Genesis

Assam, long considered a part of Indic civilization, remained relatively isolated however, from developments in the rest of the Indian subcontinent, in the medieval, and early modern period. This continued until Burmese incursions in the early 19^th century, forced the British to intervene and annex Assam in 1826, incorporating it into British India. The discovery that tea could be easily cultivated in Assam caused an expansion of British imperial activity and entry of large numbers of laborers from the rest of India, to Assam. Further expansion of commercial activity and linkages with the entry of a large commercial Marwari merchant class into Assam, brought the province closer into a British Indian orbit, and ultimately, firmly into the federal, independent, Indian state.

The entrance of new elites and the end of dominance by Assamese elites was a cause of grievance for the Assamese. There were brief attempts to reassert Assamese dominance, in the sphere of education, for example, under one of the early CM’s, Bishnuram Medhi. However, these were not only met by opposition by the new entrants into Assam, the Hindi speaking Marwaris and the Bengalis, but by other indigenous peoples who had their own linguistic and cultural traditions and would not have welcomed being forced to learn Assamese, in their schools. The splitting of Assam into eventually 6 other states and a rump Assam, was seen in some quarters as a deliberate further attack and a weakening of Assamese dominance in the region. However, the more likely cause was the simple fact that governing such a heterogenous entity efficiently was not possible, and hence the division of the Assam into smaller, more homogenous, more governable states.

Assamese fears and grievances, fueled by the perceived sidelining of the Assamese in Assam, were further aggravated by the perception that the natural resources of the state were being exploited by the Center, and that little benefit accrued to Assam. A myth of Assam’s vital importance to India grew in the 1970’s, a period in which, before the development of Bombay High, some 70% of India’s then marginal crude production came from Assam, saving India much foreign exchange. Additionally, large quantities of tea for export, was produced in Assam and earned India valuable foreign exchange. The Assamese grievance, that little in the way of royalties from crude production, or from tea, went to Assam, could have been amicably solved. But in some Assamese eyes, this was just one in the long list of a litany of grievances against the Indian Union, that begins with the perceived marginalization of the Assamese, and that talking to ‘Delhi’ would have served little purpose. The fundamental grievance and cause for Assamese disenchantment with the Indian Union, has been and remains the perceived current and future sidelining and removal of indigenes from positions of power and dominance. Conflict between indigenes and settlers is a familiar one, the world over, of course. In Assam, the relatively small Marwari community and the sizable Bengali community - who are closely related to the Assamese in culture and language – became targets of Assamese ire. From 1970, onwards, waves of mainly Moslem migrants from Bangladesh became another cause for Assamese (and Indian) fears.

In any case, a valid criticism can be made of the Central government in that there was insufficient assimilation of the Assamese into the Indian nation, and insufficient weakening of Assamese nationalism, as a result, with unfortunate consequences. It is also the case that the Assamese feeling of exceptionalism contributed to the slow assimilation and subsuming of Assamese national identity into a feeling of pan-Indian nationalism. The Center, especially toward the late 70’s and 80’s, mired in the Emergency and the political upheavals in Delhi, and fighting the fires of insurgency in the Punjab and later in Kashmir, reacted slowly, and hesitantly, if at all, to the threat of Assamese separatism. In this climate of insecurity and chaos, the largest of the insurgent movements in Assam, the United Liberation Front of Assam, or the ULFA, was born. In 1979, at the city of Rang Ghar, the seat of power of the former rulers of Assam, the Ahoms, ULFA declared its desire for independence and secession of Assam, from the Indian Union.

Evolution of ULFA: Growth, Leaders and Methods & Government of India’s response

An insurgent movement is said to go through three major stages. There is an initial legal-political phase, in which a political organization attempts to gain power or achieve its political objectives legally. The second stage involves the evolution of the insurgent organization into a fully fledged insurgent outfit. The third stage sees the insurgent outfit in direct military conflict with the counter-insurgents. In the case of ULFA, the organization took a different path than its once allied organizations, AASU and the AGP, preferring to escalate to the second level, that of an Insurgency. From 1979 till early in 1990, ULFA developed its strength in upper Assam and engaged in selective acts of extortion and terrorism. By the late 80’s, ULFA could have boasted of running its own parallel government in upper Assam. At its height, the organization boasted of some 1,250 active members, with numbers of sympathizers and political and tacit support in varying degrees from members of the ruling AGP, and a number of armed camps in upper Assam, on Indian soil. The evolution of ULFA into an organization capable of running a parallel government met with little opposition from the Indian Army, curiously. At least this was so, initially. Perhaps the Center was too busy fighting fires in the Punjab and in Kashmir and was waiting for an opportune time.

In any case, an organization which held hopes(out of hubris and misplaced confidence – Che would not have approved) of entering into the third logical step in an insurgent movement, conventional warfare with the counter-insurgents, was in for a rude shock at the hands of the Indian Army. In a well orchestrated campaign called Operation Bajrang, launched in November 1990, the Indian Army destroyed several ULFA camps and crippled the organization. In a follow-up to Bajrang, in Operation Rhino, in September 1991, hundreds of ULFA cadres were apprehended and escape routs cut off. ULFA was practically back to the legal-political stage. The four leading members of ULFA, however, remained at large. Despite the urging of the three other senior leaders in ULFA, the ‘Commander-in-Chief’ of ULFA, Paresh Barua (photo, left) – who hails from Dibrugarh, and who’s only other claim to fame is that he represented Assam at the junior level in soccer, and was a one time aspirant for a national cap - vetoed suggestions that ULFA enter talks with the Center. ULFA is run by a group of four. Abrabinda Rajkhowa, is the Chairman, Pradip Gogoi, the Vice-Chairman. The General Secretary is Anup Chetia. And of course the more famous commander-in-chief, Paresh Barua. Paresh Barua is the more visible face of ULFA and one must assume he holds sway among the four by dint of his persuasive character, and his going his own way when it came to the issue of talks with the Center, after ULFA’s humiliation in Bajrang and Rhino. Currently at large in Bangladesh, Paresh Barua was responsible for bringing ULFA back from oblivion. No Fidel Castro, he, nor even a Mao, he is still a man of determination and action and it is unlikely he will agree to talks with the Center under the auspices of the Indian constitution. It is therefore likely that ULFA will continue on as an irritant as long as Mr. Barua remains at large.

Curiously, ULFA as an organization did not overtly push forward an aggressive brand of Assamese chauvinism, as AASU and the AGP were often accused of doing so in the 70’s and 80’s. ULFA sought to establish a federal, independent state that could also be home to non-Assamese. In a bid to win propaganda points ULFA, however, immediately weakened support among its key potential support base, the Assamese. The idea of a federal, independent Assam was a non-starter, given the military preponderance of the Indian Army, the ambivalence of the Assamese towards the idea of independence, and because non-Assamese indigenes were just as distrustful of the Assamese as the Assamese were of non-indigenes. Besides, a hypothetical federal independent Assam would by definition have included non-indigenes, hardly a solution for the Assamese grievance against the ‘newcomers’. ULFA also misjudged both the degree and the direction of support for its cause. There was disaffection with the economic climate in the state, but similar disenchantment existed in southern Bihar – now Jharkhand - also, for example. The Assamese were sympathetic to ULFA because it was perceived to be a pro-Assamese organization(which it wasn’t really, since it had done a 180 and sought a federal Assam), with Assamese members, than out of any great sympathy for the cause of independence.

The majority of the Assamese, at the height of the ULFA insurgency, could have been termed disenchanted with the Center, at the worst. Only a small minority supported the aims of ULFA, either out of sympathy, coercion or because of family ties. In fact the number of Assamese serving with the Indian Army, or with the Central government, and of course with the government of the state of Assam dwarfed ULFA membership. A large number of those sympathetic with the goals of ULFA, or otherwise disenchanted with the economic climate and the question of non-indigenes, were also quite pragmatic and settled for capturing power through elections, in the 80’s or they later agreed to surrender in the 90’s and received political patronage. The surrendered outfits, were collectively termed SULFA- Surrendered ULFA – and were used by both the Congress government of Hiteshwar Saikia, and the later AGP government of Prafulla Mahanta, elected in 1996. These outfits were often used to intimidate rivals, settle political scores, and were given a free hand to practice petty extortion in the cities of Assam, in return for their not returning to the path of insurgency. SULFA has also been accused by ULFA of attacking the relatives of ULFA members, at the behest of the state government.

After their humiliation at the hands of the Indian Army, from running camps on Indian soil, ULFA changed tactics and sought to align itself with rebel groups in Burma and with the dreaded NSCN, for example. ULFA cadres are now based and trained in small, likely mobile, camps in Bhutan and perhaps Bangladesh. The Burmese Army evicted ULFA from its training camps in Burma. A good guess would be that ULFA numbers have dropped to a few hundred armed insurgents, and collaborators within Assam itself, and are currently low in the morale department. ULFA has probably developed linkages with the ISI, evidenced by its actions during the Kargil crisis in 1999, and its public support for Kashmiri independence. ULFA has clearly, however, been pushed back to becoming a second-stage insurgent movement, only capable of selected acts of terror and ambush, against selected targets, and against the counter-insurgents, respectively.

To the dismay of ULFA no doubt, the rise of the BJP in the state in the late 1990’s raised the specter of the dilution of pan-Assamese sentiment and its replacement with pan-Hindu and Indian nationalist sentiment. ULFA struck out in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, assassinating Pannalal Oswal, the BJP candidate for Dhubri, a non-Assamese, at least in name, on September 24^th, 1999. Despite this, the BJP won, or came a close second in as many as 5 Lok Sabha constituencies. ULFA has attempted to drive a further wedge between Assamese and non-Assamese Hindus in Assam with the brutal killings of mainly Hindi speaking citizens of the state in late 2000. ULFA may believe that this will tie up the Indian Army in its cantonments and in policing the cities, leaving small armed bands of ULFA cadres free to roam the countryside, as was the case in the late 80’s.

In any case, time is running out for ULFA. There is no large irredentist neighboring state who’s citizens, and the occasional organ of state, are willing to contribute ‘moral and diplomatic support’ to the cause of independence. There is growing dissillusionment among the ULFA cadre who find the prospect of laying down their arms and returning to their families and perhaps peaceful employment, more and more attractive. India has moved forward in the last 22 years and has settled insurgencies in the Punjab and is moving, slowly, towards a negotiated settlement with groups in Kashmir, or at least towards a tacit understanding. Assam and the Assamese have themselves changed. If ULFA wishes to seek educated cadres it should spare a glance for the new Assamese Diaspora who have spread out across the rest of India, instead of taking up arms or rallying to the banner of AASU, ULFA’s traditional fertile recruiting ground. In so looking, and in observing the ease with which the Diaspora have assimilated, they may learn the mantra, that Assam is an integral part of India.

Solutions

Many angry young men turned to the gun in the 1980’s, for two primary reasons. There was a dearth of economic opportunities due to the lack of the rule of law, and the flight of capital out of Assam. And because when this angry young man actually did put his hand forward to pick up the gun, the law was not there to act as a deterrent, and to stop him. Any solution to the Assam imbroglio has to begin with the reintroduction of the rule of law and effective civilian administration which are so fundamentally important, above all else, to keeping a populace contented, since the two mentioned fundamentals allow for productive social and economic activity. For years, Assam was run as a petty fiefdom of the Saikia family, and was later mismanaged by the AGP. It is a point of shame for Indian democracy that things could come to such a head. Beyond the endemic poverty of Assam, with PCI levels at 72% of the rest of India, the civilian administration, at the behest of politicians, did not for the most part – or could not - even pay lip-service to the needs of the civilian population. The Central government, perhaps content to have what it perceived to be pliable governments in Assam, turned a blind eye to the perhaps most rapacious bleeding of state funds and funds allocated by the Center ever seen in independent India. It was the consensus in Assam in the early 1990’s that Hiteshwar Saikia, personally, diverted about a crore rupees a day. Most CEO’s would be jealous to have that sort of cash flow. Few Assamese are ready to guess at how much the AGP has been ‘diverting’, perhaps because they have become used to it. At the same time, thousands of state employees had to sometimes go for months without wages.

The state is a vital corridor and link to the rest of the North East, and beyond, to Southeast Asia, for India. The Indian citizens of the state of Assam have had enough of apathy from the Center and bad governance by the state government. ULFA is no longer the menace it once was. ULFA will itself, in likelihood, die a slow death, but there are several other armed militias at large in Assam, other than ULFA. SULFA is beginning to resemble a Bihari private army and the Bodo groups are beginning to put the Naxalites to shame. The members of these groups should be rooted out, tried and sentenced, in accordance with the principles of law. An example and precedent should be made to reestablish the authority of the government administration and the judiciary. Additionally, pro-independence sentiment, if it ever was strong, is practically non-existent now, and the Center can be sure that it does not need to now keep a pliable state government in Assam. The avowedly nationalistic BJP, should, either in coalition with the AGP, or with a faction of that party, or even by imposing President’s Rule, clean up Assam. ULFA too can be brought into the political process, by for example offering amnesty to its members below the Group of 4, and by enforcing an end to the tit-for-tat killings between ULFA and SULFA. The irritant of ULFA may be removed in this manner. If Assam can be made as safe as the Punjab, and a conducive atmosphere for investment created in Assam, there is hardly any question that the citizens will have a renewed respect for the Government of India, that will only deepen with an improved economic climate. The reestablishment of the rule of law, is of course also a priority in the Naxalite belt in portions of Eastern, Central and Southern India, apart from Assam. Reestablishment of effective civilian government and peace will be seen as a victory for the government and as an indicator of the power of the state, thereby increasing its prestige. The State can also create employment in disturbed areas though the creation of mass-employment schemes in rural areas. A Centrally funded rural wetlands reclamation scheme(and the handing over of the then reclaimed land to landless peasants) and building of a viable flood control system to reduce flooding of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries, for example, would be much appreciated by people of Assam, and would do much to increase goodwill for the Center.

The steps hinted at, require proactive and responsive and effective government action at the highest levels in the planning, and then similarly effective implementation at the local levels. Given the track record of the Indian state, one finds it doubtful that just simply a BJP led government at the Center will perform any differently, or better than a Congress led government. There is just so much inertia in government, a change at the top of the pyramid does little. The BJP does, however, make more of the right noises, and hopefully, some of this will translate and trickle down to action on the ground, in Assam. However, realistically, in all likelihood, the status quo will be allowed to drag on, with ULFA becoming a non player within a decade, and the occasional insurgent movement again rising up, to be in turn doused and quashed by the Indian Army, when necessary. The greater availability of resources because of the all round development of the Indian economy, however, will cause something of a trickle down effect and an improvement of economic life in Assam, if only through the greater allocation of funds to the state government from the Center. However, much hardship could be avoided for the people of Assam if for once in the history of independent India, the government at the Center and the state could act in the benefit of the Indian citizens of the state of Assam. It remains to be seen whether the Assembly elections in Assam will produce a much changed government and cabinet. And whether this new government(or for that matter the same government, reelected and with a new mandate) can, in conjunction with the BJP led NDA government at the Center, make vital changes and take the necessary steps. In any event, one hopes and prays that the people of Assam find peace and prosperity, and so doing, strengthen India, in this, New Year, and millenium.