A new dimension has been added to the NER insurgency lately. As expected, insurgent groups are coordinating among themselves more as they come under more security crack-down. Few years ago, IBRF (Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front) was formed comprising a few extremist outfits. However, it became ineffective when NSCN (K) - a key member of IBRF, broke ranks and started dialogues with GOI. Also, a few separatist organizations are acting as surrogate mothers for the new and/or small insurgent groups in the region to keep security forces tied down while they reorganize their cadre and command structure. NSCN (I-M) is known to have helped floating outfits of Garos, Dimashas (in North Cachar) and Hmars. Similarly, ULFA is known to be helping KLO (Kamtapur Liberation Organisation) in North Bengal where Kamtapuris (Rajvanshi tribe) are demanding a separate state in Kamtapur. [5,6] In this NE quagmire Pakistani ISI is not only helping major extremist organizations with money and materials but has also cultivated migrant Muslims and set-up half a dozen extremist outfits on religious lines. [7,8,9] ISI is also acting as a coordinating agent among various NE terrorist outfits. The coordination among the extremists is the operating principle now. Over the years, Indian security forces have learned the NE topography, strategies of the extremists, pattern of attacks etc., and as the pressure mounts the extremist outfits often form overt or covert 'alliance' or 'front' to optimize their strength even though many of them were formed for cross purposes.

Anthropologically, culturally and linguistically NER is quite different from the rest of India. The region is any researcher's paradise; inhabited by various tribes for centuries in near isolation. The area has approximately 125 major indigenous tribes, and out of approximately 1625 dialects spoken in present day India nearly 400 can be traced in the NER. As the rest of the Indian history witnessed many foreign invasions mostly through the west and north-west and subsequent upheavals, the NER protected by its geographic inaccessibility from the rest of India maintained its quiet isolation interacting mostly with present day Myanmar. For example the royal chronicle of Manipur maintains an uninterrupted historical record of the land and its people since 33 AD. By eleventh century AD Manipur had a written constitution in the form of a royal decree and it was in force till the British conquest in 1891. Similarly, the Ahom kings of Assam ruled for about 600 years and the mighty Brahmaputra helped them defend against the powerful Mughals who tried unsuccessfully 17 times to conquer Assam. Ahoms were eventually defeated by the Burmese who in turn accepted British domination in 1826. Much later Khasi-Garo-Jaintia Hills were curved out of Assam to form Meghalaya in 1972. Similarly Lushai Hills were taken out to form Mizoram. Only Tripura remained as an independent kingdom during the British rule albeit as a protectorate. [10,11]

More than fifty years after Indian independence we are still miles away from the fundamental issue involving the NER, i.e., bringing it to the 'mainstream' thus helping the 'national integration'. In this article some touchy issues will be discussed which are probably hindering the so called process of bringing the NER into national mainstream. National integration should be a two way traffic. As we expect the rebellious NER coming to national mainstream, let us ask ourselves whether or not we had been hundred percent sincere about it in the past. Until recently our gesture of extending hand to the NER had been limited to mainly sending security forces to the region. In post 1947 era, as the tribals started becoming aware of their surroundings, they tried to assert their identity, and were to some extent misunderstood by New Delhi. The British had kept the people of NER isolated from the rest of the country to keep the 'bad political influence' (read 'Quit India Movement' in particular or the 'Independence Movement' in general) at bay. Nehru, though never too enthusiastic about the NER, had two options - one, he could have followed the oppressive Chinese footsteps in bringing Tibet to submission; two, take a more liberal view and let the local people feel that they had perfect freedom to live and practice their own culture within India. India, under Nehru embarked on the second path, but half-heartedly. Note that had the NER were not been included in India by the British or India immediately after 1947 (as done for Manipur and Tripura annexation in 1949) the region would have gone under China and or Burma with track records of suppressing ethnic aspirations ruthlessly. India's half-hearted approach now bears fruits in the form of ethnic strife. Where did we go wrong?

To find the possible answers for `what went wrong' let's take a look at some of the basic socioeconomic-cultural issues. For example, take any history book followed in mainland India. As the mainland students learn about `Indian History' beginning with the Sindhu-Saraswati civilization and ending with the turbulent times of the twentieth century, nowhere do we find a sound history of the people of the NER. A vague impression is created about the region with tribals mostly head-hunters. Geography of the region is hazier. An average ‘mainland’ Indian has no clue whether Mizoram is a part of India or Bangladesh. This ignorance about the region has accumulated over the years, and it is this ignorance about the people and local culture that is creating havoc in this region. In fact this ignorance is fully utilized by some of the extremist groups.

Our monumental neglect towards the region can be grasped by Congress's apathy with the Sylhet problem. At the time of partition, the British faced with a problem with Sylhet district - whether to include it in India or in then East Pakistan. When local Muslim leaders met Md. Ali Jinnah they were given a free hand to make up their mind. The situation was so fluid that had Congress leadership taken some initiative Sylhet would have become a part of present day Assam. Instead, Congress central leadership left the matter with Assam state-level leadership, and Lokapriya Gopinath Bordoloi chose not to do any thing about Sylhet.[12]

Ever since independence, the NER as been looked upon as a place for extracting natural resources the process of which started well in British era. To develop the region the British first brought workers from Bengal, white collar as well as blue collar. That was the first phase of 'foreign' migration into the region. In fact, this foreign migration helped immensely in setting up railway and communication lines. Initial intellectuals - teachers, doctors, accountants all came mostly from Bengal, and that was first wave of Bengali settlement in the region and it continued during the WWII because of the regions importance in the Pacific war. After the partition another wave of Bengali settlers (mostly Hindus) came to North-East from the then East Pakistan. This migration continued unabated till the culmination that resulted into Bangladesh War. This huge migration changed the face of the NER considerably. For example, tribals accounted for 80% of the population of Tripura in 1949, today they account for fewer than 30%. The migration continued even after 1971; especially a devastating famine in Bangladesh (1972-73) made the situation worse. But the latter migration which continues till today consists of Bengali Muslims many of whom have occupied Brahmaputra 'char area' (temporary islands). The sudden influx of 'foreigners' made the Assamese Hindus a minority in their own state and this fuelled the Assam Movement, spearheaded by AASU (All Assam Students Union) and AGSP (Asom Gana Sangram Parishad). In 1985, under Rajiv Gandhi, Assam Accord was signed by which the central government agreed to identify all foreign nationals who entered after 1971 through a tribunal followed by deportation. This 'foreign national identification' has become an explosive issue. Also, officially the Government of Bangladesh doesn't acknowledge existence of illegal Bangladeshi nationals in India. The massive influx of illegal foreigners has set off a series of chain reactions. Realizing the effect of Assam Accord, Bodos started their movement to preserve their identity which encouraged Khasi students to demand eviction of the foreigners, and these are just to name a few. So why is this paranoia?

In any developing region the benefits of developments - called `economic pie' is supposed to grow with time and population growth. In the NER, the central apathy has already stunted the growth of the local economy. The area had become a scavenging ground to collect resources for the mainland Indian economy. "Assam produces six million tonnes of oil each year and more than half of it is sent to Barauni refinary, Bihar. Why?" asked Dhirendranath Bezboruah, editor of Sentinel, the largest English daily in Assam, in an interview given to Earth Times News Service in 1997. Well, the refinary in Barauni was set up at a time when Indian President was Dr. Rajendra Prasad - from Bihar. Every year, the NER produces over Rs. 800 crores of tea, but less than ten percent goes to the state coffers. A good number of large businesses are controlled by people not from the region, and they have little sympathy for the indigenous people. Resources earmarked for developmental projects get siphoned off by a nexus of corrupt bureaucrats-politicians-businessmen, who in turn use a part of the loot to pay taxes to the extremist groups. In economic terms, more and more developmental money is thus becoming non-performing which in turn shrinks the local economy. As the local economy shrinks, the economic pie gets smaller relative to the ever expanding population that again pulls down the average standard of living. The result is economic crisis of the indigenous people, and this crisis turns into an identity crisis in the presence of `foreign settlers'. The overall result is disastrous - a vicious circle of more extortion, more corruption, and more economic degradation. This vicious circle threatens the very survival of civil administration, and corrective measures don't seem to work. An example of this nefarious nexus among business-politicians-extremists is the Tata Tea - ULFA controversy (Tata tea executives and politicians patronized ULFA). The problem has become so deep rooted that ULFA, NDFB and other groups are allegedly holding large blocks of preferential shares in Tata tea and other tea companies.[13]

Handling the economic problems from a military point of view only complicates the matter. Continuous security checks, combing operations, and counter protests, strikes etc can only hamper the economic progress further depriving the people of meager economic benefits. The people then vent their anger by supporting extremists more. Extremists also try to destroy the very state machinery that is supposed to provide socioeconomic upliftment. The more hardship caused to the common people, the easier it is for the extremists to wedge a gap between the state and people, and the more it happens easier it gets for the extremists to recruit new cadre. More than security crack-down the extremists fear most is losing public sympathy. Hence any counter insurgency measure must include people. However, the huge cultural difference between the mainland and the NER pose a different threat in security operations. Until recently most of the army, CRPF, BSF personnel used to come from mainland India who have no knowledge of the sensitivity of the local populace. Often security personnel mistreat local tribals or take advantage of womenfolk which has negative effects. Many tribal societies are matriarchal and alienating women can only make the security personnel look like an occupation force. What are the possible steps to stem the rot in the NER? We have to keep in mind that the NER problem is primarily economic in nature with a military component attached to it. So the approach to handle it should be `carrot and stick'. In order to solve the ethnic strife in the region one should make the people understand that the economic development is the way to assert their identity. Few lessons to be learned from the experiences in NAFTA and Bureau of Indian Affairs in the US:

(1) Recently (January 2000) PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared an economic package of Rs.10,000 crores for the NER. Sheer pouring money like water in a leaky vessel is not going to help much. Worse yet, the money will find its way to the hands of extremist groups. To monitor the development of the region a full-fledged cabinet ministry in charge of the region is very much needed. This will certainly help the GOI to convince the people about its sincerity about settling the outstanding issues. A positive popular mood will force the extremist groups to come to the negotiating table.

(2) Politically, the miniscule number of NER MPs in the parliament have not much influence. Some kind of constitutional reform may be needed so that local people's voice can be heard. A possible mini/regional parliament/assembly based in Guahati or Dimapur with certain power to pass local laws (within the Indian constitutional framework) can be considered. Further division of the NER states along tribal lines is not viable, but greater autonomy can be granted within tribal home areas. Representatives of these autonomous councils/districts can be members of the regional mini-parliament/assembly. For example, in Manipur, autonomy can be given to Meitties, Kukis and Nagas among other tribes. Autonomy may include wide latitude to raise taxes, dealing with prohibition, etc like the native Indian tribes in the US.

(3) A cultural exchange program between the mainland and the NER is the need of the hour. National integration shouldn't be a buzz word only in political spheres. It should encompass every aspect of life. For example, our very education system must take into account the rich and diverse cultural and historical background of the region.

(4) Keeping in mind the local sensitivity towards the security personnel posted in the NER who are often seen as a occupation force, local youth should be inducted in a massive way into our central security establishments. Only very recently army and Assam Rifles have taken such a move. Even though local people are bound by their tribal loyalty, they will be seen more as 'our boys' than 'their army'. Serious considerations should be given to include local female security personnel in combing operations, especially in areas like Manipur and Nagaland. Rape by security personnel who are mostly from Indian mainland is an irritating stumbling block to win over local population. Militant outfits at regular intervals publish list of rape or human rights victims allegedly perpetrated by `Indian security forces'. No doubt these lists are often inflated and exaggerated, but even if a part of those are true then it is a very serious matter.[14] Security establishments must bring the culprits to the book, and compensate victims and/or their families with due sincerity.