Alexander Evans, Reducing Tension is Not Enough, The Washington Quarterly 24 (2) 181-193 (Spring 2001).

This article focuses on the implications of a resolution of the Kashmiri situation, without the express involvement of the Kashmiri. The article offers a brief history of the Kashmir issue from pre-independence to post-Kargil. It then proceeds to examine the various shifts in the stances of major actors. From these shifts, the author addresses the various avenues for resolution without offering any new suggestions of his own.

The primary case that the author posits is that there has been a qualitative change in the situation in Kashmir since the Kargil War of 1999. India is considerably more confident in its actions. Pakistan is buckling under the loss of credibility engendered by its actions in the Kargil War, its precarious economic situation, and the thin frontal edge of religious anarchy. This has resulted in a perceptible shift in the zero-sum game of the subcontinent towards India. India’s military confidence is bolstered by its rise in geopolitical stature certified by Indo-US engagement.

The author makes a case that the geopolitical and economic situation that Pakistan finds itself in may predispose it to a Line of Control solution to the Kashmiri issue. Since this is the preferred Indian and International solution, the author foresees a very real possibility that India and Pakistan may resolve the Kashmiri issue on these lines. The author asserts that such a resolution, without the inclusion of the Kashmiris would not really solve the Kashmir issue. This is a curious assertion, since the LoC solution is not the dominant discourse pertaining to the Kashmiri issue. Indeed, the Indian Government has expressly sought to establish dialogue with the representatives of the Kashmiris. However, external actors such as the Pakistani government and Radical Islamists have sought to disrupt this dialogue. In addition, it is curious that the author does not raise the issue of the self-determination of the Kashmiris who live as second-class citizens in Pakistan’s "Azad Kashmir" and "Northern Areas" in a territory that is more than three times as large as the Valley.

In summary, the author’s concerns are questionable, since the Government of India has sought to resolve the Kashmiri issue through negotiation with the Kashmiris rather than with the Pakistanis. This is the isolation is driving the voices of moderation in Pakistan, rather than the alternative expressed by the author. Ultimately, the question of what the Kashmiris want will be clarified significantly when the political, diplomatic and military support from Islamabad ceases. The fact that Evans does not discuss this is also another indication of either his expertise, or his prejudice.

S. Joshua

 Timothy D. Hoyt, Modernising The Indian Armed Forces, 1990-2000, Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2000.

This article analyzes India’s military modernization effort as it enters the 21^st century. The author seeks to answer a series of questions about India’s expanding military capabilities in the post-Cold War world, the threat scenario; does the evolving Indian military pose a threat to neighbors and international security? Finally, can India’s new military capability provide expanded political influence, within Asia or the world? To its JFQ audience, the article addresses the fundamental question of "Why does India’s military capability matter to the U.S.?"

The author begins by covering the overall trends since the end of the cold war. He makes an intriguing statement that "India initiated acquisition of almost every category of modern weapons in the sub-continental rivalry" with Pakistan. While this may be true from a nuclear weapons perspective, it is debatable where conventional weapons are concerned. From Sabre jets, F-104s, TOW missiles, Harpoon AShMs, P-3 Orions to F-16s Pakistan and its backers in the US Pentagon have always ensured a qualitative edge over India in nearly every genre of weapons. The author later covers the current reversal of this situation due to Pakistan becoming an international pariah and being cut off from its traditional sources of hi-tech weaponry. The author then goes on to analyze each armed service’s capabilities and status. The analysis of the army is quite detailed, and lucid both on its capabilities and its problems.

When analyzing the navy, the author covers the decline in force levels during the 90s and the acquisition of the Viraat, and possibly the Gorshkov, as well as the Delhi class. However, he does not do justice to the resurgence in Indian naval shipbuilding and some of the later programs such as the Kashmir class, P17 frigates, P25 corvettes, P75 submarine program, Brahmaputra and Bangalore classes. Adding the successes of the Indian Navy with these shipbuilding programs (despite their being sometimes behind schedule), sonar programs (APSOH, HUMVAAD, Panchendriya) and torpedo development would have provided a more accurate and balanced picture of the Indian Navy. A comment by Admiral Sushil Kumar for more reconnaissance aircraft is incorrectly portrayed as a lack of reconnaissance aircraft.

The analysis of the IAF records the increased obsolescence of the MiG-21 fleet, the dismal accident record, and the stalling of the AJT program. He points out the lack of force multipliers in the IAF such as AWACS, in-flight refueling and electronic warfare and how these prevent the IAF from aspiring for the capabilities displayed by the USAF in the Persian Gulf war. The article does not cover the recent happenings with the LCA since it dates back to 1999.

A very brief review of strategic forces covers the nuclear tests (including the sub-kiloton "tactical" weapons), possible stockpile estimates and testing of the Agni-II. The review of the national security infrastructure points out the improved focus on this subject by the BJP lead administrations and concludes that while things have improved, there still remains a lot to achieve before the military has a greater say in national security issues. Some analysis of the establishment of a national command structure or the lack thereof would have added value to this discussion.

Covering the threat scenario, the author rightly concludes that internal insurgency is the primary threat to Indian national security. The diminished capabilities of Pakistan’s conventional forces, the overwhelming superiority of Indian conventional forces and the threat of nuclear escalation have allowed Pakistan to wage a low intensity war through insurgency. While some may take issue with it, the second threat from the Chinese is correctly not perceived as a major strategic threat despite the overtures to India’s neighbors like Myanmar and the proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons to Pakistan. The extra-regional threat is seen to be more notional since the Indian military including the navy are robust enough to deter any possible adversary.

Covering the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and India’s attempts at RMA, the author postulates that the nature of India’s threats (mainly internal insurgency) do not merit a very high technology component and can be better dealt with by manpower intensive military forces. It is hard to agree completely with this reasoning. A manpower intensive force coupled with a mix of high technology units and efforts might be a more effective counter against these threats particularly for the army. The Air Force and Navy by their very nature will need to maintain a high technology content, which they have demonstrated.

Finally, the article concludes that despite the growth in Indian military capabilities, a lack of strategic vision hampers the Indian national security scenario. The Indian military does not possess any major extra-regional capability and should not be considered a potential hostile peer-competitor. This observation bears more weight with the increased engagement between India and the US and the perceived common threat of China. For military and security aficionados, the article does not reveal any new earth-shaking insights. It offers a refreshingly balanced view of the Indian national security scenario for its American audience.

Sukumar R. Iyer

K. Subrahmanyam, Challenges to Indian Security, Field Marshal Cariappa Memorial Lecture 2000, Organised by Indian Army HQ, text published by IDSA, December 2000, Vol. XXIV, No. 9, pp 1557-1576.

Mr. Subrahmanyam in this paper severely castigates India for failing to evolve a culture of long-term pro-active strategic thinking and absence of efficient institutional mechanism to successfully prepare the nation to face myriad security challenges in timely manner. He uses the term "Panipat Syndrome" to define this tradition of not anticipating the threat in advance, not being prepared to meet it and to attempt to counter it after it has assumed serious proportions

He makes a passionate and rational plea for making necessary changes for effective functioning of the National Security Council, which is the apex body to co-ordinate long term defence planning and response. The paper instantly became controversial and the comments made therein were widely reported in the national media especially for its reference to the failure of National Security Council to discharge its mandate, for apparent reference to the casual approach of the Prime Minister’s Office and to National Security Adviser Mr. Brajesh Mishra.

In the paper, Mr. Subrahmanyam cites the Sanskrit saying 'Yadha Rajas Thatha Praja'-as is the king so are the subjects. He goes on to add that if at the topmost political level there is an attitude of casual approach to national security, one cannot expect the bureaucracy, the parliament, the media and others to pay more meaningful attention to national security. He adds for good measure that in our system the buck stops with the Prime Minister, therefore, the responsibility for the present unsatisfactory situation of casual approach to national security vests with the Prime Minister and his immediate advisers in matters of national security.

It is worthwhile to remember that Mr. Subrahmanyam is a pre-eminent expert and perhaps the foremost defence analyst in the field of strategic security issues in India. He has unparallelled knowledge about the working of the Government of India, having been a part of establishment since joining the civil service in the Fifties. His long and distinguished career included many high-ranking governmental positions including Deputy Secretary and Director of the Ministry of Defence, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and Secretary (Defence Production) Ministry of Defence, 15 years as the head of IDSA (Institute for Defense and Strategic Analysis). Even recently the Government of India appointed him the Chairman of the Kargil Review Committee. He is also the Convenor of National Security Advisory Board that drafted the Indian nuclear doctrine. This coupled with his long, deep and abiding interest in the defence field has seen him emerge as a distinguished and a serious thinker of merit on long-term defence issues that is a relatively unknown species in India.

The point is that this paper which directly indicts the national security set up is not written by a stringer whose knowledge is hashed from dubious open source material and the analysis is based on mood for the day. When a person who has been a part of the policy making echelons of Indian establishment for such a long time and is the head of the team that drafts Indian nuclear doctrine writes such a hard hitting paper then it is essential to take notice. He mercilessly dispels and puts to rest the illusions of the eternal optimist that behind the apparent sloth, inefficiency, inattention, disinterest, corruption and lack of coherence there is a Grand Scheme being worked by the best and brightest of military, bureaucracy and the polity. This paper may be read with another paper of Mr. Subrahmanyam which discusses lack of proper planning and lack of involvement of Private Sector in defence production and procurement to complete the dismal picture: "Self Reliant Defence and Indian Industry".

The paper itself is written in a narrative style. Mr. Subrahmanyam gives a personal, anecdotal and interesting account of strategic thinking in India or the lack thereof. The paper starts with an apocryphal story about an exchange between General Cariappa and Mahatma Gandhi on the issue of Ahimsa. Thereafter he discusses various challenges facing the nation and the inadequacy of our establishment for creating the necessary "Security Management". He riles the nation for relying on ad hoc approach even though the gravity of the situation calls of more substantial and systematic approach. The paper echoes the growing demand of transparency and argues for mobilizing the nation by informing them of the real and actual nature of threats to their nation. For instance he points out that there is absence of planning to involve private sector for producing the next generation weaponry equipment. Even the proxy war is being fought by India on the basis of ad hoc improvisation for 17 years rather than formulating a comprehensive and integrated strategy.

He cautions that the situation is likely to become further complicated with the new role envisaged for India as a state with nuclear weapons, an emerging economic power on high growth trajectory, a strategic partner of major powers, a global player, an aspiring permanent member of the security council and an increasingly democratising and federalising polity. Also that, there is inadequate realisation in this country that achieving these aims will amount to a major alteration of the status quo in Asia and the world and therefore there will be a lot of resistance to it from both within and outside the country. He points out there is absence of sufficient awareness in the government that the country is not equipped to plan long term national security policy. At best it is equipped only to carry out short term and current national security management.

As regards the core issue of the paper, Mr. Subrahmanyam goes on to say that the present government started encouragingly by setting up a National Security Council, (NSC) a National Security Advisory Board and a Strategic Planning Group in 1998. NSC has an advisory and deliberating role to develop long term future oriented perspectives and to direct the ministries to come up with their policies and recommendations. On the other hand there is no change in the attitude. The NSC set up in 1998 had hardly met. If the NSC is not able to fulfil the role prescribed this will itself becomes a challenge to national security. He lists the factors affecting the tasks mandated for NSC and details his suggestions that seem straightforward, reasonable and capable of being implemented.

Raj Malhotra

Gaurav Kampani, Living with India’s bomb: In praise of Indifference, Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, March 2001.

In this article, the author starts off by defining two challenges that confront the US administration and the "global non-proliferation community" in the aftermath of India's 1998 nuclear tests. The first challenge is to determine how one deals with a de facto nuclear weapon state that is outside of all regional and global non-proliferation regime. The second is the management of nuclear risks and promotion of crisis stability in South Asia.

The author has devoted most of his efforts in this article to address only the first challenge. The author believes that India's decision to test nuclear devices seriously threatens the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime. This also sets a precedent for other potential proliferators. The manner in which this challenge is "managed" by the "global non-proliferation community" led by the US could either make or break the non-proliferation regime as it now exists.

The author then goes on to discuss the initiatives taken by the Clinton administration in detail vis-à-vis the first challenge. According to him, they adopted a middle-of-the-road stance between the non-proliferation purists on one side who wanted a hard-line stance and the South Asia experts who wanted a more pragmatic stance. They imposed economic and technological sanctions on India as well as initiated a high level dialog to engage India to explore the convergence in Indo-US economic and political interests particularly in the post-cold war era. They also informally began de-linking the nuclear and non-nuclear components of their India policy. The goal was to balance US's commitment to the non-proliferating regime with regional interests in South Asia.

On the nuclear front, the Clinton administration realized that rollback of the Indian nuclear program was not an option and so tried to cap India's strategic capabilities. Their stated objectives comprised of four benchmarks. One, strategic restraint on weaponisation and deployment of nuclear forces. Two, India's accession to CTBT. Three, moratorium on fissile material production pending the negotiation of FCMT. And four, strengthened export controls in nuclear and missile technologies. In order to achieve these "limited" objectives, India and the US started and sustained a comprehensive dialogue for ten rounds. This groundbreaking dialogue was the first of its kind in the history of US-India relationship.

The author feels that except in the area of tightening export controls, India has not complied with any of the remaining benchmarks. Therefore, India has won this "Nuclear Debate" and believes that the fault rests firmly with the Clinton Administration. He attributes the following reasons for this failure. One, the process of informally disaggregating ties into nuclear and non-nuclear strands sent mixed signals to India's nuclear advocates. India misunderstood the high-level attention accorded to it in the non-nuclear strand to mean that the US also "indirectly acknowledged the correctness of India's nuclear policy". Two, during the course of the negotiations, the US officials "committed the mistake of tacitly recognizing India's nuclear status". Because of the above reasons, rather than curbing vertical proliferation in South Asia, it has served in stoking it further.

As for his recommendations of how to proceed, he feels that the US has other significant political, economic and strategic interests in India that cannot be deferred until the non-proliferation issues are resolved. Therefore, he advocates that it is no longer viable to hold ties with India hostage to a single-point non-proliferation agenda. He feels that ties with India should be disaggregated into nuclear and non-nuclear aspects and pursued independently of each other. This he believes will generate "goodwill, blind trust and subtly expand US influence in India in the long run". The people who are pulling for this policy are increasingly assertive and politically active NRI community and the business community. These two groups will force Congress to press for a more flexible policy towards India. In spite of the above, he recommends the US to stop the strategic dialogue, to carry on with the dual-use technology sanctions and also adopt a policy of "nonchalance on nuclear issues in order to deflate New Delhi’s exaggerated sense of self-importance".

The second challenge, management of nuclear risks and promotion of crisis stability in South Asia, is dealt with in a very cursory manner by the author. He states that there are "no obvious or easy answers". This is due the to lack of leverage the US has with India. He feels that it is important for the US to work on "delegitimizing" India’s belief in the "prevalence of a nuclear weapons-centred global power hierarchy". He feels that it is the key to "defeating" India’s nuclear challenge.

Comments:

The feeling that overcomes me on reading this article is the lack of balance. Also the arrogant and overwhelmingly patronizing attitude displayed by the author towards India and Indians in general is amazing. The irony that the author himself is of Indian descent does not escape me. It saddens me.

I indicated that the article was not balanced. Let me address that issue. The author indicates several reasons why India chose to detonate nuclear devices in May 1998. He contends that they all had to do with "growing muscularization of Hindu society". He completely ignores the fact that India is in a tough neighbourhood with two nuclear-armed neighbors. It has fought wars with both of them in the past. One of them actively proliferated nuclear bombs and missiles blatantly, violating the very treaties this man hangs his hat on, while the US looked the other way. He completely ignores the launch of Pakistan’s Ghauri missile on April 6, 1998, which was the straw that broke the camel’s back as far as India was concerned and signalled an end to recessed deterrence.

He also indicates that he recognizes that India is a democracy. He acknowledges that even today the act of going nuclear enjoys across the spectrum popular support. All of India wants India to have a minimum nuclear deterrent. India has not signed the CTBT or NPT and therefore, has not violated any treaty obligations. Being a democracy of 1 billion people they overwhelmingly support this decision across party lines, and he does not accept that it can mean nothing but racial bias of the worst kind.

Look at the self-contradictions in the article. He believes that the Clinton administration erred because India misunderstood and took advantage of their attempted process of disaggregating ties with India. Yet he prescribes the same solution to the Bush Administration. He acknowledges that it would be nice if India developed into a counterweight to China in one sentence and marginalizes the importance of that in the next sentence.

He states that US has very little leverage with India. Yet he prescribes dual-use technology sanctions. He is also naive enough to believe that India-US friendship will continue to grow by leaps and bounds in spite of these sanctions. He has failed to address why the US lost the leverage in the first place. Does he not realize that India has been under sanctions for almost 40 years in one form or the other?

The bottom line is this, what kind of relationship does the US want with India? India is a democracy and it will be very difficult for the US to use the same tactics as it used against communist countries during the cold war. It will be increasingly difficult to build a coalition against India. So it has to decide what it wants to do now. It will get worse with each passing year. Gaurav Kampani’s old wine in a new bottle is a response that reflects an ostrich-like attitude. NPT and CTBT are unjust and flawed treaties. They are inherently unstable as they are written. It takes only one country to topple them. India did just that. Rather than cry over split milk, they should all get together and figure out how to get rid of all nuclear weapons in this world.

India is what it is. It does not need the US to acknowledge it to be anything. The US does not "own" science. India has achieved critical mass. Its forward momentum cannot be stopped. All these sanctions will do is to make India spend precious resources in reinventing the wheel. This process makes India more resurgent and will erode US "leverage" even more.

Arun Kolal

Hard-hitting questions are raised and observations made by the author based on his long involvement with this particular NGO. Of relevance are the stand taken by Pugwash in the NPT Review and CTBT discussion. The author states that Pugwash's thinking has been largely North centric and its position regarding NPT has been more geared towards non-proliferation rather than Nuclear Weapon Free World (NWFW). However he notes that there have been limited efforts by the organisation from the end of the Cold War leading to its call for a well-defined time frame for achievement of NWFW in 1997 where a two decade limit was first suggested.

With regard to the NPT review, the author's efforts to influence Pugwash gives us a glimpse into some of the inherent bias that seem to exist within Western academics towards NWS. What is more interesting is the author's view on the NPT provisions, which are worth noting. NWS have made it clear that they are not even committed to the non-proliferation goals that they so loudly preach to countries like India. Efforts to transfer nuclear weapons to EU and documented statements from government officials stating that the NPT would not be binding, in the event of a nuclear war situation, on the Allies and NATO clearly demonstrates that it is a treaty that NWS are not going to adhere to.

The author goes on to discuss the efforts made by Pugwash to pressurise the Indian government in signing the CTBT. He details the reluctance on the part of Pugwash to make an attempt to understand the Indian position. He concludes that despite joining this group with great expectations, he finds it an educative but essentially disillusioning experience.

In the second part, he makes some observations based on his experience on India's options with regard to the nuclear threat and it consistent stand towards disarmament. He argues that without an equitable NPT and a link to complete disarmament it makes little sense for India to sign any treaty - be it CTBT or FMCT. He questions the motives of the NWS in promoting these treaties and argues that they are essentially meant to control the ability of others while continuing to perpetuate their abilities to produce and stockpile nuclear weapons. He argues that the security implications of such an approach will never allow India to accept these treaties without a genuine equitable treaty to eliminate the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons in a time-bound manner, which is subject to equitable and international verification process. Until this is done, India has no choice but to maintain its minimal deterrent capability and pursue with vigour its commitment for genuine disarmament.

He also dismisses the case made by certain activists who point to Japan as a model and exposes the duplicity in the Japanese position against nuclear weapons by highlighting the wide gap between its actions with regard to disarmament initiatives as against its professed principles. He argues that the Indian position has been consistent and realistic and that the Japanese model is not something which India should emulate.

In the final section he effectively discusses the so-called ethical dimension. He counters the argument that India has strayed away from the core principles of ahimsa championed by Gandhi and Nehru. He quotes Nehru as being opposed to unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons by India. He argues while they were for peace, they advocated durable peace based on equality and were definitely opposed to nuclear apartheid. He argues that a self-righteous pacifist approach or unilateral action will not take India anywhere. While it may be acceptable for an individual to face death bravely for his absolute principles, he argues a country cannot adopt the same approach and bind future generations to an inequitable world order. He states that there is no contradiction between India's persistent and patient work towards the objective of NWFW and developing the nuclear option in the interim in this unequal world.