Civil Defence Capabilities of the Indian State
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
Few discussions of the
implications of nuclear weapons in the India-Pakistan context make any mention of the
civil defence capabilities of either state. It is generally assumed that the civil defence
services in both countries will be rapidly overwhelmed by a nuclear attack and would be as
good as useless. This may well be true – we have yet to find out - however, in
India's case, the state has had enormous experience in dealing with some of the most
catastrophic natural disasters known to man. While these may not approach the magnitude of
a nuclear attack, they provide an interesting insight into the strengths and weaknesses of
the Indian disaster management apparatus.
India maintains
and trains a sizeable civil defence force and has laid down a reasonably comprehensive set
of procedures and regulations governing civil defence operations in the event of war.
While many of India's state governments do not implement these plans in peacetime, the
fact that these plans exist and are periodically reviewed cannot be ignored. Moreover, as
will be shown, the plans lay emphasis on rapid emergency measures rather than on a
well-developed peacetime infrastructure.
In addition to
the civil defence organization, India spends considerable money on a reserve body called
the Home Guards and on the National Cadet Corps. These organizations do receive a modicum
of civil defence training and are expected to reinforce and assist the regular emergency
services in the event of war. India's huge police and paramilitary forces also have
considerable experience in disaster management and would be a very valuable asset. The
question as to how this set up will perform in the event of a nuclear war, however,
remains unanswered.
The
Development of Civil Defence in India
India's first steps in creating civil defence organization came at the start of the
Second World War. Between the years 1939 and 1941, a cell in India's Home Department was
established to deal with the subject of Civil Defence/Air Raid Precautions. A Lieutenant
-Colonel of the Indian Army was placed in charge of this cell with effect from October
1939.(1) This officer was given the status of a Deputy
Secretary to the Government of India and his duties included extensive touring to advise
and help Provincial Governments in preparing Civil Defence plans.(2)
Another officer was later appointed to act as a liaison between General Headquarters and
the Home Department and to assist with technical advice on Air Raid Precautions matters.
It was not until
June 1941, however, that an army Major was appointed as Deputy Assistant Director General
- Indian Medical Service in order to deal with the medical aspects of civil defence.(3) It can be seen from this that civil defence was not taken
particularly seriously by the Indian government. Despite these developments, virtually no
civil defence plans or organization existed on the ground. It took the start of the war in
Europe for civil defence to receive more attention in India and in July 1941, a decision
was taken to create a full-fledged Civil Defence Department. In September 1941, India's
first Director General of Civil Defence was posted to the Home Department. The Civil
Defence Department came into being on 24 October 1941 when Dr. E. Raghavendra Rao - the
first Civil Defence Member of the Governor General 's Executive Council - arrived after
training in England. The Air Raid Precautions cell in the Home Department was transferred
to the new Civil Defence Department and was expanded.(4)
Throughout 1942,
the Indian Civil Defence Department expanded at a rapid pace as the threat of Japanese
attack intensified. In close cooperation with the Provincial Governments - who were
responsible for the implementation of the individual plans - a series of plans were drawn
up to cope with the perceived threats.(5) As the main
Japanese threat came from the North-East, most of the civil defence efforts were
concentrated in this area. The Civil Defence Department was responsible form planning ,
advice and provision of equipment while the provincial government was responsible for the
distribution of civil defence instructions and on raising of fire-fighting and rescue
units.(6) The Civil Defence Department and the Provincial
Governments did some remarkable work, but, civil defence activities in India were not
particularly extensive or comprehensive. Compared to what existed before the war
substantial progress had been made, but, compared to the massive civil defence efforts of,
say, the United Kingdom, India's measures were woefully inadequate.
As the threat of
Japanese attack faded, the Civil Defence Department was steadily wound down. In 1946 the
Department was liquidated.(7) A small cell - a mere shadow
of the wartime organization continued to exist in the Home Department, but for all intents
and purposes, India's civil defence organization ceased to exist.(8)
After independence, in 1948, the Emergency Relief Scheme existed as a cell in the Ministry
of Home Affairs. This cell concerned itself with fire-fighting and fire-prevention and
eventually led to the establishment of the National Fire Services College and the Central
Emergency Relief Training Institute - now called the National Civil Defence College - at
Nagpur in 1956-57.(9)The formal initiation of civil defence
in India started in 1953 when a civil defence plan was drafted. However, this failed to
get accepted and was drastically revised.(10) While the
Civil Defence and Fire Service Colleges continued to run courses, for the first 15 years
of Indian independence, there was no civil defence organization in existence on the
ground. The Chinese invasion of 1962 changed all this.
As part of the
massive rethinking and reorganization of India's national security policy, the British
civil defence expert, General Irwin, was invited to draft the blueprint of a national
civil defence plan and to give practical advice on how to meet both conventional and
unconventional attacks.(11) Two manuals were compiled and
circulated to all state governments for the preparation of comprehensive civil defence
plans in selected high priority towns which were categorized on the basis of their
importance.
The Defence of
India Act 1962 gave the State and Union Territory governments with all the powers
necessary for the implementation of the measures outlined in General Irwin's manuals.
These two manuals - ' The Master Plan for Civil Defence in India' and 'General Principles
of Civil Defence' - form the structural basis for India's Civil Defence Organization to
the present day.(12) As regards the implementation of
these plans, it was officially stated in the Indian Parliament in 1963, that while certain
recommendations were implemented immediately, other measures regarding civil defence were
to be kept on paper, to be implemented when needed. To this end, a comprehensive plan of
operation was drawn up and directives issued to the State and Union Territory governments
to make their own civil defence plans and to keep them, even if just on paper, in a state
of readiness for their successful implementation in an emergency.(13)
Over time,
certain states have drafted a number of other emergency plans to cope with natural
disasters such as cyclones and earthquakes as well as man-made calamities such as chemical
and nuclear accidents. These plans tend to be kept in a higher state of readiness than the
civil defence plans since the civil defence plan allows for the mobilization of resources
in a phased manner to meet a threat for which there is considerable prior warning. In the
case of natural disasters, this warning is not available.The 1965 and 1971 wars provided
some experience for the Indian Civil Defence Organization. Despite this, no major changes
have been recommended and the civil defence organization in India continues as envisaged
in the Irwin Plan of 1962.
Strength,
Organization and Structural Foundations
In 1995, the Indian Civil Defence Organization had a sanctioned strength of
676,000 volunteers in addition to a small ( strength unknown ) nucleus of professional
staff which is to be augmented in an emergency.(14)
However, only 376,000 have actually been raised and of these, only 330,000 are fully
trained.(15) The civil defence staff and volunteers are a
distinct and separately organized group from the other Indian emergency services - i.e.
fire departments and paramedics. At present, civil defence units are raised and stationed
in categorized civil defence towns. These towns are graded on both their vulnerability and
on their strategic importance - a practice dating back to the Second World War.(16) At present, there are 110 categorized towns spread over
24 states and union territories.(17) This means that civil
defence personnel and expenditure are concentrated in the areas where they are needed
most. This is particularly important since the regular civil defence forces receive only
Rs. 65 million from the central government.(18) The
Central Government handles all matters regarding equipment and communications. All the
central government ministries have civil defence cells which would be activated in
wartime.(19)
In addition to
these volunteers, the Indian Civil Defence Organization relies heavily on the Home Guards
and the National Cadet Corps. These two organizations are funded and, in the case of the
NCC, trained separately from the civil defence volunteers. The Home Guards have a
sanctioned strength of 573,793 and has a current raised strength of 418,493.(20) Unlike the Civil Defence Organization, the Home Guards
are spread across the country and extend into the rural as well as the urban areas. The
Home Guards were created as an auxiliary to India's vast police and paramilitary forces
and have an important role in the maintenance of law and order as well as internal
security.(21) In peacetime, the Home Guards assist
communities in emergencies as epidemics, fires and floods, while their role in wartime
extends to civil defence work as well as assisting the army in maintaining rear area
security.(22) The Home Guards have a budget of Rs.280
million - considerably higher than the Civil Defence Organization.(23)
The organization, since it is more geographically widespread, provides a veneer of civil
defence cover to rural areas as well as reinforcing the civil defence units in the 110
categorized civil defence towns. Their training, as will be discussed later, prepares them
for rescue and fire-fighting work. There is also provision for raising auxiliary Home
Guards from the ex-soldiers population of India in case of extreme necessity - as in the
case of the 1965 India-Pakistan war.(24)
The National
Cadet Corps are another important source of manpower for civil defence. Their training
will be discussed in some more detail later, but since the 1980s, 32 NCC officers and
cadets are trained as civil defence instructors at the National Civil Defence College each
year.(25) The National Cadet Corps Act of 1948 states that
NCC cadets have no military service liability.(26) This
means that they cannot be deployed on duties where they have to be armed - unless special
legislation is passed. This, however, does not exempt them from civil defence work. On
9th. September 1965 - during the 1965 India-Pakistan war - the Indian Central Government
drew up a list of duties which were to be performed by NCC personnel over the age of 17. (27) These included the following:(28)
(a) Passive Air
Defence - including rescue work, first air, casualty evacuation fire fighting and removal
of debris
(b) Manning of
Civil Defence Posts - including civil defence patrols and look outs
(c) Maintenance
of essential services - including motor transport, pioneer and engineering and water and
power supply
(d) Traffic
Control
(e) Manning
Static Signal Installations
(f)
Administration and running of evacuation camps
With these duties
assigned to them, the NCC forms a very useful reinforcement for the Civil Defence
Organization. This is even more obvious when it is realised that the NCC has 420,000
cadets in its Senior Division - made up of university students over the age of 17.(29) The central and state governments contribute to the
expenditure on the NCC in the ratio of 2:1.(30) The budget
for the NCC comes, in part from the Ministry of Defence - not the Home Ministry in the
case of the Home Guards and Civil Defence Organization. It should be stated that the army
regards the NCC as a waste of money.
In addition to
these organizations, the Indian government controls the Central Industrial Security Force
and the Crisis Management Group of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. These two
organizations, while not specifically created for the task of civil defence, could provide
vital equipment, training and skilled personnel when operating in an environment of either
radioactive or chemical contamination.
As regards
funding, the Indian central government maintains a sizeable calamity relief fund for use
in the case of a natural disaster. This would provide a valuable source of reconstruction
funds for post-war recovery. In fact, it can be said that the published expenditure on
civil defence - Rs. 65 million - represents a relatively small fraction of the expenditure
on a disaster relief/civil defence infrastructure. While little evidence of civil defence
activities can be seen in peacetime, the extensive pool of manpower, combined with plans
and an organizational set up, gives India to field a civil defence organization in wartime
that is far better organized, larger and more capable than would first be apparent from
the rather pathetic peacetime infrastructure.
The Civil Defence Set-up - Central and State Responsibilities
The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs has, under its direct control, a
Directorate of Civil Defence headed by a Director General - usually a senior police
officer. He advise the Home Ministry on all matters relating to the Civil Defence
Organization and the Home Guards as well as regular fire-fighting units.(31)
The central government has the responsibility for coordinating civil defence activities in
States and Union Territories. This is done to ensure that civil defence personnel have a
uniformly high standard of training and that plans are kept up to date.(32)
The principal role of the central government is that of supervision and coordination -
laying down principles and policies on air raid shelters and on protection in general.
The civil defence
set-up at the centre drafts all emergency plans for all states and provides for the
provision of equipment and training where necessary. In order to effectively carry out its
assigned task, the central Directorate of Civil Defence maintains close contact with other
government ministries for expertise on various subjects. For example, the Ministry of
Urban Development provides technical advice on the construction of air raid shelters while
the Ministries of Communications and Surface Transport provide communications equipment
and transport for civil defence units.(33) Other
ministries provide advice on evacuation, bomb disposal and on health and welfare. Each of
these ministries has a small civil defence cell.
The Ministries of
Defence and Railways are responsible for civil defence on properties owned or managed by
them. These include ordnance factories and army cantonments as well as railway stations.
These two ministries receive their advice and instructions from the Central Directorate of
Civil Defence. The main functions of the Central Civil Defence Organization can be
summarized as follows:(34)
(1) To coordinate
work among the various ministries of the Indian government - including the State
governments
(2) To lay down
general policy for Civil Defence in India
(3) To prepare
and keep ready in peace times, plans for training of personnel and organization of Civil
Defence services
(4) To determine
the manpower requirements of the organization by assessing the existing resources and
preparing plans to remedy the deficiencies
(5) To ensure
uniformity of practice and procedure and to indicate the action which should be taken in
any towns as and when an emergency arises
(6) To build up
stockpiles of essential civil defence equipment
(7) To prepare
draft civil defence legislation, plans and literature on evacuation, welfare,
precautionary and protective measures for the protection of life and property.
It can thus be
seen that the central government of India plays only a advisory, planning and coordination
role in Civil Defence Matters. The real responsibility for the implementation of civil
defence measures in the event of war falls to the State and District administrations in
the States and Union Territories. The officials manning these tiers of government are in
the forefront of any emergency. They are responsible for all rescue and rehabilitation
measures in the event of either war or natural disaster. They have considerable experience
in the latter - not so much in the former.
Each State and
Union Territory government has, under the overall control of its Inspector General of
Police, a Director General of Home Guards and Civil Defence. As in the case of the central
government, he is a senior police officer and is responsible for controlling fire
departments as well. It must, however, be pointed out, that many of the urban fire
fighting units in India are under the control of Municipal Corporations and as such are
not always equipped to the standard established by the DG - Home Guards & Civil
Defence.(35) Fire-fighting regulations are also routinely
ignored.
The local
governments are responsible for fire-fighting, maintenance of municipal roads, water
supply, conservation etc. The Public Works Department is responsible for the provision of
shelters, sandbags, trenches, salvage, repairs and demolition. The other state government
branches - health, labour, railways etc. - assist in their various fields, as in the case
of the central government.(36) All State governments have
plans for civil defence against attacks - both conventional and unconventional - as per
the recommendations of General Irwin. Most of these plans are kept on paper, to be
activated only in times of war- involving mobilization of manpower and resources.(37)
The State
governments rely heavily on the central government for the provision of equipment.
However, their record in dealing with natural disasters is quite impressive - even when
disasters strike suddenly. Moreover, in addition to their civil defence plans, most states
have disaster management plans and schemes which are usually kept in a considerably higher
state of readiness as they are needed almost annually. The Commissioner, District
Magistrate and Sub-Divisional Officer are the ultimate authority for Civil Defence in the
Division, District and Sub-Division respectively.(38) The
District Magistrate functions as the Controller of Civil Defence, but in certain cases
there may be a need to a separate and autonomous Civil Defence Controller to give
additional assistance to the local authorities.(39)
The Civil Defence
Controller nominates various departmental heads of the district as the commanders of the
various civil defence services. For example, the Chief Medical Officer functions as the
head of the casualty service and the Executive Engineer - Public Works Department (
Building & Roads ) as head of the Rescue and Demolition Service.(40)
The Civil Defence Controller - the District Magistrate in most cases - coordinates the
activities of all these departments in respect of planning, enrolment, training and
provision of equipment.(41) In times of need, regular
meetings are held to ensure the readiness of the various civil defence units.
The civil defence
of a city or town is organized on the basis of its population as well as on its
vulnerability. Any city/town having a population of more than 300,000 is divided into one
or more zones of 2-300,000 people each. Each zone is further divided into two or three
Divisions - each with 100,000 people - which are in turn divided into Warden Post Areas -
with 10-12,000 people. These are further subdivided into Sectors - with a population of
2-3,000. Each Sector has one House Fire Party per 500 people.(42)
The civil defence
structure of a town having a population of more than 300,000 looks like this:(43)
Zone ( 2-300,000
persons )
|
Division Division
Division
|
Warden Posts - 1
per 10-12,000 people
|
Sectors - 1 per
2-3,000 people
I
House Fire Parties - 1 per 500 people
Civil Defence Services in India can be broken down into three basic categories:(44)
(1) Volunteer
Services - provided by the public e.g Air Raid Wardens
(2) Control &
Depot Services - provided by Home Guards, NCC etc. e.g Rescue Units
(3) Special
Services - provided by other Departments e.g Engineering
In peacetime -
the volunteer units are not active - the various government departments responsible for
these tasks pay little attention to them. In times of crisis, coordination and
mobilization are absolutely essential for India's civil defence plans. The service
categories listed above are themselves broken down into the basic civil defence services
that form the backbone of any civil defence structure.
The civil defence
authorities in India are required to make provision for both control and sub-control
centres. These are located in the various civil defence zones and towns and are to
coordinate all civil defence efforts between them.(45) The
Indian government believes that one sub-control centre can deal with 40-50 Wardens posts.(46)
These control
centres are to be protected against both blast and fragmentation effects of high-explosive
bombs. This standard of construction also gives significant protection against limited
atomic strikes as well.(47)
As would be
expected, the control centres would have good communications links to the various wardens
posts and the civil defence emergency services. In addition to this, the control centres
are responsible for the Air Raid Warning system. This includes both the standard air raid
sirens - including factory sirens - as well as a more direct warning system based on
telephone links. Air raid wardens also assist by using whistles and flags to warn their
areas of responsibility.(48)
A reliable and
flexible early warning network based on both telephone lines and on radio/wireless has
been established in categorized civil defence towns.(49)
Most states have communications networks for use in the event of a natural disaster -
cyclones and floods in particular. The Indian Department of Telecommunications would be
responsible for most emergency broadcasts. Agencies like All India Radio will play an
essential role in any civil defence situation in the Indian context. As in the Second
World War, the backbone of the civil defence effort will be borne by the Air Raid Wardens.
These are unpaid volunteers in peacetime and would be responsible for all civil defence
efforts in their sectors.(50) The warden is responsible
for advising local people on civil defence, organizing self-help parties for fire fighting
and rescue and reporting all damage to the control centres. Each civil defence division is
sanctioned 114 wardens, including special advisors from government departments.(51)
The civil defence
emergency services - casualty, rescue, fire-fighting and welfare - are all under the
direction of the control and sub-control centres. These services rely heavily on other
government agencies for the manpower, equipment and expertise for their embodiment and
successful operation.
The casualty
service relies heavily on the emergency hospital organization for its operation. This
involves the use of ambulance trains to evacuate casualties in vulnerable areas to
hospitals in safer zones. The Director of Health Services in each state is responsible for
the various hospitals in the state - government, local, charitable, private and railway
hospitals. All of these come under the emergency hospital organization and will be used in
the event of an emergency.(52) This ensures that all
medical and paramedical personnel and equipment is used as efficiently as possible. The
importance of this cannot be underestimated since in peacetime, the Indian health system,
while extensive, is extremely inefficient and badly coordinated. It is likely that medical
personnel and equipment will be requisitioned for areas lacking adequate resources.
As part of the
overall casualty service, there are provision for mobile and static first aid posts as
well as mobile surgical units. The mobile surgical units are to be allocated on a scale of
one per civil defence zone, with a 25% reserve of manpower and equipment.(53)
The first aid posts are to be provided on a scale of ten per division - one per Warden
Post.(54) Ambulances, which come under the control of the
staff officer of the first aid parties, are to be provided on a scale of 2 per 5 first aid
posts and 1 per first aid party.(55) This plan relies
heavily on the mobilization of manpower and vehicles for the provision of first aid
personnel and vans for use as ambulances.
Rescue units -
eight men per unit - are provided on a scale of one per 25,000 people.(56)
Drawn from men in the Home Guards and National Cadet Corps - as well as from police,
paramilitary forces and the Public Works Department - the rescue units are under the
overall control of the District Executive Engineer. Advice is also provided by specialists
from various government departments - both from state and central governments. Equipment
and vehicles are supposed to be earmarked for use by the rescue units - again, this relies
heavily on mobilization of resources.
As can be
imagined, fire fighting teams are the single most important element in civil defence work.
The regular Indian fire departments are woefully undermanned and, in a few cases, poorly
trained and inadequately equipped. In wartime, they are to augmented by auxiliary
fire-fighting units - manned by Home Guards and equipped with trailer pumps towed by
trucks. These are to be provided on a scale of one per 25,000 population.(57)
There are also provisions for small house fire-parties, under the control of air raid
wardens. These, equipped with stirrup pumps and buckets, are unlikely to be of any use in
the event of a nuclear attack. However, they would provide an extremely valuable asset in
the event of conventional air attack.
All states are
also required to make provisions for a self-contained Civil Defence Mobile Force.(58) It was recognized that State civil defence units would
have to reinforce each other and to this end, the concept of the mobile civil defence
forces came into being. The Civil Defence Mobile Force is to consist of separate civil
defence battalions, each battalion having four companies with 200 personnel each.(59) Each company would have the following four platoons and
would operate semi-independently:(60)
(a) Company
Headquarters
(b) Rescue
Platoon
(c) Medical
Platoon
(d) Fire-Fighting
Platoon
It is not known
if any states maintain fully operational mobile civil defence battalions, however, the
Central government maintained (maintains ?) a Mobile Civil Emergency Force. This force,
based at Delhi and Calcutta and under the direct control of the Home Ministry was well
equipped and trained for all aspects of civil defence work.(61)
This force was used extensively for emergency relief operations during the 1977 cyclone in
Andhra Pradesh and its performance was found to be more than satisfactory.(62)
In peacetime, the Delhi unit was used as a training school, conducting courses on rescue,
fire-fighting and casualty clearance.(63) However, in
1988, it was reported that the Delhi unit was being wound up - perhaps because of the
significant improvements in emergency services in the national capital and its surrounding
states.
As far as the
individual states are concerned, there is a nucleus of civil defence instructors and
experts under the control of the state police and fire services. These have in the past
been used for rescue operations beyond the ability of the regular emergency services.(64) They are apparently well trained and reasonably well
equipped - including protective masks and clothing for chemical attacks/disasters.(65) It is not clear, however, as to how many personnel are
available for immediate use nor are any clear details available about their organization -
it is unlikely to be above company/battalion strength.
Civil Defence
emergency services are stationed at civil defence depots. These depots, to be based at
each sub-control centre, house first-aid, ambulance, rescue and fire-fighting services as
well as mobile surgical units and canteens.(66) The depots
are to be located at least one kilometre away from any likely target - this would assist
in minimizing damage, even in the event of a limited nuclear attack. The depots are also
to provide all the emergency units with air-raid shelters - for personnel, vehicles and
stores - indicating at least some awareness of the risk of loss in the event of attack.(67)
As far as
air-raid shelters are concerned, the Indian Civil Defence Act of 1968, makes provision for
any Indian police officer or civil defence official to order the construction of an air
raid shelter wherever and whenever necessary.(68) The
Crisis Management Group of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board constructed a number of
shelters for use in the event of a nuclear accident , designed to be blast and fallout
proofed.(69) All military installations have underground
command centres and major fuel and ammunition stores at airbases are buried deep
underground.(70) The Indian civil defence plans place
great emphasis on the construction of emergency air raid shelters. Particular emphasis is
given to trench shelters - both covered and uncovered. While these would provide very
little protection against blast effects, the trench shelter offers very considerable
protection against the effects of nuclear fallout and radiation.
The Civil Defence
Act also gives some indication regarding evacuation. Either the State or Central
Government may order any area to be evacuated. Guidelines are also provided regarding the
accommodation of evacuated persons and their welfare.(71)
The Welfare Service deals with the feeding, accommodation and evacuation of the
population.(72) A fully equipped welfare unit is to be set
up at each civil defence division - with feeding, information, housing and emergency
clothing facilities.(73)
All states have
evacuation plans of some kind and some have become quite adept at emergency evacuation of
even extremely remote areas. The government of the impoverished state of Andhra Pradesh,
for example, was able to evacuate over 260,000 people over the course of a few days in
November 1996.(74) This was done to avoid a sudden cyclone
- much more could be expected to be done with adequate warning and from urban centres well
served with road and rail links- like the various state capitals.
The Indian
central government maintains a substantial buffer stock of foodgrain - between fifteen and
twenty-two million tonnes - and has had considerable experience in providing emergency
supplies of drinking water.(75) Thanks to India's very
considerable experience with natural disaster management, both central and state
governments have considerable practical expertise in dealing with relief efforts,
including the provision of food, water, shelter and medical care. This expertise would be
invaluable in the event of an attack - nuclear or conventional (or chemical- Bhopal
provided practical experience).
With regards to
vital industries, India's defence planners have based their war assessments on a war
lasting roughly two months. As a result, the Indian government maintains a stock of
imported raw materials - those required by vital industries - for about six months.(76) The Indian military industries stockpile vital
components - both imported and locally produced - for several months based on a high usage
rate.
The existing
civil defence structure, therefore, relies heavily on auxiliary units for the provision of
emergency services. The officials responsible for this task are already in place - though
not acting in their civil defence capacities. These officials, at both the central and
state government level are supposed to have some training in their assigned civil defence
tasks. This also applies to the Home Guards, NCC cadets and policemen who will provide
manpower for the civil defence emergency units.
Training,Planning
and Equipment
The training of civil defence personnel takes place at the national, state
and district level, reflecting the nature of the organization. The National Civil Defence
College at Nagpur conducts courses for all probationers in the Indian Police Service and
the Indian Administrative Service. The two week long training course includes basic
disaster management as well as civil defence against nuclear, chemical and biological
threats.(77) The National Civil Defence College also
trains civil defence instructors for the state governments as well as over thirty NCC
officers and NCOs each year.(78) Over 28,000 personnel
have been trained at the college since 1957.(79)Most
personnel trained at this institute have shown themselves to be reasonably competent in
times of crisis. In fact, it is now accepted that the training standard and quality of
civil defence officers and volunteers is of an acceptable standard, even if their morale
is not.(80) As is the case throughout the Indian services,
civil defence personnel are woefully underpaid.
The central
government also trains key fire fighting personnel for the central forces as well as the
state fire fighting services. The National Fire Service College - also located at Nagpur -
trains the fire officers from all the Indian states as well as from foreign countries.(81) Almost 11,000 fire officers have been trained since
1957. These in turn provide advice and training to the state fire services. The College is
the only one of its kind in South/South-East Asia and provides reasonably comprehensive
training.(82) At the state level, each state has a
combined training institute for the training of the Home Guards as well as Civil Defence
volunteers.(83) These institutes provide a nucleus of
instructors who are responsible for the training of the District civil defence volunteers
and Home Guards.(84) One civil defence instructor per four
Home Guard companies is assigned to train the Home Guards in civil defence.(85) The Home Guards receive additional courses in
fire-fighting, crowd control and weapons training.(86)
As regards
equipment, the Public Works Departments possess almost all equipment necessary for rescue
work. The fire departments are usually equipped to a reasonable standard - including
aluminized fabric garments and breathing apparatus, which protect against NBC agents to a
considerable extent.(87) The auxiliary fire fighting,
rescue and emergency units would be provided with protective gear as and if required.Paper
plans to cope with emergencies abound in India - though they are not publicized. However,
the moves by the Indian government to create a comprehensive disaster management plan must
be viewed positively, even if much of the infrastructure is not in place. This policy,
drawn up in consultation with the state governments as well as central ministries and
institutions, lays out a comprehensive set of guidelines for dealing with natural
calamities, civil strife as well as chemical and nuclear disasters.(88)
A crisis
management plan has already been implemented for dealing with chemical emergencies at the
central, state and district levels.(89) Guidelines have
already been sent to the states and the central government is providing assistance for the
development of the required infrastructure.(90) While this
may seem to be of little relevance, the coordination of skilled personnel now being
trained and equipped under this scheme would be invaluable in the event of a chemical
attack - as would the protective equipment used by such personnel. Of even greater
importance are the emergency plans of the Crisis Management Group of the Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board. In addition to the provision of shelters mentioned earlier, the CMG has
organized a central stockpile of protective clothing and monitoring equipment which could
be airlifted to the scene of an emergency.(91) The CMG has
also trained medical and relief workers in the areas around nuclear power plants on how to
deal with a nuclear disaster - invaluable in the event of war.(92)
Weaknesses
of the Indian Civil Defence Organization
As has been shown, the Indian civil defence authorities have a comprehensive series of
plans to cope with emergencies. There are provisions for auxiliary emergency units and for
evacuation and medical care. However, the system has a number of inherent weaknesses. What
is striking about the Indian civil defence plans is their reliance on the Home Guards,
police and NCC to provide manpower for the emergency units. The problems with this scheme
are twofold: how well trained are these units and how fast can they be mobilized ?
Elements of the
National Cadet Corps do receive training in civil defence - instructors at the National
Civil Defence College and others at annual training camps.(93)
The NCC has, during the 1965 and 1971 wars, been used for civil defence duties. In 1971,
over 100,000 cadets volunteered for civil defence duties.(94)
The performance of the NCC units in both wars was considered reasonably good and they
earned considerable praise.(95) It is not known how well
they would perform in any future war, but their previous performance gives cause for some
optimism. With regard to the Home Guard units, they have, even in peacetime, been used to
augment both the police and regular fire brigades. Their performance in any future war
would depend on how much time was available for refresher training in new civil defence
techniques. Also, Home Guard officers are specifically tasked with civil defence.
The mobilization
of the manpower for civil defence tasks could well be a very time consuming task. Home
Guards are raised in their specific towns and are therefore available at relatively short
notice. However, it is not clear whether their equipment would be available as easily, nor
is it clear that this equipment would be in a good state of repair. Nonetheless, at least
some equipment - especially the fire-fighting and rescue apparatus - is kept to a very
high standard as it is often needed by the regular fire-fighting services and the public
works departments. The NCC units are based at colleges and universities and as such may be
easily mobilized. Additional manpower is available from the State Armed Police Battalions,
which are usually available at short notice and have a fair amount of expertise in rescue
work - with natural disasters.
Perhaps the
biggest hurdle faced by the Indian Civil Defence Organization is public apathy in
peacetime. It is extremely difficult to motivate people and governments to allocate either
time or money for civil defence tasks. This is why there is a shortfall of 300,000
personnel in the strength of civil defence volunteers.(96)
Indian state government, while receiving adequate funding from the central government,
tend to cut back on the state's contribution to civil defence units. The worst offender in
this regard has been the incredibly corrupt and impoverished state of Bihar where gross
mismanagement and a state of utter chaos exists in the state civil defence department.(97)
In peacetime, the
police officers assigned to civil defence departments are usually officers who are
anti-corrupt or who have the courage to stand up to illegal orders.(98)
These officers, while reasonably competent, feel frustrated as they are considered to be
out of favour with the police high command. In some states, however, these police officers
are also in command of the regular fire-fighting units. Here, as in the case of civil
defence, inadequate funds are provided, though, with help from Japan and from the
Government Insurance Corporation of India, additional funds for the modernization and
expansion of state fire services have been recently been forthcoming.(99)
Public apathy is
far more difficult to overcome. As soon as an air-raid materializes, there is a clamour
for civil defence measures, yet, the public have not taken and do not take civil defence
seriously - until war breaks out.(100) It is virtually
impossible for the police officers, Home Guards and fire service personnel to encourage
the population to take civil defence more seriously in peacetime - it is almost impossible
to get Indian civilians to take peacetime fire prevention regulations seriously.
The other
problems faced by civil emergency units in India are extremely serious. There is a lack of
coordination among various agencies and many lack adequate preparation for their assigned
tasks.(101) In addition there is a lack of centralised
ambulance, accident and trauma services.(102) These make
relief operations in peacetime extremely difficult, yet,India copes quite effectively with
several natural calamities each year. The civil defence plans provide for rectifying many
of these weaknesses in times of war by mobilizing auxiliary units - it remains to be seen
if this will work effectively.
Conclusions
It is not possible for the central and state governments
of India to maintain large full-time civil defence forces in peacetime. The existing
scheme, while far from perfect, is at least realistic in relying on auxiliary units to
provide the bulk of the emergency services. It is also realistic in assuming that much of
the required civil defence infrastructure would have to be set up in a short space of
time.How will the Indian civil defence structure cope with a nuclear attack ? The answer
is not known as such a situation has not yet arisen (fortunately) in India, or in any
other country for that matter. However, India's enormous experience in dealing with
natural and man-made calamities has provided India's relief officials at both state and
central levels with considerable expertise in handling mass rescue and relief operations.
The current drafting of a comprehensive disaster management plan will be of great help.
Serious questions remain about the ability of the Indian auxiliary forces to mobilize,
train and equip quickly enough to operate effectively. The plans look good on paper, but
their reliance on mobilizing assets could reduce their potential effectiveness. However,
the Home Guard and Civil Defence units are located in or very near to the 110 categorized
civil defence towns. This would dramatically reduce response time and also permits
concentration of resources at vulnerable areas. Adequate warning would, of course be
needed to mobilize all the necessary resources - a warning time of at least 48 hours
should suffice to at least prepare emergency personnel and measures. This
is not to say that the Indian civil defence agencies will not be hard pressed to cope with
a nuclear attack. However, given the available resources and past experience, it is
unlikely they would collapse into complete chaos and ineffectiveness.
_______________________
Notes
1. B.Prasad ed., Official
History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War - Expansion of Armed Forces and
Defence Organization,( Kanpur : Combined Inter-Services Historical Section - India
& Pakistan 1962 ), p.292
2. Loc.cit.
3. Loc.cit
4. Loc.cit
5. ibid
p.295
6. ibid
pp.294-295
7. R.Datta,
Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, ( New Delhi: Sehgal Publishers 1991 ),
p.8
8. Prasad,
Expansion of Armed Forces and Defence Organization, p.296
9. Datta,
Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, p.8
10.
P.Singh, Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age, p.223 ( New Delhi: Army Educational
Store 1972 )
11.
R.Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age ( Bareilly: Prakash Book
Depot 1988 ), pp.63-64
12.
ibid p.64
13.
Loc.cit
14.
Government of India, India 1995 - A Reference Annual, ( New Delhi: Ministry of
Information & Broadcasting 1996 ), p.685
15.
Loc.cit. The fact that the Indian Government publishes these three figures and is
fairly honest about the numerical strength of the Civil Defence Organization may be an
indication that the Government is fully aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the
existing structure and is working to remedy them.
16.
Prasad, Expansion of Armed Forces and Defence Organization, p.293 & p.296
17.
Government of India, India 1995 - A Reference Annual, p.685
18.
Loc.cit
19.
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, p.13
20.
Government of India, India 1995 ,p.685
21.
Loc.cit.
22.
Lt.Gen. M.L.Chibber, Paramilitary Forces - USI Paper 4,
( New Delhi: United
Services Institution 1979 ) , p.10
23.
Government of India, India 1995, p.685
24.
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, p. 27
25.
Government of India, Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1995-1996, p.88
26.
S.P.Baranwal, Military Yearbook 1974, ( New Delhi: Guide Publications 1974 ),
p.223
27.
Loc.cit.
28.
Loc.cit
29.
J.Baranwal, The Military Yearbook 1992-1993, ( New Delhi: Guide Publications
1993 ), p.801
30.
J.Baranwal, The Military Yearbook 1993-1994 ( New Delhi: Guide Publications
1994 ), p.366
31.
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, pp. 12-13
32.
ibid p.12
33.
ibid p.13
34.
ibid p.14
35.
Communication with S.K.Ghosh - Indian Police Service - dated 16 March 1995
36.
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, p.15
37.
Communication with Dr. P.K. Ramachandran - dated 24 July 1994
38.
R.Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age, p.65
39.
Government of India, Civil Defence Handbook No. 1,(New Delhi:Ministry of Home
Affairs 1966), p.2
40.
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, p.15
41.
Loc. cit.
42.
ibid pp.15-16
43.
ibid p.16
44.
Loc.cit
45.
Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age, pp.69-73
46.
Govt. of India, Civil Defence Handbook No.1, p.27
47.
ibid p.43
48.
Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age, pp.77-80
49.
Govt. of India, India 1995, p.685
50.
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, p.17
51.
Govt. of India, Civil Defence Handbook No.1, p.65
52.
Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age, p.87
53.
Govt. of India, Civil Defence Handbook No.1, p.74
54.
ibid pp. 80-81
55.
ibid p.71
56.
ibid pp.94-95
57.
ibid pp.125-126
58.
ibid p.184
59.
Loc.cit
60.
Loc.cit
61.
S.Cohen & C.Raghavulu, The Andhra Cyclone of 1977 ( New Delhi: Vikas Publ.
1979 ), p.115
62.
Loc.cit
63.
S.P. Baranwal, Military Yearbook 1987-88 ( New Delhi: Guide Publ. 1988 ), p.329
64.
The Asian Age - 5 July 1995, p.5 A team of civil defence experts from
Rajasthan were involved in a rescue operation to free some villagers trapped in a well
after being overpowered by poison gas.
65.
Loc.cit.
66.
R.Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age, pp.109-111
67.
S.P.Baranwal, Measures of Civil Defence in India, pp.167-170
68.
Civil Defence Act 1968 - Section 18
69.
South - June 1989 p.15
70.
Maj. S. Bhaduri, 'Weapons Overview' in Indian Defence Review - July 1991, p.168
71.
Civil Defence Act 1968 - Sections 6, 7 & 8
72.
R.Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age, pp. 97-106
73.
ibid p.106
74.
G.Radhakrishna, 'Once is not enough' in Sunday - 15-21 Dec.1996, p.29
75.
Govt. of India, India 1995, p. 455
76.
Lt.Gen. Thapan, Review of the Organizational Pattern of the Indian Army -
Seminar held at the United Service Institution of India on 26 March 1976, p.19
77.
K.Mathur, Administration of Police Training in India,(Delhi:Gian Publishing
House 1987), p.138
78.
Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1995-1996, p.88
79.
Govt of India, India 1995, p.685
80.
Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age, p.140
81.
Govt.of India, India 1995, p.687
82.
Loc.cit
83.
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, p.25
84.
S.P.Baranwal, Measures of Civil Defence in India, p.42
85.
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, p.33
86.
S.K.Ghosh & K.F.Rustamji ed., Encyclopaedia of Police in India - Volume II Part
A
( New Delhi: Ashish
Publishing House 1994 ), p.980
87.
Personal communication with Dr. P.K.Ramachandran - dated 29 January 1995
88.
'Centre drafts disaster management policy' in The Asian Age - December 29
1994
89.
Govt. of India, India 1995, p.186
90.
Loc.cit.
91.
South - June 1989, p.15
92.
Loc.cit.
93.
S.C.Maikap, Cadet Corps in India, ( Calcutta: Darbari Udjog 1979 ), p.117
94.
ibid pp.163-165
95.
Brig.M.M.Sharma, The National Cadet Corps of India, ( New Delhi: Vision 1980 ),
pp.161-163
96.
Prasad, India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age, p.64
97.
The Statesman Weekly Edition - October 23 1993
98.
Datta, Civil Defence - Problems & Prospects, p.44
99.
Govt. of India, India 1995, p.687 See also SP's Military Yearbook 1992-93,
p.809
100.
P.V.R.Rao, Defence Without Drift, ( Bombay: Popular Prakashan 1970 ),
pp.282-286
101.
K.M.Mathur, Management of Internal Security, ( New Delhi: Gyan Publ. 1995 ),
pp.166-167
102. ibid p.169
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