In the decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, few initiatives have consumed the attention of the international security community as the pursuit by successive US governments to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) and a "limited" Theater Missile Defense (TMD). At its maximum, the plan calls for the testing, development and deployment of a multiple-layered NMD system, including the use of space-based sensors and interceptors, for the robust defense of the territory and assets located within the continental United States (CONUS). Similarly, the TMD system envisions a credible defense of US personnel and assets, along with those of US allies, and could be deployed in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and possibly in the Middle East - on Israeli territory as well as on US naval assets deployed in the Persian Gulf.

In its current dispensation, however, the US plans include a far more limited defense, both in terms of territories to be defended, and the technical means deployed to secure the defensive aims. Even so, it is easy to understand the intense international scrutiny and debate this has generated, given the diverse and significant implications of this lofty pursuit by the United States.

In early June, a communiqué issued by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) expressed understanding and qualified approval of the US initiative toward creating a "new security framework." This US framework includes de-alerting the deployment posture of its nuclear-armed missiles, unilateral reduction of its strategic nuclear warheads, and moving forward with its NMD plans. The above communiqué, and subsequent statements by Indian policymakers, has stirred the strategic discourse within South Asia, and its reverberations have been felt within the US discourse as well. This positive Indian response, and the indication by this US administration to accord a higher position to India in its strategic calculus, led to the June visit to Tokyo, Seoul and New Delhi by the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, in part to explain the US NMD plans.

Further, on July 12, 2001, Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy US Secretary of Defense, in a Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, elaborated on the growing threat faced by the United States from incoming missiles, and reiterated the importance of moving forward with the NMD plans of the Bush administration [1]. Finally, the successful interception of a missile in a simulated test scenario by the Pentagon on July 15^th, is likely to provide a fillip to the proponents of the NMD and strengthen their case that building such a defense is technologically viable, and justifiable, given the growing threats [2].

This paper draws upon the above situational backdrop to examine the implications for South Asian security of the US decision to develop and deploy the NMD and TMD systems. It begins by providing the overarching legal and analytical framework of this debate, then discusses the evolving South Asian security template, and concludes with some observations that hopefully contribute toward what factors should be driving this discussion in South Asia.

The Wider Legal and Analytical Framework

The US-Russia Axis of Analysis

First, the current US approach in its negotiations with Russia effectively undercuts, or at least severely delimits, the latter’s "space for maneuverability" in responding to the US position. In essence, this derives from the US decision to explaining its NMD plans to Russia, and indeed the international community, as part of a "package deal" that comprises three elements. One, de-alerting the deployment posture of its nuclear-armed, strategic-range, missiles from the current "launch-on-warning" and "launch-on-attack" postures to one where the use or threat of force could take several hours and up to a day. Two, depending upon the recommendations of the strategic defense review underway [3], the United States would be prepared to reduce, unilaterally if necessary, its strategic nuclear warheads down to 1500, or even 1000. This number represents the upper limit of reductions envisaged within START III, which is far away from being negotiated, given the problems in ratifying START II. And three, the US decision to develop and deploy the NMD system, but simultaneously consult Russia, US allies, and other major countries including China (and India).

The Russian position in opposing the NMD so far has rested primarily at two levels. First, the NMD will violate key provisions of the ABM Treaty (1972) and its Protocol (1974), long considered the "cornerstone of strategic stability" of the international system [4]. The ABM treaty effectively put a ceiling on unbridled arms racing between the United States and the Soviet Union since their total nuclear arsenal had reached an absurdly high level of around 67,000 by the end of the 1960s. Thus, by imposing restrictions on developing and deploying fortifications to defend targets within their countries (ultimately to one site per country), it left the remaining territories "vulnerable" to incoming missiles, which in turn sustained the logic of MAD. Now, the NMD will violate key provisions of the ABM, including restrictions on number of sites to be defended, number of (anti-missile) interceptors deployed to preemptively strike against incoming missiles, type and speed of the interceptors, as well as the location of the sensors and interceptors. As such, this move will effectively gut the ABM provisions and deploy defensive fortifications that will upset the power symmetry against the adversary, forcing the latter to restore the symmetry by engaging in offensive buildup to overwhelm the defensive shield, as well as possibly build some defenses of its own. This logic could ultimately lead to a new round of arms racing, in tandem with defensive deployments of NMD-type systems.

The second level of Russian argument has been to maintain the essential link between the ABM and START processes. While elaborating on this important linkage is not within the scope of this paper, it must be noted that in the past Russia has threatened to withdraw from the sequence of START negotiations for mutual nuclear arms reduction if the United States violates the ABM provisions [5].

But the current US approach effectively "de-fangs" both of the Russian objections enumerated above. By announcing its intention to move ahead with unilateral deep reductions, at least up to the level envisaged within START III, it robs Russia, at least in theory, of the moral high ground of moving toward greater arms control and eventual disarmament. Moreover, as the Wolfowitz testimony reiterated most recently, "we do not intend to violate the ABM treaty, … [just] move beyond it." In essence, the United States is enunciating a new security framework that does not visualize Russia as an adversary but a friendly country. As such, according to this logic, there is no need for an ABM-type approach to insure security between these two states. Further, the United States has offered to undertake measures to assure Russia, verifiable at a technical level, that its NMD-based interceptors will not target Russian missiles. Instead, as is repeatedly clarified, the NMD system is geared toward defending US assets from "rogue" states, sub-state actors, or from accidental launches (presumably from otherwise responsible state actors).

Given the above US formulation, it becomes increasingly difficult for Russia to maintain its opposition to the NMD plan. Continued economic difficulties worsen the Russian dilemma. With a defense budget of less than $10 billion in 1997 constant dollar terms, Russia finds it hard to maintain the current size of its strategic missile forces; it even needs resources for the dismantlement of those warheads that are already targeted for elimination. Financial support from the United States in this process, as well as for larger effort for maintaining the safety and security of the nuclear complex via the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program funded by the US government, has become critical.

The European Axis of Analysis

The Russian strategic ambivalence surrounding the NMD issue is further proof of the success of the US strategy, at least from the perspective of the current US administration. Recent media reports further suggest that the US side has indicated in its bilateral negotiations that it might be willing to purchase some S-300 area-wide defense systems from Russia to be employed as part of the US defensive fortifications. This is projected as another proof of a new collaborative framework within which US-Russian relations could evolve, moving beyond the adversarial positions of the past. Concomitantly, the ABM treaty, as a relic of the bygone era, should also be scrapped or modified so as to not deter or impede the promise of this new cooperation between erstwhile adversaries.

These moves have resulted, among others, in a Russian offer of its own version of an NMD system to Europe, a move that has not elicited any serious response from the European capitals. Further, the INF Treaty (of 1987) banned an entire class of medium-range nuclear forces from the European theater. That, and the US nuclear umbrella, has ensured against the threat or use of nuclear weapons in Europe throughout the previous decades. Above all, if the US-Russian relationship were to evolve away from an adversarial one, drawing upon ABM- and MAD-based security, to one of cooperation, then it takes away a significant part of the European opposition to the NMD.

Now, if the US NMD plans were to be extended to cover key installations within NATO countries, then it leaves perhaps only two significant areas where European objections could derail or delay US plans. One, key European capitals have been somewhat reluctant to enunciate clearly the threats emanating from certain Middle Eastern states that could come via missile attacks or via terrorists or other unconventional means. Under the ABM regime, US radar and tracking stations were located in Fylingdales in England. Deploying an NMD system would include installation of extensive ground- and air-based sensors and interceptors in several NATO countries, many of which would require feeding pre-determined targets and launch scenarios to permit rapid response. Such a military-technical build-up would undercut the ability of the European capitals to remain, or appear to remain, somewhat distant from this US deployment, and complicate the conduct of their foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran, Iraq, Libya, and others.

And two, current US intercept technology, still to be proven in myriad test scenarios, has worked best in cases when attacking lower-altitude missiles or those that have not yet crossed the "boost phase." Indeed, Israel’s initial work on the Boost Phase Launcher Initiative (BPLI) received indeterminate American collaboration before the latter pulled out. Striking a missile before it has crossed the boost phase yields higher kill probability, and if the interceptor is launched from a location closer to that of the in-coming missile, permits a longer trajectory over which to track and kill. Both these factors, as well as the need to deploy sensors and interceptors, would require use of European locations to deploy the NMD components. European objections to them could significantly retard this process.

However, it is my opinion that on balance, Europe would agree to a limited US NMD deployment, provided a negotiated settlement with Russia has been reached, and after securing some insurance that its adverse impact would not be felt on European soil. It is hard to speculate on the terms of this bargain-imbedded settlement, but it could include a significant economic component. It is perhaps to this end that the US government is moving forward with the Defense Trade Security Initiative. Although the DTSI has run into problems recently, in the main it seeks to create a new regulatory policy on export controls that would facilitate the trade and transfer of high-technology goods across the Atlantic without the bother of a cumbersome process of case-by-case licensing of items.

The China Factor

Although China does not have the legal locus standii in the matter, it has remained vociferously opposed to the US NMD plan. Beijing and Moscow have over the past two years jointly voiced opposition to this plan, but it is noticeable that the latter is subtly beginning to distance itself from this approach. This became most visible in the "Strategic Partnership" Document signed by Russia and China on July 16, 2001, which reiterates the importance of the ABM treaty but makes no explicit mention of their opposition to the NMD according to available media reports [6].

It should also be noted that the PLA has been engaged in a force modernization program for over a decade now. This involves developing longer-range missiles, submarine force, airlift and sealift capability, and a range of information warfare (IW) and electronic warfare (EW) capability as it prepares for an asymmetric warfare scenario for the future. Thus, China’s modernization of its missile force has been proceeding for a long time before the current US push for the NMD became prominent (although the same has survived for over two decades now, variously known as SDI, GPALS, BMD, and now NMD). On August 3, 1999, China successfully tested its Dong-Feng (East Wind) series IRBM, DF-31, to a distance of 3,000km, although the maximum range of the missile is 8,000km [7]. It is believed to be improving the accuracy of the DF-31, while work on the longer-range DF-41 is also reportedly proceeding apace.

It is believed that efforts are being made to make the DF-41 capable of carrying multiple warheads, a task made easier if, according to the Cox Commission report (May 1999), China might have acquired certain technology and blue prints for the design of the US warhead, the W-88. The small size and compact design of the W-88 would greatly assist Chinese ability to field an ICBM force with multiple warheads. And if it develops or acquires the capability for terminal guidance, it would be in a position to field a small MIRV-ed ICBM force that would be capable of striking targets across most of the United States. At the very minimum, such a capability would provide China an additional tier of deterrence if it were to proceed with aggressive steps in unifying Taiwan with the mainland.

In sum, China’s force modernization drive extends beyond a decade now, and is likely to continue regardless of the current US thrust to pursue an NMD capability, although the allocation of resource and policy priorities for the Chinese plans might to an extent co-vary with those of the US side. India (and therefore Pakistan) would have to factor that into its decisional calculus in formulating a response to the NMD issue.

Implications for South Asia

The South Asian inheritance from the NMD "pie" is equally contentious and in need of greater elaboration and scrutiny. Some South Asia watchers unduly stress the causative linkage between Chinese offensive missile build-up in response to the US NMD deployment, and the inevitable Indian build-up, forcing Pakistan to follow suit. The logic underlying this "domino" effect is both true but also not necessarily the most important factor in examining this debate for South Asia.

For one, China’s missile build-up predates the current US thrust for an NMD. For another, its force modernization drive is geared toward acquiring capabilities that would significantly raise the technical, human and policy costs to the United States if it were to intervene in a possible Chinese use of force against Taiwan, or another instance of Chinese policy unilateralism in Asia. Much of this Chinese capability is not relevant to the Sino-Indian context. In other words, China already possesses sufficient means of air and missile delivery of nuclear warheads against India, and its response to the US NMD should not drive the debate and force preparedness debate in India.

Instead, India should make a pragmatic and technical assessment of current and proximate threats to its national security, and then prepare a coherent strategy of meeting these threats. In doing so, the nature and type of threat from China, as well as Pakistan, should be factored carefully in drawing up the response scenarios, and to the extent possible, key variables should be examined within the domestic security discourse without compromising state secrets. Such pragmatic calibration of threats and responses, and some input from the larger discourse, would imbue the official policy with greater clarity as well as enhance consensus and accountability, the latter two being vital ingredients in a vibrant and robust democracy. Pakistan should also formulate its response based on such a threat assessment, and not necessarily as a "derivative" of the linkage between the policies of US, Russia, Europe and China.

In examining the South Asian response to the NMD, this paper briefly explores two scenarios and their implications.

Scenario A: US NMD Deployment Plans Successful

This scenario makes the assumption that the US government would be able to circumnavigate the current legal and wider foreign policy hurdles and be able to deploy an NMD system within the next decade, and possibly limited TMD systems in East-Southeast Asia and beyond.

For India, the derivative is that this paves the way for deployment of limited area-wide defense systems against nuclear-armed missiles. Since 1998, India and Russia are negotiating the purchase of S-300 PMU-1 for the Indian Army and S-300V for the Air Force. In June 1998, India agreed to purchase 6 batteries of S-300 ATBMs from Russia at a total cost of $1b [8]. Although the deal has not been finalized, it is believed that Indian scientists might be involved in testing and evaluation of the design parameters before taking delivery of the system. The integration of the Israeli Green Pine radar into the final modified system that India procures is also believed to be an active option.

It is possible that some of India’s indigenous weapons systems might be integrated into this defensive platform. For instance, Akash, a medium range (25km) surface-to-air missile (SAM), with a quick reaction time (from detection to launch) of 15 seconds, and being developed for both the army and the air force, might be integrated into the platform. The fire control radar of Akash is a multi-target, multi-function, phased-array radar system called Rajendra that in principle has a range of 60km, a range resolution of 30m, and can track 64 targets, 4 of which it can engage simultaneously. Flight tests of Trishul, a short-range all-weather SAM, are also being conducted, to service the army, air force and the navy [9]. India might also acquire AWACS capability from Russia in the near term that would augment its defensive capability against incoming missile attacks [10].

In this context, active negotiations with Israel raise the possibility that at least three of its Phalcon early warning radar systems might be integrated with the Russian aircraft to provide a more potent dimension to the final defensive deployment that India might field. This assumes added significance in light of two recent developments. One, on July 17, 2001, India and Israel signed a $2 billion deal for arms purchases, including transfer of considerable technology from Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI) to the Indian Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) [11]. In turn, Israel has expressed strong interest in purchasing the Indian Pilotless Target Aircraft, Lakshya. This signals that the Indo-Israeli defense cooperation might incrementally begin to resemble the Indo-Russian model, where technology collaboration and two-way sharing has grown over time, and where India is no longer simply a passive consumer and adapter of imported technology. And the second significant point is that in 2000, Israel had cancelled negotiations with China for the sale of Phalcon radar systems, a deal reportedly worth $250m, presumably under US pressure. At that time, Israel’s negotiations with India for the Phalcon had been suspended. The inclusion of this item into the arms deal signed on July 17^th, therefore, signals maturity and greater commitment from both sides in their evolving defense and strategic policy coordination.

In sum, it appears that India is devoting considerable resources to acquiring the ability to field limited defensive systems in the near to medium term (say, 10 years). On the other hand, the formulations of the Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine (August 1999) stipulate that India seeks to acquire a credible minimum deterrent (CMD) that, given the NFU pledge, would have to be highly survivable, dispersed, and "capable of shifting from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces within the shortest possible time" [12]. Further, according to the seminal work by Ashley Tellis of RAND, India’s CMD should be regarded as a "force-in-being" whose essential components would not necessarily reside in the same location in order to enhance survivability [13].

Given the above NFU pledge, and the need to create a small but highly survivable nuclear arsenal that could be deployed on a triad of land, air and sea based platforms, India would need to field at least a half dozen area-wide defense systems, in addition to one protecting New Delhi as the capital and the National Command Area. The locations of the other deployments would be along the northwestern and northeastern quadrants with some proximity to the Pakistani and Chinese borders, given the range limitations of Agni (currently proven to a maximum range of 2000km). As missile ranges grow, Indian land- based deployments could move southward for greater protection.

Ultimately, the highest security of the Indian arsenal would lie in developing submerged deterrence, as indicated by the pruned nuclear deployments aboard submarines for England and France. But in the medium term, until problems with Sagarika [14] and the development of the ATV (Advanced Technology Vessel) are resolved [15], Indian plans for a submerged nuclear deterrent remain a distant possibility [16].

Aside from the technical difficulties in securing such defensive deployments, whose merit has not yet been proven even in the US case, the financial costs of such an undertaking are likely to be fairly prohibitive. The strategic gains from such a deployment would be to raise the "defensive shield" against Pakistan. This is likely to enhance Pakistan’s quest for longer-range missiles, with greater accuracy and higher numbers, to "overwhelm" the limited Indian defensive shield [17]. The technical and financial costs of this arms racing, however, are likely to be felt more heavily in Pakistan, given its lower technical and financial resource base. On the other hand, if Pakistan opts to deploy defensive systems of its own, the net derivative might actually be more stabilizing for South Asia, as that would enhance Pakistani confidence about the security of its own assets, and raise the threshold for threat or use of nuclear weapons against India.

It is also possible that Pakistan’s acquisition of such area-wide defenses might lead to greater confidence in the survivability of its nuclear assets, leading to greater adventurism or nuclear brinkmanship by the latter. But that is harder for Pakistan, given its lack of indigenous array of satellites and other technical assets necessary for information-gathering and processing, surveillance, guidance, and related measures for effective area-wide defenses. On balance, however, the acquisition of greater offensive and defensive capabilities by the two adversaries is likely to lead to a greater responsibility in their threat or usage. In the ultimate analysis, area-wide defensive systems, if within reach of these countries, and accompanied by military-technical CBMs regarding the deployment postures of their offensive arsenals, would lead to greater crisis stability.

In the Sino-Indian context, the net effect of Indian defensive deployment would be to raise the defensive shield against China, but not sufficiently as to erode the superior Chinese offensive position against India. On the other hand, China’s building up of its defensive shield would simply further raise the bar against Indian strikes. On balance, until India achieves proven sea-based deterrence against China, the power balance is unlikely to shift significantly. In the eventual analysis, growing capabilities on both sides would raise the threshold for preemptive or aggressive behavior, which in conjunction with military-technical CBMs, should enhance crisis stability between the two sides.

Scenario B: US NMD Deployment Plans Not Successful

If the US plans to deploy an NMD were to prove unsuccessful, either because of technical problems, or because of mounting international pressure, or both, then the technical and policy costs for India, China and Pakistan to pursue such deployments would grow proportionately higher. In that event, the net deterrent relationship devolving between India and China, and India and Pakistan, would in part be a function of their respective offensive capabilities, and in part a function of the larger ambit of their security dialogue.

Conclusions

The net security derivative for South Asia from the NMD debate should be grounded in issues of regional relevance, and not accord disproportionately high degree of importance to the larger debate between the United States and Russia. To be sure, the regional powers do have a right to enunciate their views on the larger principles that govern the international system [18]. And at that level, there is no gainsaying the fact that limited defensive deployments by the United States, in tandem with potent offensive capabilities, will skew the power balance more heavily in its favor. Another net effect of such a plan is likely to spur a new round of offensive arms buildup, along with pursuit of defensive systems by certain countries.

However, at a more pragmatic level, the United States wields considerable influence at this unipolar global moment, and is likely to prevail in its wishes to deploy a limited defensive system, if the technology for the same were to become available. Again, to quote from Wolfowitz, "it is not anymore the challenge of technology, but one of engineering." Further, the US approach is mated with the search for a new and more constructive security framework, wherein countries such as India have the opportunity to explore a wider basis of cooperation with the United States. If China’s capabilities keep growing, then its ability to behave unilaterally within Asia also grows, regardless of whether it will exercise aggressive options. Its assistance to Pakistan is also ultimately a function of Chinese decision, where a stronger India with a broad-based relationship with the United States, could only serve to dampen Chinese enthusiasm for adventurism.

In sum, it would take a decade and more for India and Pakistan to deploy a credible network of area-wide defenses, even if the technology for the same were to become validated in the near term. China’s financial ability to deploy such systems is greater, and its negotiation with Russia to acquire the S-300 systems is a pointer of its decision to move in this direction. Ultimately, the Indian and Pakistani decision to respond to the NMD debate should be grounded in regional calculations, and a mature handling of such capability, should it become available and affordable, could lead to greater crisis stability. Effecting such an outcome, however, as always, devolves upon the foreign policy and national security leadership of the two countries, and the same can be said about the leadership in both China and India.