In the aftermath of the Kargil intrusion, the Government of India was left facing several uncomfortable questions. To the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, several of whose constituents had stressed the need for aggressive management of national security resources, these questions proved very embarrassing. The desire to seek answers to these questions, the enormous pressure from the opposition parties in parliament and the tenor of the public debate, essentially forced the government's hand. In its order dated July 29, 1999, the Government of India announced the formation of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC). The committee comprised of Shri. K. Subrahmanyam (Chairman), Lieutenant General (Retd.) K.K. Hazari, Shri. B.G. Verghese and Shri. Satish Chandra, Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) (Member-Secretary). Its terms of reference were as follows,

1) To review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir; and

2) To recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions.

The KRC was given an approximate timeframe of six months to accomplish its task.

The KRC worked through that time interviewing several witnesses, experts, and policymakers and submitted its report on February 24, 2000. The findings and recommendations of the KRC were placed in an executive summary, which was made public [1].

The Union government accepted the KRC report and tabled it in session III of the 13th Lok Sabha (Session 189 of the Rajya Sabha) on February 28, 2000. On April 18, 2000, it submitted a Supplementary Action Taken Report (ATR) and announced the formation of the Group of Ministers (GoM) to evaluate and act on the recommendations of the KRC. The GoM consisted of Hon. Minister Home Affairs Shri. Lal Kishenchand Advani, (Chairman), Hon. Minister for Defense Shri. George Fernandes, Hon, Minister External Affairs Shri. Jaswant Singh, Hon. Minister for Finance Shri. Yashwant Sinha and Planning Commission Chairman Shri. K C Pant. It was estimated the GoM would take six months to complete its task and initially the National Security Advisor Shri. Brajesh Mishra, the Cabinet Secretary Shri. Prabhat Kumar and the National Security Council Secretary Shri. Satish Chander also attended its meetings.

On May 10, 2000 the GoM created four task forces to examine the recommendations of the KRC in detail, but by May 22, 2000 the GoM expanded the scope of these task forces[2] and asked them to evaluate aspects of national security above and beyond the recommendations of the KRC[3]. The task forces addressed issues relating to the Intelligence Apparatus (Shri. Girish Chander Saxena[4]), Higher Defense Organization (Shri. Arun Singh[5]), Border Management (Shri. Madhav Godbole[6]) and Internal Security (Shri. N.N.Vohra[7]). The task forces met for the first time on May 15, 2000 and were given about three months to write up their recommendations. The task forces on Intelligence Apparatus and Border Management turned in their reports by September 30, 2000 and the GoM examined their reports and finalized its recommendations by November 10, 2000. The recommendations for the task forces on Higher Defense Organization and Internal Security were delayed at this point due to the unavailability of Hon. Minister External Affairs Shri. Jaswant Singh[8], however subsequently the task force on Internal Security submitted its report on November 25, 2000. The Chiefs of Staff met with the GoM on November 24, 2000 and offered it their inputs on the issues at hand[9]. The report of the task force on Higher Defense Organization was extensively discussed and accepted on January 5, 2001[10]. The GoM is still deliberating the recommendations and hopes to send its recommendations to the Prime Minister by the end of January 2001.

Based on media reports about the task forces and analysis papers on the subject of India's intelligence needs by experts in the field, the author will present an estimate of the recommendations made to the GoM and the likely structure of Indian intelligence agencies in the years to come.

A brief overview of the structure of the task forces

The task forces comprised of retired administrators, security-intelligence bureaucrats, and academicians. The membership of the task forces relevant to this analysis is presented below.

1) The task force on Intelligence Structure comprised of Shri. Girish C. Saxena[4](Chairman), Shri. M.K. Narayanan[11], Shri. K. Raghunath[12], Shri. P.P. Srivastav, Shri. B. Raman [13]and Shri. R. Narasimha and Maj. Gen. (retired) Chandan .S. Nugyal.

2) The task force on Internal Security comprised of Shri . N.N.Vohra (Chairman), Mr. Julio Ribeiro, Mr. Rajendra Shekhar, Lt-Gen (Retd) V. K. Nayyar, Mr. R. C. Jha, Mr. M. K. Narayanan and Mr. M. L. Wadhawan.

The two task forces have made several recommendations, to make it easy to present them, we shall make use of the outline of the report of the task force on Intelligence Apparatus as a guide[14]. As per the report, we shall principally focus on the following:

Challenges facing Indian intelligence targeting in the present times

The intelligence apparatus in India faces challenges on four main fronts:

1) There has been a sea change in the perception of what constitutes our `national space', the definition is much broader now and issues (such as economics, media, science) that were for some time considered removed from the realm of intelligence targeting are now indivisible parts of it. At the very least concepts such as `Economic-Warfare', `Cyber-warfare', and `Media-Offensive' etc... have served to increase intelligence targeting needs.

2) There is a change in the tenor of revisionist sentiment within the country. Revisionists today are able to use sophisticated resources to aggressively project their views. In some cases this leads to advanced forms of terrorism. It can also exacerbate the existing fissures and divisions in society i.e. caste, religion, ethnicity, and economic disparity. Intelligence agencies today are under a lot of pressure to predict and thus help contain revisionism.

3) The nature of organized crime has changed and its infiltration into society is growing. The merger of the local crime syndicates with narcotics distributors and arms smugglers has increased their destabilizing influence on society. This element often interacts with the elements mentioned in point 2, and produces extremely serious threats to national security. Intelligence targeting of these elusive and dangerous criminals is a difficult task especially as it involves crossing national borders.

4) Increased nuclear and missile technology proliferation to India's hostile neighbors has imposed more demanding requirements on all three aspects of intelligence targeting, i.e. collection, collation and dissemination. The need in this case to provide accurate and actionable intelligence assessments regarding these threats is paramount.

The task force on Intelligence Apparatus probably raises such issues in the chapter titled `The role of intelligence in the changing security environment'. The changed environment clearly places great strain on the intelligence services, so severe are the demands that in the case of the Central Intelligence Bureau that the task force on Internal Security has gone so far as to recommend that the charter of the IB be re-written[15]. It is also quite clear that an emphasis is needed on the use of technical means of handling intelligence and the task force on Intelligence Apparatus was asked to look into ways of merging TECHINT into the entire intelligence collection system [16,17].

In the next few sections we focus on the intelligence collection agencies. We briefly review the problems facing them and try to determine what changes have been suggested in each.

Central Intelligence Bureau

The Central Intelligence Bureau (IB) is the oldest intelligence agency in India[18]. In the past it was tasked with all intelligence targeting but in recent times it has focused on internal security. The IB is officially under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), but in practice the Director IB (DIB) is a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Steering Committee and has the authority to brief the Prime Minister should the need arise, but intelligence inputs (at least in theory) go through the regular channels in the MHA to the JIC.

The collection mechanisms of the IB[18] vary depending on the region, but the IB operates both at the state level and the national level. The bulk of the intelligence collection is carried out by `Grade II' employees of the IB, i.e. in increasing order of seniority; the Security Assistants (Constable), the Junior Intelligence Officers (Head Constable), the Asst. (Central) Intelligence Officer (Sub-Inspector), Deputy Central Intelligence Officers (Inspector), and Joint Central Intelligence Officers (Superintendent of Police)[19]. The `Class I'(gazette) officers carry out coordination and higher-level management the IB. These officers are (again in increasing order of seniority[20]) Asst. Director, the Deputy Director, Joint Director, Addl. Director, Special Director or Special Secretary and finally the Director IB. Grade II officers are in part direct recruitment and officer deputed from state police forces, but Class I officers are mostly deputed from state services[21].

At the state level all IB officers are part of the State Special Bureau[22] report to a Central Intelligence Officer (the intelligence advisor to the Governor). The IB maintains a large number of field units and headquarters (which are under the control of Joint or Deputy Directors). It is through these offices and the intricate process of deputation that a very `organic' linkage between the state police agencies and the IB is maintained. In addition to these at the national level the IB has several units (in some cases Subsidiary Intelligence Bureaus) to keep track of issues like terrorism, counter-intelligence, VIP security and threat assessment, and sensitive areas (i.e. J&K, North East Region (NER) etc...).

Some of the problems within the IB are briefly listed below:

1) There are problems regarding recruiting, in the past postings and deputations with the IB were regarded as positive career choices among police officers, this led to a favorable buildup of expertise in the both state and national law enforcement circles. In more recent times, this has changed, state police forces offer far swifter means of promotion and career advancement, also the perks of state level police postings in some cases compare more favorably than those of a central posting[23]. The result is that people have to be forcibly deputed to the IB. This is further compounded by the fact that IB postings often involve extremely hazardous duties in hostile populations[24]. Thus some postings go unfilled and in some cases the IB gets very thinly stretched on the ground. This leads to gaps in intelligence collection.

2) In sensitive areas (ex. J&K. NER) the pace of security operations is very high. This means that the turnaround time between collection, collation and dissemination has to be very small. IB officers serve largely in advisory capacity and have to coordinate with the regular enforcement arms. To reduce the dead time in intelligence handling, today in most sensitive areas, the law enforcement arms (in most cases) are endowed with their own intelligence units. These units do varying amounts of intelligence targeting and are in theory supposed to coordinate with the IB, sometimes however, this coordination is not achieved and quite possibly another intelligence agency dominates leading to the loss of the `overall picture'.

3) The IB is Government of India's principal internal news agency. It is responsible for monitoring all aspects of governance. As an extension of this role, it routinely monitors the state governments and often draws up independent assessments of the security situation in a state and advises the Governor. At the central level the IB closely monitors developments relating to parliamentary affairs and reports back to the Cabinet Secretariat. The Special Enquiry and Surveillance unit (SES) of the IB[25] handles most of this work. This task is vital in maintaining the stability of elected governments. However it can easily be subverted to achieve less savory aims, especially at the state level. Apart from any actual degradation in capacity, this kind of work breeds the impression in that the IB is purely a mechanism for targeting the opposition[26].

4) The IB is also tasked with Counter-Intelligence operations. This area of IB work has been the object of severe criticism and almost every internal disturbance is projected as a failure in counter-intelligence (there is always talk of the absence of specificity in threat assessments). Problems related to this part are discussed more extensively in the section on counter-intelligence issues.

The task forces have in all probability made several recommendations about these topics. The task force on Internal Security has stated the need to place emphasis on the position of the Secretary (MHA) and that all intelligence regarding internal security developments should be passed to him; this is appears to be an attempt to foster the functioning of the `Core Intelligence Processing Unit' in the MHA [27,116]. The task force on Internal Security has also made clear the need to create dedicated `systems and procedures' of intelligence dissemination to aid in the conduct of counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations. It is also likely that the capabilities in the IB relating to counter-intelligence are being upgraded (this is discussed in greater detail in the section on Counter-Intelligence). The task force on internal security has also called for an end to political interference in the IB, it has suggested that a internal review and oversight body be set up in the IB to stamp out this sort of thing, but it is unclear to the author as to exactly how this mechanism will function.

Research and Analysis Wing

The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) is India's external intelligence agency. The Secretary(R) in the Cabinet office is the Director of the R&AW. The structure of the R&AW is a matter of speculation, but brief overviews of the same are present in the public domain[28,29,30]. Intelligence is usually collected from a variety of sources by field officers and deputy field officers; it is either pre-processed (vetted) by a senior field officer or by a desk officer. The desk officer then passes the information to Joint Secretary and then on to the Additional Secretary and from there it is disseminated to the concerned end user[31]. The Director R&AW is a member of the JIC Steering Committee and is authorized to brief the Prime Minister should the need arise.

Some officers of the R&AW are members of a specialized service, the Research and Analysis Service (RAS) [32], but several officers also serve on deputation from other services. The R&AW has sub-organizations[33] like the Aviation Research Center (ARC), the Radio Research Center (RRC) or the Electronics and Technical Service (ETS), which have considerable capacity for technical intelligence gathering. Another important branch under the operational control of the R&AW is the Directorate General of Security (DGS), this agency has oversight over organizations like the Special Frontier Force (SFF), the Special Services Bureau (SSB) etc... Liaison with the military is maintained through the Military Intelligence Advisory Group and the Military Advisor to the Director R&AW[31].

Though the R&AW is primarily intended for collecting intelligence beyond India's national borders. It has over time come to have a strong presence in all fields of intelligence gathering[8]. The R&AW was brought into internal security issues during the Sikkim situation, it played a role in the events of the emergency of 1977-79, it was asked to operate in Punjab to counter-balance the presence of the ISI (and so also in Kashmir), and the R&AW has provided the security for the India's nuclear program[34].

The KRC has made specific references to failures in the intelligence collection mechanisms of the R&AW. These issues are examined briefly below:

1) The task of collecting HUMINT is dependent heavily on region in question. In some areas[35] like the Northern Areas of POK, China, where there is little cross border movement of people or the populations on either side are of a completely different ethnic and linguistic stock, it is difficult to operate anything more than shallow penetration agents. In some cases the R&AW depends on the military for logistical and security support the absence of this can lead to a drop in intelligence collection. There are persistent problems with shallow penetration agents, as they work in most cases for remuneration, they can easily be recruited by the other side or even by another Indian intelligence agency. This can lead to severe anomalies in intelligence assessments. The R&AW has also had some problems infiltrating the ranks of the Pakistan based Mutahida Jehad Council[35], the reasons for this are unclear. The lack of local recruitment for intelligence purposes leaves open the possibility of (cross border) long-range reconnaissance patrols, these can in principle be carried out[36] but as this is fraught with implications of a diplomatic nature, permissions for this sort of targeting would have to come from the highest authority in the land. Such sanction would take time, and hence this cannot serve as the primary mode of intelligence gathering.

2) In the field of technical intelligence, R&AW has a fairly large asset list. It has a presence in the fields of ELINT (including eavesdropping, radar fingerprinting, etc...), COMINT (eavesdropping) aerial reconnaissance and survey, and SATINT. The R&AW also has some capability to carry out surveillance over the Internet; the R&AW and the IB are designated as the `Properly constituted authorities' for monitoring Internet traffic over data lines in India. There is a large pool of talented persons in the country and the R&AW does recruit technical people from universities and colleges. The problems confronting the R&AW in the field of technical intelligence gathering stem in part from the TECHINT asset list. The aerial survey equipment is of western origin. The ARC makes use of Gulfstream III/SRA-1[37] (or perhaps the upgraded version i.e. the Gulfstream IV/SRA-4[38,39]), the equipment from the west has in all probability come with end-user obligations that limit its targeting uses[35] to certain countries only. There is a very limited capability for analyzing moving targets and rather sadly an attempt at indigenously producing a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) by the ISRO, which showed promise initially failed to secure the necessary priority that it deserved in 1996-97[40,41] at the cabinet level. This has in turn contributed to a failure in targeting in the Kargil sector. In the field of SATINT, the IRS-1C is believed to have a 5-6 meter resolution capability; this is inadequate for the task at hand. Higher resolution imagery is available commercially outside the country but it is expensive and it is not current, i.e. the companies that can sell it only after a stipulated period of time[41]. Here too delays had stalled a project by ISRO to indigenously produce a more advanced survey satellite called the CARTOSAT-1[42].

3) The overall interaction between the military and R&AW is somewhat strained. The experiences of the IPKF intervention and the events leading up to the Kargil intrusion have put considerable pressures on both sides here. Complaints against the R&AW by military range from the inability of a `civilian mind' to grasp military needs, to more specific complaints of military officers being kept `out of the loop' by their R&AW counterparts. The conflict at some level stems from the fact that the military and the R&AW concurrently share responsibility for intelligence gathering near the border but only the R&AW is tasked with collecting intelligence beyond the border. This implies that the military is dependent on the R&AW assessments in the crucial areas such as ORBAT, Tables of Organization, military maps etc... The R&AW for its part is often handles both military and diplomatic issues and this compounds the mistrust between the two.

4) The R&AW in the 80s has experienced its share of labor problems; there are accounts in press[43] about unionization in sections like the SSB, ARC etc... The exact origin of these problems is unclear, and historical accounts suggest that these first began in the aftermath of the emergency of 1977-79, when the R&AW faced severe budget cuts after a harsh review by then Prime Minister Shri. Morarji Desai. There are also other accounts, which suggest that the R&AW is a top-heavy organization and this leads problems as junior service employees face enormous strains. The problems in the SSB have become so severe that an internal review committee under Shri. A.S.Syali (Dir.R&AW till 1997) recommended that the SSB be disbanded or merged with the paramilitary forces[44,45,51].

5) There has been a fair amount of thought within the R&AW about reforming its structure, and making it in tune with the needs imposed by the times, however rather tragically a vital review in 1988-89 failed to secure cabinet approval[46].

6) On the issue of weapons technology proliferation, in the past there has been a dependence on human intelligence assets. There is a need for application of technical means to this sector[47].

These issues will figure to some extent in the task force on Intelligence Apparatus's recommendations. In the next few years the technical capability in the field of aerial surveillance should receive a major boost if either the program of indigenous production is allowed to continue or if the import of airborne surveillance systems from Russia is carried out[35,48]. ELINT capability is likely to be maintained at the current advanced level. With the launch of CARTOSAT-1 and CARTOSAT-2, satellite based surveillance capabilities will considerably augmented[49]. The R&AW will also most likely undergo expansions in its scientific and information technology staff as it gears up to meet the challenges posed by the increase in Internet usage in India and the need to provide meet the intelligence targeting needs of the scientific community in India. There is also a possibility that the existing capacity in the R&AW for covert counter-terror operations will be expanded to create a new policy alternative in facing the complicated problems of cross-border terrorism[50]. The R&AW has for a very long time kept track of developments in the Pakistan nuclear and missile program. There is a need to expand this area of targeting, if it has not already been done, then quite possibly a Weapons Technology Proliferation Desk should be set up to keep a constant eye on things. Any dependence on foreign technical assets in this sector must be minimized. Ideally in this sector, HUMINT and TECHINT must be used corroboratively so as to avoid mistakes. The GoM will also consider a proposal to merge the SSB with the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and enhance intelligence collection and policing along the Nepal border[51]. There are also reports about the emphasis placed in the task force report on increased interaction between the MEA and the R&AW[10]. The role of the R&AW in counter-intelligence, economic intelligence and psychological warfare will be discussed later.

Military Intelligence

The three services each have their own intelligence wings; these organizations are usually placed under the command of a senior officer (Army-Lt. General, Navy-Commodore, Air Force- Air Vice Marshal). Each service headquarters has a Joint Intelligence Committee, which processes intelligence collected [28]. The three intelligence wings are known as the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI-Army), the Directorate of Air Intelligence (DAI), and the Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DNI). Interaction with the Cabinet Secretariat is maintained through the Military Wing and also officers are seconded to civilian agencies. The three services intelligence wings and civilian agencies interact formally through the Joint Services Intelligence Board [52].

Military Intelligence (MI) in India suffered a major setback after independence when a majority of its British officers staffing the Intelligence Corps left[53]. In an attempt to build up this branch of service, Lt. Gen. S.S.P. Thorat called for the creation of the defense attaché system and in 1954 a proposal was made to create a Defense Intelligence Agency[53], this proposal failed to secure cabinet approval. Thus for the better part of modern India, the military intelligence organization was confined to field security issues, but in time the intelligence wings of the three services did grow in size.

The largest of the three services was the DMI and it has managed to expand considerably. In 1979 it underwent a major review and subsequently three main branches were setup. These branches dealt with cross-border intelligence collection, field security and counter-intelligence. Subsequently a branch dealing catering to intelligence requirements faced in counter-insurgency was also added[54]. The Intelligence Field Security Units (IFSU) handle the protection of army operations and assets, the Liaison Units (LU) handle counter-intelligence, and the Internal Security Groups (ISG) deal with counter-insurgency issues. There are also a large number of other units dealing in special issues like Psychological Warfare (MI-24), Remote Sensing (MI-17)[55], ORBAT, military biographies, etc... Intelligence collected at the lowest levels travels up a chain of intelligence teams and finally lands up at the Joint Intelligence Committee at Army headquarters. The DMI has a Signals Intelligence Directorate, which operates the Central Monitoring Organization[56] (CMO) under the MOD. The CMO[28] is responsible for most of the army's electronics, communication and signals intelligence gathering, and it monitors radio, television, and encoded transmissions in the country and along the borders.

The Directorate of Air Intelligence collects intelligence through Photo Reconnaissance (PR); it also has considerable capacity for collecting ELINT and COMINT[57]. The DAI carries out the work of photo interpretation, image analysis and has the capacity to electronically disseminate intelligence briefings and photo imagery over large distances[58]. The DAI also has a limited investigative capability[59] and it also maintains a close watch on airspace violations. The Air Force also operates a number of aerial surveillance platforms.

The Directorate of Naval Intelligence has a capability for ELINT and COMINT; some Kilo class submarines are equipped with special masts[60], there are also aircraft (Tu-142M), which are capable of maritime surveillance. The signals intercepts collected in this fashion are routed to the through the Director Naval Signals and from there on they are passed on to the Director Naval Operations or passed further up to the JIC[61]. The DNI also regularly monitors the situations developing in neighboring countries[62].

In addition to these there is the Defense Imagery Processing and Analysis Center (DIPAC), which handles downloading, processing and dissemination of satellite data[63]. There is also the Joint Cipher Bureau (JCB) or the Cryptographic Service of the Ministry of Defense; it is responsible for all encryption related technology in the country[64]. There is a defense attaché system, which operates out of most Indian embassies, these officers monitor defense related developments in that region.

The problems faced by the armed forces in the management of their intelligence assets [65,66] are briefly listed below:

1) The remit of MI does not permit it to extend its targeting to cover the regions beyond the border, here the armed forces must rely on the R&AW to do a part of the targeting. This creates problems of information flow.

2) MI cannot draw up higher-level assessments; the R&AW draws up assessments on a six monthly basis and provides a 30-day warning for imminent hostilities. This is felt to be inadequate and the armed forces would like all assessments to be provided on a monthly basis.

3) There are problems regarding the command and control over technical intelligence collection assets, the ones under direct MOD control are perceived as being inadequate for the task at hand. Areas such as satellite imagery are in need of improvement[67]. There is a shortage of aerial surveillance platforms for Tac R[68]. There are weaknesses in SIGINT collection and more glaring weaknesses in SIGSEC and COMSEC[69. There are lacunae in the area of battlefield surveillance and management[1].

4) MI suffers from a lack of trained manpower, and also there is inappropriate tasking of MI personnel[70].

5) In addition to a lack of confidence in the ability of a civilian agency to measure up to the task of defense intelligence handling, there are also additional coordination problems stemming with the BSF intelligence organization, which also operates along the border[71].

These issues most likely find expression in the task force report. The Government has already ordered the implementation of the KRC recommendations on issues like UAV platforms for the army and the navy. The armed forces are also undergoing an upgrade to a fully digital communication system. The Signals intercept capability is also undergoing some upgrade. The task force on Intelligence Apparatus has recommended the creation of a Joint Services Technical Intelligence (JSTI) Agency, which will coordinate TECHINT handling, and will also examine issues relating to information technology[52]. There are also suggestions relating to the formation of a Defense Intelligence Agency, and considerable debate[65] and publicity has surrounded this proposal. This proposal has found support from the task force on Intelligence Apparatus[132] and within the armed forces[72,73,74]. This is agency if created, would fulfill a long-standing requirement of the armed forces and could at least hypothetically improve intelligence targeting especially in the Post-Chagai environment. It is likely to be headed by one of the armed forces intelligence chiefs[75,132] (most probably on rotation and to facilitate this, the Chiefs of the DAI and the DNI will be raised in rank). It will handle the task of coordinating the various service intelligence arms, and will have the remit to target all matters relating to military intelligence (strategic and tactical) along and beyond the border regions. This agency will also most likely have oversight over the JSTI. Creating the DIA in a reasonable amount of time will involve splitting off sections from the R&AW (such as the ORBAT sections, Military bibliography sections, the Pakistan Intelligence Cell etc...). This may face some opposition as such a split could lead to the loss of intelligence targeting. Bearing in mind that the balance of power between the political classes and the military in India is deliberately asymmetric and that control over the intelligence services and the primacy of the R&AW are a part of this asymmetry. To change any feature of this asymmetry is tremendously complicated and will be met with resistance from the political classes. Thus even if the DIA is created it will remain under the control of the cabinet secretariat, either under a National Intelligence Board or a National Intelligence Advisor and under such an arrangement command and control over the DIA could become complicated.

Intelligence Branches of the Police Organizations

The police organization in India is split into two levels; the local level (state police forces) and the national level (central police forces). The state governments are constitutionally responsible for maintaining law and order and thus maintain their own police force. In addition to a regular police department, most state governments also maintain a large number of State Reserve Police Forces (SRP). At the National level, the Ministry of Home Affairs has an Internal Security Department, which maintains a large number of reserve police forces; these are collectively referred to as the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF). The CPMF consist of the Border Security Force (BSF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), and the Assam Rifles (AR)[76]. The MHA also operates the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the National Criminal Records Bureau (NCRB), the Special Protection Group (SPG), the National Security Guards Organization (NSG), the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD), the Rapid Action Force (RAF), the Home Guards and Civil Defense Organization, the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB)[77].

For the most part, officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) and the Provincial Police Services (PPS) staff the police forces in India, however certain CPMF conduct direct recruitment through national exams.

Police intelligence issues can be broadly classified into two categories, criminal intelligence and special intelligence. Criminal intelligence relates to targeting individuals with criminal tendencies, mapping patterns of criminal activity (modus operandi, organized crime etc...), and maintenance of criminal records. The task of Special Intelligence deals with community surveillance and involves keeping track of foreigners or non-local persons, assessing the levels of communal and ethnic tensions in society, VIP protection and maintaining a watch on political activity.

In India, Criminal intelligence usually deals with local criminal activity. The Criminal Intelligence Departments of the various police forces collect this information and there exists an intricate system of record keeping leading all the way up from the local CID to the NCRB at the center. The state police CID deals with intelligence work in the rural areas, and most metropolitan police departments have their own CID. These organizations work in close coordination with the Detection of Crime Branch (DoCB) and the Detective Corps (CoD).

Special Intelligence in India has a strong association with internal security and most police forces India have a Special Branch. However in police departments in metropolitan India and in certain states having extended internal security requirements, due to communal or ethnic tensions or proximity to the borders etc... the Special Branch handles only routine police matters like Records, Passport verification, police enquiry and an Intelligence Special Wing handles issues relating to sensitive political surveillance, anti-terrorism, liaison with other intelligence agencies, and intelligence support special police forces. Elsewhere Special Branches also maintain a close relationship with central intelligence organizations, and officers are seconded from these organizations to central intelligence organizations on a regular basis. There is also an Anti-Corruption Bureau in each police department, which investigates and prosecutes cases of corruption in government departments.

The CPMF have some intelligence targeting capacity. The BSF, which guards the borders with Bangladesh and Pakistan, has a G-Branch (BSF (G)). BSF (G) processes intelligence inputs emerging from BSF units along the border. In addition to the counter-intelligence operations near the border and in internal security deployments, the BSF (G) also maintains a close watch on enemy forces close to the border, and carries out intelligence operations against narcotics and arms smugglers. A Deputy Inspector General (DIG) heads the BSF (G), and G-sections are attached to BSF battalions, these in turn pass their reports back to the local BSF HQ, which in turn passes it back to the BSF HQ in New Delhi[78]. The ITBP, which guards the border with China, coordinates intelligence collection with the IB and with the SSB, and the Assam Rifles too has some capability to collect intelligence inputs and works closely with the DMI.

The problems facing police intelligence setups in India are,

1) The task of intelligence collection (criminal or special) ultimately falls on all policemen. Here any lacunae in training, indoctrination and briefing can cause nasty problems. The problem is most severe in the lower ranks. The chain of intelligence collection is begins with the constable on the beat or the Police-Patil in the village. Issues such as stress and poor health management, gravely affect the ability of these policemen to collect intelligence. Issues relating to pay and housing make personnel at this level especially prone to recruitment by criminals.

2) Most states impart only very basic training in intelligence collection. Policemen learn advanced skills the hard way, i.e. on the job, in hostile environments that cost lives. The absence of an emphasis on intelligence collection and its importance, leads to some irregularities in rural areas[79] and to slackness in intelligence collection and documentation work. Many state police forces carry out rudimentary national security indoctrination for the lower ranks of the police. This in some cases leads to laxity (due to lack of awareness) on part of the local police forces. Also further problems arise as policemen who lack a basic indoctrination are hard put to comprehend more advanced briefings that may receive on the issue during later years of service.

3) There are lacunae in the communication networks of the police departments in India. This causes problems in intelligence targeting as inputs often take time to travel to and from less developed regions. In more sensitive areas where criminals are in possession of advanced technology, the use of old technology by the police makes for poor operational COMSEC.

4) The police departments are not very well equipped with the ability for signal intercept and COMINT. Here they must depend on the central agencies, this creates delays in intelligence processing. Their ability to conduct targeting operations against criminals who use the Internet is also limited, IT utilization is poor, and resources such as POLNET are in need of attention. This hits the police hardest when targeting narcotics smugglers and organized crime.

5) In cities, the requirements posed by bandobast duty, VIP security and Nake-Bandi etc... are breaking up the normal pattern of chowkies and patrols. These are vital to the collection of intelligence especially that relating to communal and ethnic tensions.

6) The political intelligence mechanism in the special intelligence units is prone to misuse. This also weakens criminal intelligence targeting and can lead to adverse effects on relationships between central intelligence agencies and the state police intelligence wings[80].

The suggestions of the task force on intelligence structure are likely to include further increases in the outlay for police intelligence and communications. Recently in a bid to improve training and indoctrination, the IB and the Gujarat Police have started an intelligence-training course[81] for policemen. Efforts like this will receive more encouragement. There is considerable emphasis on coordination between the State Special Bureau and State Police Intelligence wings in the report of the task force on Internal Security, so there are likely to be some developments in this regard as well. There have been some efforts recently to expand targeting of criminals over the Internet[82] these too may receive some special attention. Problems faced in targeting international narcotics distributors are also likely to find mention in the report. Work related stress, housing, pay etc... are unlikely to be completely addressed in the short term, though there may be an increase in allowances to officers in special police forces. Issues relating to political interference in intelligence wings are not likely to be addressed in the report on Intelligence Apparatus.

The problems in intelligence targeting facing the CPMF are as follows:

1) With the exclusion of the BSF, the intelligence organization in most CPMF is weak. The CRPF and the CISF do not have intelligence units, and the ITBP and the AR depends extensively on central intelligence agencies[83,84].

2) The BSG (G) is supposed to coordinate with the Army in sensitive areas; there is some resentment in both organizations over this interaction[78,85]. This has the potential to compound any coordination problems that might arise between the two agencies.

3) Technical intelligence gathering and information technology usage appears to low, the best performance in this regard is that of the BSF (G), which has some IT infrastructure and some signals intercept capability. The CRPF and the CISF have signals battalions only for communication purposes[76].

Given this background, the task force recommendations will most likely relate to creating intelligence wings within CPMF involved in counter-insurgency operations[15]. There is also the likelihood that technical assets and IT applications will receive a boost. The problems of coordination between CPMF and other intelligence organizations can be resolved through the Core Intelligence Processing Unit approach[86,87]. However given that the Army, through the Unified Command has operational control over the CPMF in sensitive areas, it is unclear to the author as to how exactly these two requirements will be patched together.

Economic Intelligence Targeting

Economic intelligence targeting by a nation consists of four main branches of activity:

1) Collection of information related to the internal state of the nation's economy, this includes subjects like tax collection, illegal trading practices, traffic in controlled substances and specially taxed goods.

2) Collection of information related to external influences on the economy, especially attempts by other countries to undermine the nations economy as a whole or attempts to wrongfully dominate economic institutions.

3) There is also the task of collecting and collating data about other economies of hostile countries and economic competitors of nationally sensitive business interests.

4) Targeting relating to international economic organizations, i.e. the detailed nature of their functioning, and their perceptions of the nation's economy.

Internal intelligence gathering in India relating to taxation etc...is primarily the responsibility of the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB). This organization is the secretariat of the Economic Intelligence Council, a nodal body, which coordinates the response of various government agencies (CBI, IB etc...) to economic offenses. The CEIB coordinates the work of the Directorate General of Revenue Intelligence (Customs), the Directorate of Enforcement (Foreign Exchange), the Directorate General of Anti-Evasion (Central Excise), the Directorate General of Income Tax (income tax evasion), and the Narcotics Control Bureau (controlled substances)[88]. The second activity falls under the realm of counter-intelligence and has been discussed in that section. The third activity falls to the R&AW, it has built up considerable expertise on the functioning of economies in the South Asia and East Asia. The ministries of external affairs, finance, commerce and industry act in coordination in the last area of activity, in part targeting relating to detailed functioning of these organizations is handled by the R&AW.

The targeting capability in this area is a matter of speculation, however American counter-intelligence experts have constantly referred to three principal sources of economic intelligence collection[89], these are

1) Expatriate communities in western nations, with their access to almost all levels of economic and scientific activity make excellent HUMINT sources,

2) Communications in India are controlled by government agencies, so fax, email, and telephone-based transactions are often intercepted and examined by intelligence agencies. The Government limits the level of encryption that can be used in transactions, it also has laws that enable intelligence agencies to intercept any communications made over data networks and strong penalties for failure to cooperate[90], and

3) Most data networks are prone to penetration and in this sector too India with its large technical manpower base has developed considerable expertise.

Given the little information that there is about targeting in this sector, it is impossible to point out any specific deficiencies, however there is a need to expand targeting in this sector, and the task force on Intelligence Apparatus will make several recommendations in this regard. The author feels that the R&AW will in all probability establish or expand its economic intelligence unit. There are also likely to be suggestions[91] aimed at increasing coordination between the various wings of government, which deal in economic intelligence and to improve oversight in these matters. The task force on Internal security has recommended the formation of a separate agency with such an ambit under the National Security Council Secretariat[15].

Counter-Intelligence Efforts

The task of Counter-intelligence revolves around identifying, processing and arresting attempts to penetrate the `national security space'. The task of counter-intelligence is divided between the various intelligence agencies. Broadly speaking the task of identifying penetrations is shared equally, but the bulk of the task of processing and arresting penetrations falls to the IB, the task of investigating and judicially prosecuting the cases falls to the Central Bureau of Investigation[92]. In an open and diverse society like India, the task confronting any counter-intelligence officer is enormous.

In recent times in India, counter-intelligence collection has focused on four types of individuals.

1) Members of armed extremist organizations (of religious, ethnic, or political persuasion) with the backing of hostile governments or other foreign entities. They are responsible for acts of terrorism in several parts of the India[93,94,95]. They are constantly in search of `spectaculars' to promote their brand of revisionism and their existence in free society is an ever-present threat to national security and peace.

2) Sympathizers, supporters and foreign agents who operate the logistics of the aforementioned organizations. These individuals carry out the work of intelligence collection, motivation, recruitment, supply and transport. They also routinely suborn acts of terror through vicious campaigns of propaganda that rouse religious, ethnic, and linguistic sentiments. This category includes persons operating under some manner of diplomatic cover who carry out or support espionage activities.

3) There are also foreign agents and persons of misplaced loyalties who infiltrate or seek to infiltrate the administration. Their aim is to collect and transmit sensitive information or in some cases to influence policy formulation and implementation. When cases of this type come become public, the government of the day suffers tremendous adverse publicity and the confidence of the people in government is undermined.

4) Members of organized crime cartels that seek to indulge in acts of chicanery to achieve economic gains. These elements often on interact with foreign entities and conduct crime with the specific aim of physically undermining the law of the land. They use bribes, blackmail and threats of violence to compromise government machinery.

The Intelligence bureau has a Counter-Intelligence Wing; it is headed by an Additional Director and handles most of the IB work in this area. The IB also maintains a range of capabilities in the field of electronic surveillance, to enable it to process suspects without their knowledge. In some cases there are issues of a diplomatic nature and also some of the individuals involved do not reside outside the country, to deal with this, the R&AW also maintains a counter-intelligence section. The COMINT capacity of the R&AW has been mentioned earlier. In the armed forces and paramilitary forces, there are dedicated sections, which keep track of counter-intelligence issues.

In sensitive areas like J&K, there is network of grids. Within these grids, suspects arrested by law enforcement agencies are first taken to detention centers where they are interrogated by the concerned intelligence wing. Subsequently they are sent to a Joint Interrogation Center, where teams from various intelligence agencies question the suspects. These teams are coordinated by an organization called Counter Intelligence Kashmir[96], which processes these reports and passes on to other intelligence agencies and end users. The Army intelligence in these sensitive areas is coordinated by the Internal Security Group (ISG) of the DMI[28]. The ISG depends on support from elements of the Directorate of Signals for COMINT. The Border Security Force G-Branch carries out counter-intelligence operations along the IB, and they also have a presence in J&K. BSF also operates has some signal intercept capability[97].

The embassies and consulates of certain countries are kept under constant surveillance in order to deter or detect espionage activities. The Special Branch of Police in metropolitan India and Foreigner Registration unit in the IB keep track of foreign nationals in the country. In cases where Non Governments Organizations seek to utilize funds from outside the country for development projects, the IB vets the donors. Discreet surveillance is also maintained on the activities of religious organizations and their functionaries especially in communally sensitive areas.

Deficiencies in the counter-intelligence area are listed below:

1) The bulk of the movement of armed infiltrators is across the International Border and the Line of Control; here counter-intelligence revolves around detecting the intrusion. The capacity for maintaining surveillance along this very porous border is poor. This is in part due to a lack of financial resources and in part due to more advanced surveillance and border management technology[98].

2) There is an increase in the use of advanced communication devices like dual mode i.e. burst transmission and frequency hopping radios by groups in the Kashmir valley. Many terrorist groups in the valley have a complicated grid of control stations and repeater stations, which can communicate with HF transmitters. There is also extensive and aggressive (frequently changing) use of encryption based on code-matrices in different languages. With the help of the ISI, these groups buy top of the market equipment. Pakistan's intelligence agency (ISI) has stepped up this kind of assistance to groups in the North East as well. There is a limited capacity for the interception of this kind of signals. Frequency hopping and encryption make the task enormously more difficult. There have been some improvements in the capacity after cabinet approval was secured for procurement of more advanced direction finding devices in 1998, but the battle in this field has only just begun[99].

3) Targeting in Nepal is weak. Though some would attribute this to the `Gujral Doctrine', Nepal has historically been a center for intelligence activities aimed at China and India. Of late Pakistan ISI has managed to establish a considerable presence there. As there are no travel restrictions to Nepal, it offers a place for foreign intelligence handlers to meet their Indian operatives without fear of discovery by Indian CI agents. Organized crime cartels have established a strong presence in Nepal as well[100].

4) There is an increased focus on India among some western intelligence agencies after the nuclear tests. A concerted effort is likely on their part to infiltrate scientific and administrative institutions in India. In the past some attempts[101] of this nature have been detected, however it appears there is more to come[102].

5) There is an increase in the use of cellular technology and Internet sites by organized crime[103,104]. There is some limited capacity for targeting this, but compared to the size of the problem, it is inadequate.

6) There is a campaign by Pakistan to undermine the Indian Rupee; this is a form of economic warfare that involves the use of counterfeit currency[105,106]. The capacity for detecting and countering this is limited.

7) Most western intelligence services have expanded their economic intelligence collection setups. The interest expressed in India by a number of business organizations has a seamier side as these bodies are used to provide Non Official Cover[107] to foreign economic and industrial intelligence agents. In general the end of the cold war has flooded the market with out-of-work spies, these persons are now acting in advisory capacity to corporate and big-business interests in the first world nations. It is also believed that IT based surveillance is a very big part of the efforts to gather sensitive economic and industrial intelligence[108] and experts acknowledge that the banking sector is vulnerable due to its use of security software developed abroad[90]. Industrial and scientific institutions working on non-classified projects are likely to be targets of espionage by rivals and aggressive business interests. There is a need to extend a regime of counter-intelligence targeting to these institutions as well[109,110].

8) Surveillance of sympathetic individuals attached religious and ethnic organizations, is an enormous task given the sheer number of targets. It is in sectors like this every little shortage and error hits the hardest[111].

These issues will be discussed in the report on intelligence apparatus. Recommendations will most likely include an increase in the financial outlay for counter-intelligence operations[112]; there will also be investments in new COMINT and surveillance technology (UAVs, motion detectors etc...), cooperation with states like Israel, UK, and France is likely in these fields after the Shri. L.K.Advani's trips there recently[113]. There is also a possibility that the signal intercept capability in the BSF will be upgraded in order to facilitate better coordination between BSF (G) and the Army. It is also likely that counter-intelligence wings will be set up in the police forces of J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala and Tamil Nadu[114]. There will also be an attempt to promote closer cooperation between the police intelligence wings and the IB. The process of verification and vetting followed at the time of recruitment to government service especially scientific and technical may also undergo some changes. Counter-Intelligence wings of the R&AW and the IB are also likely to employ staff with a background in economics and industry to deal with the prospect of espionage in these sectors[115]. The National Association of Software and Service Companies (Nasscom), a private confederation of Indian companies has established a committee to help companies improve their security after recent hacker attacks[116], this too will find support in the task force report. Regarding operations in Nepal, there will most likely be an attempt to foster closer intelligence ties with Nepal, perhaps even to create a Nepali IB. This will in all probability be dovetailed other police and security aid programs to Nepal[117]. Although there have been several high profile espionage cases, it is unclear to the author as to why there are so few judicial convictions[118]. One plausible explanation is that there is gap between the investigations of the CBI and the IB, but it is unclear to the author if any suggestions have been made in this regard. Apart from this, the author feels that there will also be new security checks in administrative and scientific institutions especially in the area of computer network security.

Psychological Warfare (Perception Management)

Psychological Warfare (Psy-War) deals with attacks on enemy's mind. Though there exist several recorded applications of it in history[119], more modern views place Psychological Warfare in the much larger context of Information Warfare[120]. In this paradigm, psychological warfare is not limited to use in wartime situations alone but extends much further in peacetime to the concept of Perception Management[121]. Perception Management revolves around using `soft' (positive) and `hard' (negative) images to influence the minds of a target population[122]. With the growth of mass media, it is now possible to evolve an asymmetric situation in a confrontation by selectively projecting aspects of the enemy nation.

India faces the following threats on this front,

1) Pakistani initiatives seek to balkanize India through the use of perception management. These techniques have been used in J&K earlier (in the run up to 1965), and then refined over time in Punjab (1980s). They are now being used in J&K (1980-2000) and other states to selectively project religious any animosities between the Hindu and Muslim religious communities.

2) Errors of omission or commission on part of western agencies with regards to information about India. These have become more acute in recent times as the penetration of the western media into India has increased. The damage potential of these acts is fairly high. Given the fickle nature of international trade and investment, this aspect should not be underestimated.

3) Non-state actors and NGOs of various persuasions are in a position to exploit the media boom to project India adversely in order to achieve their limited aims. The NGOs, though incapable of physically degrading security directly, can use the media to build up pressure points in the policy making chain[123].

4) The Internet, lacking regulation has offered shelter to a vast number of interests inimical to the Republic; these persons now can project their views graphically and with a few relatively simple programming tricks ensure that their site receives sufficient coverage. These sites can very adversely affect the country's image.

There exist certain mechanisms within the intelligence structure to deal with some of this. Military Intelligence for example has a special unit to deal with these Psy-war operations on the battlefield. Military deployments in sensitive areas are equipped with a Counter-Psy-Ops cell[124]. The ministry of Information and Broadcasting has moved considerably (at great risk to its staff) to meet the challenge posed by anti-national propaganda by TV and Radio in J&K and the North-Eastern Region. At a higher level there exists inter-ministerial group that coordinates the tasking of the various agencies in this sector and this has produced some results[122].

Deficiencies in this field relate to:

1) The inability to completely check the spread of pamphlets, audiocassettes and videocassettes containing anti-national material especially in sensitive areas. These materials completely offset any denials and public statements issues by security forces and in some communally hypersensitive areas create utter havoc.

2) Inferiority in production within the state owned media. The Indian state governed TV and Radio Company lags behind industry leaders in this field. This becomes crucial as western media sources dominate public opinion.

3) The inadequate nature of the response to anti-India propaganda over the Internet. This at present falls under two categories, firstly `passive', i.e. maintaining sites, CDROM distributions etc... aimed at providing a doctored or questionable picture of events in India and secondly `active', involving the use of e-mail, fax, and hacking `spectaculars' aimed at seizing media attention.

There have been some attempts recently to offset these shortcomings; the 15th Corps in Srinagar for example has a dedicated media wing that disseminates information over the Internet and to the local media[125]. Army units have started filming cordon and search operations, so as to be able to provide footage to the media. There was also an attempt by the same formation to start a newspaper to counter anti-national propaganda in the local press[124]. Doordarshan and AIR have started special 24-hour channels for the North East Region and Kashmir. Moves like this will find support in the report of the task force on Intelligence Reform. There have been suggestions to use the intelligence agencies to "build a comprehensive database of individuals indulging in anti-India propaganda over the net"[122], the author feels that this capability will be expanded, though it is unclear as to which agency will ultimately be tasked with this job.

In the next section we look at the overall intelligence coordination mechanisms in India. This area has come in for considerable commentary and criticism in recent times.

Intelligence Coordination and the role of the National Security Council

Given the proliferation in the number of intelligence agencies, there has been a continuous need to enhance coordination between agencies. Prior to 1998, the Department of Cabinet Affairs (Cabinet Secretariat) [28,126] consisted of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the JIC steering committee. The JIC itself comprised of

1) Chairman: Addl. Secy. Cabinet Secretariat,

2) Joint. Secy. MEA,

3) Joint. Secy. MHA,

4) Joint Secy. MOD,

5) Joint Dir. R&AW,

6) Joint Dir. IB,

7) DGMI,

8) DNI

9) DAI (member-secretary).

The JIC-Steering Committee comprised of

1) Chairman: Cabinet Secy., (also member-secretary)

2) Secy. MEA,

3) Secy. MHA,

4) Secy. (R), (Dir. R&AW)

5) DIB,

6) Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.[127]

Subsequent to the establishment of the NSC in 1998[128], the JIC was merged into National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), the author feels at this point the JIC was expanded to include representatives from the ministry of Finance, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the newly formed National Security Council Advisory Board (NSAB), etc... The JIC Steering Committee was expanded to become the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), which comprises Cabinet Secretary, three Service Chiefs and secretaries of core ministries like foreign affairs, defense, home, finance, atomic energy and space beside the heads of the Intelligence agencies and the Governor of RBI.

Media coverage in the aftermath of Kargil indicates that the complaints about the functioning of the old JIC have been heaped almost immediately on the new NSCS.

The problems encountered in the old JIC were,

1) The Intelligence services felt that the assessment process in the JIC took too much time. The JIC gradually weakened as agencies failed to pass on critical inputs to it.

2) The Military felt that it was under-represented in the JIC[129] and the overall analysis process. Officers in the JIC often complained that their civilian counterparts kept them out of loop. This was compounded by the fact that MI did not have the ability to independently pursue intelligence targeting in several critical sectors. This meant that come crunch time, they were really not in a position to comment on some of the assessments. The Military also felt that the JIC output was excessively academic and not always convertible into militarily actionable items. This together with the dominance of the R&AW over crucial military assessments has fostered a very negative view in the army about the state of affairs.

3) The JIC was staffed by people on deputation this impaired their ability to formulate long-term policy. In theory the JIC Steering Committee was supposed to advise the JIC on these matters, but given the day-to-day pressures of running government departments and ministries, it seems plausible that this arrangement did not materialize fully.

The task force on Intelligence Reform has carefully considered such aspects and called for the creation of a National Intelligence Board under the National Security Advisor[130]. This board will comprise of the intelligence chiefs of the R&AW, IB, Economic Intelligence, and Defense Intelligence Agency[131,132] and a representative of the CPF. The author also feels that the National Intelligence board will contain Secretary (MHA), the secretary MEA, and the Secretary MOD. It also seems probable that the formation of the National Intelligence Board is a precursor to the appointment of a full-fledged National Intelligence Advisor[133]. It is also likely that the National Intelligence Board will have a secretariat and that entities like the Core Intelligence Processing Unit will be placed within it.

The author feels that merely replacing the JIC with a new body will not do away with the problems. There are deeper issues at play here[134] and that it will be a while before any asymmetries in this body ebb away and a truly unified response is effected. There is also the equally complicated matter of staff selection and recruitment, which will play a big role in deciding the ultimate fate of the National Intelligence Board.

In Conclusion

In the manner that it has handled the Kargil Review process, the NDA government led by Hon. Prime Minister Shri. Atal Behari Vajpayee has shown a considerable degree of maturity and caution. This government has also demonstrated a capacity to foster visionary thinking, the likes of which have not been seen in halls of government for some time now. The author feels this is no small feat, and this much alone merits a note of commendation to all those involved in this effort.

At this point however, it remains to be seen, if the Government of Shri. Vajpayee can indeed stamp its will on the administration and the political classes of the time, and if indeed the recommended changes produce the desired improvements.

The author feels that the answer to both these questions is a difficult one. The nation today suffers from an acute lack of awareness in matters national security. This deficiency shows up most vividly in the political classes who are unable to comprehend the unified nature of security and intelligence. The bureaucracy given its sheer size offers great inertia to any process of change. These factors can easily combine to produce inaction and unresponsiveness in governance. A cynical attitude on part of the public only makes matters worse. Ultimately the citizens of India must bear in mind the following fact, there is no single cure for the nation's ills, and thus a periodic review of administrative machinery (especially intelligence) should not be considered in a negative light.

Notes

[1] `Kargil Committee Report: Executive Summary', http://alfa.nic.in/rs/general/25indi1.htm.

[2] `Scope of Task Forces' analyses widened', Jay Raina, http://www2.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/230500/detNAT01.htm.

[3] The exact compulsions for this decision are not known, it may however be noted that there was considerable consternation expressed in some segments of the Indian security-intelligence bureaucracy over the KRC Report. Some intelligence officials were of the opinion that the intelligence agencies were unfairly being blamed for what was actually a total systems failure and yet others felt that the committee had overlooked several aspects, articles of evidence and testimonies and hence reached the wrong conclusions. A clear view of these objections may be found in the references below

a)`IB,RAW retaliate to Kargil report', MahendraVed, http://www.timesofindia.com/230400/23home5.htm.

b) `Taking the rap for Kargil', B.Raman, http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/090300/detOPI01.htm.

[4] Shri. Girish Chander Saxena was an officer of the IPS (1950), he is currently serving his second term as Governor J&K, he was Secy.(R&AW) in the Cabinet secretariat in 1983-86. A brief bio may be found at http://jammukashmir.nic.in/govt/gov.htm.

[5] Shri. Arun Singh was the Minister of State for Defence in the Rajiv Gandhi administration, he is currently serving as Advisor to the Shri. Jaswant Singh (Hon. Minister Ext. Affairs).

[6] Shri. Madhav Godbole was an officer of the IAS, he served as home secretary to the Narasimha Rao administration until taking premature retirement in 1993 (in the aftermath of the Babri-Masjid demolition).

[7] Shri. Narendra Nath Vohra was an officer of the IAS Punjab cadre(1959), he has held several important posts and is the author of the N.N.Vohra committee report on the nexus between criminals and politicians in 1993(a copy of the same may be obtained from http://www.indiapolicy.org/clearinghouse/notes/vohra-rep.doc), he was as Principal Secretary to Shri. Inder Kumar Gujral (Hon. Prime Minister of India from 1997-98). A brief bio may be obtained from http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/mai/savirtualforum/ResumesCommunique.htm.

[8] http://www.indianarmedforces.com/news/news.htm

[9] `GoM on Kargil meets to discuss security', HT Correspondent, Hindustan Times New Delhi 25 November, 2000.

[10] http://www.thestatesman.org/arc.news.php3?id=25830&type=Pageone&theme=A&dat=2001-01-05

[11] Shri.M.K.Narayanan is an officer of the IPS Tamil Nadu Cadre (1959). In 35 years of service he has held several postings both in Tamil Nadu and at the Central Govt. level. He has served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Bureau from 1987-89 and as the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the as the Secretary NSC. He is currently a member of the National Security Advisory Board.

[12] Shri. K.Raghunath is an officer of the IFS (1962), he served as the Secretary(external affairs) during the Inder Kumar Gujral Administration and subsequently has held several sensitive diplomatic posts, he was recently involved in interactions with the Clinton Administration on the issue of India's nuclear policy. He has considerable expertise on China and has spent many years there.

[13] Shri. B.Raman is an officer of the RAS, during his stay in the R&AW; he has served as the head of the counter-terrorism desk and has liased with several international governments on the intelligence matters (1992). He was most likely the deputy chief of R&AW (he retired as Additional Secy. Cabinet Secretariat, a euphemism for the same).

[14] http://www.the-hindu.com/2000/10/01/stories/0201000m.htm.

[15] http://www.indian-express.com/ie/daily/20001019/ina19001.html.

[16] http://www2.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/230500/detNAT01.htm.

[17] The author feels that readers of this part of the task force report will find shades of B.Raman's writing on the same issues, it is also hoped that a fair bit of attention was paid to the possible uses of information technology in the process of collation and dissemination.

[18] A fairly detailed history may be found in Intelligence Services, Organisation, Analysis and Functions, Dr.Bhashyam Kasturi, Lancer Papers 6, Lancer publishers 1995.

[19] http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19970731/21250043.html.

[20] http://www.policeinindia.com/cops.htm - INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

[21] http://www.financialexpress.com/ie/daily/19970603/15450063.html

[22] http://www.indian-express.com/ie/daily/19980714/19550134.html

[23] http://www.hindubusinessline.com/2000/04/08/stories/04085502.htm.

[24] IB operatives are often specially targeted by terrorist organizations in an effort to undermine the intelligence apparatus, at special risk are the officers who spend time in sensitive field postings in mofussil areas along the border, each assassination of this nature has a very negative impact on morale.

[25] http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19970731/21250043.html.

[26] Prominent national politicians have on several occasions voiced this sentiment. All intelligence agencies have had to suffer these comments from the public irrespective of their role in the events. This perception is perhaps rooted in the past when the Intelligence agencies were used to target Indians involved in the freedom struggle.

[27] http://www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1000516/front_pa.htm - head4

[28] Intelligence Services, Organisation, Analysis and Functions, Dr.Bhashyam Kasturi, Lancer Papers 6, Lancer publishers 1995.

[29] Inside R&AW, Asoke Raina, Vikas Publications, New Delhi,1981.

[30] http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/jun/03karg.htm.

[31] http://www.satp.org/idr/Jul-Sep 00/Dr Bhashyam Kasturi.htm - top

[32] http://www.angelfire.com/in/jalnews/191991.txt

[33] http://www.angelfire.com/in/jalnews/247991.html

[34] Weapons of Peace, Raj Chengappa, Harper Collins, 2000

[35] http://www.frontlineonline.com/fl1615/16151170.htm

[36] There is apparently a limited capacity for such operations and details of the same by found in books like references (29)(30).

[37] The initial purchase consisted of Gulfstream SRA-1s equipped with sideward looking cameras, these aircraft first made an appearance in the mid 80s, they flew regularly out of ARC controlled airbases all over the country. Reports in the media (38),(39) seem to indicate that these platforms were upgraded to Gulfstream IV/SRA-4, which has a synthetic aperture radar.

[38] http://194.205.16.17/ency/G/Gulfstream.asp.

[39] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/sra-4.htm

[40] 'IAF ignored reconnaissance radar', Joseph Thomas, IDR., Volume 14 (3) pp.93-94, July Sep 1999.

[41] http://www.saag.org/notes/note27.html

[42] http://www.indian-express.com/ie/daily/19990802/ige02076.html

[43] This comment in part is prompted in part by details listed in references 19,20. The author also has a vague memory of an interview on Doordarshan in late 80s of an R&AW employee claiming to be president of the R&AW grade II employees union. The author also recalls that the same union had made a series of allegations against the senior officials in the R&AW, most notably charges of embezzlement against the Dir. R&AW.

[44] http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19991020/ige20087.html.

[45] http://www.tribuneindia.com/99aug25/edit.htm - 5

[46] http://www.saag.org/notes/note91.html

[47] The author draws in part on accounts of events in 1977, and on more recent events involving the `defection' of a Pakistani nuclear scientist to the United States. The absence of long-range SAR and high resolution SATINT makes dependence on foreign assets a high likelihood.

[48] The likely candidates for a SAR/ISAR and MTI package include the so-called Sea Dragon, further information may be obtained from ` DEFENSE ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTING, ADVANCED RUSSIAN MARITIME PATROL AVIONICS SUITE IN DEVELOPMENT', Janes IDR, ed. 1998, volume/issue: 031/012. There is also the possibility of the purchase of Israeli SAR pods for the MIG-27, for details see http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper131.html.

[49] http://www.isro.org/annreport/imp_space_project.htm.

[50] http://www.saag.org/notes/note65.html

[51] http://www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1001212/national.htm - head7

[52] http://www.dailypioneer.com/archives/secon22.asp?cat=\story3&d=fpage&t1=Dec1

[53] For a detailed historical development of MI in India kindly refer to http://www.geocities.com/TheTropics/3328/idr00001.htm

[54] http://www.tribuneindia.com/99sep03/edit.htm - 4

[55] http://www.cdacindia.com/html/geomat/geoidx.htm

[56] http://mod.nic.in/aboutus/body.htm

[57] The IAF has a number of PR aircraft such as the Mig-25R and Canberra. Platforms like the BAE Jaguar and some helicopters can be equipped with vibration stabilized camera pods, these permit the IAF to perform Tac R. ELINT and COMINT capability in the IAF is in the form of specially equipped 707s and IAI Astras and other such platforms. Airborne surveillance platforms are under development at the DRDO. These assets are used in coordination with the Cabinet Secretariat through the Joint Communications and Electronics Office.

[58] http://www.cagindia.org/reports/defence/1998_book1/chapter3_p2.htm

[59] The DAI has carried out internal investigations for the IAF, it has also participated in ancillary capacity in investigative bodies like the MDMA formed after the submission of the Jain Commision Report.

[60] http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/sub/ssn/part01.htm.

[61] A reference to this may be found in the Jain Commission Report, which is available online at http://www.india-today.com/jain/vol2/chap15.html.

[62] http://a228.g.akamai.net/7/228/289/10e5e739c71797/www.indiainfo.com/watch/lanka/lankanew.html.

[63] There are also Imagery Interpretation Teams at all Corps and Command HQs, for details see http://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb00-5.html

[64] http://www.allindia.com/gov/doe/cryplaw.htm

[65] http://www.idsa-india.org/an-nov-00-1.html

[66] http://www.janes.com/security/regional_security/news/fr/fr000706_1_n.shtml

[67] http://www.indian-express.com/ie/daily/19990926/ige26005.html

[68] http://www.satp.org/idr/April-June 00/Air_Marshal_ BD_ Jayal_ (Retd).htm

[69] There were some costly SIGSEC and COMSEC failures in both the IPKF operations and during Kargil for details kindly refer to the Jain Commission Interim Report(68).

[70] The Intelligence corps is not regarded as a positive career choice in the armed forces, also there is some association of this with the tasks of Field Security for more details see references (56), (67), (68). There is a sentiment among some writers that the use of MI personnel to deal with adverse media coverage of the armed forces is a misuse of the office, the author feel such a view is somewhat limited.

[71] The negative statements by military officials regarding the functioning of civilian intelligence agencies have flooded the press, this is in part due to the recent experiences in Kargil, and also it is part of an institutional memory passed down through a perennial flow of security crises.

[72] http://www.infowar.com/mil_c4i/mil_c4i_111798b_l.shtml

[73] http://www.the-hindu.com/2000/10/21/stories/05212512.htm

[74] http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/sep/11bomb.htm

[75] `Centre plans a Unified Defence Intelligence Agency', Deccan Herald, Oct 19,2000.

[76] http://164.100.24.167/book2/reports/home_aff/54_rep.html.

[77] http://www.policeofindia.com/org/central.htm

[78] http://www.tribuneindia.com/20000923/edit.htm

[79] A most appalling example of this is in the field of criminal intelligence targeting. In British India, in a bad instance of racial profiling, certain tribes were classified as criminal tribes; they were required by law to report to the police-patil of the nearest village twice a week. If tribesmen wanted to travel to other parts, they would have to seek permission from the police-patil and he would inform police outposts along their path and at their destination. The tribes were `denotified' after independence, and the restrictions on them were removed, however today they continue to be the targets of police surveillance at the rural level and many of them are falsely implicated in cases.

[80] To gain insight into this statement, the author recommends a reading of the Jain Commission Internim Report and the effect of the events of the early 80s on center-state relations vis-à-vis Tamil Nadu. The author suggest focusing especially on the testimony of Shri K. Mohandas, then IGP(Intelligence) TN Police.

[81] http://www.timesofindia.com/110200/11mahm6.htm

[82] http://www.timesofindia.com/201100/20info1.htm.

[83] http://www.ipcs.org/projects/mil-data/mil-ind-para.htm.

[84] http://www.policeinindia.com/cops.htm - INDO-TIBETAN%20BORDER%20POLICE

[85] http://www.the-hindu.com/1999/09/07/stories/02070007.htm.

[86] http://www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1000509/national.htm

[87] http://www.timesofindia.com/300900/30indi20.htm

[88] http://www.nic.in/ceib/frameset.htm

[89] http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/crisis/chapter1.txt

[90] http://www2.epic.org/reports/crypto2000/countries.html

[91] http://www.saag.org/papers/paper50.html

[92] The Central Bureau of Investigation or the Delhi Special Police Establishment, is India's national detective agency, it has no intelligence gathering capacity, and depends heavily state police intelligence wings, and the Intelligence bureau assets for the same.

[93] http://www.saag.org/notes/note65.html

[94] http://www.timesofindia.com/270600/27edit4.htm

[95] In areas like the North East, J&K, and Punjab, they have almost paralyzed the state administration, undermined democratic institutions, law enforcement and judicial machinery and communal harmony. In cities like Bombay, Delhi, and Coimbatore collusion between local criminal elements and extremists have led to campaigns of terror.

[96] Literature circulated by the Human Rights community contains innumerable references to the CIK and its perceived role.

[97] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/lns.html

[98] http://www.the-week.com/99jul25/cover.htm.

[99] http://www.india-today.com/itoday/14091998/war.html

[100] These issues came to light in the aftermath of the IC-814 hijacking, the link to criminal elements came to light after criminals like Babloo Srivastava, and Ashwin Naik took refuge in Nepal to avoid arrest by the police. The involvement of the ISI and the Dawood-Chotta Shakeel cartel came to light with the assassination of Nepali MP. Dilshad Ahmed Beg. For details refer

a) http://www.india-today.com/itoday/20000619/neighbours.html

b) http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/00jan12/edit.htm.

[101] http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/060698/detOPI01.htm

[102] http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/130798/detFOR04.htm

[103] http://www.infocommworld.com/2000sep/features.htm

[104] http://www.southasiadimensions.com/india/i2709a.htm - 10

[105] http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/jun/30defen.htm

[106] http://www.the-hindu.com/2000/02/05/stories/01050001.htm

[107] http://mediafilter.org/caq/Caq55EconIntel.html.

[108] http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/ic2000/ic2000.htm

[109] http://www.saag.org/notes2/note103.html

[110] http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/20001127/ina27036.html

[111] India is sanctuary to an enormous diversity of theological and spiritual strains. Each of these fosters it's own brand of revisionism. The difficulties involved in this area have come to into sharp focus in case of Deendar Anjuman, quite possibly one of the last organizations one could reasonably expect to get mixed up in a campaign of violence.

[112] http://www.geocities.com/TheTropics/3328/idr00006.htm

[113 ] http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper131.html.

[114] This was actually proposed earlier but it will be mentioned in task force reports as it is most likely impossible to meet the requirements with the resources of the IB alone, and an extended approach involving local police forces might yield results, for details please refer to http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/00feb07/national.htm - 1

[115] It is likely that GoI will follow the steps of other countries. These are briefly reviewed here http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/nationalsecurity/img_1999_05_02.htm

[116] http://www.telegraphindia.com/archive/1000215/front_pa.htm.

[117] `From Nepal with hope ', Hiranamay Karlekar, The Pioneer, 28 July 2000

[118] http://www2.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/040600/detFEA02.htm

[119] A detailed discussion of Psychological Warfare, its history, and its applications to war and peace-time state policy are beyond the scope of this article. To obtain the same, kindly refer to the Psy-war Society - Home Page or to The Science of Modern Propaganda.

[120] http://www.idsa-india.org/an-mar-4.html.

[121] http://www.africa2000.com/PNDX/glossary.html

[122] http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/military/m_1999_02_27.html

[123] The author recommends a study of the protests relating to the Sardar Sarovar Project.

[124] http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/20001112/ina12031.html

[125] http://www.armyinkashmir.org/history.html

[126] For a historical overview of recent developments in the area of national security management in India please look through http://www.dailystarnews.com/199812/11/n8121113.htm.

[127] http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper123.html

[128] http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper123.html

[129] http://www.tribuneindia.com/20000311/edit.htm.

[130] http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/011000/detFRO05.asp

[131] http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/011100/detNAT06.asp

[132] http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/191000/detNAT19.asp

[133] http://www.saag.org/papers/paper84.html