| Article Reviews
Nuclear Command &
Control and National Security Management
Jasjit Singh, Nuclear
Command and Control, Strategic Analysis, May 2001 Vol. XXV No.
2, pp 147-159.
The author attempts to outline his views of what is necessary for the
command and control (C2) of India’s nuclear arsenal in this short, minimally
footnoted article. This makes an interesting opinion piece, but as an analytical article
it raises as many questions as it answers, primarily due to the author’s tendency not
to distinguish between his own opinions and Indian government policy trends (in so far as
we can perceive them). As a result, the reader is left somewhat confused about the proper
approach to creating an Indian command and control system.
Singh begins by laying out some core assumptions. He argues that
the nuclear doctrine India chooses will determine India’s nuclear strategy, and that
doctrine, strategy, and force posture are closely related. This approach differs
significantly from classic strategic theory, which puts the ends and the strategy as the
determining factors, and from them derives the doctrine and force posture (means). Singh
is either arguing that the routines for deploying and utilizing nuclear weapons should be
formulated before deciding how possession and development of nuclear weapons can be
utilized for Indian national interests (which seems counter-intuitive), or he has reversed
the relative importance of doctrine and strategy. Either way, this opening section can
confuse the reader. Singh also focuses on deterring nuclear threats – much more
difficult to do than deterring nuclear use, particularly when "threat" is not
defined. He also argues that India’s doctrine requires it to "immediately
retaliate with adequate power to inflict an ‘unacceptable’ level of punishment
and destruction on the aggressor. (p. 1)" This approach does not appear to coincide
with the Draft Nuclear Doctrine, which is the primary source available for interpreting
the direction of Indian nuclear strategy and doctrine and therefore for assessing C2
requirements. The author does not really make clear the fact that this is his
interpretation of India’s needs, further adding to the reader’s potential
confusion.
Singh then states that "no-first-use" requires a single
massive retaliatory strike – again, an opinion or interpretation rather than a
statement of formal policy, and one which denies a government the option of proportional
response or other political limits on the use of nuclear force once deterrence fails. The
author states that this requirement leads to a number of other issues – mobility,
dispersion, and deception measures will all be important parts of an Indian nuclear
posture. He argues that India must be prepared to launch a retaliatory strike in thirty
minutes, and certainly no more than two hours. Again, this does not match the statements
and interpretations of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine, which imply the possibility for
considerable delay if that is felt to be politically useful.
Singh then leaps again into personal opinion – stating that India
must never acquire tactical nuclear weapons, because there is no use of a nuclear weapon
that is not strategic. This argument is correct, but applies to virtually any other use of
conventional or unconventional force available to a government. All use of military force
has strategic implications, which is why it is useful to consider the strategic impact
before one acquires or uses certain types of weapons. However, if one intends to deter
nuclear threats rather than nuclear use, this may place a premium on possession of an
extremely robust arsenal at all levels, and an apparent or rhetorical willingness to
engage in limited nuclear exchanges if necessary (at least, this was one justification for
the build-up of Western tactical nuclear arsenals). Singh does not square this circle, nor
relate his opposition to tactical nuclear devices to his apparent support for the use of
small warhead yields for strategic purposes (on p. 7). It is unclear if the use of
sub-kiloton warheads is consistent with his objections to tactical weapons, to his
concerns about escalation and fighting nuclear wars, and to his belief that India’s
appropriate nuclear response must be a massive retaliatory strike. If deterrence rests on
destruction, why pursue more discriminate weapons? If tactical nuclear weapons are
completely unacceptable, why pursue weapons that implicitly fall into that category, and
will be so perceived by India’s adversaries? Singh also states that India must not
fight a nuclear war, for it would surely lose it – but does not identify a threat or
potential opponent. He rejects the notion that nuclear weapons have military utility
– arguable, given the apparent decisions by both India and the United States to
deliberately pursue low-yield, less destructive weapons which do not raise a significant
collateral damage problem.
His prescriptions on the nature of Indian command and control systems
rely less on conjecture and assertion, and somewhat more on analysis. He asserts that the
nuclear arsenal must be controlled by political leadership, that it must have a an
efficient operational command and control system run primarily or completely by the
military, that costs must be minimized, and that potential threats must be carefully
assessed and analysed in peacetime, since there will be no time in crisis. It is hard to
disagree with these statements – but his assertion that the new C2 program should be
integrated into the current military command structure with minimum disruption of
organizations and procedures is worthy of debate. Why not create an entirely new
organization for the new strategic forces? The Soviets did (the Strategic Rocket Forces),
and other militaries have carved large new relatively autonomous organizations out of
existing structures to deal with the complexities of nuclear C2 (Strategic Air Command,
for example). Singh argues that most of the responsibility should remain in the hands of
the IAF, which already does lots of strategic targeting, but that responsibility for
physical security of the weapons and components should be in the hands of the Army. He
argues that the main IAF strike units will have both conventional and nuclear roles –
this raises the possibility of attrition/erosion of nuclear assets in wartime, or of
non-availability of the IAF’s most important aircraft if they are held in nuclear
reserve. He finally asserts that for the next 5-6 years, the only available aircraft that
can perform the nuclear strike role will be approximately 80 Su-30s and Mirages (he argues
that the Jaguar will have to be confined to the Western theatre), and that therefore the
IAF will have to maintain a serviceable and operationally available fleet of about 25 of
these for the nuclear role. This may stress and already heavily burdened IAF in need of
modern strike assets.
In summary, this is a thought-provoking piece, but one which deserves
somewhat better editing. It would be useful if the author specifically identified where
his opinion differs from official statements, and if he pursued some topics (particularly
the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and the deterrent value of warfighting capabilities)
further.
T.Hoyt
Vinod Anand, Management
of Defence: Towards An Integrated And Joint Vision, Strategic Analysis,
February 2001 Vol. XXIV No. 11, pp 1973-1987.
This paper deals with the questions of appointing a Chief of Defence
Staff (CDS) and integrating the Service Headquarters with the MOD, so that defence
decisions are made by designated qualified professionals, and there is a clear decision
making structure from the proper civil authority to the military with little or no
duplication of work. It is a very detailed account of the state of defence decision making
in India and a must read for all concerned Indians, not just those in the upper echelons
of government.
It is ironic that in 10 years Mr Arun Singh has submitted two reports
recommending reforms - the latest being his report of the Task Force on Defence Management
(TFDM). The old report was ignored and there is every risk that the latest recommendations
may go the same route.
The paper may be broadly divided into 4 parts: 1) What is wrong with
the Indian Defence decision-making setup today?, 2) Why and how reforms are being opposed,
3) The US and UK models and 4) What role is intended for the Indian CDS and integrated
MOD.
1) What is wrong with the Indian Defence decision-making setup today?
The paper details how, in a series of little shifts and "divide
and rule" moves, total control of the defence set up is in the hands of the Indian
bureaucracy. This game has extended to raising the de facto seniority in protocol of some
civil servants to put them on par or ahead of the three service chiefs. Anand says:
"the Defence Secretary, ipso facto, is responsible for anything and everything to do
with defence matters and Armed Forces of the Union". The defence secretary is also in
effect the Chief of Defence Staff. "Supremacy of civil over military authority in its
application to the Indian context has come to mean bureaucratic prevalence at the
uppermost level in virtually all defence related decision- making."
The nearest parallel would be to imagine that all the senior specialist
doctors in all of India's hospitals are replaced by bureaucrats who have to make critical
life-saving decisions to be implemented by junior doctors. It is clear that no politician
or bureaucrat would want his heart bypass to be decided by another bureaucrat, but the
situation is considered to be acceptable for India's defence.
Some quotes from Jaswant Singh in the paper are frighteningly relevant
here:
"- the Defence Ministry, in effect becomes the principal destroyer
of the cutting edge of the military's morale; ironic considering that very reverse of it
is their responsibility. The sword arm of the State gets blunted by the state
itself."
"the ignorance of the civil servants in India about military
matters is so complete that we may accept it as a self-evident and incontrovertible
fact."
"Many strategic experts and defence analysts have commented upon
the absence of a strategic culture in India. Largely, the politicians and bureaucrats lack
the insights necessary for managing security and defence affairs"
2) Why and how reforms are being opposed
Everyone is agreed that there should be a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
and that the Services HQ and MOD should be integrated into one. Nobody is saying why it
isn't being done. Bureaucrats have been playing on political fears that there will be a
military takeover if the military are allowed to get too powerful, and the bureaucrats
also heighten inter-service rivalries to show why a CDS from another service may
compromise a particular service. Actually all these problems can be and have been
adequately addressed by checks and counterbalances as shown in the study of the US and UK
systems. Many of these fears are easily addressed by
1) Allowing individual service chiefs the right to present a dissenting
view
2) The CDS is compelled to integrate all views in the advice he gives to a government
3) Free access to civil leadership to be given to other service chiefs.
4) Civil leadership has the right to accept or reject the advice given
The civil servants and polity need to recognise the strong democratic
roots and proven apolitical credentials of the Indian armed forces before they continue to
dither over vital issues while lives are lost, decisions are delayed or duplicated, and
enormous sums of public money are wasted.
3) The US and UK models
These are dealt with at some length. In the US the secretary of Defence
("Defence Minister") issues a Defence Policy Guidance or Contingency Planning
Guidance with inputs from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CDS). The US has
evolved an effective mechanism to give good quality, single point military advice to the
President or Defence Secretary. The UK has a Secretary of State for defence (Defence
minister) who has 2 principal advisers - the UK CDS - the military head and a civil
servant, the Permanent secretary. The UK integrated its MOD in 1964 and the MOD now has
both civilian and integrated service staff responsible for defence policy and planning
based on national aims, military capability required for those aims, and finances for the
same. The UK model has many aspects that India could emulate.
4) What role is intended for the Indian CDS and integrated MOD.
The CDS will consult the three service chiefs and be the principal
military adviser to the government. He will develop a joint national military strategy
after receiving the National Security Strategy (which needs to be developed!) He will
coordinate and command inter-service operations, control strategic forces via the command
HQ (as and when that is set up!), and command various newly proposed inter services
agencies For his work he will need the help of integrated joint staff that should be a
suitable mix of military and civil staff with suitability and experience as the criteria
for selection.
The Defence Secretary, for his part will deal with Policy and Budget,
Personnel and Infrastructure, Civilian Administration, Defence procurement, coordination
of depts of Defence, Defence Production and DRDO with each other and the CDS, apart from
other roles including being the interface between the various MOD departments and the
parliament.
It is fervently hoped that Arun Singh's latest TFMD report is not
consigned to the scrap heap like the earlier one. One last comment about Vinod Anand's
paper: it makes really difficult reading - with tightly packed facts randomly strewn
around - but is a goldmine of information.
S. Sastry
R. Hathaway, Unfinished
passage, India, Indian Americans, and the US Congress, The Washington
Quarterly, 24:2, Spring 2001, pp.21-34.
This review is one of the most sober appraisals of the current status
of the political clout of Indo-Americans with special reference to the US Congress. It
starts off bemoaning the lack of truly knowledgeable members about the subcontinent in
general and India in particular, among the membership of the Senate and the House.
Starting from this abysmally low point, the article goes on to trace the increasing
interest in the last decade especially in matters Indian. There is a section on the
increasing political clout wielded by Indian Americans that is far in excess of their
relative numbers in the US population as a whole. The article draws attention to the role
the business community is playing in this process of increasing the awareness of US
lawmakers in India. One section deals with India’s position vis a vis China. There is
fairly extensive mention of the India Caucus and the main players in the Caucus as well as
those arrayed against the Caucus. Finally, the article concludes with an in depth
discussion of the intricacies of the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches especially as they relate to India and the Indian American community.
The article starts with a highly appropriate remark by Rep.Gary
Ackerman (D-NY) that most members of the US Congress believed that
"IndiaPakistan" was a single word and that most members of Congress
"wouldn’t know India or Pakistan if they came up and bit them in the ass".
Be that as it may, and I do not believe this summation strays too far from reality, the
fact remains that there is not a well developed vision of the strategic reality that is
India today and the place that this one/sixth of humanity occupies in the world. Members
of the US Congress continue to be hobbled by the perception that the entity called
‘IndiaPakistan’ needs to be treated as an organic whole.
Some of the reasons for the sea change in attitude during the last
decade, culminating in the highly successful visits of President Clinton and Prime
Minister Vajpayee are discussed. Chief among these reasons was the collapse of the former
Soviet Union, the attendant Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the resulting lessening
of US-Soviet tensions. But the author is also very perceptive in recognizing that there
was now a new phenomenon in US Congressional politics, namely that increased attention to
India could bring benefits in the US political arena. The author believes that this was
the key to the shift away from pro-Pakistan politics that prevailed during much of the
Cold War.
Simultaneous with the increased attention in the US Congress has been
the greater interest of the US business community. A direct result of the deregulation
begun by PV Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh has been the fact that there is now an
effective lobby for India in the form of American business interests. The author makes the
point that during the entire tenure of Ambassador Moynihan, he received only 3 visits from
members of Congress, two of which consisted merely of members passing through on their way
to another destination.
While the author makes reference to the China card and the Clinton
administration’s policy of engaging China, regardless of the fact that China flouted
non-proliferation regimes with impunity, he alludes to the fact there has been a double
standard, in the words of Rep. Ackerman when it came to keeping India at arms length.
Clearly, in the last decade, there has been a not so subtle change in the way Washington
views China and this will have an impact on US-India relations.
The India caucus was a giant step forward in the education of
congressional members about the geopolitics of India and received the enthusiastic support
of Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ) and Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla). The initial idea for the
caucus came from 2 Indians who were active in the Indian American Forum for Political
Education (IAFPE) Himanshu Shukla and Kapil Sharma. The Congressmen immediately realized
that their Indian American constituents had all of the basic ingredients of the classic
American Horatio Alger story, an upwardly mobile group of individuals with the highest
qualifications of any ethnic group, with a high sense of civic duty. Pallone deserves a
lot of credit for establishing an effective information network, distributing talking
points, enlisting floor speakers and lining up votes. Under Pallone’s leadership the
caucus provided India for the first time with an institutional base of support.
A very important part of the paper is the insight into the inherent
conflict between the executive and legislative branches when it came to Indo-US relations.
The author makes the point that many congressional members were sympathetic to the idea of
lifting the sanctions against India. It was President Clinton who did not avail himself of
the flexibility that the Congress offered him with giving him the waiver – the power
to waive the sanctions. This is because President Clinton, was still keen to use the stick
of sanctions to force India to sign the CTBT. Ironically it was Sen. Jesse Helms who
favoured suspension of the sanctions, as that would remove the lever that the
administration might (and did) use to press New Delhi to accede to the treaty, a treaty
for which he had little use.
In closing, the author makes the point that it was Congress that was
and is beginning to take the lead in fostering closer relations with India. However, he
also cautions the reader that unless succeeding administrations, and in particular the
Republican administration of President Bush takes the initiative to create a closer
relationship, the future of Indo-US relations remains uncertain. He opines that beyond
removing sanctions, Bush is unlikely to give sustained thought to South Asia.
K. Vepa
Rahul Roy-Chaudhary,India’s Maritime Security,
Knowledge World, New Delhi, June 2000, ISBN 81-86019-29-4, 208 pp. Hardcover
In spite of being the only nation in the world, which has an ocean,
named after it India has not sought to build upon its strengths of straddling critical sea
routes and having a modestly powerful navy. Indeed, for many Indians the navy is a force
too far off to be visible and as a consequence it was ignored in defence spending until
recently. In this, his second book, noted naval analyst Rahul Roy-Chaudhary makes a
compelling case for a proper appreciation of the maritime dimensions of India’s
overall security.
Foremost among these is energy security. With a rapidly growing
economy, India is importing increasing amounts of crude oil to power its engine of growth.
It is expected that sea borne imports of crude oil will account for nearly 84 million
tones in 2002-2003. As a large part of these shipments will be carried in on Indian
flagged and owned tankers on a SLOC straddled by an adversarial Pakistan, the necessity
for constant vigilance cannot be understated. Natural gas carrying pipelines are facing
their share of problems from various quarters. The proposed Oman-India pipeline ran into a
set of technical problems. The Indo-Iran pipeline is still in preliminary discussion
stage, owing to India’s uneasiness of dealing with Pakistan as a partner in the
venture among other things. Even Bangladesh, which can be a cheap source of piped natural
gas, is unwilling to become a supplier on account of domestic political compulsions
vis-à-vis India.
Apart from energy security, India also has to guard its overall sea
borne trade, even more so as it has embarked on a strategy of exports to boost its
economy. Infrastructure issues of ports and oil and gas terminals are also well covered in
this book. In the chapter titled ‘The Political Dimension’ the author has
described every treaty and charter of which India is a participant. Maritime disputes are
also well explained with adequate maps. Trafficking in arms and narcotics and piracy is a
growing menace in the region and India’s role in dealing with these by itself and in
joint operations with others has been documented. The author analyses the naval presence
and operations of a number of local and extra-regional players in the Indian Ocean. Force
levels, capabilities, current doctrines, and future trends among these players have been
described and analysed in detail and India’s probable options in dealing with these
have been described as well.
In the chapter titled ‘Trends in Indian Naval Power’, the
author gives an excellent overview of all the current upgradation, modernization and
acquisition programs of the Navy. India’s ATV program is well documented. A data-rich
assessment of Indian naval spending is a highlight of this chapter. Finally the book ends
with an overview of Indian naval co-operation with other navies. India is seeking to
upgrade its contacts with other navies as the recently held International Fleet Review in
Mumbai demonstrated. Details of joint operations, training, conferences exercises and port
visits are all documented here. Despite shying away from suggesting a maritime security
policy for India himself, the author nevertheless has succeeded in providing a framework
of such a policy. He has contributed a valuable work to the study of Indian maritime
affairs, which will be an important resource for others interested in this topic. A must
read on account of its objective handling of the subject.
K. Chandni
John Esposito, Political Islam and the West,
Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 2000.
This article marks an attempt to analyse the complex phenomenon of
Islamic politics to an American military audience that is unfamiliar with its details.
Prof. Esposito does a good job of refuting the popular image of a monolithic Islamic
fundamentalism, without necessarily denying its darker aspects. The article begins with a
general overview of the various Islamic movements around the world, highlighting events
like the Six Day War, the Bangladesh civil war and the Iranian revolution that decisively
influenced the course of Islamic political activism across North Africa and Asia. Early in
his article, the author refutes the view that a clash of civilizations involving the
Muslim world is imminent. He points out that nations are more often led by their national
and regional interest than any abstract "civilisational" impulse, and contends
that the image of a monolithic Islam partly springs from a "secular
fundamentalism" which views all religious politics as essentially the same. The
author highlights the variety of Islamic movements that inhabit the political terrain,
ranging from electoral parties like Turkey's Refah and Tunisia's An Nahda to the violent
Armed Islamic Group in Algeria.
Prof. Esposito tackles head on the question of whether or not Islam and
democracy are compatible. He argues that the attitude of Islamist movements towards
democracy is more a question of political culture and of education, than of religion per
se: "Failure to strengthen civil society and support the culture of political
participation encourages both religious and secular authoritarianism". Thus,
authoritarian regimes (e.g. Algeria) that crush their Islamist opponents are unlikely to
facilitate peaceful opposition. In contrast, countries like Jordan and Malaysia that have
incorporated Islamist groups into the system have proved far more stable.
While many Islamist groups have indeed been anti-democratic, the author
correctly notes the effects of situational factors: "Opening the political system
challenges Islamic monopoly of opposition voters. They must compete for votes and, when in
power, rule amid diverse interests as well as move beyond slogans to real solutions.
Islamic parties, like secular parties, must broaden their ideology and programs in
response to domestic realities and diverse constituencies." Although Prof. Esposito
does not explicitly say so, the radical Lebanese Hizballah offers perhaps the most
startling example of this occurring.
The article finally turns to the changing shape of radical Islam. The
1980s marked a confrontation between radical Shi'ism and Western interests, even as the
West supported Sunni radicals in their jihad against the Soviet Union. The 1990s have
witnessed a shift towards a clash between radical Sunni movements and the United States,
in which the battlefield has shifted east from the Middle East to South Asia. Many of
these Sunni radicals are also sectarian anti-Shi'a activists, and the Shi'a-Sunni rivalry
(as manifested in Pakistan and Afghanistan) has also been a cause of much violence.
In brief, Prof. Esposito offers a quick guide to Islamic politics, in
which he successfully refutes reductionist accounts that focus solely on the religious
content and claims of Islamist groups. He shows that political factors are equally strong
determinants of how Islamic movements evolve in the political landscape. He concludes with
a discussion of the influence of Sunni militants on the foreign and domestic policies of
Pakistan, making the claim that "the same militant forces involved in Kargil were
used by General Pervez Musharraf, who masterminded that operation, to precipitate a law
and order crisis in Pakistan to undermine a democratically elected government. In the days
leading to the military coup of October 1999, some 45 Shi'a religious and communal leaders
were assassinated across Pakistan by Sunni sectarian gangs including fighters from
Kashmir." Speculative or not, it appears clear that the most radical Islamist
movements are today at India's doorstep. Whether General Musharraf can tame them is the 64
rupee question.
A. Dubey |
