U.S. - India Strategic Relations: Issues before the New Administration

Gary K. Bertsch and Anupam Srivastava

The post-Cold War relationship between the United States, the world’s oldest and most powerful democracy, and India, the world’s largest democracy, is on an upward though not stable trajectory. At the dawn of the new Millennium, the bilateral relationship between these two critical democracies is poised on the cusp of significant possibilities, but a definitive prognostication of the ultimate outcome is uncertain. The causes of this uncertainty are politico-strategic as well as paradigmatic in nature. Both these factors animate our thinking as we conceptualize and enumerate specific near and longer-term policy options to assist formulating a more effective US policy toward India. We begin with discussing the politico-strategic and the technological dimensions, and conclude with policy considerations.

THE POLITICO-STRATEGIC DIMENSION

We begin with the clear recognition that the need to re-configure US policy toward India and South Asia may not occupy a high position on US foreign and security policy agenda in the near term, with other worthy claimants for greater attention. At the same time, if appropriately re-conceptualized by the new Bush administration, and cast more in Asian rather than South Asian terms, relations with India could occupy a more prominent position within the US strategic calculus, with commensurate gains for both sides, and a major success story for the new administration.

Stale Paradigm à   Sub-optimal Policy Outcome

It is often said that a protracted problem that defies easy solution requires "broadening the definition" or "changing the boundary conditions" of the problem. The most resilient of the problems in US-Indian relations has been the US perception of "India as a problem," relating to Kashmir, or to the nuclear rivalry/animosity with Pakistan, or even nuclear non-proliferation. India has bristled at this treatment, expecting greater respect as a fellow democracy, and the "maneuvering space" to pursue policies that are in harmony with its domestic interests and capabilities.

Changed Dynamics à  New Opportunities

Asia will remain a locus for economic and technological dynamism in the coming decades. At the same time, the Asian strategic landscape has inherited its own share of the flux and counter-currents generated with the end of the Cold War.

• Russia, unable to impede the eastward expansion of NATO and to assert its preeminence within the post-Soviet "space," is consolidating its strategic relationship with China and India.
• China, consolidating two decades of robust economic growth, wishes to become the decisive factor in Asian affairs, in the process engaging Russia and India to pursue its wider strategic objectives.
• Japan, gradually emerging from its economic stagnation, is searching for clarity and domestic consensus on its strategic policy toward Asia and beyond.
• India, whose economic reforms have imbued its domestic discourse on security with a new sense of pragmatism, seeks a greater voice within Asian affairs and beyond.

Given the above dynamics, there is clear need for a comprehensive review of US policy toward these major Asian players, coordination with whom is vital to devising a viable framework to promote prosperity and security in Asia. It is within this larger Asian framework that a more effective US policy toward India needs to be conceptualized. This, we believe, would yield handsome dividends not only on the bilateral front but would also have a salutary impact on the evolving Asian balance of power.

We now briefly highlight the key issues and dyads that shape existing US policy and would assist in reformulating US policy toward India.

THE INDO-PAK CONUNDRUM

Feasibility of Line of Control (LOC) as the International Boundary

After three full-blown military conflicts, several skirmishes and cross-border insurrectionary activities over five decades, it is clear that a "military" solution to Kashmir is not possible. US government needs to advise Pakistan that redrawing of boundaries with force, even if it genuinely believes in the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people, is not a viable option anymore. As such, both sides need to generate domestic consensus around the LOC serving as the international boundary. In any case, the LOC has served as the de facto boundary since 1954, and its sanctity was recently reaffirmed during the parallel US negotiations with India and Pakistan after the nuclear tests of May 1998, and later during the Kargil crisis of 1999. In any case, the influx of mujahideen from Afghanistan and other parts of the Islamic world has changed the demographic balance in the disputed territory, making any future plebiscite unreliable and/or unacceptable. The real victims of the protracted conflict are the Kashmiri people, while both states are drawn into a conflict that diverts vital national resources and policy attention from more pressing developmental imperatives.

US assistance to promoting military-technical (and wider) CBMs

Absent the political will and capability to enforce wider confidence building measures, each side needs to develop and deploy a broad set of national technical means (NTMs) at federal and command levels as well as within the sensitive theaters. These include de-alerting nuclear missiles, keeping warheads separate from delivery vehicles, robust C³I to avoid launch-on-warning, advance warning on troops movements, surveillance and signal mapping, and a range of technical measures for war avoidance.

US assistance, through identical or similar software and hardware to enhance respective NTMs would reduce human error in surveillance and false warning for retaliatory response, and improve the technical backbone that undergirds routing of decisions through the respective chains-of-command.

US role in curbing counter-terrorism and drug-trafficking

Many Western and regional experts in recent years have detailed the growing scope and intensity of terrorism and drug trafficking, and their inter-linkage, throughout West Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and South Asia. Increasingly, the territories of Kashmir, Nepal, Myanmar and Southeast Asia are being utilized to create a "soft corridor" to link the "Golden Crescent" with the "Golden Triangle."

It is also increasingly reported that the government in Pakistan, both the civilian and the military variety, has lost effective control over the operations and aspirations of the religious fundamentalists and the mujahiddeens. This is turning Pakistan into a vortex of bilious irredentism across an ethno-religiously diverse region where substantial energy assets are located.

The bilateral Joint Working Groups that the United States has formed with India and Russia need to be bolstered, and coordinated where appropriate, to counter the cross-cutting cleavages that represent a significant threat to regional stability and prosperity.

Light arms proliferation à low intensity conflict à escalation into nuclear war

The role of light arms in the escalatory ladder between India and Pakistan is often underplayed. And yet the arsenal of the mujahideen active in Kashmir has become increasingly sophisticated over the past few years, and now includes assault weapons, artillery, shoulder-launched missiles, anti-aircraft guns, night-vision devices, and high-altitude gear and battle training. All this has substantially raised the human, technical and policy costs of tackling these modern and highly motivated terrorists.

Further, Pakistan’s calibration of cross-border insurrection is partially a function of India’s level of response. A miscalculation on the part of either side could lead to an escalation of conflict, raising the specter of deliberate or unauthorized threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The United States needs to devote sustained attention to working with India (and Pakistan) to enhance NTMs and reduce the risk of such miscalculation, while working for an expeditious resolution of the larger Kashmir problem within the above framework.

THE CHINA FACTOR

Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation

China remains the common link between horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles in Southern Asia. As such, any viable framework of US engagement with India (and Pakistan) to define, deploy and manage the "credible minimum deterrent" must perforce involve China and its activities. Given the larger Chinese economic and strategic interests in the oil-rich Central Asia and the Caucasus, a finely calibrated US policy mix of incentives and punitive measures, including the launch of US satellites from Chinese launchers, would elicit greater responsiveness.

NMD/TMD

Technically, China has no locus standii on US negotiations with the Russian Federation re NMD deployment and amendment of the ABM Treaty. And yet this issue, as well as TMD development and deployment in Taiwan, South Korea or Japan remains a serious impediment to Chinese pursuit of greater "autonomy" in the region, including sea-denial to US troops and maritime assets in South China Sea and beyond. It becomes advisable and imperative for the new US administration to engage India and other Asian powers in clarifying the technical parameters and intended purpose of NMD/TMD deployments. At the very minimum, this would help to preempt the "cascading" logic of offensive buildup by China à India à Pakistan. And overall, the new administration should be very sensitive to the irreducible reality that NMD and TMD, by upping the defensive ante, are going to invert the logic of "offensive deterrence."

We understand the current US policy toward China as making the latter an increasing stakeholder in the stability of the international system by drawing it into a series of multilateral institutions. At the same time, if the "benign" outcome of China’s growing strength does not materialize, what is the back-up plan?

We submit that an independent and robust US engagement with India would in any case benefit both countries, but also possess the capability to circumscribe the latitude and propensity for such unilateral Chinese policy activism as might be of detriment to peace and stability in Asia.

THE RUSSIA FACTOR

Military Technical Cooperation

Indo-Russian military-technical cooperation (MTC) has evolved from being a combination of Indian needs and Soviet/Russian capability to one of growing Indian clout and pragmatism and enhanced Russian "supplier’s dependency syndrome." Currently, almost 80% of Indian armed forces hardware is of Soviet/Russian origin, and Indian imports account for about 35% of all Russian exports, keeping nearly 800 defense enterprises in that country in operation.

Russia is providing crucial assistance to India’s Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) program to build a nuclear-powered submarine, improving its naval missile delivery capability, AWACS and re-fuelling platforms for multi-role aircraft, area-wide missile defense systems, and civilian space capability for geostationary satellite launch vehicles.

Bridge Technologies to Diversify Procurement

However, as India moves into longer-term MTC with Russia, including significant R&D collaboration, its procurement and technological base is becoming even more dependent on the solvency and viability of the Russian industrial base. Proportionately, this circumscribes the Indian search for autonomy in defense production and limited pursuit of weapons exports. Clients for the latter, in particular, have weapons platforms that employ mostly Western components and technologies, making "integration" of Indian- or Russian-Indian exports that much harder.

For both these reasons, India has sought "bridge" technologies from Israel, France, England, and South Africa, among others. India would thus be very amenable to resumption of dialogue and advanced conventional weapons cooperation with the United States that were pursued until May 1998 within the institutionalized framework of the Defense Policy Group and its subsidiary, the Joint Technology Group.

Indian Nuclear Energy Sector: Untapped Market

India has set itself the ambitious target of generating 20,000mw of electricity by 2020 to meet its rapidly growing power needs. It is worth recalling that India has one of the oldest civilian nuclear programs in Asia (its first research reactor going "critical" in 1956), and has mastered virtually the entire fuel cycle.

Russia is building two 1000mw nuclear power reactors in India, and more are possible. Russia states that while agreement for these two (in 1988) pre-date its NSG obligations (from 1992), it would "re-consider" its membership within NSG if attempts to prevent such cooperation were made. It believes that "facility specific" safeguards (Russian, Indian and IAEA) should be sufficient to prevent risk of spent fuel diversion.

Given India’s impeccable record of not proliferating beyond its borders, the United States (and the international community) is, therefore, faced with the prospect of both-- weakened Russian commitment to the NSG and the continued isolation of the Indian nuclear energy sector from global advances in safety and security.

THE JAPAN FACTOR

Securing SLOCs and Economic Cooperation

Japan’s heavy dependence upon oil imports from the Persian Gulf makes it amenable to cooperation with India regarding security of sea lanes, joint peacekeeping in the Indian Ocean, and maritime interdiction operations. US naval cooperation with India, and policy coordination with Japan in this context, would secure transportation of economic assets from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca.

Aside from this strategic cooperation, US coordination with Japan to incrementally include India into the ASEAN and APEC would augment larger goals of securing Asian stability and economic growth.

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND NEED FOR POLICY COORDINATION

Dual Use Technologies

Advanced technology has increasingly become "dual use" in nature, capable of being easily adapted to different uses within and across the civilian and military sectors. Accordingly, in tandem with "supply side" controls on technology transfer such as "end user certification" and "post shipment verification," greater attention to the "demand side" of the equation is equally crucial. This includes regular consultation and policy coordination with the recipient country to prevent unauthorized diversion or re-export of the original shipment of equipment, technology and related know-how/know-why.

As such, a more effective and sensitive US leadership of multilateral security regimes would permit aspirant nations such as India to join these regimes if they are able to shape the regime’s agenda from within, thereby diminishing the "exit" impulse and generating greater "voice" and "loyalty." Greater transparency in the setting up of rules, greater accountability, and greater uniformity of reciprocal obligations would likely induce higher Indian willingness to join regimes such as MTCR and WA, while also strengthening its export control regulations and implementation. The lessons of Indian participation within the CWC regime (at The Hague) are instructive in this regard.

RMA/RMT

The inexorable "march of technology" and its growing transmutation are amply reflected in the "revolution in military affairs" and "revolution in military technologies." Both RMA and RMT underscore the need for secure networks for communications across deployed aerial and maritime assets and land-based command centers during peacetime and during combat. Information security, encryption, and related IT software applications, are becoming the crucial elements in IW/EW and successful conduct of modern wars.

India’s growing strength in providing IT solutions can become a great asset for US-India cooperation. If India’s concerns against signing GSOMIA are taken care of, a range of military exercises and joint peacekeeping missions are possible. This partnership could then include US technical assets deployed along with Indian personnel for joint peacekeeping in the Indian Ocean and the extended maritime theater.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Every state, including India, has the sovereign right to make a technical assessment of threats to its national security, and then take adequate steps to prepare for those threats. At the same time, this sovereign right is tempered with the obligation to not engage in decisions and actions that undermine regional or international security. The new pragmatism that animates Indian security policy affords the United States, with whom India desires a robust and broad based relationship, valuable opportunities to "solve" the protracted South Asian security imbroglio. Further, given that there are no direct or underlying "conflict of interests" between the two sides, this would permit the United States to engage India more effectively in formulating its larger policies within Asia and beyond.

AREAS OF CLEAR CONVERGENCE

• Promoting democracy, secularism, and free trade within South Asia and throughout Asia.
• Countering religious fundamentalism and drug trafficking within South Asia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.
• Joint exploration of oil and natural gas assets, and securing pipelines and transportation of the energy assets from the above region (including Bangladesh and Iran).
• Expeditious, negotiated, and politically viable resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
• Enhanced military-technical CBMs between India and Pakistan to reduce the risk of open conflict and escalation into nuclear exchange, pending durable solution of the Kashmir dispute.
• Strengthened national export controls and greater "self regulation" by private industry in India, to facilitate commerce as well as permit greater technology transfers.
• Joint peacekeeping, maritime interdiction and security in the Indian Ocean and the extended littoral region, to secure peaceful commerce from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca.
• Cooperation in IT and advanced technology to foster economic growth and optimize the "peace dividend."
• Russian assistance notwithstanding, if the United States and India were able to devise a practical mechanism to "island" India’s nuclear weapons complex from its civilian reactors, and permit cooperation, India’s limited energy infrastructure would not throttle the pace of economic reforms and derail the salutary outcomes for both sides.

POSSIBLE PITFALLS (WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR)

• Continuation of US policy of perceiving India as a "problem to be solved," either through the lens of non-proliferation or as embroiled in an interminable conflict with Pakistan.
• Failure to recognize the success of democracy and incremental economic de-centralization in an over-populated, ethnically and religiously diverse nation, in a poor and unstable neighborhood.
• Failure to recognize that India is already the tenth largest economy in the world (fourth in purchasing power parity terms), with one of the largest technical manpower pools in the world, widespread use of English language, with well established rule of law and financial institutions.

• India has formally announced the decision to not conduct additional nuclear tests. As such, the primary obligation to abide by the CTBT has been met. Until support for CTBT in the US Senate has been received, or to negotiate a revised CTBT, holding wider bilateral engagement hostage to India formally signing and ratifying the CTBT would be counterproductive.

• In the same spirit, India has expressed agreement to participate in the proposed FMCT agreement. Greater bilateral dialogue regarding the size of the Indian "credible minimum deterrent" would clarify the Indian position on this treaty, but making it a pre-qualification for wider engagement would be counter productive. Similarly, from the Indian side, vague assurances and lack of clarity on this subject would impede wider bilateral engagement.
• India’s failure to recognize that stricter standards of transparency, accountability, pragmatism and quality control apply on the "high table" of international relations. As such, it should provide greater clarity to the trajectory of its security policy, including those relating to its nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
• Holding "mirror images" of each other, and expecting the other side to make the first move, will mean not capitalizing upon the new opportunities presented by the realignment of forces following the end of the Cold War. A case in point is the "inverted pyramid" paradigm in the area of advanced conventional weapons cooperation, where the US side wanted to sequence cooperation from the military à dual use à civilian sector while India wanted the opposite.

THE BOTTOM LINE

• India possesses the credentials for, and desires to be treated as, an important Asian player. The United States seeks to maintain its technological and moral leadership of the world.
• Both countries have much to offer and gain from enhanced cooperation. If both were to learn to calibrate their interaction, more dialogue and cooperation instead of static would result, and yield handsome peace and economic dividends.

The economically successful and politically ambitious Indian-American community, if appropriately engaged, could become a cementing factor in improving bilateral relations.

Gary K. Bertsch and Anupam Srivastava are Directors, South Asia Program at the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia Athens, GA 30602. Web-site: www.uga.edu/~cits