Lieutenant General Sundararajan Padmanabhan has been appointed as the next
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of the Indian Army. He assumes office on
01 October 2000. We will
examine his biography, and attempt to predict what we may expect from his tenure as
COAS.
Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan was born on 05 December 1940 in Trivandrum, Kerala. He is an alumnus
of Rashtriya Indian Military College (RIMC), Dehra Dun, and National Defense
Academy (NDA), Khadakwasla.
He was commissioned into the Indian Army in the Regiment of Artillery after graduating
from the Indian Military Academy (IMA), on 13 December 1959. His early career included
two stints at the IMA, and one as a gunnery instructor at the School of Artillery in Deolali.
He also served as Major in the General Staff (GS) of a newly raised infantry brigade, and
as a Colonel (GS) of a mountain division. His first command was the Gazala Artillery
Regiment. He was promoted to Brigadier in 1985 and had the distinction of commanding one
artillery and two infantry brigades in vastly different terrain. He was promoted to Major
General in 1991 and was given command of a frontline infantry division in the western
sector. He then served as Chief of Staff of a Corps in the Eastern Sector. In 1993, he was
promoted to Lieutenant General. A rapid promotion in less than three years indicates how
highly the Army regarded him.
His charge was the highly sensitive 15 Corps in the
Kashmir valley. The
newly promoted Corps Commander was to have a baptism by fire in his first months of
command, when terrorists created an international furor by occupying the revered
Hazrat-Bal mosque in Srinagar. It is a testament to his negotiating skills, and to his
deft handling of the siege of the mosque, that the terrorists surrendered without firing a
shot, and without getting any concessions from the Indian government. This period also
marked the turning point in the counter-insurgency war, with the Indian security forces
under a unified command led by Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan slowly gaining the upper hand over the
terrorists. Along with his able Brigadier (GS) Arjun Ray, he also initiated a more open
& sophisticated media management approach, which gradually won over the hostile local
media and earned plaudits from the national media. Again, he was rapidly promoted to the
next level, and appointed as Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) at the Army
Headquarters in 1994. As DGMI, and later, as the Commander of the Udhampur-based Northern
Command, he broke the back of local militancy in Kashmir by persuading local militants to
come over ground and join the pro-India Ikhwan organization. The retirement age for
Lieutenant
Generals was raised to 60 in 1998, and to prevent stagnation among serving army
commanders, there was a shuffle of commands under which Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan got command
of the Pune-based Southern Command. This one time occurrence makes him one of the very few
Indian generals who have commanded two different commands. The added experience should be
of great use, as he takes over the reins of the Indian Army from
the retiring General Ved
Prakash Malik.
Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan's high profile postings in the 90s make possible some
predictions about his style of managing the routine work of a
COAS, and the substance of
the changes he is likely to bring about. The bitter experience of the capable, but abrasive,
Admiral Bhagwat shows that both style and substance are equally important in the realm of
higher defense management. Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan's record of accomplishment in Kashmir attests
that he brings to the office formidable negotiation skills to help him champion the cause
of the army. Unlike the army generals up to the 1980s who led careers secluded from the
rough and tumble of Indian governance, he and Gen. Malik have earned their spurs in an
environment which calls for close cooperation with politicians, bureaucrats, intelligence
agencies, paramilitary forces, police, and the mass media. The school of hard knocks has
taught such men to be equally adept at managing king-size egos, playing hard-ball with
recalcitrant parties, and inspiring subordinates. As Gen. Malik has shown already, such a
set of skills is invaluable in keeping the wheels of Ministry of Defense running smoothly
and without the angst & high drama that have marked some other tenures in South Block.
All officers are products of their times and their professional
experience. General Sundarji, for example, developed his vision in the broad expanses of
the desert, and in leading the elite armored division (1 Armoured Division) and strike
corps of the army. Leaders like him have the luxury of dreaming grand dreams of armored
thrusts through the desert; dreams that turned to horrors when confronted with the messy
limited conflicts such as Blue Star and IPKF. Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan, on the other hand, has
thrived in the convoluted battleground of Kashmir. Dirty
counter-insurgency battles produce
pragmatic and politically perceptive generals who are comfortable with the constraints of
limited wars and peace keeping. Modern limited wars place much greater demands on
training, equipment, and motivation of small units, as opposed to mass maneuver and heavy
mechanization required by total wars. This means that Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan will pay close
attention to preparing the Indian soldier for the kinds of conflicts he is likely to
encounter.
Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan epitomizes the growing divergence between the
post-independence crop of generals and the current bunch. The British were inclined
towards a deliberate, attritive mode of warfare, and their Indian pupils diligently copied
them in '47, '65, and '71 (western front). Even a visionary like Gen. Sundarji went in for
the brute force, frontal approach in Operation Blue Star. To the Indian Army's credit,
another breed of maneuver minded leaders slowly began to emerge - witness Lt. Gen. Arora
and Lt. Gen. Jacob in '71, Lt. Gen. A. S. Kalkat with his multiple pincers in Operation Pawan, and
Maj. Gen. Mohinder Puri with his superb concentration of forces in Kargil.
Lt. Gen.
Padmanabhan belongs squarely in the latter camp - for example, it would be hard to imagine
him recommending the use of brute force in breaking a siege in a religious place!
We now move on to the likely substance of the initiatives he will
undertake during his tenure. These initiatives will be dictated by the
politico-economic-strategic situation prevailing in the country.
Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan assumes
office at a time when the political scene is stable, and the government is supportive of
initiatives for restructuring defense management and military modernization. An improving
economy and a growing realization of the necessity of conventional deterrent permit
generous financial allocations for all three services. The lessons from Kargil, the
continuing low intensity conflict in J&K, and the North East, and from other wars such
as Desert Storm and Kosovo, have opened the Indian establishment's eyes to the
potential of Information Warfare. There is a growing realization that India should not be
left behind in this increasingly prevalent form of warfare. The army, under Gen. Malik,
has already launched a computerization and computer literacy drive. Other means, such as
reconnaissance drones and satellites, and modern Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment are
likely to be inducted in the coming years. A new, dedicated defense intelligence agency
may be raised in the near future, and the role of the newly formed National Security
Council will evolve as experience builds in its working. These general trends will all
direct and shape the initiatives that Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan will take, and in turn, he will
have an opportunity to leave his mark on them. Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan is familiar with the
increasingly sophisticated covert war in Jammu & Kashmir. The situation has placed a
high premium on modern Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and EW equipment, on proactive
media management, on manpower management in security forces, and on intelligence
operations. By experience and inclination, he is comfortable with the new modes of
thinking that modern low intensity conflicts require. Given this composite picture of the
man and times he works in, his tenure is likely to usher in a revolution in the way the
Indian Army fights Information Wars (IWs), in much the same way as Gen. Sundarji revolutionized
Mechanized Warfare.
There is an upbeat mood among the defense management community at the
prospect of things to come. Lt. Gen. Padmanabhan will assume office at a time ripe with
possibilities. He has the aptitude and the experience to seize the opportunities, and we
wish him the best at his finest hour.
