LCA: Impact on Indian Defense

Sukumar R. Iyer

 

In the development of air power, one has to look ahead and not backward and figure out what is going to happen, not too much what has happened.

-Brig. General William 'Billy' Mitchell, USAS, the father of modern air power

 

India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) flew for the first time on January 4^th, 2001, almost a full forty years since the last major Indian designed fighter took to the skies. The occasion marked the culmination of the scientific dreams of many in India. That day also perhaps marks the rebirth of the Indian aerospace industry and will have a significant impact on Indian defense for many years to come. The future of India’s aerospace abilities and confidence in hi-tech defense research and manufacturing rests on the success of the LCA program.

Rebirth of the Indian Aerospace industry

We would be remiss to analyze the role of the LCA without looking at the past attempts, failures and shortcomings of the Indian aerospace industry.The HF-24 Marut was India’s first and last foray in the last century into developing an indigenous fighter aircraft [8]. Designed by the legendary Kurt Tank, (father of the Focke-Wulf 190 in WWII), the Marut was perhaps a little early for its time considering the immaturity of Indian industry in those years. The refusal of the British to provide an engine capable of powering an aircraft its size, and the Indian inability to develop one doomed the Marut from the start. A similar fate met the Egyptian Helwan also designed by Kurt Tank’s team.

Since then, Indian aerospace has languished without direction and the lack of political will, combined with the stupor governing the Indian public sector that has a stranglehold on defense related industries. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the lone Indian aircraft company has long satisfied itself with assembling a line of aircraft under license and recently supplying parts to overseas aircraft manufacturers. With a work force of more than 40,000 employees comparable in size to aerospace giants in the west, this public sector behemoth symbolized the inertia in the Indian aerospace and defense industries. The only bright spots in this otherwise bleak picture were the development of the Ajeet, Kiran and a line of piston-engined trainers.

The dying spark of the Marut program was an attempt to design and build a Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA) the HF-73, a twin engined derivative of the Marut. The demise of the HF-73 later culminated in the purchase of the Jaguar to fill this role. While a series of imports and license assembly programs followed, hopes were kept alive by the launch of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) in 1984 with the sole purpose of developing the LCA.

The first flight of the LCA on January 4^th, 2001 along with the fledgling Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) and the Saras programs marks a rebirth of the nascent Indian aerospace industry, which had been all but written off. Combined with successes in the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), the nuclear program going overt and a new awakening in strategic thinking, the LCA marks the beginning of a new era in Indian defense Research & Development (R & D) and manufacturing. Lets consider some of the significant broader accomplishments in the development of the LCA:

1. Program Management: Planning and coordination between hundreds of defense laboratories, ministries, universities, public sector companies, private firms and overseas collaborators. This becomes more significant considering the typical bureaucratic hurdles, inertia, infighting, turf battles and scientific egos that are typical of the Indian research establishment.
2. Systems Integration: Long a weakness in the Indian scientific psyche, the ability to plan and integrate the many complex systems and technologies that make up a modern fighter. ADA has developed virtual reality based software to help in this aspect. This state-of-the-art software (the author can attest to this, having seen a demonstration) is now in demand with western aerospace companies.
3. Development of innovative Technologies: The program has tried to buy, learn and incorporate many of the complex technologies from overseas collaborators integrating then with an array of indigenous efforts. Sanctions and the unwillingness to share on the part of the USA and UK lead to the indigenous development of many of the hi-tech capabilities needed for a modern fighter. A non-exhaustive list of these technologies includes – avionics, systems integration, gas turbine engines, flight control software (fly-by-wire), actuators, sensors, composites technologies, virtual reality software, CAD/CAM (Computer Aided Design/Manufacturing) software, Computational Fluid Dynamics and communications [1]. Many of these technologies are strategically important from a national security perspective and form the bedrock of the reborn Indian aerospace industry.

Development of aerospace technology and industry mark the maturation of a growing economy with the capability to build or absorb these technologies. Combined with the significant strides made in the Indian space effort, the LCA will be a major confidence builder for bolder strides in defense R & D. The next sections analyze the larger impact and role of the LCA in Indian defense.

Birth of the Indian Aerospace Infrastructure & Technology Independence

An examination of the aerospace industry in a well-developed economy shows that developing and building aircraft requires a vast infrastructure of ancillary manufacturing industries and a few systems integrators. Today’s aircraft and aerospace systems (like the space shuttle) are extremely complex systems requiring an array of companies and industries focused on the different component technologies that integrate into such a system. This is one reason for aerospace industry to remain confined to a few developed economies. In Europe, the need to master this array of complex technologies and the high costs involved has lead to companies from different countries pooling their resources in pan-European efforts like the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA).

The competitive demands of today’s global economy also dictate sourcing components and technologies from other countries where those technologies are mature and available economically. Those that complain about components imported for use in the LCA should note that the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen, which is the LCA’s closest competitor sources 40% of its components from non-Swedish sources starting with its US made engine [5]. ADA has wisely imported technologies (already developed) where available from overseas, and indigenously researched those not available or offered. It would also be logical to introduce import substitution and license manufacture of some of these technologies later in the production phase of the program.

The development of just the LCA prototypes has lead to the birth of a number of aerospace ancillaries and partners spanning

1. Private sector companies [2].
2. Public sector giants
3. Research departments in IITs, IISC and major universities
4. DRDO and defense research laboratories

The contribution of these companies and organizations has extended from nuts & bolts to more complex systems such as engines, materials, landing gear, airframe parts, electricals and electronics. These four sectors constitute the primary aerospace infrastructure needed to support systems integrators such as HAL, which has built up considerable experience in integrating aircraft for the last forty odd years. With the development of the production LCAs these four sectors would grow exponentially laying the foundation to manufacture the next generations of fighters, helicopters, transport aircraft and trainers the country needs.

Since independence, the country has spent billions of dollars to build a capable air force to defend its skies and the airliners flying people in and out of the country. These billions, ill affordable for a country with India’s needs have ended up in British, French and Russian coffers and helped build better homes and lives for people in those countries. With the birth of the Indian aerospace industry, an ever-increasing percentage of those billions would go to Indian companies and bellies, a more attractive proposition. Media reports have indicated the government’s intention to go for an initial production run of ~200 LCAs. At the often quoted price of $26 million per unit [9,10], just the buy of these aircraft is $626 million redirected into the Indian economy rather than overseas. Combined with expenditures on maintenance and spares this figure could well be upwards of $2 billion in funds entering the Indian economy rather than leaving it.

The development of this infrastructure and technologies in the country also builds "swadeshi" self reliance and more importantly is sanctions proof. In today’s growing global economy, India must integrate with the rest of the world but can ill afford not to have strengths and self-reliance in critical areas such as aerospace.

The LCA’s Mission Profile & Integration into the IAF

There has been much debate about the intended role of the LCA, its weapons fit and capabilities fit into the IAF arsenal. A major portion of the IAF fleet comprises the MiG-21 procured in large numbers from the 1960s through the 1980s. Having done a stellar job in multiple roles – interceptor, interdictor, close air support – the ageing fleet is increasingly obsolete as indicated by the frequent crashes reported in the media.

The LCA is intended to replace the MiG-21 and fill the role of a multi-role mainstay aircraft. This means that the LCA must fill the evolved role (in today’s battle environment) which was then filled by the MiG-21. Every modern air force has a mix of aircraft intended to fill different roles, the sum of which makes for a deadly and efficient air force.

The LCA was designed to be [3]:

1. light, maneuverable and agile
2. carry a decent weapons load (4000 kg)
3. have an extendable range with aerial refueling
4. include a sensor suite and weapons mix (precision guided and dumb) for an adequate air-ground role
5. combine maneuverability with BVR missiles for the air-air role

In other words, the LCA is not designed to be a state-of-the-art interceptor or the last word in strike technology. The IAF has other aircraft for those specialized roles. The LCA is designed to be the utility infielder, available in adequate quantity, playing with the other numerically fewer specialized aircraft in the IAF’s combat team. Table-1 analyzes the role profile of the LCA and other aircraft in the IAF arsenal along with comparable aircraft.

* MCA – Medium Combat Aircraft (speculative design on the drawing board

+JSF – Joint Strike Fighter (USAF/USN/USMC/RAF joint multi-mission stealth fighter)

Table-2 analyzes the role of the LCA in a strike package intended for say a medium range, well-defended target in Pakistan such as Sargodha AFB. The typical LCA role for such a mission would be the primary iron hauler along with support missions such as advance reconnaissance, SEAD and EW support.

The first of many

A successful LCA could be the harbinger of better things to come down an Indian aerospace industry pipeline. Nothing succeeds like success and the LCA could prove the industry’s ability to manage a complex technological project and bring it to fruition. ADA has published ambitious plans for many other follow-on types of aircraft, as has HAL. What has been most encouraging is also the entry of public and private sector firms such as Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) and Taneja Aerospace and Aviation Ltd. (TAAL) into the picture with their Swati and Viator lines of aircraft. Table-4 shows a list of possible follow-ons and new aircraft in the pipeline that would be inspired by an LCA success story.

The technologies developed and lessons learnt in the LCA program would immensely benefit these other efforts. The ancillary and R & D infrastructure developed from the LCA program could be reused in these other programs leading to further development of the aerospace industry in India. These facts further underscore the LCA being the foundation stone of the modern Indian aerospace industry.

Cost-Benefit Analysis of the LCA

The previous sections have brought out the vast benefits that would accrue to the nascent Indian aerospace industry from a successful LCA program. These benefits more than justify any cost of development, however high it may be. It would be hard (and in the author’s opinion - futile) to even try to attach monetary value to these benefits, since it is a question of survival for Indian aerospace and hi-tech defense development. There are those that have carped about the costs incurred in the development of the LCA. It would be instructional to compare the projected `per-unit’ costs of the LCA with those of other similar platforms currently available on the international market. Table-5 shows a comparison of the LCA costs with the Swedish JAS-39 Gripen which is the closest competitor to the LCA. Figures for the F-22 program are attached to contrast these costs.

BVR

Beyond Visual Range. The ability to detect, engage and destroy an opponent beyond visual range in an air battle.

CAS

Close Air Support. Firepower support for ground forces in the field, a mission well carried out by the MiG-21 and MiG-27.

EW

Electronic Warfare, an acronym covering a range of capabilities from jamming enemy radars, counter jamming, providing targeting information, etc.

SEAD

Suppression of enemy air defenses. In this role, aircraft carry sensors and weapons that allow them to detect and destroy enemy radars and SAM, AAA defenses. Developed during the Vietnam war by the USAF, these missions initially called "Iron Hand" are now the "Wild Weasel" mission run by ageing F-4Gs and specially modified F-16s.