| Article Reviews
Meeting with the Muj
Jessica Stern, Meeting with the Muj,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 57 No. 1, January/February 2001.
Now that South Asia has been described as the locus of
worldwide terrorism, made only more exciting by the existence of nuclear weapons on the
subcontinent, we can only await the inevitable deluge of academic, journalist and
"policy" articles on the subject. This is one of the more readable and
educational articles about the impact of the Mujaheddin on Pakistan. Stern’s article
draws from her visits to several madrassas in Pakistan – in particular those that
comprise the purist Deobandi school of Islamic thought – which she made last summer
in pursuit of a larger project on religious extremism in Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism
and Islam.
Written as a vivid and colorful
travelogue, Stern’s article begins with a description of her visit to a Deobandi
madrassa called the Jamia Manzoor ul Islamiya, and focuses on the school’s
single-minded focus on religious studies and the jihad against India, to the complete
exclusion of modern subjects such as the sciences. She finds that some of the students
would rather become doctors than mujahideen, but is convinced by the principal that the
young boys will eventually come around to his point of view. The school is a microcosm of
the larger jihadi movement which Pakistani officials estimate controls 10-15% of all
madrassas. It feeds off poverty and the poor provision of education by the state, and uses
resources generated by donors in Pakistan and abroad to build an army of brainwashed
adherents and, perhaps, martyrs. This army of mujahideen is of course a threat both to
India and to Pakistan, since the "jihad against the Indians in Kashmir and jihad
against the Shia in Pakistan [are] inextricably linked".
Nevertheless, Pakistan is unable or unwilling to turn off the tap, and
Stern outlines the many ways in which the army is complicit in sending mujahideen to fight
and die in Kashmir. While this is well known, Stern brings the links between the army and
the mujahideen alive through interviews with jihadi participants and both supportive and
dissenting Pakistani officials. Most tellingly, she quotes Sami ul-Haq, a leader of the
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam, saying that the army is firmly in the fundamentalist camp and
that it is too late to attempt to close the madrassas.
For jihad aficionados, the most interesting part of the article is
probably the section that outlines the different players in the jihad game, viz. the
Deobandi and Wahhabi groups that send mujahideen across the border to India and to
Afghanistan (in support of the Taleban). She offers fascinating details about the internal
politics of these groups, focusing especially on India’s bete-noire, the wealthy and
capable Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Unusually for a jihadi group, the LeT draws from the
Wahhabi (Ahle Hadith) tradition and springs from the Markaz-Dawa-Wal-Irshad led by Hafiz
Mohammad Saeed. Stern offers details of the secret of the LeT's success: money. While most
radical madrassas send a small fraction of their graduates to fight the jihad, the LeT
claims to dispatch 80% of its graduates to mujahideen training camps, the main reason for
which is its excellent financial situation (no doubt related to the fact that Wahhabism
has wealthy backers in the Gulf). Stern also discusses the links between the mainstream
Jamaat-e-Islami and the Hizbul Mujahideen, as well as the possible military rebirth of the
al Umar Mujahideen, a JKLF offshoot.
For those interested in strategy, Stern outlines how the mujahideen and
Pakistani army believe that the jihad has succeeded in pinning down the powerful Indian
Army and creating a siege mentality across the border. Whether this is true or not, the
article certainly sheds light on the psychology that is driving mujahideen and army
operations against India.
To summarize, Stern’s article is worthwhile reading for anyone
interested in the insurgency in Kashmir. While she does attempt some analysis, her article
is more valuable for the texture and color it contains, and the snapshots that it offers
into the jihad.
A. Dubey
James Phillips, Defusing Terrorism at
Ground Zero, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No.1383, November
2000.
The Heritage Foundation article gives a brief
chronology of the turmoil in Afghanistan, a country that it refers to as "the
world’s leading exporter of terrorism." It stresses the role of Afghanistan
during the Cold War in which the U.S. in coordination with Pakistan's ISI supplied
Mujaheddin groups with funds and weapons that ultimately resulted in a Soviet withdrawal.
The article gives an overview of the various groups in Afghanistan after the Soviet
withdrawal and their temporary alliances and infighting. This anarchy directly contributed
to the rise of the Taleban and the initial support of the Afghanis for that regime. The
article goes into detail on the fighting between the Pakistan supported Taleban and the
Northern Alliance, an amalgam of the former Mujaheddin groups. It gives insight into the
Taleban’s policies, regarding their treatment of the local population and their
promotion of opium growth (Afghanistan has become the largest opium producer in the world)
and a rising drug trade. The author also mentions some of the problems faced by the
Taleban such as military setbacks, reliance on foreign countries, the population’s
anger at their strict standards and their lack of willingness to develop the country. The
Taleban because of the strategic location of Afghanistan are poised to have an impact on
the region. The article calls Afghanistan the "cockpit of Asia" and sees the
current time period as an extension of the Great Game, in which Russia and the British
Empire fought for influence in the region, however with different countries vying for
influence. Furthermore, the article mentions the role of Pakistan and some of the Arab
countries in financing and arming the Taleban and mentions Pakistani motivations for
intervening in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan continues to serve an
important role in U.S. policy due primarily due to the asylum it gives to Osama bin Laden.
Bin Laden is currently on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitive list and has a $5
million reward for his capture. A chronicle of bin Laden’s life shows his
participation in the Jihad against the Soviets. Later, he masterminded attacks on U.S.
troops in Saudi Arabia, embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and numerous attempts to
disrupt the millennium celebrations. More ominous are the links between bin Laden’s
Al Qaeda and the aid to the Taleban and similar organizations in Egypt such as Al Jihad
and Algeria’s Armed Islamic group. Even more ominous is the recent discovery of bin
Laden’s attempts to acquire chemical or biological agents for attacks against
American troops in the Persian Gulf region and in the United States. The article states
that, as Afghanistan has continued to become more dangerous, the Clinton
administration’s policy has become more narrowly focused on the capture of Osama bin
Laden rather than the broader issue of Afghanistan. It accuses the administration of not
understanding the remaining problems in Afghanistan, which could pose a threat to American
interests. The author even states that the Clinton administration through its policies has
harmed the opposition groups fighting the Taleban and of being overly optimistic by hoping
that the Taleban will bring stability and that, American engagement will moderate its
policies. In short, the article states that the U.S. squandered its influence in
Afghanistan and now has no influence over a country that has become a source of terrorism,
drugs, and instability to its neighbors.
The article while giving a
pertinent history and a critique of the current policy also offers a new multi-step policy
towards Afghanistan. First, it calls for a shift in focus from a bin Laden centric policy
to a regional policy trying to contain the dangerous elements of Afghanistan. In that
regard, the U.S. should work with regional allies towards a peaceful solution in
Afghanistan. It even goes, as far as to state that Afghanistan could become a neutral
buffer state similar to Austria. The article advises that the U.S. should exert
international pressure through a selective arms embargo against the Taleban and declare
them a terrorist state for harboring Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, it advocates pressuring
Pakistan, which is the main obstacle to a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, to end its
support to the regime.
The article also gives a reasonable view
of the American policy over the last few years. Though, it seems at times, that it may be
overtly critical of the Clinton administration’s handling of the situation and its
sole focus of Osama bin Laden. The new policy proposed by the author is refreshing and
ambitious. The hopes of having a region wide policy, taking into account
Afghanistan’s neighbors, Russia and the international community increases the chances
of successful implementation. There are a few shortcomings in the paper. First is the
effect of the Taleban regime on Afghanistan. It states that the U.S. should force Pakistan
to end aid to the Taleban but does not address the practicality of such a point,
especially considering that the military government in Pakistan often succumbs to the
demands of the religious fundamentalists. It seems unlikely that Pakistan even pressured
by the U.S. would end aid to the Taleban, a regime in which it has heavily invested. U.S
pressure may force Pakistan to aid the Taleban through other channels. Another shortcoming
is that it mentions India peripherally, as an advantage by the U.S against Pakistan. It
does not see India as a state affected by the Taleban regime. In reality, India is
affected through the Taleban’s training of terrorists in Kashmir and the
radicalization of Pakistan. Furthermore, India can play a major role in the U.S policy
against the Taleban especially in light of its sympathies and aid to the Northern
Alliance. Any regional solution attempting to resolve the problems in Afghanistan must
take into account the aforementioned points.
This article much like Jessica
Stern’s "Pakistan’s Jihad Culture" recognizes that Afghanistan and
Pakistan will become a major focus in American policy because of the danger posed to U.S.
national interests by their fanatical elements. In that sense, the article perhaps as an
unstated goal, attempts to shift the focus of American foreign policy from the traditional
view of the Middle East as the hot bed of Islamic fundamentalism.
L. Bahroo
Gurmeet
Kanwal, India's National Security
Strategy in a Nuclear Environment, Strategic Analysis 24 (9):
pp.1591-1628.
Kanwal attempts to assess both the theory
and practice of developing a national security strategy, and apply these concepts to
modern India. This is a useful exercise, given the belief in some circles that India has
never had a national security policy or strategy. In an effort to make the article
comprehensive, the author makes it too long - brevity and a more concise approach would
make his arguments clearer and, perhaps, more coherent, and would make the article as a
whole less confusing. For example, his opening arguments about the increasingly confusing
security environment in the 21st century are clearly applicable to the U.S., and perhaps
to NATO. It is not clear, however, how much India must adapt to the changing environment.
The author provides an interesting discussion on the few public
assertions of something close to a national security policy, primarily revealed in the
Annual Reports of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs. His analysis
would have been strengthened by some consideration of unofficial national security
policies practiced by India's leaders - Nehru, for instance, clearly had a vision of how
to achieve Indian national security. The fact that it was never entirely articulated
(particularly the nuclear dimension), and that it ultimately failed, does not indicate a
total absence of thought.
Kanwal's efforts to apply the theories to practice, and come up with a
set of priorities, are unsuccessful. His six-page discussion of "India's National
Security Strategy" (pp. 15-21) is an unprioritized laundry list of military
requirements - hardly a reflection of a calculated strategy, which relates ends and means,
costs and benefits, and resources to commitments. Part of his problem may lie in
misunderstanding or misapplying U.S. documents - the National Security Strategy of the
United States, for example, is an official document that is clearly applicable to his
discussion. Joint Vision 2010, however, is not nearly as appropriate - the National
Military Strategy of the United States, based around the concepts of shaping the
international environment, responding to significant change, and preparing for future war,
is much more applicable (JV2010 really only applies to the last of these three tasks). In
fact, what Kanwal has done (unwittingly, I suspect) is to codify one of the least coherent
U.S. strategic approaches (the Clinton Administration's) and attempt to apply it to India.
This is, truly, a recipe for confusion.
Crucial definitions are misapplied - for instance, he states that Pearl
Harbor constituted a "survival threat" to the United States (an arguable
assertion, given Japan's inability to project ground forces to the American continent).
His easy acceptance of the notion that Pakistan would never use nuclear weapons first
against India is based on assumptions about that state's rationality that inadequately
reflect Pakistan's abysmal strategic performance and gross lack of judgment over the past
fifty years. This assumption is, simply, astrategic. He quotes Bharat Karnad extensively
on topics from the need for Special Forces to India's nuclear requirements, including the
desirability of providing Vietnam with nuclear capabilities. Kanwal's support of the
latter, and of the sale of Prithvi SSMs to Vietnam, certainly has profound strategic
implications, primarily in terms of negative international response and increased concern
over India's intentions. Considering the potential consequences of actions is also part of
creating a responsible national security strategy. Kanwal argues, in the end, that India
needs more of everything, and can drive China to a border resolution by increasing
pressure on it through Vietnamese and other proxies. This may or may not be true, but
without examining other considerations, it hardly constitutes a national security
strategy.
Tim Hoyt
G. Kanwal, India’s nuclear
force structure, Strategic Analysis 24 (6): pp.1039-1075.
This is a continuation of the author's work in examining the Indian
Nuclear posture. Previously he has written about the various elements of the posture -
command and control, targeting philosophy, and the question of tactical weapons. Here, he
examines the force structure to back up the doctrine.
The author provides an extensive account of what various foreign
experts had estimated the Indian capability after the May 1998 tests. This is followed by
the estimates of various Indian experts of their view of a notional force structure.
The author proceeds to rationally examine what force structure is
demanded by the fundamental principles of unacceptable damage. He first identifies the
challengers, defines what could be an unacceptable damage to them, and casts his force
requirements based on this. Working with available materials and technology, he decides
upon a countervalue strategy and the elements to make it work.
The paper has certain inadequacies due to the approach chosen. For
instance, his force structure requires weapons of yields not tested and thus suffers from
credibility. In addition he has not reconciled the low yield tests conducted by India and
what role they could play. He also has a tendency to treat these weapons like conventional
shells and devote large numbers per target. He does not take into account the accuracy
being achieved in the IGMP program. Another area, which needs to be examined, is the
nature of the challenger regimes and how it influences the targeting doctrine and the
force structure. While pursuing the idea that bigger is better, the author should have
examined whether these could end up being self-deterred.
In conclusion, the paper is a good beginning in examining the force
structure and has extensive bibliography that should be useful for serious students. While
it has some limitations, it does provide a basis for discussing the critical 'what next?'
after the tests. This is becomes important as the GOI Task Forces' reports are due to be
presented to the Central Cabinet for implementation.
D.Ramana
Larry M. Wortzel,
PhD, and Dana R. Dillon, Improving Relations With
India Without Compromising US Security, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder,
No. 1402, December 11, 2000.
This is a paper that attempts to provide a general
route-indicator, if not a roadmap, for future Indo-US relations without, as the title
says, "compromising" US security. It is divided into four sections, addressing
trade issues and security concerns, American concerns about India’s
"campaign" for global recognition, New Delhi’s continuing alliance with
Moscow, and parameters for future Indo-US relations. The brief conclusion includes two or
three general statements and seems to be an afterthought.
The authors point out that India’s
nuclear and missile programs, "which threaten regional stability", are a major
obstacle in relations. They add that India is seeking "US assistance to develop its
commercial satellite and space launch" capabilities, and point out that this must not
be done without keeping in mind they could be used for "weapons development"
(presumably nuclear) or missile programs. This theme is repeated several times throughout
the paper. They point out that the US must recognize that India is a great
"emerging" democracy that is redefining its identity and objectives.
On the question of balancing trade
and security issues, a case is made for the relative unimportance of current Indo-US
economic relations. Some words are expended on the need for India to open up various
sectors, eliminate tariffs, etc., etc. The authors mention that the US does not share
India’s assessment of the China threat, but add that New Delhi’s apprehensions
"cannot be simply dismissed". They describe Beijing’s proliferation
activities and military moves that are of concern to India.
The section on "concerns
about India’s campaign" for global recognition includes an assertion that
expanding the permanent membership of the Security Council is not in US interests. This is
based on the claim that India is neither a developed country nor an economic power, that
it contributes very little to the UN budget, and that India has voted against the US at
the UN on most issues. In the next section, about the Indo-Russian relationship, the
authors suggest that New Delhi is beginning to nuance its position and is moving closer to
the US. Herein they find opportunities for the India and the US to work together, "to
limit mischief by China and Pakistan in the region".
On establishing new Indo-US
relations, the authors say the two countries must view themselves as friendly, and then
goes on to provide a list of what Washington should do to move its policy in that
direction. These include, among other things, not transferring any dual technology,
explaining to India the pitfalls of its nuclear and missile programs, refraining from
interference in Kashmir and other local disputes, etc.
While there are some positive
points in the paper, the perspective of the two authors is too wrapped up in the language
of the cold war years. The title suggests, for instance, that any improvement of relations
with India implies some compromise on American security interests. The point made about
strict neutrality and non-interference in local disputes is welcome. However, the
recommendations are not only quite meaningless in the current geo-political milieu, but
impractical even if they were not. Serious US observers of the Indian scene should by now
have concluded that, at most, Washington can delay India’s nuclear and missile
momentum. It cannot stop the process by which India will arm itself with whatever means it
deems necessary for its own security.
As far as avoiding dual technology
co-operation is concerned, the US will be the net loser in such an approach. Washington is
not the only country with satellite and space launch technologies. India’s
collaborative efforts in this area with Europe and Russia are likely to yield financial
dividends for both sides. The US would only be shutting itself out of a market with a
sanctions-based approach – the wisdom of which has rightly been questioned by the new
administration.
For many observers of the Indo-US
scene over the past couple of years, this paper may appear as a rather unwelcome blast
from the past – much in the same way as Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s
comment lumping India together with Iran and North Korea as proliferating states that
threaten the Middle East and Europe. Nevertheless, it is a timely, and perhaps a
necessary, dampener on any euphoria or sentimentalism New Delhi may have developed over
the past couple of years. Indeed, papers such as this one help us to remind ourselves that
powerful nations tend to act primarily according to their perceived interests – even
if, as in the case of this paper, their perceptions may be trifle outdated.
J.E.Menon |
