At first glance, an observer may dismiss Afghanistan as just another poor third world country torn apart by the usual civil war with social problems and under developed or non-existent infrastructure. That observer would be correct, at first glance. Upon taking into account the geography and the role of the region in the past and present, one comes away with a more profound understanding of Afghanistan and how it can affect the region and the world. Afghanistan is located in a watershed region between the Indian Subcontinent, Central Asia, China and Iran. A dozen ethnic groups make up its population. The largest of these is the Pashtuns in the southern region of the country are subdivided into two large groups the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns. People of Tajik origin, the second largest group, live in the northern regions. The third of the major ethnic groups are the Hazaras who are predominantly Shia and live in the Hindu Kush mountain region of central Afghanistan

For millennia, Afghanistan has been the domain of empires, as the frontier of Indian civilization, and conquests of Alexander the Great, followed by Arab, Mongol, Persian and Mughal empires. Its history of being a conquered land has been punctuated by wars between tribes and city-state warlords. Each empire has made a distinct mark on the land and its people. Modern history continued this trend. In the period of the Great Game or as the Russians called it Bolshaya Igra, empires sought military and economic influence resulting in an intense and covert competition. The British and Russians by agreement established the boundaries of present day Afghanistan in an attempt to create a buffer zone between the outlying regions of the British Empire in India and the Russian Empire in Central Asia. The British united a fragmented Afghanistan as a bulwark against the Russians but in the process turned it into a "Rentier" client state, one that depends largely on foreign aid, a legacy that would endure for years to come. In 1947, as the British left the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan briefly fell into obscurity but continued to exist as a client state with large foreign aid from the U.S. and USSR. The monarchy continued to rule, exercising nominal control over Afghanistan's northern tribal areas.

Political turmoil engulfed Afghanistan in the 1970’s, leftist parties with sympathies towards the USSR, deposed the monarch in a coup. They tried to enforce a uniform rule throughout the country a volte-face from the policy of the past. In the following years, Afghanistan faced several other revolts culminating in direct Soviet intervention in 1979. Direct intervention by the USSR, further compounded the growing disaffection and refugees poured over the borders primarily into Pakistan. The U.S. joined by the Saudis worked with Pakistan's ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) to train and arm the Mujaheddin to fight the Soviets. The Iranians too provided military support and funding to the refugees in its territory and the Chinese provided limited military support and manpower from their Muslim majority province of Xinjiang. The battle between the superpowers locked in a Cold war was now seen as a "jihad" by many Muslim countries as thousands left from Bangladesh, Philippines, and the Arab countries to fight against the USSR. The cost of the war was staggering in human terms; 1.5 million Afghans died and 15,000 Soviet troops were killed. The financial aspect was equally shocking with the Soviet Union investing $ 45 billion ($5 billion per year) and the U.S. and Saudi Arabia investing a total of $10 billion. The money was used to prop up the respective followers and mainly to buy weapons. The CIA funneled weapons to the seven major Mujaheddin groups via the ISI who skimmed heavily and frequently played favorites. The withdrawal of the Soviets under the Geneva Accords in 1989 brought more confusion. Originally, every group had a common goal of fighting the Soviets, but petty differences previously suppressed now escalated. As a result, the Mujaheddin commanders were unable to form a common government and squabbled amongst themselves. In 1992, the commanders finally reached Kabul and displaced the Soviet backed Najibullah government. Instead of bringing peace to the country, the warlords continued to fight. Elsewhere, warlords and their local commanders brutalized the population, through random violence, rape and corruption.

In 1994, a group of students (talibs) from the Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa (religious school), in Akora Khattak in Pakistan's North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) led by a one -eyed religious teacher, Mullah Omar, made an appearance on to the scene and successfully battled a local Mujaheddin commander. They initially echoed principles of Islam and its legal code Sharia, stating that they wanted to end oppression and brutality by the warlords. The Taliban could be considered second generation Mujaheddin being different from their predecessors in several aspects. First they are children of the war, largely made up of the refugees who fled Soviet occupation. Second, since they had not grown up in Afghanistan and are not aware of its history, culture or tribal ancestry. Third, they are ethnically Durrani Pashtun from southern Afghanistan. Fourth, they were too young to fight at the time of the Afghanistani resistance against the Soviet Union.

Their military campaign had rapid initial successes and in their first three months they had captured 12 out of the 36 regions of Afghanistan. These successes were in the Pashtu belt, their ethnic base, and in numerous cases involved bribery rather than armed combat. After establishing control over most of the poppy fields located in Southern Afghanistan, they started to expand westward toward Herat and northward toward Kabul. In the conquered area they imposed strict laws and disarmed the population. By imposing strict Pashtun standards on other ethnic communities, the Taliban had begun to commit the same errors as the communists. In 1996, they captured Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan and attracted international attention. Upon capturing the city, they promptly imposed their version of Sharia law and tortured and publicly hanged former President Najibullah who was living in the UN compound.

Almost as immediate as their initial successes, they suffered a reversal of fortune. The Mujaheddin commanders now united and with support from Iran, Russia, Central Asian countries and India attacked them and forced them to retreat. The retreat had a far-reaching impact; it not only was expensive in terms of manpower and equipment but also threatened their legitimacy in a religious sense as being commanded by God. The retreats were largely reversed with the help of Pakistan's madrassas (their ideological comrades), that would close down so that the students would take part in helping the Taliban. The Taliban continued to rely on Pakistani students and have been unable to recruit people in their land because their strict laws have disenchanted the population and created resentment. The Taliban are continuing the "Rentier" state status of Afghanistan, albeit with different benefactors. They are largely dependent on Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries for aid.

Infused with this new support and supplies from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the Taliban moved north towards Mazar-e-Sharif. They had hoped to get a foothold into northern Afghanistan and gain recognition form the Central Asian Republics that they hoped to soon border. Upon capturing the of Mazar-e-Sharif, they characteristically imposed their harsh order and this time the population revolted and pushed them back with heavy casualties. As previously, more students from the Pakistani madrassas ran to join them. The Taliban made another move towards Mazar-e-Sharif, this time were successful. Besides imposing strict laws, they engaged in massacres of Shias. The Taliban brutality continued to rise as time passed, in 1998 during their siege around Bamiyan in central Afghanistan, they used hunger as a weapon against civilians. These events further embittered ties between the predominantly Sunni Pashtuns and Shias.

Organization & Finance

Mullah Omar is the religious leader of the Taliban and has the titles of Commander in Chief and Amir e Momineen (Commander of the Faithful). He acquired the titled of Amir e Momineen upon wrapping himself in a cloak that originally belonged to the Prophet Mohammed, in an attempt to legitimize his role and raise the morale of the Taliban as they were facing their initial defeats. Mullah Omar is a Pashtun from southern Afghanistan near Kandahar. He has never traveled to any other region of Afghanistan and traveled to Kabul only once to legitimize his rule. Initially, he ruled by a jirga or shura (committee) where people would voice their opinions and he would make the final decision. This has changed and Mullah Omar now makes decisions with a few trustworthy mullahs. Neither he nor any of his confidants have experience in running a government; they started their careers as clerics in Pakistani Army. Many of the appointed ministers by Mullah Omar are also battlefield commanders, and replaced when they lose his favor or gain popularity. The ministries are unable to function when the minister is on the battlefront. Further adding to frustrations is the problem of two capitals. Kabul is the administrative capital while Kandahar is the spiritual one. Agreements that are worked out with the Kabul shura often are rejected because Mullah Omar did not agree with the decisions of those in Kabul.

The Taliban's ruling style had angered many in the country from ordinary citizens to the minority groups. The only functioning ministry in an otherwise dysfunctional government is the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, essentially a religious police. This religious police are involved in disseminating and enforcing the edicts of Mullah Omar such as appropriate attire and the length of beards. The edicts are broadcast on Radio Shariat. The Sharia imposed by the Taliban is in reality a mixture of Sharia with the traditional Pashtoonwali, code of the Pashtun tribes. The imposition of a code that contains a tribal philosophy on other communities of Afghanistan has caused discontent. It is here that the Taliban are replaying the mistakes committed by the leftist governments and the Soviets, which ultimately led to uprisings. Another factor that angered the minority ethnic groups is their lack of representation, upon the capture of a city; the appointed governing members are Pashtuns and exclude other ethnic groups and the conquered population.

The Taliban government has a war chest of about $100 million. Most of their revenues are generated from smuggling trade with Pakistan via the Afghan Trade Transit (ATT). Another significant source of income is the revenue from the poppy crop, generating a minimum of $20 million. The Taliban have provided Islamic sanction for opium growth, it is estimated that Afghanistan produced $3 billion worth of heroin or about 50% of the world supply (it is estimated that in the future Afghanistan may account for as much as 75% of the world's opium). Opium is exported across Afghanistan’s borders to its neighbors especially Pakistan and then exported to Europe and the U.S. Their final major source of income is direct and indirect aid from Pakistan. In actuality, Pakistan is the Taliban’s major financier, providing an overwhelming support to the regime which depends on Pakistan for the ATT, transiting of drugs as well as direct / indirect aid.

Regional Impact

Pakistan: In 1991 as the Soviet state collapsed and the American government withdrew from its involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan was left with the burden of Afghan internal strife and refugees. Coupled with the burden was the opportunity to be the sole country to have a major impact on Afghanistan. As the Mujaheddin commanders wasted time with squabbles, Pakistan's Afghanistan policy and its funding of the Taliban was motivated by both internal and external factors. First, the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in new Central Asian states, Pakistan desired to improve its economic prospects and gain influence with newly independent Muslim states but the path lay across a fragmented Afghanistan. Another was the political influence of the transport mafia in the NWFP and Baluchistan who wanted a single government in Afghanistan, so they would not have to pay tribute to every local commander. A third reason was the concept of strategic depth enunciated by Pakistani President Zia ul Haq. President Zia envisioned a Muslim bloc stretching from Pakistan to Central Asia as a force against India. A fourth reason, fragmented and armed Afghan Pashtuns might renew their call for a Greater Pashtunistan across the Durand Line (the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan set by the British) and cause an uprising among Pakistani Pashtuns in the NWFP. This occurred in the 1950's and 1960's resulting in a wave of violence in Pakistan, which subsequently used its army to crush the revolt. A fifth reason was that if Afghanistan were to stabilize the several million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan would opt to return home. Finally, Islamabad was motivated by the proposed energy pipelines that would run through Afghanistan and into Pakistan. Pakistan would gain revenue from the transit fee and serve as a conduit for energy to the rest of the world thus improving its status.

Pakistan has become the chief benefactor of the Taliban. It has provided the Taliban financial support, weapons, aid in maintaining aircraft, road construction equipment, and oil. All of these provisions help fuel the Taliban war machine. Pakistan has even sent some of its soldiers to aid the Taliban in crucial battles, many retired Pakistani troops are known to advise and even fight along side the Taliban. The Finance Ministry of Pakistan pays the salaries of the Taliban officials. Naserullah Babar, the Minister of Interior in Prime Minister Bhutto's cabinet, maintained close contacts with the Taliban and is even credited with forming the group and initially supplying them with equipment. It is perhaps not a coincidence that one of the initial acts of the Taliban was to protect Pakistani truck convoys going to Central Asia. The Taliban have also accommodated the transport mafia by charging a uniform transit fee, which is less than the fees paid to the various regional commanders in the pre Taliban days. Religious students from Pakistan are the main foot soldiers of the Taliban and the madrassas frequently close in order to allow their students to aid the Taliban.

While Pakistan has reaped some of the benefits of a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, there have been many disastrous effects. Pakistan's infamous "gun culture" is fast becoming a "gun-religion-drug culture" a synergistic and far more devastating alliance. Easier movement of goods has allowed for the easier movement of drugs from Afghanistan. Drug mafias along the border region have become wealthier and gained political influence by donating funds to major political parties. Drug mafias also play a role in the increasing violence by funding and arming extremist organizations. Increasing violence between armed gangs in Western Pakistan especially in Quetta and Peshawar is now spreading eastward into major cities like Karachi and Lahore. The number of drug addicts in Pakistani cities has risen dramatically from few hundred thousand ten years ago to a currently estimated 5 million, as is expected to increase dramatically. The increase in lawlessness and corruption has had a negative impact on Pakistan’s economy.

Adding further fuel to the fire is the ATT (Afghan Transit Trade) located along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is the largest goods smuggling operation in the world. Even though the ATT is located along the border, its effect is felt across Pakistan. Goods such as electronics, food, and fuel are smuggled from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The ATT decreases government revenue generation at a time when Pakistan depends on loans from international organization and its debt continues to rise. Additionally, it is devastating Pakistan's economy by destroying local industry and increasing unemployment. Lack of employment forces poor members of Pakistani society to send their children to study at free but dubious religious schools where the sole aim is to train people to fight religious wars. In recent years, there has also been an increase in the number of Pakistani radical groups and private armies with religious agendas inspired by the Taliban. One example is the extremist anti-Shia group, Sipah e Sahaba, which is responsible for many of the Sunni-Shia clashes in Pakistan. Other groups modeling themselves after the Taliban have proclaimed semi-independent emirates in Pakistan. A few years ago, Laskar e-Jhangvi, a radical Sunni group, attempted to assassinate Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Many groups emulating the Taliban have carried out violence against movie theaters, video stores, and other representations of "western" corruption. The vicious cycle of increased violence, and religious fanaticism, coupled with drugs and smuggling is hurting Pakistan's foreign investment inflow. Western investors are increasingly wary of investing in a country with rising sectarian violence, where anti-western attitudes are echoed and law and order is declining.

The failure of state run organizations results in public disillusionment, with people increasingly looking towards religious groups to fill the void left by the state. The Jammat e Islami’s (JI), Pakistan's largest Islamic group, popularity has increased in recent years. JI has changed its position on women's rights to bring it in line with the policy of the Taliban. The organization already has established political and military contacts within Pakistan and radical organizations in India and Bangladesh. It has stated its goal of a jihad throughout South Asia and an Islamic Caliphate in Pakistan. Recently JI's leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed criticized General Musharraf, the Chief Executive of Pakistan, and even called for his removal by another coup. Pakistan's military is also affected by the "Talibanization" of Pakistan. The trend of military officers with radical religious leanings started during the 1980's under President Zia ul Haq as a way of increasing the fervor of thwarting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The advent of the Taliban is further burgeoning this trend. Today, many military officers are sympathetic to the cause of religious groups and even support their goals. The ISI whose agents in Afghanistan are predominantly Pashtun are sympathetic to the Taliban and are influencing Pakistan policy towards Afghanistan by providing biased information. It is even rumored that the head of the Taliban intelligence unit, Qari Ahmadullah is actually in the Afghan Division of the ISI and is masquerading as a Taliban mullah.

In the early 1990’s, the U.S. pressured Pakistan to close the camps for Kashmiri terrorists fighting India. However, Taliban controlled Afghanistan provided and ideal training ground and a degree of plausible deniability regarding Pakistan's agenda in Kashmir. While initially it may have been a masterstroke to move the training camps for Kashmiri terrorists to Afghanistan. It has resulted in an increased radicalization of the insurgency in Kashmir. This may backfire on Pakistan, as the people of Kashmir tire of rigid impositions. By moving the camps to Afghanistan, Pakistan has effectively put all its eggs in one basket. Taliban's leaders are now assured of Pakistani support since the have the capability to not only affect Pakistan's link to Central Asia but also the Pakistan's operations in Kashmir.

Central Asia, China, Iran & India: The Taliban have repeated proclaimed that they have no territorial desire outside of unifying Afghanistan. Even if this statement is taken at face value (though there is ample evidence to suggest the contrary) the Taliban movement impacts Afghanistan's neighbors and benefactor Pakistan and there is every reason to suspect that it will have a similar effect on other countries in the region. The Central Asian countries, Russia, Iran, India and the China all have grave fears that the ideology of the Taliban will spill into their countries.

There has been an increase in the number of Taliban inspired groups in many of the Central Asian republics (CARs) due largely to a stagnant economy. The CAR states have seen an increase in drug trafficking, the growth of a drug mafias (who many soon wield political influence) as well as an increase in the number of drug addicts. Uzbekistan, in particular, is fighting a fanatical religious movement with ties to the Taliban. The Uzbek government has even accused several Pakistani religious organizations of aiding religious radicals against the government. Russia has discovered that the Taliban are training Chechen and Dagestani separatists. In response to these threats, CAR countries have sought closer cooperation with Russia. In turn, Russia has established military bases and carried out joint patrolling of the border. Russia and many of the CAR states aid the Northern Alliance. Russia has used military bases to support the anti-Taliban alliance, providing them with helicopters, tanks and military advisors.

India, since the emergence of the Taliban movement has supported the government of President Rabbani. India feels wary of the Pakistani connection to the Taliban and the latter's support for the jihad in Kashmir. Many of the terrorist groups such as Laskhar e Taiba and Harkat ul Ansar have links to the Taliban and seek to Talibanize Kashmir. Al-Badr, a splinter group from Hizbul Mujaheddin, is known to have ties to the Taliban. Many copycat Taliban groups are trying to establish links among the Indian Muslim community in India's major cities. In the last five years, bomb blasts have occurred in the South Indian cities of Coimbatore and Chennai, while Hyderabad is believed to be a major hub of operations for these groups. In response to the current and the potential threat from the Taliban, India supports the Northern Alliance with funds, light weapons and most recently helicopters, logistical advisors and even a hospital in Tajikistan for the wounded soldiers of the Northern Alliance. India sees the Taliban as an obstacle to its long-term policy of forging closer relations with the Central Asian countries. In the long run, India hopes to increase trade relations and gain access to the mineral wealth of the region. The radicalism espoused by the Taliban and its overflow into Central Asia run inimical to India’s short term and long term interests.

Iran sees the Taliban as a radical Sunni group with demonstrated anti-Shia leanings coming to power along its Northeastern border. As the only Shia Muslim country, Iran feels a parental role towards the Shias of the world. Iran's fears of Sunni radicalism increased when a bomb explosion in Mashhad at the Shrine of Imam Reza killed worshipers. For Iran, the actions of the Taliban towards the Shias in Afghanistan have come to signify the dangers of Sunni radicalism. In 1998, Afghan Shias and Iranian diplomats were killed in Mazar-e-Sharif by the Taliban, Iran reacted with predictable outrage and threatened to invade Afghanistan. It demonstrated its resolve by holding military exercises along its border with Afghanistan. Iran's anger with the Taliban increased at the their harsh treatment of the Shia Hazara minority. Furthermore, Iran sees itself as a competitor with Pakistan for influence in Afghanistan and also as an alternate conduit for Central Asia’s resources. Iran has for some years been verbally and militarily backing the Northern Alliance and also arming the Hazaras in Central Afghanistan.

China too feels threatened by the policies of the Taliban as there has been increasing unrest in its Xinjiang province bordering Afghanistan. The Uighur resistance is motivated by lack of religious freedoms, close links to the recently independent CAR states and by Han encroachment into the region. China hopes to construct a pipeline from Central Asia through Western China to further fuel the economic boom in the coastal regions of China and decrease dependence on sea routes for its energy needs. A separatist movement in western China could dampen Beijing’s plans for the pipeline. China has not yet supported the Northern Alliance and has remained neutral on the U.N sponsored resolutions against the Taliban. Instead China has chosen a different route by communicating it wishes to Pakistan, a close ally. It hopes that some degree of dialogue will prevent the Taliban's support and training of the separatists.

Conclusion & Future

Afghanistan has been in political turmoil for three decades and the center of armed conflict for the last 20 years. By most criteria it is a failed state, if it can even be called a state. The Taliban while ruling most of the population and controlling most of the land have not made any initiatives to win the mandate of the people. They have not built anything, and have actually worsened some of the functioning institutions with their policies. Schools have been shut down since the female teachers are not allowed to teach, and intellectuals, artists and musicians have fled the country. Barring any major developments, Afghanistan in the near future will continue to exist in its present condition. The Taliban control about 90% of the land and will continue to fight the Northern Alliance supported by Russia, Central Asian countries, Iran and India. The Taliban’s total occupation of Afghanistan will not resolve the ongoing conflict and will not suceed in bringing stability to the region. Even if the Taliban manage to control all of Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance would still be able to attack them from their bases in Central Asia.

There are several events that may change the situation of the Taliban. The first is greater cooperation and planning among the states supplying the anti – Taliban forces. Russia with support from Central Asian countries is working with Iran and India to produce a "blueprint" to push the Taliban back. The second development could be an ideological split within the Taliban between the moderates and the hard-liners. The recently deceased second-in-command of the Taliban, Mullah Rabbani, was known to have some ideological differences with Mullah Omar. His death may result in a vacuum and a competition for the number two spot. If Mullah Omar picks a hard-liner for the post, it could result in a marginalization of the moderates and may precipitate an ideological split. Such an occurrence may lead to a civil war within the Taliban. The downstream effects of a split would depend on the support if any, the moderate faction receives from Pakistan or other neighboring countries or if the Northern Alliance capitalizes on the confusion with in the ranks of the Taliban. If the moderate faction is not supported, it is likely to wither away quickly. The funding and inflow of weapons and aid from Pakistan and the Arab countries will most likely be controlled by the faction loyal to Mullah Omar. Another major development could be a citizens’ revolt against the Taliban. In 1998, an unsuccessful coup attempt occurred as bombs exploded outside of Mullah Omar’s Kandahar residence. The most effective uprising against the Taliban would come from within their ethnic base, the Pashtun population. Over time the Ghilzai Pashtun population has come to see the Taliban as Pakistan’s puppets. A revolt is possible since there is a large undercurrent of anger against the Taliban’s self-righteous policies and their denial of power to the Ghilzai Pashtuns. The revolting Pashtuns may form an alliance with the anti Taliban forces and also provide impetus to others groups disgruntled with the Taliban’s rule.

Afghanistan has proved to be a modern day Charybdis, the infamous whirlpool of Greek mythology, for its neighbors. Pakistan’s relation with Afghanistan can best be seen in the light of a failing state helping a failed stated with each contributing to the other’s downward spiral. Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy can reasonably be considered a failure, since it has achieved little if any of the initial objectives. There are numerous failures, Pakistan’s support of the Taliban has reduced its credibility with the CAR countries and not improved relations. Though the refugee problem has lessened in the past few years, it could be exacerbated if people living in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan decided to leave the harsh regime for Pakistan. This will put Pakistan in a bind since it is interested in pushing the remainder of the refugees out of its territory.

In the process of supporting the Taliban, Pakistan’s relations with Iran have been damaged and Pakistan faces growing international isolation over its support of the Taliban. Pakistan's links with Osama Bin Laden who is allegedly involved in acts of terror against the U.S. and has advocated jihad against India and Israel among others, has also further isolated Pakistan internationally. Bin Laden is known to have links with the ISI through his training of jihadis bound for Kashmir and other areas in the region at his Khost complex near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Even cordial relations with China, may sour if the Uighur separatists continue to receive aid from the Taliban and Pakistan’s own religious groups. China has previously asked Pakistan to stop training Uighur separatists on its soil and to ask the Taliban to do the same. So far Pakistan is unable to do so as evidenced by the recent encounter between Uighur separatists (part of LeT group) and Indian security forces in Kashmir. Pakistan’s reason for not complying with the Chinese request is either due to domestic pressure from religious groups or inability to convince the Taliban. Ultimately, it may drive a wedge between China and Pakistan, resulting in further isolation.

Domestically for Pakistan, the Taliban continue to create problems, by furthering Islamisation. Such a trend will accelerate as Pakistan’s economy further deteriorates and the poor will be seduced by the fanatical elements and their agenda. The religious organizations in Pakistan seek to escalate the jihad in Kashmir, make Pakistan a Taliban style Islamic state by revolution if necessary, and change Pakistan’s economy to conform with their idea of Islam. In fact, Pakistan’s rulers are fearful of the domestic goals of the religious groups. Recently Imam Akram Awan and his group of followers consisting of former military personnel echoed a desire to march on Islamabad to install an Islamic government. Pakistan’s Chief Executive, General Musharraf, took the threat seriously and sent Minister Haider to speak to the Imam. Pakistan is also unable to restrict violent clashes in its provinces without disrupting the flow of weapons and fighters in Kashmir and the Taliban. The reason is that there are no clear distinctions between the various organizations and many of the organizations receive recruits from the same madrassas and are often consider each other ideological comrades. Harkat ul Ansar and Jaish–e-Mohammed, two groups operating in Kashmir, are linked to the Taliban and SSP (Sipah e Sahaba) which operate in Pakistan.

Pakistan has found itself in an unenviable position between the Charybdis of Afghanistan and the Scylla of its own fanatical groups. It is presently unlikely that Pakistan will be able to steer a course between these two forces acting synergistically. The advice and warnings of Pakistan’s elite regarding Afghanistan have fallen of deaf ears and the government has made no major changes in its policy in the last year and a half. As the Taliban continue to receive Pakistan’s help, they will directly and indirectly alter Pakistan. Second, if the government stops aid to the Taliban, then they along with their allies in Pakistan may seek to overthrown the current military regime in Pakistan. Another option is equally unpalatable, if the war in Afghanistan lessens in intensity, then many of the fighters, who are of Pakistani origin, will return to further accelerate the Talibanization of Pakistan. It is stated by many Pakistani intellectuals and even former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto that Pakistan in its current political and economic condition is ripe for a Taliban style government. This ultimately results in the nightmare scenario of radical religious groups gaining control of a nuclear armed country and results in a further increase in self styled Taliban groups in India, China, Central Asia and beyond. It may even lead to a conflict with Iran. Many of the aims of the Taliban movement run counter to the Pakistan’s national interests, but disentanglement from Afghanistan may prove next to impossible. Overall, Pakistan finds itself in a quagmire largely of its own making; the Taliban movement, a Pakistani proxy, seems to have taken on a life of its own.

Afghanistan’s other neighbors also find themselves in a precarious position. The Central Asian states, Iran and Russia find an encroaching Taliban influence in their respective countries disturbing. The have witnessed an increase in drug trafficking, smuggling, religious extremism and violence. As the Taliban continue to cement their rule in Afghanistan, these trends will continue and even accelerate. It is reported recently that Juma Namangani, leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, crossed the Amu Darya River separating Afghanistan from Central Asia, in hopes of assisting the radical groups fighting their respective governments. Namangani, whose stated goal is to overthrow President Karimov’s government in Uzbekestan, is financially backed by bin Laden and has been aiding the Taliban in the war effort in Northern Afghanistan. Instability in the region will result in a cataclysmic domino effect throughout not just Central Asia but also fuel fighting in Chechnya, Dagestan and even China’s Xinjiang region. India views the Taliban’s advance with predictable caution. An advance of the Taliban and its increasing influence in Pakistan will dampen the possibility of an already unlikely peace. Groups such as Lashkar e-Taiba who are tied to the Taliban have carried out brazen attacks in the Red Fort in New Delhi and also have acquired anti-aircraft guns to further escalate the violence in Kashmir particularly and in India generally. India faces a twin threat from a radicalizing Pakistan fomenting violence in India and the possible radicalization of elements in India’s own Muslim population.

The near future of Afghanistan remains uncertain due to the conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance and also because neither can really provide a stable government for the people of Afghanistan. As Afghanistan remains in a political and economic 'limbo' its neighbors will be affected. Most noticeable is Pakistan, as it continues to radicalize. The government of Pakistan may be overthrown or may have to acquiesce to the supremacy of the religious groups. In either case, the level of violence in Pakistan will rise. This in turn will affect other countries such as India, Central Asia and their respective economies. Potentially the situation in Afghanistan will have far reaching impact on China's western frontier and Russia's southern lands. One may witness an increase in the tempo of separatist movements, as well as new insurgencies styled after the Taliban. In conclusion, the current Afghanistan imbroglio has the potential to influence and alter the destiny of its neighbors.  

References

[1] Jessica Stern, Pakistan’s Jihad Culture, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000

[2] G.D Bakshi "Afghanistan as a Rentier State Model: Lessons from the Collapse" http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-8.html

[3] Brahma Chellaney, Sliding towards anarchy, Hindustan Times October 4, 2000

[4] Robert D. Kaplan, The Lawless Frontier, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/09/kaplan.htm

[5] Akash Kapur, Inside the Jihad, http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/ba2000-08-09.htm

[7] B. Raman, Continuing unrest in Xinjiang, http://www.saag.org/papers/paper41.html

[8] B. Raman, Afghanistan: in Perspective, http://www.saag.org/papers/paper78.html

[9] B. Raman, Bin Laden, Taliban & India, http://www.saag.org/papers/paper83.html

[10] Ahmed Rashid, Central Asia crisis talks over Islamic ‘invasion’, www.telegraph.co.uk

[11] "Moscow preparing plan to overthrow Taleban" www.rediff.com/news/2001/jan/05tal.htm

[12] Arnaud de Borchgrave, Bin Laden is ‘cult figure’of Pakistani Muslims, Washington Times, March 21, 2001

[13] Charu Singh, Russian troops back in Afghanistan, www.tehelka.com

[14] Meena Singh Roy "India’s Interests in Central Asia"

[15] B. Raman "Aghanistan: Pakistan’s Black Hole"http://www.saag.org/papers/paper228.html

[16] B.Raman "Pakistan’s Jamaat-E-Islami: The Hidden Agenda" http://www.saag.org/papers/paper76.html

[17] Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: the struggle for empire in central Asia, Kodansha International, 1992

[18] Peter Marsden, The Taleban, Oxford University Press, 1998

[19] Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press, 2000