This lengthy and well-researched paper by A.G. Noorani examines the circumstances surrounding the announcement of the ceasefire and its withdrawal approximately two weeks later. The paper is divided into three segments, beginning with a description of the background leading up to the ceasefire announcement and the issues pertinent to it. The second part deals with the events during the ceasefire phase, i.e. from July 24-August 8, 2000. The third part examines the future prospects for a return to peace, where the author considers what may be possible in Kashmir in light of the conflict resolution model being applied to end the strife in Northern Ireland.

The author’s analysis leads to the conclusion that the Government of India (GOI) was to blame for the collapse of the ceasefire. In the author’s view, the ceasefire was withdrawn largely because the GOI sought the "surrender" of the Hizbul Mujahedin, instead of "seizing a fine opportunity for initiating a process of peace and conciliation". He attributes this failure to "the small minds of the stewards of India’s affairs" – in other words, the current functionaries of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government led by the Bharathiya Janata Party (BJP).

Mr. Noorani’s core premise is that the "hawks" on the Indian side were successful in setting the agenda which led to the ceasefire’s withdrawal, having had their own positions strengthened by the "criminal folly" of Pakistan’s post-Lahore Declaration military gambit at Kargil. Throughout the paper, there is a strain of contempt for Indian negotiating positions and bargaining tactics implying they are somehow incorrect, impractical and immoral or a combination of the three.

Some Observations

Mr. Noorani writes persuasively, marshalling his research to effectively buttress his position. But in doing so, he often bares his own political leanings and suggests a perspective on Jammu and Kashmir that essentially involves succumbing to the logic of violence. In other words, the author is not detached in his analysis and is far from dispassionate about the issue.

However, being passionate about the subject does not necessarily make Mr. Noorani’s arguments flawed. Rather, what make them flawed are the weaknesses in his

1. Assessment of the players involved in the ceasefire process, with the GOI painted in broadbrush strokes as unpredictable and unreliable, Pakistan’s military largely ignored (one wonders whether Islamabad did give an "instant, enthusiastic endorsement of the ceasefire), US intermediaries only mentioned in passing, and Hizbul Mujahedin (HM) chief Syed Salahuddin effectively painted as the hero of the piece;
   
2. Evaluation of how the GOI should have responded, with criticism levelled at it for treating the ceasefire as a "preliminary to HM’s surrender", for being wary of Pakistan’s motives, for regarding the Islamist groups as proxies of Pakistan, and ridiculously, even for congratulating the HM for declaring the ceasefire.
   
3. Interpretation of the circumstances that prevailed during the ceasefire period, saying HM "moved to create a climate for parleys" (an odd assessment considering that it introduced a new condition on July 25, the day after the ceasefire announcement), while New Delhi "sought to create a climate which would enable it to impose its terms on all" (which was hardly the case, considering that at worst India imposed no more conditions than HM did).

There are plenty of other examples throughout the paper that expose these flaws, but I intend to leave it at that and move on to other points, which will in any case touch on these weaknesses in passing. Noorani’s analysis of why the ceasefire collapsed contains other glaring gaps. He does not take into account the following realities:

1. The split within the Pakistani military leadership. The author only quotes extensively from a Pakistani writer on this factor, and its implications, but does not offer his own perspective on what impact it could have had on the ceasefire offer by HM. He speaks of the Pakistani establishment as a monolithic entity. This is a delusion entertained by few these days, with one Pakistani writer having helpfully classified the factions in the military as being either "Islamic maximalist" or "pragmatic nationalist".

2. There is no mention of the role of Mansoor Ijaz, who claims he acted as an intermediary with the blessing of the White House, although the State Department has denied he had official sanction. The author does refer to Kashmiri-American intermediaries, but Mr. Ijaz who arguably was the most important among these is not a Kashmiri American. His recent writings in the International Herald Tribune and his interview with Rediff on the Net give credence to the view that it was the Pakistani military establishment that ultimately derailed the ceasefire effort. It is important to note that while his precise standing within the peace effort may be denied, no one has yet accused Mr. Ijaz of fabricating his account of meetings with high level officials including the prime minister of India and the chief executive of Pakistan to discuss the Kashmir issue.

3. The author only briefly mentions the massacres beginning July 30-31, and only to say that the HM was not involved in it. So what? According to Mr. Noorani’s paper, the rest of the Pak groups should have fallen in line with the ceasefire offer, given that it was sabotaged only by the Indian government. He fails to take into account the reality that compromise on the issue of tripartite talks – a condition reiterated after the massacres occurred – was made virtually impossible by the killings. Ordinarily, one would expect GOI to be credited for pressing ahead with the first round of talks on Aug. 3.

4. Mention is made of Vajpayee's statement about extra-constitutional discussions to say they were insufficient. Does he mean Vajpayee needs only to cater to opinion among the militants?

5. There is no mention of the US condemnation of the Hizb withdrawal and its apportionment of blame in that regard. Is the US doing India a favour, and if so to what purpose?

Jasjit Singh. Dynamics of Limited War, Strategic Analysis,24 (7) 2000: pp 1205-1220.

The end of the Cold War has resulted in a relatively unstable world, with fairly large sized protagonists and increasingly solidified nationalist ideologies. Jasjit Singh makes a case for the concept of limited war between belligerents in this new geopolitical context. Territorial wars are things of the past as the advent of nuclear weapons has limited their scope, yet states possessing these weapons remain vulnerable to conventional attacks via potent precision weapons. Global war no longer being an option, ‘limited’ war presents the only viable proposition for states seeking to employ coercive military means to fulfil national aims. The author goes on to examine in some detail the various factors limiting war with reference to political goals and military imperatives. His logical breakdown of the parameters governing such action constitutes a long overdue analytical look at this subject.

This paper could almost have been a compact introduction to the general concept of limited war were it not for the fact that the parameters that govern it are not independent; the behavior of a state is a complex function of its interdependent socio-cultural, economic and strategic variables. Perhaps a deeper study of these issues specific to the Indo-Pak context would enable one to better appreciate the potential of limited war as a tool of statecraft from an Indian perspective. The author makes some observations about India’s reactive philosophy and the lack of an articulate strategic doctrine. One hopes that ongoing exercises in this direction will rectify any lacunae. The article goes on to examine deterrence and its dimensions. More specifically, the author proposes the use of combat air power as an effective tool for deterrence through denial and punishment, arguing that "a calibrated air strike would extract only an air power response". Yet in a recent article on hot pursuit & limited war, Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmed Khan wrote: "…air strikes will be naked aggression, and Pakistan must respond to it fittingly." The problem for Indian policymakers, of course, is to gauge what ‘fittingly’ constitutes.

George Fernandes is quoted in Asiaweek as saying "The idea that limited war can escalate into something more serious is not on our mind". Jasjit Singh’s article demonstrates the need for closer study if limited war is to rise from being a buzzword in political statements to becoming an effective military tool for the fulfillment of national aims and objectives.

A. Sarvatra

A.K. Sachdev. India's Surface to Surface Missiles: The Doctrinal and Strategic Framework , Strategic Analysis, 24 (2) 2000: pp 265-281.

This article is an attempt to evaluate the role of surface-to-surface missiles like the Prithvi in Indian military doctrine. The author makes two important points: One, that India's missile program was developed more or less independently of any military input and, two, that economic constraints will significantly limit India's ability to put in place an ambitious nuclear "triad". This suggests that India needs to be both more realistic and more aggressive in demarcating what role SSMs will play in Indian doctrine, says that author. Although the author is possibly mistaken in equating the excessive secrecy that surrounds Indian nuclear decision-making with a failure to develop command-and-control structures for India's nuclear forces, especially since ambiguity is an important aspect of Indian strategy, he is correct to note that the armed forces have until recently been excluded from much of Indian nuclear development. This lack of interest has been reciprocated, he writes, partly because of the limited conventional applications of the Prithvi and Agni systems due to accuracy and cost issues. This analysis, the reviewer feels, might be outdated given that the 333 Missile Group has now been operational for five years and has had ample time to develop a doctrine and target acquisition capabilities. Less is known about the Agni system and its deployment of course, pending the institution of a strategic command.

The second point is probably more pertinent, that building a real triad is probably beyond India's financial and technical capabilities in the near future. The author notes that the cost of nuclear warheads comprised only 7.4% of the US nuclear weapons program, with the rest going to delivery vehicles and support infrastructure. The cost of the French nuclear triad peaked at a quarter of the defense budget, which implies that the Indian defense budget would need to rise from 3 to 4% of GDP to cover the true cost of a nuclear triad. Even with vigorous economic growth, the author says that such a dramatic increase is impossible. The Indian nuclear deterrent will have to rely consequently on air-deliverable weapons for some time to come. The author suggests that India aggressively develop the missile option as the next step towards a triad. The article's main contribution is to highlight how far India is from developing a true triad, and to suggest that the SSM route is the quickest one to building a strong deterrent. On the flip side, this is not a particularly original argument. The presentation isn't very clear either since the article continually discusses issues whose relevance isn't immediately obvious.

A. Dubey

The article evaluates eight years of President Clinton's foreign policy and accounts for its most common criticisms and praises. It is particularly well timed since we are now in the twilight of the Clinton administration which has coincided with numerous historical events, such as the post cold war relations between the U.S and Former Soviet Union, internet, unprecedented economic growth, globalization, and an increase in the number of countries moving towards free market democracy. It mentions two nearly unknown but critical points. First, it mentions that President Clinton did have a foreign policy, contrary to what many opponants have said and that it ailed from lack of attention and not a lack of vision. Second, it states that the President Clinton's policy was not very different from the one proposed by his predecessor George Bush.

The article is well organized and points out the major concerns during the eight years and explores each individually and in depth. President Clinton is credited with accelerating trends towards globalization, economic intergration and increasing the role of the economy in the U.S foreign policy. It is stated that he did so in hopes of being able to manage some of the volatility of these trends by supporting the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO), completing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to name a few. President Clinton is generally blamed for 'losing Russia," according to the article this is an unfair exaggeration. The Clinton administration is however faulted with being overzealous about Russia's overnight transition into a free market and naive about its reform and rapid privatization. Another main charge against President Clinton is that he weakened U.S defenses, this is considered to be false since there has been a decline of only $100 billion in the defense budget from the cold war defense spending of $400 billion. The article states that while his opponents may refer to him as an appeaser or Neville Chamberlin with regards to China, he did send in aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Straits when China threatened Taiwan. The article is at times critical of Clinton's policy stating that short term tactics were used to achieve immediate goals at the expense of long term objectives. Also that there were elements of convenience and that public opinion was a major factor in swaying national security decisions. According to the former National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake political advisors played a greater role in the Clinton administration and often complicated decision making. The article, in summary, states that it is too early to tell the effect of the Clinton foreign policy on the U.S and the world, mentioning that it will be a few years before we can judge the foreign policy legacy of the Clinton administration.

While overall, the article attempts to provide a fairly balanced view and comprehensive view of foreign policy under President Clinton. There are multiple shortcomings in this article. While in rebuffing the charge of weakening the military by mentioning that there was a spending decline of only $100 billion from the Cold War era, the article does not take into account the increase in deployment of U.S forces around the world. It does not mention President Clinton's numerous attempts to make peace and its failure in the Middle East, similarly it ignores the lack of success in denuclearlizing South Asia and the President's hope to play a mediator's role in Kashmir. On a broader note it does not mention the administration's multiple attempts but lack of concrete success at trying to stop proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq under the U.N auspices and illegal transfer by North Korea, China and Russia to states such as Pakistan and Iran. In actuality, the administration has been lenient on China for its proliferation to Pakistan by refusing to enforce sanctions or even acknowledging that the transfers took place despite ample evidence to the contrary. By turning a blind eye to such developments the Clinton administration has not only undercut its own goals of nonproliferation but also contributed to the instability of the Indian Subcontinent and is not seen as an honest broker in matters of proliferation. A glaring omit ion in the article concerns the National Missile Defense (NMD), the article fails to mention the Clinton administration's indecision over the matter and the failure to reach an agreement with the Russians on the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM treaty). In conclusion, one gets the impression that President Clinton while being successful in the economic aspects of foreign policy has not been as successful in the more traditional aspects of foreign policy.

This represents a remarkable departure from the conventional thinking amongst foreign and strategic analysts. The author makes an authoritative case for a complete departure from the current US policy towards India, which he terms as "fundamentally flawed." He forcefully argues that Washington's policy is based on a "fundamentally wrong assessment of India's place in the World and of what India can contribute to stabilizing Asia's security environment." He goes on to argue that to assign India a merely regional role and aiming to curtail its nuclear capability is wrong. He also comes down on the view that India is a South Asian power at best and a third world country which is not of paramount importance to the US in the long term. He argues that current policy is short-term oriented and does not engage India in the long-term. The potential fallout for the US for this approach is instead of having India as a potential strategic partner it can undermine US interest by treating India as a potential adversary.

The result of this would be a Russia-China-India axis that would undermine US interests in the long term. While the author does make a strong case based on the three countries' (Russia, China and India) uneasiness with NATO expansion, Kosovo crisis etc., his rationale for Sino-India rapproachment is not well supported. He calls for a radical change in US approach in its relationship with India. He identifies the need for "political wisdom, courage and vision." Wisdom is needed in understanding the unique non-Western culture of India, courage is needed to abandon stereotypes and shibboleths like non-proliferation and vision is needed to look beyond immediate and near-term concerns and consider long-term gains.

He calls for choosing India as a partner for the future, highlights that in the long-term India could become more important to the US as a partner than its current trans-atlantic partners. He warns that "India can be either an influential proponent or formidable opponent of US led globalization efforts" He also argues that India is the only candidate that can work with the US and effectively balance China. Taiwan is not militarily relevant, Russia is still too weak even if US managed to repair its relations with it and Japan relies far too much on the US which would risk US to a direct role in a potential conflict with China. Working with India, could thus provide the US the best option in Asia.

Turning to India's global aspirations, he accurately captures the essence of India's aspirations and the broad bipartisan backing that exists amongst the leadership and the population for these aspirations. He notes that the differing approaches in achieving those aspirations and the emergence of a more assertive foreign policy in New Delhi with BJP led NDA in power. He highlights six national goals and argues that though ambitious, these have a national backing and are achievable by India. The author displays a rare grasp of the Indian psyche here.

Discussing, India's nuclear doctrine at length, he argues that India will never give up its nuclear weapons. He also argues against the popular theory held by many strategists that India's nuclear programme is a result of a quest of purely national pride. He points out that India's nuclear strategy is not guided merely by Pakistani or Chinese nuclear threats but is based on and includes US nuclear capability in its calculations. He states emphatically "Thus, at its core, India's determination to keep its nuclear weapons until universal nuclear disarmament has little to do with Pakistan, much to do with China and everything to do with America." He dwells at length on India's uneasiness with America's penchant for interfering on the grounds of nebulous universal values. Implications of America's role in Kashmir are dealt in the article from an Indian perspective for a change.

Calling for a change in American policy which he terms as "too modest in its ambitions, too narrowly focussed in its scope and too limited in its goals", he argues for radical changes. As a first step he calls for admitting India into the nuclear club by making a distinction based on India's role, its democratic nature and makes a valid case for it. In any case the US has been making far more specious cases in accommodating powers, which are far more likely to pose challenges to the US. As a second step he calls for the US to endorse and support India's candidature for the UN Security Council. He calls for including India as a partner in the political side of G7, like Russia, arguing that in any case India is likely to emerge as a bigger economy than Britain, Canada and Italy in size of GDP by 2006. He also calls for lifting of all sanctions, greater technological cooperation, higher involvement of Indians in US Hi tech and knowledge based economy and resumption of military ties to promote regional and global security.

V. Anand. Integrated and joint approach to military intelligence, Strategic Analysis,24 (7) 2000: pp 1397-1410.

This article is yet another in a long list that have appeared after    Kargil. In this write-up Vinod Anand, a senior fellow at IDSA, makes a strong case for the creation of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) inside the Ministry of Defense (MOD). He motivates his case first by examining the existing intelligence infrastructure, and then by outlining the perceived integration problems and failures of the same. The author emphasizes the need to develop the DIA as an alternative intelligence channel to the RAW (to enhance corroboration), and as a more focused approach to the management of intelligence assets and capabilities presently in the MOD. He also presents a rough sketch of the likely aims and objectives of the DIA, principal among which is the task of tailoring intelligence assessments to the needs of the armed forces. He also points to alternate channels intelligence collection (such as the Defense Attaché system) that the DIA can develop and fully exploit to enhance the overall `intelligence picture'.

In being somewhat gray about where exactly the new DIA would fit into the existing security-intelligence bureaucracy, the author neatly sidesteps the more contentious debates about the overall command and control of intelligence agencies. He also seems somewhat unsure about the exact relationship between the DIA and the Joint Services Technical Intelligence agency (also on the anvil at the Group of Ministers), and leaves this aspect of the issue underdeveloped in his presentation. The author also does not present a very clear discussion of the manner in which intelligence is handled in the armed forces and what if anything can the DIA do to enhance it. However barring these technical and (in most cases) strongly debatable points, the author presents a preliminary and yet reasonably detailed idea of what an Indian DIA can be expected to look like, and this in itself is a substantial contribution to growing pool of debate on the issue Intelligence Reform