Analyzing an insurgency: On the trail of Nagalim

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Is there an end to the Naga imbroglio? Can there be a solution to the problem, which will be acceptable to the government, as well as the insurgent outfit? Can the example of Mizoram be replicated in Nagaland creating yet another island of peace? Answers to questions like these can be at best ambiguous. In spite of attempts, a problem that is categorized as the longest running insurgency in India’s trouble torn northeast, has continued to defy solution. In this scenario an analysis of the intricacies of insurgency and attempts to provide a solution acquires importance. Such an attempt needs to aim at understanding the multiplicity of reasons behind the demand of the outfit and the narrowing stream of choices before the government.

The history of a pursuit for an independent Naga homeland (Nagalim) has come a full circle since the days of the Naga National Council (NNC). Many metamorphoses later, the prevailing avatar of the Naga cause, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), in spite of a four year long cease-fire with the Union Government has steadfastly tied up with the idea of being able to carve out a homeland for the Nagas.  The phenomenon will be analysed with a tinge of theoretical explanation that would form the benchmark for probing the unfolding developments.

An insurgent outfit, on a perpetual basis, needs to justify its emergence and continuance. Most of the insurgent outfits in the Indian north-eastern region have emerged with a demand for a homeland that challenges either the authority of the State as a whole or merely questions the basis of geographical demarcation of existing units. However, protraction of the conflict beyond a period forces the outfit to change the nature of its demand, which might mean either dilution or reinvigorated version of its earlier demand. While dilution of the demand has a potential of initiating a political dialogue and eventually makes the outfit a statist one, reinforcement of its demand continues the trouble and also the counter measures to contain it. However, as a departure from the standardized patterns, the following analysis would reveal that the NSCN-IM of today has come to combine both. It has chosen to engage itself with the government while at no point of time giving up its demand of a separate independent State, Nagalim or a greater Nagaland. Even when the outfit’s leadership has tended to show signs of flexibility in accommodating a practicable stand, its dwindling command over its cadres has forced it to underline its primary objective time and again. In addition, the sheer engagement has brought in windfall, financial and otherwise, for the outfit making it imperative for it to stay engaged.

The NSCN-IM Predicament

Attending a three-day conclave of the Nagas in Niuland in June 1999, the NSCN-IM General Secretary Th. Muivah reiterated the demand for a greater Nagaland. He said, “It's not a question of smaller or greater Nagaland. It's a question of the freedom of the Naga nation”.[1] Two years later in June 2001 speaking from Bangkok, in reaction to the volatile situation in Manipur in the wake of the cease-fire area extension, Muivah said, “We don’t have greater Nagaland nor do we have smaller Nagaland. We have just the land that belongs to us.”[2] Toeing the same line of argument, Shimrang, another senior leader of the outfit said in July 2001 that “To us there is nothing called Greater Nagaland or Small Nagaland. It is the land of the Nagas that we are talking about and uniting all the Nagas together.”[3]  These occasions were only three of the many in which the insurgent outfit reiterated its long-standing demand of creating a Nagalim, independent of Indian suzerainty.

The dream of an independent Nagalim consisting of the Naga inhabited areas of the regions in and beyond the geographical territory of Nagaland can be traced to the days of the Naga national Council. The legendary Phizo fought till his death, albeit from the comfort of London and away from the real battlefield, for carving out a Nagalim. Two splits later the NSCN-IM still harps on the same geographical area and homeland for the Naga people. But today there are enough reasons to question the very commitment of the people in the area towards the ongoing struggle. It seems that the ongoing struggle suits various people in various ways.

Udoyan Mishra writes, “Every government in Nagaland since the State was formed, has had some stakes in having the insurgency continue. Among other things, the insurgency has always been a convenient lever to secure greater benefits from the Centre.”[4] Thus the profitability of insurgency not only accrues to the outfit but also to the administrative set up. The present regime’s hobnobbing with the Khaplang faction of the NSCN is a case in point that takes away the trust factor from the negotiation process with the NSCN-IM. Mishra further adds, “the NSCN sticks to the path of liberation through armed struggle because the emergence of new political equations has made it difficult for it to openly opt for a negotiated political settlement.”[5] The ruling elite, on the other and, “may not wish the NSCN to abjure violence and participate in mass politics because that would sizeably reduce their own political space.”[6] Thus, the convergence of various interests keeps insurgency alive.   

Question, thus, arises why does the dialogue go on if the NSCN-IM sees little reason in it? The answer will point at the peripheral benefits the outfit has managed to garner by indulging in the process. Always held in foreign lands such as Bangkok and Amsterdam, these events have been used by the outfit mainly to extract maximum international exposure. It has succeeded in creating a wide international support base for the outfit, which has also opened up fund-raising avenues for it. In addition, there have been incidents when international non-governmental agencies have been found colluding with the outfit. Example can be cited of China, which provides arms and logistic support to the outfit. Its larger aim of destabilising the whole north-eastern region finds complimentaries with the requirements of the outfit. Somewhat similar is the case of Myanmar, which has managed to strike a deal with the outfit in return for a possible non-inclusion of the Naga-inhabited territory of the country in the proposed Nagalim.[7] The outfit needs such territories as safe-havens to escape periodic army onslaught.

There is different angle to the whole story as well. The reason behind the outfit’s consistent refusal to work within the ambit of Indian constitution stems from the socio-economic changes in Nagaland. It needs to be remembered that the Nagalim of NSCN-IM is essentially sectarian in nature.[8] In a State where the enormity of easy money has created a corrupt political establishment and let loose the forces of anti-egalitarianism; a voice for Nagalim tends to bind the Nagas together. It creates a situation of ‘We versus Them’ in which the NSCN-IM attempts to emerge as the ‘Good’ versus the ‘Evil’ elites. Thus, the outfit’s constitution, which makes references to the Christian composition of the proposed State, has less to do with religion and more to do with a desperate attempt to project the heterogeneous Nagas united by religion.

Thus, a closer look at the previously mentioned rhetorical statements by the NSCN-IM leaders reveals that these are essentially directed at different set of audience. Apart from keeping the government on the tenterhooks, the outfit also attempts to portray itself as the sole representative of the Naga people, a position long denied to the insurgent outfit by divided Naga loyalty. The “demand for a ‘greater Nagaland’ is clearly linked with the growth of the forces of Naga nationalism which, over the years, have been trying to keep in check, though not always successfully, the inter-tribe and inter-clan rivalries inherent in Naga society.”[9] The variegated discourse on the Naga imbroglio has failed to note that an insurgent outfit through its acts of sabotage and mayhem aims at a much larger goal. The goal is that of primarily popular and secondarily political acceptability.

History bears the account of insurgent leaders becoming political masters of the region they fought for, after the successful culmination of the insurgent movement. NSCN-IM could be no different. The example of Mizoram looms large in the minds of every insurgent leadership in the northeast. The big question however, that remains unanswered is that, have the NSCN-IM leadership reconciled to the eventuality of accepting a political role under the Indian sovereignty? The answer is simple. The day the NSCN-IM finds a permanent solution of the problem a positive sum approach, there will be a move towards that direction. In the absence of that the curious permutations and combinations of the game of insurgency will keep the banner of ‘revolt’ flying.

The NSCN-IM leadership’s undiluted stance on Nagalim, under the above-mentioned paradigm is relatively simple to analyse. An open dilution in its demand runs the risk of sidelining the leadership. Commentators point at the lack of control of Muivah and Isak over their cadres to the extent of making them agree to an arrangement under Indian constitution. “For the cadre, and indeed even the second-rung leadership, anything short of sovereignty seems unacceptable. The question is how much control the two top leaders have over the rest of the band.”[10] Thus, there is a possibility that the rhetoric might have emerged as a major bottleneck for the NSCN-IM leadership in the successful culmination of the negotiation process. But as long as the rhetoric goes on there is little hope for a solution.

Choices before the Indian Government

The dilemma before the Indian government is enormous, and choices severely limited. The dialogue must go on. But at the same time the process has not only to deal with an outfit that sees its interest in not giving up its demand, but also a system that thrives in the condition of insurgency. Thus, the continuing engagement requires a sensitive handling of the forces, which are a part of the establishment. Any acceptance of the demand of a Nagalim, on part of the Indian government is bound to have serious repercussions. It would not only pose a direct threat to the nation-building process in the country, but has the potential of opening up of the proverbial Pandora’s box for the establishment of many such imaginary homelands. The recent outbreak of violence in Manipur provides a curtain raiser to the reverberation that might occur involving loss of human lives and properties. Thus, a solution to the problem must tread an extremely cautious path by stopping well short of the formation of a Nagalim.

While there have been several attempts at both the official and the unofficial level, very little has actually happened in terms of an antiphonal development. While, the reason for the outfit’s engagement with the government is nothing less than achievement of its various objectives, the government has moved very little beyond the prevention of violence in the region. In fact the de-escalation of violence remains the government’s only claim to responsiveness. A reality check reveals that apart from the actual killing, rest of the insurgent activities have shown little sign of receding. This includes abductions, extortion activities, arms-transfer, collusion with other insurgent activities, international propaganda and odd ambushes targeting security forces. The question one tends to ask is if the Government is playing into the hands of the outfit by remaining engaged?  

To a large extent the official machinery in charge of the negotiation process has displayed relative frivolity in handling the situation. The official talks too have been created more mystery in the minds of the people rather than clearing the existing doubts. This is applicable not only to the people and academic community in the region but also outside it. Marked by little transparent mechanism, talks and their proclaimed successes have remained mainly an unknown variety. In the absence of official pronouncement regarding the course and outcome of various rounds of talks, the NSCN-IM publicity wing remains the only source of information. Thus, what dominates discourse is the insurgent outfit’s claim regarding the progress or failure of discussions. As a result, on the record statements like the following, raises a number of queries. In September 2000, Chief negotiator K Padmanabhaiah stated that ‘at no point of time did any government representative had agreed to extend the ceasefire to all the Naga areas. The term Naga areas is vague and was still to be defined’[11]. On July 27, 2001, Swaraj Kaushal, Union government’s one time Chief negotiator, said in Rajya Sabha, “I need clarify that during the negotiations with the NSCN-IM, not once did the NSCN raise the demand for a greater Nagaland. I read this word, for the first time in the newspapers.”[12] Such statements put question marks on the very objective of the outfit. However, statements such as these point at the direction of the basic thesis of the article. The outfit is more interested for the time being to gather the peripheral benefits that would assist it to inch towards its ultimate goal.

The very fact that in the last four years, the negotiators have not been able to persuade the NSCN-IM leadership to hold talks within the Indian territory is a sad commentary on the competence of people involved. It is also a sad commentary on the way negotiations are conducted with the outfit. The system that chooses its negotiators who lack both charisma and individual credentials for such a sensitive assignment appears to be heading nowhere in reaching a permenent solution to the problem. The aim of the negotiator and that of the Indian government can at no point of time be separated from each other. Even if certain manoeuvres are allowed the end goal must merge at a single point. That seems not to be happening, at least did not happen in the recent Bangkok meeting. The negotiator going overboard to win the confidence of the outfit seemed to have been nullified whatever little had been achieved in the last four years.

The outfit has maintained a strict ‘no no approach’ to the eventuality of holding talks within India, as it would amount to accepting Indian sovereignty. Actually, feeble efforts to start the talks within India’s territory were initiated in 1999. However, the NSCN-IM leadership, which had arrived in India after a good 33 years in May 1999, left India quietly after consulting the cadres in June 1999.[13] Analysts suggest that the little softening of approach on part of the NSCN-IM leaders did not match with the expectations of the cadres. In fact in a similar development, back in 1975, after signing the Shillong Accord, the Naga National Council leader, Phizo accepted the Indian constitution unconditionally on behalf of the Nagas, only to find that he did not have the mandate to do so.[14] This again is a major irritant that has been played down by the government. It only validates one’s fears that the outfit has not given up its goal of creating a State independent of India.

Policy Options and Recommendations

From the point of view of a negotiator, it can be a frustrating exercise to be repeatedly shelled with the demands of Nagalim. The silver lining, however, lies somewhere else. One needs to pick up the threads from symbolic gestures the outfit has demonstrated over the years. The first and the foremost is the duration of the cease-fire with the Government. Irrespective of the absence of a concretised result that pleases everybody, the very fact that a four-year old cease-fire is still in place raises hopes for a solution to the problem. It is also a fact that these years of cease-fire have contributed to a low rate of human mortality in the region. Interestingly, most of the dead were insurgents.

Secondly, the discomforting peace in Nagaland in the aftermath of the Union government’s backtracking from its June 14 Bangkok agreement tells a different story. It was presumed that any alteration in the government’s stand of extending the cease-fire to the Naga-dominated areas of other states would eventually lead to the resumption of bush wars by the NSCN-IM cadres. Statements emerging from the NSCN-IM quarters also suggested the same. So far no bush war has been resumed following the Amsterdam talks, which has been termed as nothing close to success by the NSCN-IM leaders. Till date Nagaland remains as peaceful as the last four years. This is another gesture, which suggests the readiness of the insurgent outfit to keep the dialogue going in spite of the government’s volte face. It is tempting to dismiss the outfit as lacking the striking force. Media reports suggest that NSCN-IM remains poor caricature of the pre-August 1997 days. The other factor that might have forced the outfit’s hands is the coming together of the other north-eastern outfits to protect their own imaginary home-lands that Nagalim threatened to engulf. It was reported that the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the Dima Halom Daogah (DHD) of North Cachar Hills District of Assam, the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) of the Karbi Anglong district of Assam, NSCN-K, Meitei outfits of Manipur have formed a united front to oppose the NSCN-IM. A different line of argument would also suggest that the NSCN-IM stands to loose all the goodwill in the event of any initiation of violence. There are reasons to believe that a majority of Nagas now blame the Central government and the Manipuris for the U-turn of events. Thus, it is a rather precarious scenario where peace is either chosen by the outfit or forced upon it. It is peace nevertheless.

There have been few recommendations for an alteration in the government’s strategy in the negotiation process. One inserting a clause in the agreement that the truce extension will not alter the territorial integrity of the neighbouring States. Secondly, a public commitment from Mr. Muivah to this effect. And thirdly, declaration of a unilateral cease-fire with all the insurgent outfits in the region.[15] However, implementation of these recommendations runs the danger of not only being disapproved by the NSCN-IM, but also because of their impracticability. Such a step will in all likelihood invite reactions similar to those in the recent past. The sensitivity involved would require a lot of groundwork that precedes such a decision.

The other hyped recommendation that failed to see the light of the day was that of noted social anthropologist B K Roy Burman. His prescription of a ‘Sami Council’ type Naga body that oversees the Naga affairs in various states of the northeast was rejected by the Naga Hoho, the apex tribal council. Such a rejection underlined the scepticism of the body towards such cursory prescription for the solution to the long pending problem. Most ironically, the proposal fell through after an ebullient Naga Hoho summoned Roy Burman for breaking the impasse in the aftermath of the June 14 Bangkok declaration.

A stray thought would also like the government of attempting to drive a wedge between the leadership of the NSCN-IM and its cadres. The reported schism between the two can be exploited to an extent of moderating the set of demands. However, overplaying such policy option can be a matter of great risk so as to throw whole process of negotiation out of tracks. Muivah and Isak would be well aware of the situation and the eventuality of loosing the support of their cadres. It would only hasten the process of their exit from the leadership and their loss of acceptability among the Nagas. This also would create problems for the government as the leadership, which replaces the present ones would be much more tied to the idea of a sovereign Naga nation. Thus, wisdom lies in playing the card to the extent of diluting the demands and no more.

At the same time the ongoing negotiation process needs to be supplemented by tactics that have a clear eye on the objectives. A recommendation in the direction of a policy reorientation needs to address the following points.

1.  The appointment of a negotiator whose knowledge of the area is profuse and yet not biased. This is not merely a reiteration of the demands of the Chief Ministers of the northeastern region. It must be realized that the appointment of former bureaucrats and mainland politicians has led to the creation of avoidable anxiety. The appointment of former Lok Sabha speaker and politician from Meghalaya, Purno Sangma in this regard could have been of immense help in this direction. However, the combination of circumstances that prevented that from happening is a mere reiteration of the lack of seriousness regarding the issue. Another serious contender for the post is the Chief Minister of Mizoram, Zoramthanga. Being a former rebel himself, Zoramthanga possesses the right kind of qualifications to handle negotiations. Curiously enough, his couple of rounds of interaction with the NSCN-IM leadership in Bangkok has been completely downplayed.

2.  Negotiations do not operate in a vacuum. A flexible yet tentative time frame is what seems to be lacking in the whole process. Even after four years of engagement basic irritants such as sovereignty of India, the area of Nagalim continue to be the bones of contention. If wearing out the outfit by engaging them in a protracted negotiation process is the goal of the government, it has tasted little success in this direction.

3.  The Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (CFMG) based in Dimapur must be allowed to play a pivotal role in the negotiation process. There seems to be a complete breakdown of communication between the people indulging in the negotiation process and the authorities monitoring the ground level realities. During these years of cease-fire, the insurgents and the security forces have indulged in trading charges against each other relating to the violation of the ground rules. The outfit continues to indulge in acts of subversion, extortion and arms smuggling. Thus, the entire process of negotiation acquires a farcical and time-consuming nature. The negotiation process needs to take into account the spirit of observance of the existing ground rules. Conflicts should not be allowed to persist in one level while the talks go on at the other.

4.   Role of the civil society remains the least emphasized aspect in conflict situations in the northeast. Nagaland’s claim in this regard is no better. While the dominant civil society discourse has been led by the front organizations of the outfits, government has done very little to empower the saner voice that operates at a sublime level. As a result, over the years, such feeble voices tend to be submerged in the propagandist human rights bandwagon. For example, in a matrimonial society, the role of women in conflict situations needs due emphasis. Existing groups such as the Naga Mothers Association  (NMA) needs to be promoted to infuse a wave of alternate wisdom to the whole process.

Where does it end?

The vibes for autonomy in this part of the world is likely to suffer ignominious distortions rather than deriving benefits. That is precisely why an idea like the Sami Council is less likely to produce results. Similarly, peace forced from above is not likely to be enduring. What would perhaps prevail is an agreement replicating the historic Mizo accord. But the ground realities of Nagaland pose a different problem. Unlike the Mizo National Front (MNF), the sole insurgent outfit in the State, the divided Naga loyalty negates a monolith entity that speaks for the Nagas as a whole. Need is, thus, the creation or promotion of such an entity that gradually replaces the insurgent outfits and yet acts within the ambit of the Indian constitution. Such a step needs to be preceded by a thorough revamp of the existing political set up. A set up that derives benefits out of the predicament would resist a transformation of the status quo. It would be a long-drawn-out battle, but a battle that can be won.

The proceeds of insurgency would make the NSCN-IM defy a solution. However, what might force the leadership to reach an agreement is their old age. The interminable wish of overseeing a solution to their fight might just play the right tune in the back of their minds as they indulge in any retrospection. But there are too many ifs and buts in this sort of a development. The attachment of the younger cadres to the idea of a Naga nation might reinforce the demand for an independent State. Thus, a wait and watch policy is likely to be futile. Need is thus to be pro-active and make things happen. We have had too long a honeymoon with a reactionary policy. Time has arrived to act and there is no better time than to start right now.

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Notes