Politics of Afghanistan

We will not be a pawn in someone else's game, we will always be Afghanistan -Ahmed Shah Masood

Afghanistan represents a paradox for strategic thinkers everywhere. A secure and stable Afghanistan is in the interests of its neighbors as well as the major powers. Yet, domestic compulsions preclude compromise, thereby perpetuating instability.  Each neighbor (and its extra regional benefactor) seeks to impose stability in Afghanistan on its own terms; terms which are usually incompatible the objectives of other interested parties.  This article discusses the cleavages along which various parties articulate their interests and the impact this is likely to have on the longer-term prospects for government formation in Afghanistan.

Conceiving the Taliban

In the chaos and depredations after the Soviet military withdrawal and during the Mujaheddin government arose a movement of religious students, the Taliban.  Although, commonly thought of as an indigenous Afghan movement, the Taliban, in actuality are a proxy created by a convergence of interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States.  Each hoped to use the movement for its own ends.   The breakup of the USSR provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity to spread Wahhabism.  Wahhabism is an ultra orthodox school of thought that seeks to purify Islam by removing "corrupt" influences, to the newly independent and amenable states of Central Asia.  The Saudis hoped to use the Taliban to facilitate the spread of Wahhabism into the region.  The Saudi backing of the Taliban fit into their overall policy of encouraging Wahhabi groups throughout the world.  Furthermore, the Saudis hoped that the spread of Wahhabism would check "Shia" Iran's aspirations of gaining influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Pakistan, the Taliban's largest supporter, was motivated by internal and external factors. The newly independent and predominately Muslim countries of Central Asia became a tempting destination for Pakistani strategists, and businessmen.  Pakistan sought to increase trade with Central Asia in order to bolster its economy and hoped it would eventually lead to a pipeline tapping Central Asia's natural gas and oil reserves.   For Pakistan, a pipeline would yield revenue and renewed importance in the region.  Pakistani strategists predicted that a unified Afghanistan would pave the way for improved relations with Central Asia, thus giving Pakistan "strategic depth".  This concept enunciated by President Zia ul Haq, would aid Pakistan and dramatically alter the outcome of any future confrontation with India.  However, a fragmented Afghanistan ruled by squabbling Mujaheddin proved to be an obstacle.  The Taliban, subservient to Pakistan, would unite the country and facilitate Pakistani goals.

Domestic factors also played a role in Pakistan's support to the group.  The Taliban conveniently provide Pakistan with plausible deniability regarding the training and arming of Kashmiri terrorists attacking India.  The Taliban, if successful in unifying Afghanistan under the banner of religion and beholden to Pakistan would decrease the likelihood of Pashtun nationalism.   Pakistan feared a renewed call for a greater Pashtunistan, by armed nationalistic Mujaheddin and Pashtun Afghan refugees.   During the 1950's, this call had fanned secession movements in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan.  Afghanistan's prominent Pashtuns such as King Zahir Shah and leftist leaders have periodically echoed this call.  Further, Afghanistan has refused to recognize the Durand Line dividing the two countries and the Pashtuns.

Nasserullah Babar, Pakistan's Interior Minister during Benazir Bhutto's tenure, credited himself as the "father" of the Taliban.  In addition to creating the Taliban, Pakistan provided a conduit for finances from the Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.  It also continues to provide enormous aid in the form of manpower and weapons.  Pakistan's government freely allows students from its numerous madrassas to cross over and fight with the Taliban and help reverse battlefield losses.  Besides being complicit in border crossing, retired Pakistani soldiers and members of the SSG (Special Services Group) have fought alongside the Taliban.   Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, actively works with the Taliban.  The Minister of Security and head of Istakhbarat, the internal intelligence agency of the Taliban, is Mullah Qari Ahmadullah.  Ahmadullah is actually a Pakistani intelligence officer belonging to the Afghan division of the ISI.   Besides soldiers and intelligence personnel, Pakistan has provided retired civil servants, to aid the inexperienced Mullahs in administrative work.  A nexus exists between the Taliban, Pakistani government and fundamentalist organizations that is beyond the scope of this article, more information can be found here. (Link to “Pakistan's Proxy and Regional Impact” BRM May-June 2001)

The U.S. abandoned the Afghan Mujaheddin in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal.  However, the collapse of the USSR and independence of the republics in Central Asia (with untapped oil and natural resources) brought new opportunities.  Stability in Afghanistan provided a way of accessing these natural resources.  According to the U.S. a pipeline originating from Central Asia across a unified Afghanistan and into Pakistan would be the most "friendly" way of gaining access to the oil and natural gas in the region.  An alternate route through Iran was not acceptable due to American discomfort in dealing with the Iranians.   A pipeline to Turkey via the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan was considered unattractive due to the heavy competition in Europe.

In the early 1990's Prince Turki al Faisal, chief of Saudi intelligence until 2001, advertised the Taliban as "liberators" to the U.S.  Dana Rohrabacher, a prominent member of the U.S. House of Representatives from California, recently stated that he believed that the U.S. entered into an agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the early 90's to allow them to dominate Afghanistan.  American response to the advent of the Taliban and the events in Afghanistan during the mid 1990's, suggest acquiescence to the group.  In 1995, Unocal, a U.S. oil company, vocally backed the Taliban, stating that they would bring stability; making the pipeline project feasible.  Unocal executives even held several meetings with the Taliban regarding the implementation of the pipeline.  Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, echoed American interests in the Unocal pipeline and U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Tom Simmons, encouraged Prime Minister Bhutto to give Unocal exclusive transit rights.

The "Divine Mission" & Consequences

The Taliban created to satisfy the ideological needs of Saudis, the strategic needs of the Pakistanis and the economic needs of the U.S. end up falling short of the goals of their supporters.  As the Taliban evolved a seminal event occurred in 1996.   That year Mullah Omar donned the cloak of Prophet Muhammad and was declared the Amir e- Mominen, leader of the faithful.  In fact, Mullah Omar believes that he is on a divine mission.   The mission extends beyond Afghanistan with the goal of making Kandahar the spiritual capital of a strict Islamic state consisting of Afghanistan, Central Asia, Pakistan and Kashmir.  The belief in a divine mission explains many of the policies of the Taliban, their imposition of strict rules, political actions, and the institution of jihad as state policy. 

Mullah Omar's divine mission of an orthodox state found a convenient ally in Osama bin Laden.  The relations between bin Laden and his son in law, Mullah Omar, are mutually beneficial.  Bin Laden benefited by getting sanctuary and a base of operations for the Al Qaeda terrorist organization.   Mullah Omar received aid in the form of fighters, finances and links to radical organizations operating in Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Xinjiang, and Kashmir through the Al-Qaeda network which would be a crucial step in Mullah Omar's pan Islamic state.

While the Taliban benefited from the aid provided by bin Laden, it also created problems with other supporters.   Bin Laden was exiled from Saudi Arabia for being critical of King Fahd's dealings with the U.S.  Saudi support to the Taliban was mired in the internal politics of the royal family.  There are two loosely defined factions, one supporting the Taliban with ties to bin Laden is headed by the Crown Prince Abdullah, the other faction headed by King Fahd favors closer relations with the U.S.  Osama bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan caused a divergence between the two groups and Saudi support increasingly wavered. 

Pakistan has received a heavy "blowback" for its attempts to subjugate Afghanistan.  The advent of the Taliban has resulted in an increase in fundamentalist organizations within Pakistan.  Lashkar e Jhangvi and Sipah e Shahba, radical groups responsible for violence directed against Pakistan's Shia minority have close ties to the Taliban.  These groups participated in the Taliban's anti Shia campaigns and possibly in "Bosnian style" ethnic cleansing of Shia Hazaras that was recently discovered in Bamiyan, Central Afghanistan.  The Taliban sanction for opium growth created wealthy and politically influential drug mafias in Western Pakistan.  These mafias in turn support religious groups responsible for violence within Pakistan.   The fanatical groups have repeatedly called for an establishment of an Islamic government in Pakistan emulating the Taliban.   In summary, the Taliban have altered Pakistan's "gun culture" into a more synergistic "gun-religion-drug culture" and criminalized large aspects of Pakistani society.

The Taliban supported by Pakistan and Arab countries created a regional uneasiness.  Countries neighboring Afghanistan and others that would be adversely affected by the group supported President Rabbani, the leader of the internationally recognized government of Afghanistan.  The coalition fighting against the Taliban known as the Northern Alliance or United Front is a heterogeneous mixture of former Mujaheddin who fought against the Soviet Union and each other, prior to the advent of the Taliban.  This heterogeneous group of fighters, differing in ethnicity and religious sects is backed by a diverse group of countries including Iran, India, Russia and Central Asian republics with the exception of Turkmenistan.

Each country backed the "anti Taliban" coalition for its own reasons.  Iran supported the United Front fearing increased Saudi dominance in the region and the anti Shia sentiments of the Taliban.  The Republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan battled fundamentalist forces within their territory, and progressively became concerned that the Taliban's fundamentalism would further encourage these forces.  The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has links to both the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.  Russia, already smarting over the ongoing terrorism in Chechnya feared further problems from the Taliban.  Russia felt threatened by the Taliban's associations with the Chechen terrorists and the spread of fundamentalist movements to Central Asia that threatened to curtail Russian influence.  India similarly feared an exacerbation of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, which has direct ties to the Taliban, bin laden and the Pakistani government.

Despite most Central Asian republics backing the government of President Rabbani, the government of Turkmenistan, which shares an 800 mile border with Afghanistan, chose to foster closer ties to the Taliban.   Turkmenistan is the location of the fifth largest gas reserves in the world, and the origin for the proposed pipelines.  Turkmenistan believes the Taliban will bring peace and stability to Afghanistan and hopes that this will allow for the implementation of the stalled pipeline.

At Loggerheads

By the late 90's, the situation in Afghanistan had generally become a stalemate.  The Northern Alliance supported by an amalgam of benefactors attacked the Taliban along the front lines.  After an initial capture of territory, the Northern Alliance commanders were unable to hold the ground for any significant period.  The Taliban fought the Northern Alliance with religious students from Pakistan in the summer and tried to hold positions in the winter.  The Taliban with superior numbers and armaments were able to reverse defeats but unable to dislodge the Northern Alliance from the strongholds of the Panjshir Valley in Northeastern Afghanistan and pockets in Central Afghanistan.

The stalemate existed outside Afghanistan as well.  The benefactors of President Rabbani's government armed and funded military campaigns, in order to prevent them from being militarily overwhelmed and eventually reversing the Taliban's occupation.  The countries supporting the Taliban continued to fund and arm the group in order to push the Northern Alliance out of Afghanistan and gain international recognition.  This would enable the Taliban to serve their original purpose that had become sidelined in the stalemate.  The respective benefactors with diametrically opposite goals, perceived order imposed by the other (via proxy) as unacceptable and harmful to domestic and national interests.  These hard-line positions prevented any compromise and furthered the stalemate.

Convergence Ends?

The U.S. initially saw the Taliban thru the lens of economic opportunity.  The U.S. anticipated that the radicalism of the Taliban would moderate over time due to the economic linkages and even compared relations with the Taliban to early American ties with Saudi Arabia.  However, Osama bin Laden, decreed a "guest" of the Taliban, initiated a shift in U.S. policy towards Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks on U.S embassies in East Africa.  Bin Laden is believed to be responsible for the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia, USS Cole and attacks on U.S. troops in Somalia.  The U.S. started to view the radicalism of the Taliban as a threat and exerted pressure on Pakistan to reign in the Taliban and aid U.S. forces in capturing bin Laden. 

Then on September 11, 2001, thousands of miles away from Afghanistan, three hijacked jets collided into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and caused the death of approximately 6000 individuals.  The worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil resulted in a radical alteration in U.S. policy towards the Taliban.  On October 7, 2001, the United States initiated air strikes against the Taliban.   In the weeks between the terrorist attacks and the air strikes, the United States built an international coalition against terrorism.   The coalition includes many of the countries backing the Northern Alliance.  Ironically the coalition also includes countries that are complicit in terrorism sponsored by the Taliban - Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Pakistan by joining the coalition against the Taliban seemed to place itself in a dilemma, between benefits the of aiding the U.S. and continuing support to the Taliban.  Pakistani reasons for aiding the U.S. are as complex as its motives for aiding the Taliban.  Pakistan aids the U.S. to escape punishment for its previous intransigence over the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.  It hopes to gain economic, military aid and U.S. support in pressuring India to resolve Kashmir to its benefit.  President Musharaff hopes to gain international acceptance for himself and Pakistan and reverse the international pariah status.  Simultaneously, Pakistan is fearful of the consequences of U.S. actions.  It fears a backlash by domestic fundamentalists.  It also fears that U.S. bombing of the Taliban would result in a greater influence of the Northern Alliance that would curtail Islamabad's influence.  Given the conflicting goals and pressures, Pakistan has pursued a twin policy, analogous to supporting the U.S. by day and the Taliban by night.   

Pakistan sought to mediate between the U.S. and Taliban by sending a delegation to persuade the Taliban to turn over Osama bin Laden.  However it was later learned that the delegation headed by Lt. General Ahmed, chief of the ISI, actually encouraged the Taliban to not hand over bin Laden.  After this discovery, Lt. General Ahmed was removed in hopes that such duplicity would end.  However it was learned that a large goods train was dispatched from the ISI compound in Quetta for Afghanistan.  Furthermore, the ISI has not been very forthcoming with intelligence about the Taliban.  Pakistan while providing the U.S. with airbases for emergencies and the basing of its special forces, simultaneously, allowed thousands of people and truck convoys to cross the border and aid the Taliban.

Pakistan also interferes with U.S. plans to cultivate influence among Pashtun tribesmen.  It proposed a loya jirga, grand council, in Peshawar consisting only of Pashtuns that competes with the planned loya jirga in Rome that includes all of Afghanistan's ethnicities.  The Istakhbarat with ties to the ISI has actively purged Zahir Shah supporters and putting down rebellions against the Taliban.  The Taliban possibly acting on an ISI tip killed Abdul Haq, a Pashtun opposition leader and emissary of Zahir Shah.  Similarly, Hamid Karzai's effort to establish an anti Taliban consensus among the Pashtun tribes was met with resistance from the Taliban acting on ISI orders.  It can be succinctly stated that Pakistan prefers Taliban rule without Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden.

Post Taliban government

The stunning rapid advances of the Northern Alliance and the retreat of the Taliban from Northern Afghanistan and major cities created an atmosphere of jubilation among the local population and most coalition members.  Though many would consider the Taliban retreat as wholly positive, there are some ominous signs such as Mullah Omar orders for an organized withdrawal of Taliban forces.  It is speculated that the Taliban retreat is intended to save weapons and manpower for a prolonged guerilla war against the Northern Alliance from mountain hideouts and bases in Pakistan.  Another equally ominous report states that Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden have relocated to Pakistan under the care of the ISI. 

The retreat of the Taliban creates a large political vacuum among the Pashtun tribes.  The Pashtun population is segmented into factions that are ideologically aligned with the Taliban, others that have been bribed and still others who seek an alternative government.  The Northern Alliance represents Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara populations but generally lacks Pashtun representation.  This lack of representation could result in widespread disgruntlement and may even give the Taliban and its sympathizers renewed impetus.  It is therefore important to form a broad based coalition government representing all of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan.  Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, outlined steps towards a Post Taliban government.  He states the need for an emergency loya jirga leading to a transitional government and the approval of the constitution and a new government.  The U.S and U.K favor King Zahir Shah, exiled in Rome following the 1973 leftist coup.   The deposed king is considered to be an ideal choice for representing the Pashtun tribes.

Pakistan, despite joining other members of the Six Plus Two in advocating a sovereign, independent and stable Afghanistan is wary of the Northern Alliance and Zahir Shah.  It fears that Zahir Shah’s presence might renew calls for greater Pashtunistan, leading to problems in western Pakistan.  Pakistan has repeatedly attempted to interfere with the planned coalition by proposing competing alternatives, which will maintain Pakistani control over the next government in Kabul.  Some of the alternatives involved a “moderate” Taliban government headed by General - Mullah Jalaluddin Haqquani, the former head of the Paktia province of Southern Afghanistan.  Haqquani has ties to bin Laden and the terrorist group Harkat ul Mujaheddin operating in Kashmir.  Furthermore, he is a close confidant of Mullah Omar and has recently been appointed Commander in Chief of Taliban armed forces.  Pakistan also proposed Syed Ahmed Gialani, Zahir Shah's cousin as an alternative leader.  Interestingly, Gialani is related to Pakistan’s former President Farooq Lehgari by marriage.7

The Post Taliban plan envisages Turkish troops as a part of a multinational peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.  Prime Minister Ecevit expressed a willingness to play a dominant role to fill the vacuum in the politics and administration of Afghanistan.  The post Taliban era presents Turkey with an opportunity to build on historical ties with Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  Turkish troops absolve the U.S. from maintaining a troop presence while having a predominately Muslim NATO ally carries out the duties.  Turkish presence has additional benefits for the U.S., since it will blunt any burgeoning Iranian influence and compete with Pakistani and Saudi influence in the new government.  Additionally, the Turkish presence could counter any potential Russian ambitions in Afghanistan.

The Challenges Ahead & Summary

As the Taliban retreat and the Northern Alliance and other warlords establish supremacy over the territory, an uneasy peace exists in Afghanistan.  The immediate challenge is to prevent clashes between the factions of the Northern Alliance similar to those after the Soviet withdrawal and the fall of President Najibullah's government.  Similarly, clashes between the Northern Alliance and Pashtun groups opposing the Taliban must be avoided, as the latter asserts control over captured territory.  Any clashes would lend credence to the Taliban sympathizers and countries opposing Northern Alliance rule.

The intermediate challenge is to create a stable transitional government in Afghanistan.  The proposed model of a broad based government in Afghanistan has shortcomings.  The major issue is regarding Zahir Shah whose role remains undefined.  The international community sees him as a unifying force in Afghanistan.   However Zahir Shah does not have a constituency and would derive his authority from the government and the cooperation of the Pashtun tribes.  The concern does not end here; Zahir Shah is 86 years old.  If he passes away or becomes incapable of performing duties, it will raise questions about a successor and the unity of the government.

The long-term challenge for Afghanistan's government is to maintain sovereignty.  Its government must pursue two seemingly contradictory policies, encouraging support from neighbors and while discouraging interference in internal matters.  Afghanistan's greatest threat comes from Pakistan.  Pakistani interests in subjugating Afghanistan do not end with the Taliban.  Actually, Pakistan has a history of interference in Afghan politics backing religious groups in the 70's, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in the early 90's against the coalition Mujaheddin government and supporting the Taliban.  Pakistan's compulsions assure future interference that will likely be outside international norms, against the wishes of Afghanistan's citizens and other neighbors.    

In conclusion, regardless of stability, Afghanistan will for the foreseeable future be a lynchpin for those seeking to increase influence in Asia.  Afghanistan's strategic location in the heart of Asia and fractious politics make it an ideal destination for countries seeking to advance their agenda.  Decades of conflict have made Afghanistan into a fault line between competing neighbors and global powers driven by strategic visions and domestic compulsions. The current era will continue the trends of the past with evolving convergence of interests between Afghanistan’s neighbors and extra regional powers.

Selected References

Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press, 2000.

Dr. Subhash Kapila “Pakistan’s Proxy Wars, Islamic Jehad and the Taliban: Legacy of Benazir Bhutto’s Premierships” http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper209.htm

B. Raman “Afghanistan: Pakistan’s Black hole" http://www.saag.org/papers/paper228.html

B. Raman “Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper287.html

"Ex-ISI People in Afghanistan" Chaman Times October 24, 2001

George Monbiot "America's pipe dream"  The Guardian October 23, 2001 http://www.monbiot.com/

Rohrabacher, Dana "America's Foreign Policy with Regard to Afghanistan" Congressional Record October 17, 2001 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-in/query/B?r107:@FIELD(FLD003+h)+@FIELD(DDATE+20011017)

B. Raman “Afghanistan: in Perspective” http://www.saag.org/papers/paper78.html

"Profile / Biography of Mullah Muhammad Omar" Chaman Times October 9, 2001

David Wurmser "The Saudi Connection" The Weekly Standard October 29, 2001

Vinod Anand "Export of Holy Terror to Chechnya From Pakistan and Afghanistan" 

B. Raman “Continuing Unrest in Xinjiang” http://www.saag.org/papers/paper41.html

"Bamiyan destroyed by Taleban" BBC News Novermber 13, 2001 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_1654000/1654085.stm

"Turkmenistan warm to Taliban" Chaman Times October 7, 2001

Arnaud de Borchgrave "Colliding forces in Pakistan" Washington Times September 25, 2001

David Makovsky "Pakistan's Janus Face: having it both ways with bin Laden" U.S News and World Report September 24, 2001

John Daniszewski & Tyler Marshall "Victory Could Hinge On Islamabad's Spy Agency" Los Angeles Times October 30, 2001

Bill Gertz "Pakistan sends supplies to Taliban" Washington Times November 1, 2001

Lawrence Joffe “Abdul Haq - Veteran Afghan leader seeking post-Taliban consensus rule” The Observer International October 29, 2001 http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,582692,00.html

Jason Burke "Torture, treachery and spies - covert war in Afghanistan" The Observer International November 4, 2001 http://www.observer.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1501,587388,00.html

“The Taliban and Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA)” http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/97_11_02.htm

John F. Burns “Taliban Troops Move Across Border Into Pakistan” New York Times November 13, 2001

“Taliban buying time for guerrilla war” Times of India November 16, 2001

"Mullah Omar, Osama have fled to Pakistan: Iranian radio" November 17, 2001 http://www.jang-group.com/thenews/index.html

Rajeev Sharma “Mullah Omar taken to Gilgit” Tribune News Service http://www.tribuneindia.com/20011114/main3.htm

R. Prasannan "Osama in Kashmir" The Week November 18, 2001. http://www.the-week.com/21nov18/cover.htm

"Brahimi lays out plan for political transition in Afghanistan" November 13, 2001 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=2134&Cr=afghan&Cr1=

Vartan Gregorian “A Place for the Pashtuns” New York Times November 15, 2001

“Peacekeeping duty for Turkey” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs November 15, 2001 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/bd/01.htm

“Ecevit’s Statement on Turkey’s Role in Afghanistan” Republic of Turkey Ministry of External Affairs November 15, 2001 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/bd/01.htm

Daniel Lak "Afghanistan's growing power vacuum" BBC News November 17, 2001 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_1661000/1661800.stm