved via Pune, Barauni and reached New Missamar on 23rd October. Major
Trilok Nath who was officiating as CO was told that it was assigned to 65th
Brigade under Brigadier G.M.Saeed. The battalion had a strength of 8 officers, 18 JCOs and
575 ORs. The battalion was asked to occupy the left side of Bomdi La with 1 Madras on the
right. But even before it could get there it was reassigned to Dirang Dzong. There was
utter chaos at New Missamar. There was desperate demands being made for troop labour. 1
Ton trucks were plying and were being grabbed by whoever needed it. While most of the
battalion had to foot it to Dirang, Major K P P Nair managed to get 4 vehicles to carry
some of the heavy baggage.
The
first Company to reach Dirang was D company under Major P.L. Kukrety. He was personaly
briefed by Major General A.S. Pathania and asked to occupy the left flank of the Division
covering the approach from Orka La-Punsum la. Kukrety moved his men quickly and reached
his position in one day instead of the expected three. While the actual distance was 30
kms with ridges and rivers cutting it the Rajputs did it in 28 hours. They quickly dug in
positions and sited their MMG section and 3.7 in howitzer. Over the next few days they
witnessed the remnants of Brigadier Dalvis brigades filterering through along with
refugees and a few Chinese prisoners. The Chinese prisoners were debriefed and sent away
to Bn Hq. In spite of not getting permission to register his guns Major Kukrety went ahead
and ranged them.
Meanwhile
C company was hijacked by a staff officer of 4th Infantry division to be used
for protecting Divisional headquarters. Finally a permanent CO was assigned. Lt. Col
Brahmanand Avasthy was the Adjutant at IMA, Dehradun before being posted as Senior
Instructor for the Junior Commanders course at Infantry School, MHOW. He was to take
over 2nd Rajput which was the batalion he was commissioned in. But by the time
he could get there 2nd Rajput was decimated at Namka Chu. So he was assigned 4th
Rajput and was immensely proud of being the Rajputs CO. Avasthy was considered one
of the finest officers in the army. A thorough professional he quickly got into stride. He
sent a long note to Major Kukrety advising him on the siting of guns and MMGs. He gave
advice to the quartermasters on the nuances of running the logistics which he considered
the most important aspect of keeping a battalion finely tuned.
Further
assignments were handed out which continued the piecemeal deployment seen all over NEFA. A
section of mountain guns were deployed to assist D company under Captain Ghosal. They were
situated 1 km from Dangsikpu. A platoon from C company under Naib Subedar Ranjit Singh was
sent with the guns.
A
Company led by Major KPP Nair was asked to move along track Nyukmadong, east of Pt 3011-
Tangyapand report on Chinese movement and seal the approach and prevent any infiltration
attempts to cut of the retreat of 4th Division. The terrain A company had to
traverse is mountainous dense forests at 10000 to 14000 feet. The paths were 3 feet wide,
visibility about 5 meters due to thick fog. With porters not available for fear of the
enemy the troops had to manhandle the equipment themselves slowing them down. Meanwhile 2nd
Lt Choudhary of 6 Field Regiment was sent along with an OP party. Choudhary was a
greenhorn and showed it. Nair found him nervous and moody and was concerned on his
reliability. Still by 12th November Nair reached Pt 3446 near his position. The
artillery tried to register the guns but the thick vegetation hide the smoke and the group
had to be satisfied with registering the mortars.
Meanwhile
a patrol of 1 Sikh had reported enemy activity at Luguthang village. On account of this
Nair was asked to send out a patrol under Naib Rai Singh along with an FOO. Nair tried to
get Trilok Nath to drop the requirement for the FOO as he felt the greenhorn would only be
a problem and with the guns not yet ranged not much use. But he was overruled. As the
patrol was returning Choudhary insisted on a break and decided to brew tea. Rai Singh
protested but Choudhary refused to listen. Finally Rai Singh left a section to guard the
officer and continued on. A short while later a chinese unit attracted by the smoke
assaulted and wiped it out. Only one man Sepoy Ganga Din made it back to tell the story.
Ambush
of composite patrol
To
follow up on the 1 Sikh patrol a strong patrol consisting of a company 2 Sikh LI, 2
platoons of 4 Sikh LI and 1 Sikh LI making a total of 200 men was sent out. THe patrol
crossed the Luguthana-Kya La line and headed North East. It planned to climb the highest
ridge to get a commanding view of the area to harass and interdict the Chinese. But it was
dark as the patrol reached the foot of the ridge. The patrol decided to halt for the night
and draw up defenses. But unkown to it the Chinese had their own patrols on the lookout
for Indian patrols. A Chinese patrol tracked the Sikhs and as night drew called in
reinforcements to surround it. Late at night they attacked. The Sikhs tried to put up a
defense but were ineffective. 63 men were killed or wounded and the rest fell back in
complete disarray.
The
news of the ambush stunned the Brigade HQ. Still aggressive patrolling was maintained. A
party of 4th Rajput under Naib Subedar Man Singh encountered the Chinese in the
Jalak Pu area. On hearing the news Major Nair rushed in to reinforce with his 2 remaining
platoons. The engagement continued for some time before Nair was asked to pull back to his
original positions. The Chinese having suffered some casualties retreated to find another
way around his point. This was in keeping with their tactic of maintaining their
objectives which was to get into positions behind Indian lines to cut of troops retreating
from Sela.
While
frantic debates were going on at Corps and Division HQ about the fate of Se La, Lt. Col.
Avasthy went about deploying his units to be in the best positions. C company less a
platoon was pulled back from Lubrang and deployed on Pt 2898. B company under Major Mullay
had occupied Gompacher.
Meanwhile
the confused decision had been arrived to withdraw from Sela. The analysis of this
decision is another chapter by itself. Suffice to say it was characterised by utter
confusion. With 62 Infantry Brigade falling back from Sela it looks like Awasthi decided
to defend Bridge 1 to allow the brigade and remnants from 4th Division to
retreat. At 0730 hrs on 18th morning the HQ 65th Infantry Brigade
asked the battalion to withdraw. A little later Battalion HQ asked D company to fall back
to Headquarters are near Sapper Camp. By the time the Battalion HQ decided to withdraw
they had elements of B company, elements of C company and D company. This group consisted
of seven officers. In addition to Lt Col Avasthy it included Major Trilok Nath, Major Y
Tandon, Captain Dayal Singh, Captain SK Mitra, Lieutenant DS Drar and Second Lieutenant
Chatrapati Singh. 4th Rajput units had fought cohesively to allow the men in
the north in Se La to fall back. Avasthy and his men waited for as much time as possible
holding of sporadic Chinese attacks. 62nd Brigade never came its broken
elements had already filtered through other routes. Finally Avasthy pulled back to Lubrang
destroying any stores that could not be carried back. From there he moved to Phudung
joined by various stragglers. The party soon swelled. Many of them wounded had to be
carried. Avasthy himself was carrying the medic who was snow blinded. This force reached
Priyadung, where they saw that the track bifurcated to Morshing. One side climbed towards
an old monastery Lagyala Gompa and the other followed a stream towards Morshing. With
stories of local guides misleading units and delivering them to Chinese ambushes fresh in
their minds there was some discussion on which route to take. For some reason Avasthy and
his Rajputs took the route to Lagyala Gompa.
Last
moments of 4th Rajput
Lagyala
Gompa, the last monastery is located on a high feature overlooking the Morshing Valley as
well as the route Avasthy was taking. There was a plateau just before it made its steep
climb to the monastery. It was an ideal killing field. Unfortunately a 500 strong Chinese
unit had already moved in behind and one group was waiting in ambush at Lagyala Gompa. As
Avasthy and his approached the Gompa they came under heavy fire from the Chinese. Avasthy
and his men hit back. They could have probably chosen to fall back and look for another
way around but decided to fight the Chinese. Although lacking heavy firepower Avasthy
launched a 2 pronged counter attack. The battle was fierce and the Chinese annoyed by the
casualties they were taking tried to isolate Avasthy and cut him off. But Avasthys
men surrounded their gallant leader and fought to the bitter end. Finally it came down to
hand to hand combat and after a few hours the Chinese prevailed. The battlefield was a
ghastly sight. Over 200 Chinese bodies and 126 Indian bodies littered the area. Every
Indian was killed or wounded ie 100 percent casualties. Among them were Avasthy and his
fellow officers. A shepherd boy who later became the Head Lama of the monastery is the
only witness to this heroic episode. The Chinese dug a mass grave for the Indians and left
a flattened ration tin with the names of the officers. After the ceasefire the bodies were
retrieved. Avasthys body was found with a blood soaked letter to his wife.
A
company led by Major KPP Nair lost contact with the Battalion after being told to fall
back to the foot hills. After a long trek they reached Sapper camp only to see the Chinese
troops milling about. Moving cross country via Sangti they moved towards Tenga valley.
Meanwhile their column too swelled with stragglers from various units. Short of Tenga they
came across the body of a dead 1 Madras jawan. Cautiously they tried to get a feel of who
was in charge of Tenga valleys. While they could see men in olive green move about in the
distance they were still unable to confirm that it was Indian troops. An encounter with a
Chinese patrol made them back off and take a detour through the jungle eventually reaching
Bhalukpang on December 3. This remarkable bunch of men consisting of Rajputs, Sikhs and
Dogras still retained their rifles, radios and other stores till the very end. At one
point starving they came across a wild pig. One of the soldiers went after it and then
came back emptyhanded. When asked what happened he said " Ham usko nahin marenge, woh
bachhe wali hai" (I wont kill it , she is pregnant). The men had not eaten for
days living on wild roots and other jungle food.
Meanwhile
Kukretys column likewise had fallen back after losing contact with Battalion HQ.
Reaching Phudung he found the Chinese already there. Trying to avoid Chinese columns they
moved towards Jamla. Their party had also swelled with stragglers and was later ambushed
by the Chinese. Somehow the group reached Bhutan and eventually reached Bhairabkhund. From
there Kukrety was taken to Lt Gen Kaul for debriefing and was treated to tea and sweets by
Lt Col Shahbeg Singh. The Corps Commander asked Kukrety if he would go back and see what
became of 4th Rajputs HQ party. Kukrety accordingly went and and discovered the
ambush site and mass grave and had the unfortunate task of identifying the men.
Epilogue
It
is an irony that the war started and ended with Rajput battalions bearing the brunt of
Chinese attacks. In Lt Col Bramhanand Avasthy the Regiment and the Indian Army lost one of
its finest officers. Considered one of the best COs in the Indian Army he was responsible
for many of the drills still followed in the Indian Army. One General remarked that if he
had a few more officers like Avasthy the story of 1962 would have been very different. As
Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd) said that if Avasthy had survived he would have certainly risen
high in the Indian Army. It is one of the sad ironies of war that men like Avasthy never
received any honour because there was no one left to cite them or those who were there are
too ashamed to come forward and have their role exposed. There must be many more such
heroes whose deeds are known to a few. Other than the Army and their family the rest of
the country remains ignorant of their sacrifice. In fact it has been their families who
have continued untiring efforts to keep their memory and try and get them the recognition
they richly deserve. Lt Col Avasthy left behind a wife and 2 young daughters. His wife Mrs
Sushila Avasthy had to pull herself together and bring up 2 daughters all alone. In spite
of this she never flagged in her attempt to keep his memory alive. She has written poems,
has proof read other books on the war and continues to hope for due recognition for her
late husband. The country has not done much for people like her but the least it could do
is visit this painful past and right some of its wrongs. This is why it is important to
publish the Henderson Brooks report which may contain information on many such unsung
heroes.
Acknowledgements
The
author wishes to acknowledge the time and effort Mrs Sushila Avasthy took to answer his
emails, locate info on 4th Rajput and locate Lt Col Avasthys picture. She
truly is a national treasure.
Thanks
to D Sandhu for getting him started on this article with information from the references
below.
References
A
Soldier Recalls Lt Gen S K Sinha (Retd)
Rivers
of Silence Maj Gen Kalyan Verma (retd)
Living
up to Heritage History of Rajput Regiment Lt Col Mustasad Ahmad
When
Generals Failed - Brig Darshan Khullar (Retd)
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