In July-August 2000, the conflict in Kashmir came once again into sharp focus. Hizbul-Mujahideen (Party of Warriors; HM) tentatively declared a ceasefire; hopes of peace rose, and then were shattered amidst machine-gun massacres of civilians, car bombings and other atrocities. This paper examines these events (chronology in Table 1), and attempts to throw some light on the dynamics behind them. It is hoped that by answering the question of who aborted the HM ceasefire, there will be greater understanding of the reasons behind the continuation of bloodshed in Kashmir.

Who are the Hizbul-Mujahideen?

The HM is considered to be the largest indigenous secessionist terror group in the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). It has the best network in terms of logistics and manpower in J&K. Headquartered in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), it maintains a liaison office in Islamabad, from where most of its statements emanate. According to Pakistani news sources, the HM claims that 90% of the personnel involved in actions against the Indian security forces in J&K are its members, and that they are responsible for 95% of the attacks against the Indian military¹.

In interpreting this claim, we note that the majority of terrorist strikes in J&K are against the civilian population, as are 75% of the victims, and these are generally claimed by groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), etc. (see below). Such groups are dominated by Pakistanis, though roughly 40% of their personnel comprise imported mercenaries from Afghanistan and several countries in the Islamic World, including Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Libya and so on². We also note that groups such as LeT have claimed numerous attacks in recent times against Indian security forces.

It is not unusual for HM to be allowed to claim "credit" for attacks after some other group has already made such a claim – partly in order to give a morale boost to the indigenous Kashmiri separatists. Finally, recent squabbles have shown³ that there is serious contention for the leadership of HM between the Kashmiris led by Salahuddin, and the Punjabis and other Pakistanis who form a part of HM. This dichotomy has been increasing in significance in the weeks following the ceasefire drama.

How was the HM formed?

After the abortive Pakistani infiltration of armed irregulars in 1965, secessionist violence in J&K was taken over by the Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). A former JKLF Organising Chairman and 1971 hijacker of an Indian Airlines plane, Hashim Qureshi, is quoted⁴ as confirming that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI - the Pakistan military agency responsible for sponsoring terrorism) approached him in 1984 with the plan for the terrorist movement in J&K. But by 1989, the JKLF⁵ had become disenchanted with Pakistan's plans for post 'liberation' Kashmir, declared its intention to seek true independence, and was promptly dumped by Pakistan, with its leaders arrested. HM was formed to fill the gap, after the leaders of Jamat-e-Islami (JeI), Pakistan branch, persuaded JeI (J&K branch) of the necessity for an armed wing to carry out the campaign of terror to be launched in Kashmir at the behest of the ISI⁶. The end of the Afghan war in 1988 allowed Pakistan to devote more attention, unemployed Mujahideen and their modern weaponry, to terror in Kashmir.

HM was formed in late 1989 from a terror outfit started⁵ by "Master" Ahsan Dar in 1987, to take over the role that JKLF had abdicated. It was formed as the military wing⁶ of the JeI’s J&K branch, led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani. (There are in total three wings of the JeI in the Indo-Pak theatre, the central one being the Pakistani wing led by Qazi Hussein Ahmed and another headed by Abdul Rasheed Turabi in POK). By 1993, Ahsan Dar and several other commanders were in jail in India, charged with torture and murders^5-9.

HM losses have exceeded 675 members, shot by security forces⁹, and several hundred jailed. Training of members is generally done in a vast network of camps inside POK, Pakistan proper and Afghanistan¹⁰. Recruits are taken across the Line of Control (LoC) that divides separates POK from India and returned after training, armed and indoctrinated.

Who are the other major players?

There have been numerous groups created by Pakistan to conquer J&K, up to 150 at one point¹¹, but many of them do little other than issue press releases and seek funding. In this paper we will note those that espouse violent jihad (holy war or struggle) and take action commensurate with their interpretation of this philosophy, as these groups form the last link in the chain of responsibility for the collapse of the ceasefire.

Two main entities stand out in this regard: Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT)^12-13 and Harakat-ul-Mujahedin (HuM)^14-15, the latter already labeled as a terrorist formation by the US State Department^13-15 and the former well on the way to being designated as one. LeT was the group that first claimed responsibility for the murder of pilgrims and labourers in J&K on August 1. (The HM claimed responsibility as well, but few attach much credibility to that claim). Unlike HM, LeT and HuM are composed mainly of foreigners - i.e. Pakistanis, Afghans and mujahedin from an assortment of Arab and non-Arab Islamic countries.

Two other groups with a relatively high profile include Al Badr and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). The former is said to have just 115-140 members active in J&K. JeM is a new outfit created by Masood Azhar, one of the terrorists released by GoI in return for the safety of hostages in the Indian Airlines jet hijacked in December 1999. It is speculated that this group may eventually replace HM, as HM once replaced JKLF. Other groups with a lower profile are Tehriq-e-Jihad, Al Barq, Al Jihad, Jamiat-ul-Mujahedin, Tehriq-ul-Mujahedin, Muslim Mujahedin, Al Umar, Islamic Front and Al Fateh. Very recently a "JKLA" has been formed¹⁶.

What led up to the ceasefire announcement?

In 1994, the JKLF, disenchanted with revelations of Pakistani plans for Kashmir and sidelined by the ISI, declared a ceasefire with India, and many of its members joined mainstream democratic politics, including cabinet minister Mushtaq Lone⁵. It was in this period that the J&K Ikhwan was formed of reformed terrorists. They played a counter-terrorism role by fighting Pakistan-sponsored mercenaries, on the one hand. On the other they entered the political mainstream in 1996 by participating in the state elections. It was a significant psychological blow to the separatist tendency.

HM founder Ahsan Dar, interviewed in jail¹⁷ in 1997, appeared to be in surprisingly good spirits, considering his background of bitter violence. In autumn 1999, he was released⁵ "and made no comment to the press". This action generated considerable criticism of the government in the Indian press. The current "political" status of Ahsan Dar is vague. There are indications that he is still (or back) in jail⁵.

By 1998, rivalries and disagreements between the Kashmiri and the Pakistani Punjabi factions of HM inside Pakistan had risen to murder levels. A massacre of 21 people in a village just inside POK, was realized to have been a part of this fratricide among the HM factions³. Salahuddin, leader of the Kashmir faction, was placed under house arrest by the ISI. Clearly, the HM was becoming very uncomfortable with the rapid takeover of the terrorist movement by foreign mercenaries and Punjabis brought in by the ISI, all at the cost of the youth of Kashmir, who were, in the opinion of HM’s Kashmiris, being used as cannon fodder⁴ by the ISI. In other words, HM was coming to the same conclusion that JKLF arrived at in 1989.

The abortive and disastrous Kargil invasion by Pakistani forces in 1999, and the subsequent increase in violence in Kashmir, drove the local population further away from secessionist goals, as people tired of the unending violence. It was becoming clearer to the Kashmiris that, even with the element of surprise and the advantage of holding the high ground, Pakistan could not best India. Nor did it go unnoticed that Pakistan’s Punjabi generals had used the Kashmiris of POK, who make up the bulk of the Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry, as expendable assets in Kargil.

By contrast, after the Kargil war, India conducted elections in September 1999, despite threats from the terrorists to kill anyone who voted. In early 2000, the All Party Hurriyet Conference (APHC) – an umbrella organisation including various Kashmiri Muslim parties -began making overtures to the GOI, and found that they were eagerly received. This generated some political manoeuvring, with the state government of Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah tabled the "autonomy resolution". The local HM leadership thus found themselves being marginalized both by the foreigners in POK and by locals who were joining mainstream Indian politics.

Yet perhaps the most important part of the shadow play, which led up to the HM ceasefire offer, was the visit of US President Bill Clinton to India. On the day his visit began, March 20, 2000 gunmen rounded up the 35 men of the Sikh community in the village of Chithisinghpora in Kashmir, and machine-gunned them to death¹⁸. Villagers recognized among the killers a "guide" from a neighbouring village. The HM, given that it provides most of the logistical and networking assistance for the foreign mujahedin active in J&K, had little doubts as to who the killers were.

Soon after the massacre, according to more than one report in the Indian press¹⁹, the HM commander protested to the chief of the LeT for targeting Sikhs - a community until then untouched by the terrorist groups. The rift between HM and LeT widened rapidly from then on, reportedly amid quarrels related to arms and money as well. Indeed, one Pakistani daily has been quoted as saying that the decision to offer a ceasefire was taken in March itself at a meeting of the HM Command Council in Islamabad²⁰. (Differences between militants from Indian Kashmir and foreigners have always been a problem, but the negative feelings have increased steadily in recent years because, after a decade of fighting, the locals have nothing to show for it).

The Chithisinghpora massacre appears to have been the straw that broke the camel’s back from the perspective of the HM. From then on, it was a matter of the Indian intelligence agencies expanding contacts and the HM reacting positively. The process was undertaken with considerable secrecy, which explains why there is no certainty about who among the main parties were aware of the ceasefire offer before it was made. While most players on the Pakistani side had reason to deny foreknowledge, this problem did not apply on the Indian side. The ceasefire offer was welcomed virtually across the Indian political spectrum and media, and most importantly by the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government.

Events moved fairly rapidly after contacts were initiated. From various media reports, it has emerged that (a) HM’s Supreme Commander Salahuddin (real name Mohammed Yousuf Shah) was brought into Kashmir in April, with security assured by India’s external intelligence agency, the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW); and (b) in the same month, HM’s Operations Commander Abdul Majeed Dar secretly visited New Delhi for talks with officials of RAW and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), India’s domestic intelligence agency. It is evident that RAW and IB played a key role in the months leading up to the ceasefire offer, with the Special Frontier Force (formerly 2-2) of RAW assisting with the logistics²¹.

Secret parleys also reportedly took place between HM and Indian officials in Dubai. In the US, the Kashmiri Muslim expatriate community, under the aegis of a "Kashmir Study Group", was becoming active once again with proposals for a solution. In the meantime, the APHC had been sending out feelers to the government; coincidentally, the chairmanship of the APHC had passed on from Syed Ali Shah Geelani (of JeI’s J&K branch) to Abdul Ghani Bhatt. The latter is considered in Pakistan as being "soft" on India and it is said Islamabad does not have "too much leverage" with him²².

In May 2000, Mansoor Ijaz, an investment banker of Pakistani origin well connected to the Clinton administration, made a discreet visit to J&K, again under escort by RAW and the Indian military establishment. He met various government officials and local political figures in Kashmir. (It is to be noted that Ijaz is also said to have visited Pakistan at the time for talks with Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf).

On June 26th, J&K Chief Minister Abdullah, got his autonomy proposal approved by the state assembly²³, but this was summarily rejected by the Indian central government – a crystal clear hint to both APHC and HM about the boundaries of Indian negotiating redlines. Yet barely a month later, on July 24th, in a dramatic move, Majeed Dar, speaking from the outskirts of Srinagar in J&K, announced an unconditional unilateral ceasefire for three months, effective from July 25th. Dar, who was accompanied by his four main divisional commanders, three of them without masks, stated that "we conducted grassroots surveys for two and a half months before taking this decision and we have the consent of the local people"²⁴.

The Indian government promptly welcomed the move and the Indian Army announced the suspension of offensive operations (having already softened its approach to the HM since April). Preparations were undertaken for Home Secretary Kamal Pandey to visit Srinagar for talks with HM leaders on the modalities of the ceasefire and for further broader negotiations. It subsequently emerged that Majeed Dar had visited Pakistan before the announcement for consultations with the HM Central Command, and that he had returned to Srinagar via Dubai or Kathmandu with help from the RAW's Special Frontier Force²¹. The urgency and significance with which the offer was viewed in India may be glimpsed from news reports that the Delhi offices of the Home Ministry and Intelligence Bureau were deserted, the occupants mostly being out in Kashmir around the talks.

Ceasefire Announcement – The Immediate Aftermath

The HM's announcement of the ceasefire and its readiness for negotiations came as a surprise to the general public in both India and Pakistan. What was different was the reaction in either country. In India, the response was one of almost universal approval, with the media speculating that a window of opportunity may have opened for a solution to the troubles in J&K. The Government of India (GoI) and the main opposition group (Congress) welcomed the move almost immediately²⁵, confirming to most observers that New Delhi had been aware of the impending ceasefire offer and that it had played a role in its genesis. This is a vital point to consider in understanding the events that followed.

The response from Pakistan was rather different. Even a summary assessment of media characterization of the ceasefire offer will show that much of the press regarded the HM move as a betrayal of the Kashmir cause, initially by Majeed Dar, and then by Supreme Commander Salahuddin when he confirmed the offer. (There are parallels between the media reaction to the ceasefire and to the Lahore Declaration of February 1999, which was seen in India as a ground-breaking event favouring movement towards Indo-Pak peace). ‘The News’ daily, of the "Jang" media group, described the ceasefire as a "Scud" launched and out of control, with its effects quite unpredictable²⁶.

Speculation was rife in the Pakistani media as to who else knew about the ceasefire offer in advance, particularly given (a) the initial reticent reaction of Government of Pakistan (GoP); (b) the presence of the top JeI leader, Qazi Hussein Ahmed, in the US at the time the offer was made; and (c) the presence of Indian National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra in the US at roughly the same time. But the radical Islamist formations grouped under the Muttahida Jihad Council (MJC), a coalition of 16 Islamist organisations, blasted the decision at a July 25 press conference in Muzaffarabad (POK).

The irony was that HM Supreme Commander Salahuddin was at the time the chairman of the MJC; so on July 26th the MJC held another press conference and announced the suspension of HM's membership in the coalition, thus automatically removing Salahuddin from the position of chairman as well. Also on July 26th, the Amir of JeI (POK) Abdul Rasheed Turabi disowned the HM declaration and declared jihad would continue until the liberation of Kashmir. The APHC on the same day held a meeting, presided over by outgoing pro-Pakistani JeI (J&K) chairman Geelani and attended by chairman designate Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhatt. It declared that the HM ceasefire was "precipitous" (or "hasty" according to some translations). It was clear that groups in the MJC and the APHC – apart from HM - were not aware of the ceasefire offer before it was made.

On July 27th, Qazi Hussein, at Lahore airport on his return from the US, blasted Dar and Salahuddin as traitors and said the Kashmir issue was neither initiated by a few people nor could "a handful of perpetrators" sabotage it²⁷. (A postscript: News media around 09September 2000 reported that Hussein had taken over direct control of HM, relegating Salahuddin to being a member of the council to oversee it).

Questions about the HM's position were being referred to their "liaison office" in Islamabad, rather than the headquarters in Muzaffarabad. The HM spokesman started complaining about the Indian position of holding talks under the Constitution of India. This problem was apparently smoothed out in the intervening days, i.e. July 27-July 31, as efforts to get the talks underway were on in earnest (see following reference to Vajpayee statement, August 7). It must be noted, however, that on July 30, Salahuddin for the first time introduced the condition that the proposed talks must be tripartite, i.e. including Pakistan.

The first violent blow to prospects for a solution based on the Dar initiative came on July 31: the LeT claimed responsibility for an attack on the Sunderbani Brigade headquarters of the Rashtriya Rifles in Bandipora, northern J&K, with its chief spokesman Abu Usama saying it was in retaliation for HM's ceasefire offer. On the evening of August 1, 31 pilgrims and their porters going to the Hindu holy site of Amarnath were killed at Pahalgam. A second attack at about midnight resulted in the murder of 18 sleeping labourers working at a brick kiln at Mir Bazar, near Qazigund (in Anantnag district of south Kashmir). A third attack in Sindhu Achabal village, also in Anantnag Dt., left another 9 labourers dead. The fourth attack was in the northern Kupwara district in which seven members of a family of a former militant were killed. The fifth attack was at Konda Pogal Paristan village, in Doda district of Jammu, where the homes of Hindu villagers were surrounded and 11 were mowed down. The sixth attack was also in the same district, with 8 members of a village defence committee killed in Kishtwar. More were to die later from injuries sustained.

Clearly, this was a calculated escalation aimed at derailing the nascent peace process. Nevertheless, the GoI stated that it would pursue the HM ceasefire offer and would not let terrorism succeed in derailing the potential for peace. On August 3rd, formal talks were held for the first time between the GoI, represented by Home Secretary Pandey, and the HM delegates at the heavily guarded Nehru guesthouse at the foothills of Zabarwal. Later, at a press conference, Pandey announced that GoI and HM had formed a committee to implement the modalities of the ceasefire. HM nominated a four-member team led by Khalid Saifullah and the GoI team was to be headed in the committee by Special Secretary (Home) M.B. Kaushal. On the same day, indeed as the talks were going on at the guesthouse, Salahuddin, speaking from Islamabad, issued an ultimatum that India must agree to tripartite negotiations including Pakistan by August 8th. This was promptly rejected by India, as it was not part of the unconditional talks envisaged in the original ceasefire offer.

Still, India continued, in the period August 3-8th, to make positive confidence-building overtures to the HM in the hope that Salahuddin might withdraw his ultimatum. On August 4th, the 4 Rashtriya Rifles unit and a HM team played a game of cricket at Khipora, in the frontier district of Kupwara, an area that had in the past seen bloody encounters between the armed forces and the HM. (It was a 24-run victory for HM). No meeting took place between GoI and HM representatives on August 5th, apparently because HM commanders had to go to the field for an 'on-the-spot assessment' of the situation on the ground²⁸. It appears that the assessment was favourable, because on August 6th, although HM claimed the Indian Army had violated the ceasefire in certain places, the group said talks would continue. But no date was set.

Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee went a step further on August 7th in an address to the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament). For readers to make their own judgment, extracts of the statement (as provided by the Press Trust of India) are reproduced: "We will talk within the constitutional framework. But while we talk, if certain issues arise outside that framework, as has been happening in the case of Nagaland, would we stop talking? No conditions have been attached to the talks". In other words, the Indian team would negotiate in the constitutional framework, but if extra-constitutional issues arose, the Indian delegation would not stop talking. To make it clearer, he added: "Whether talks are held within the Constitution or not is not so important". It is impossible for any democratically elected leader to go beyond this statement to satisfy the demands of unconditional talks. (It is assumed that an elected government cannot negotiate outside the bounds of its constitution. As such, the expectation that India should declare readiness to negotiate outside the constitution was itself a pre-condition, in this case a pre-condition which India fulfilled as completely as possible).

Perhaps what is more important is the fact that Vajpayee's statement came after Salahuddin's ultimatum that Pakistan must be included in the talks. On the same day, Majeed Dar, in his first statement after the ceasefire offer, declared from Srinagar (J&K) that the HM Command Council (based in Muzaffarabad, POK) had been authorised to take a decision on further talks. Although he was critical of the GoI, Dar was subtly assigning responsibility for whatever happened thereafter to the Command Council. It is also noteworthy that Dar, in an interview with the BBC’s Urdu Service on the night of Aug. 7, declared his wish that the talks should continue, pointing out that the first round of talks had shown "a ray of hope".

The Command Council publicly interpreted the statement by Vajpayee in exactly the opposite way – i.e. as a reiteration that India would talk only within the confines of the constitution. Salahuddin announced the withdrawal of the ceasefire offer at a press conference. He added: "There would be more escalation and our activities might spill over to other parts of India from Kashmir"²⁹. He has repeated this threat since then.

The Saboteurs & Their Rationale

As soon as it became evident that the ceasefire had collapsed, the governments of both India & Pakistan held each other responsible. Pakistan's broad argument was that India had undermined the peace process by imposing "conditions" – namely, the issue of talks within the Indian constitutional framework.

However, the sequence of events and a reading of the statement by Prime Minister Vajpayee to the Rajya Sabha lend more credence to the Indian position. This reading of the situation was buttressed by the US State Department, which was clear-cut in its assessment. Spokesman Richard Boucher said on August 9th: "It's not helpful for the Hizbul-Mujahideen to insist on a new condition after the ceasefire and offer of dialogue was announced and accepted by India. Specifically, the August 8th deadline for tripartite talks, including Pakistan, was added afterwards". The British Foreign Office also deplored the withdrawal of the ceasefire.

It was noted that while the ceasefire was offered in Srinagar, the withdrawal was imposed from Islamabad. There have been numerous reports claiming Salahuddin was under pressure from the ISI to include the condition that Pakistan must be involved in the talks - a condition the Pakistani leadership knew India would reject because of New Delhi's previously stated policy position that cross-border terrorism must end before talks with Islamabad can be held. Once again, it must be recalled that Salahuddin imposed the condition (though not the ultimatum) on July 30th, and that the killings began on July 31st.

Western and Indian analysts have pointed the finger at hardline generals behind Pakistani Chief Executive, General Musharraf as the main obstacle to the ceasefire talks getting off the ground³⁰. While the overwhelming media characterization of the ceasefire collapse within Pakistan has been a repetition of the official line, there are rare exceptions bold enough to lay the blame at the door of the Islamists. One example is Brig. (Retd) A.R. Siddiqui who wrote: "While the reported violations of ceasefire after the Hizb's declaration would be normal even under a UN-mandated and manned one, the concerted attack on an Indian army/police camp near Bandipura, on July 31st, was the first major attempt at aborting the Hizb ceasefire"³¹.

Yet those who choose to exonerate the Pakistani leadership of their responsibility for the collapse of the ceasefire would point to a number of factors that do not, at first glance, seem to fit into the thesis that Islamabad sabotaged the ceasefire. Why, for instance, did Pakistan initially respond in a moderately positive way to the ceasefire offer? Why did they not criticize it from the beginning if the intention was to sabotage the offer? Further, if their perspective of the ceasefire was negative, why did the Pakistani leadership not prevent the offer from being made in the first place?

To throw some light on these seeming logical inconsistencies and to understand why events developed the way they did, the following questions must be answered.

Was the Pakistan leadership aware of the offer before it was made?

It is quite remarkable that in the hours soon after the ceasefire offer by the HM there was no outright criticism from the Pakistani government. It is possible, as the initial response suggests, that at the very least some elements in the leadership assessed that others were aware of the offer before it was made and, therefore, were restrained in their own responses. Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said that while Pakistani support for Kashmiris was permanent, Islamabad would go along with whatever Kashmiris decided. The initial response of the government was as a posture of reticent acquiescence (a Pakistani columnist called it "exceedingly altruistic"³²).

In any event, the atmosphere in Islamabad was one of doubt and suspicion, with the Pakistani media chipping in on July 25. Most of the press had little doubt that the Pakistani leadership was in on the offer. The only question was who knew and who did not. Quite clearly, the radical Islamic constituents of the MJC did not know, as mentioned earlier; expectedly, they were making the loudest noises in denouncing the offer.

There is no indication that the mainstream "secular" political parties (the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People’s Party) were aware of the deal or in a position to do anything either positive or negative about it; as such they have remained out of the equation. These parties were initially quiet as well, probably hedging their bets in case the government was involved.

This leaves the military establishment and the JeI (Pakistan), which has managed to adapt well to the changes since the Oct. 12, 1999 coup. JeI leader Qazi Hussein was in the US at the time of the ceasefire declaration, and one of the officials he met there was the Clinton administration’s anti-terrorism chief Michael Sheehan. On his return to Pakistan, Qazi Hussein was strongly critical of the "betrayal" and "sabotage" by Dar and Salahuddin, and said he "did not rule out" a Pakistani government hand in the ceasefire offer³³.

Yet it is quite possible that Qazi Hussein was in on the deal. He may have retained the option to deny any knowledge of it. This is because, given his Islamist credentials, it was virtually impossible for him to support the ceasefire in light of the JeI’s domestic political compunctions. Apart from the fact that a collapse of the ceasefire would seriously undermine his personal credibility as well as his future electoral prospects, Qazi Hussein’s association with what was (and still is) seen by many in Pakistan as a plot orchestrated by the US would have been disastrous for his credentials as a senior Islamic leader.

Moreover, the nature of internecine rivalries among the various radical Islamic members of the MJC necessitated a hardline public stance from Qazi. His main rival within Pakistan, Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) had been quick to use the ceasefire as a political weapon against Qazi Hussein and JeI. Other groups followed suit.

It is hard to swallow the notion that neither JeI (J&K), of which HM is essentially the military wing, nor JeI (Pakistan) was aware of the plans by Dar and Salahuddin. Indeed, there were reports in the Pakistani media that Salahuddin had discussed the issue with the JeI leadership, including Qazi Hussein²². Nevertheless, while there is a high probability that the JeI leader was aware of the offer before it was made, it must be admitted that there remains the possibility that he was not.

Within the military establishment, it is quite clear that at the very least the Chief Executive General Musharraf and the then Director General ISI Gen. Mahmood Ahmad had to know about the offer. The DG ISI is in charge of Kashmir and Afghan operations. Very little goes on among the ISI-sponsored groups, including the HM, that the agency does not know about. One noted Pakistan columnist put it thus: "Had the Hizb pulled this off on its own, panic buttons would have been pushed in ISI HQ in Islamabad"³⁴. But "panic buttons" were not pushed, at least not initially, indicating that the ISI was not caught by surprise.

In Pakistan's "CEOcracy" it is simply inconceivable that the CEO was not informed of such a major development, as soon as the ISI found out – given the close links between Musharraf and Ahmad. The ISI had to be aware of the negotiations between the HM and the Indian RAW, given the cross-border trips undertaken by the HM leaders. Nor could the HM have held a Command Council meeting in Muzaffarabad (POK) without being monitored by the ISI. That the ISI allowed Dar to go ahead suggests it was willing, or was obliged, to allow the offer to be made. It could be that Gen. Ahmad was a reluctant player acting under Musharraf’s orders but this, too, is unlikely given their long history of friendship.

The Pakistani media has reported that the CEO had met secretly with American emissaries of Pakistan origin (Mansoor Ijaz) and Kashmiri birth (Farooq Kathwari)³⁵. Ijaz visited J&K in May, with an escort from RAW and the Indian Army, while Kathwari (whose son was killed in the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad) is also believed to have visited the region this year. It is quite possible that they had stopped over in Pakistan as well.

The Pakistani media has also reported that the government had ordered, since June 25 or June 27, a no-shoot first policy for its posts on the Line of Control dividing J&K and POK³⁶. This would have been impossible without Musharraf’s knowledge, and that of Chief of General Staff Gen. Mohammed Aziz Khan, but because of his strong jihadi inclinations he may not have been informed the precise reason for the policy which was to calm the LoC before the ceasefire announcement.

Why Musharraf could neither reject the ceasefire, nor allow it to take root

Having taken power in a coup in October 1999, promising dramatic change, Gen. Musharraf has little to show for it. The economy remains a shambles³⁷, the anti-corruption drive is running into brick walls especially where army personnel are concerned, foreign policy initiatives have not yielded the desired results, radical Islamic movements have enhanced their domestic political standing and relations with India have markedly worsened – all to the alarm of the big powers. In short, the situation has certainly not noticeably changed for the better from that of the Nawaz Sharif era.

Musharraf has been well aware for some time that, to halt the drift, he needs legitimacy abroad and political space for decision-making at home on economic and social issues. He also knows this is impossible without monetary assistance from the IMF and debt rescheduling by the major creditors, both coming up for review before December 31st, 2000. Washington has not been reluctant to use these levers to apply pressure for movement on issues that concern it, namely Islamabad's reluctance to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the issue of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy and the terrorist Osama Bin Laden, (reportedly a protégé of Musharraf) and the level of violence in Kashmir. Indeed, there have even been unconfirmed rumours that the US had threatened rejection of a visa for Musharraf to address the UN General Assembly in September if there was no movement on these issues.

In this environment, being seen to reject the best chance for peace since the Lahore Bus Diplomacy would have been impossible for Musharraf. Unlike the irreversible acts of handing over Bin Laden or signing the CTBT, a ceasefire could always be sabotaged, and hence there was no immediate pressure to be seen to reject it. Pakistani leaders, both military and civilian, are past masters at such tactics – especially in their dealings with the US. The way they are co-operating in the "drugs war" ^38-39 by turning over minor players to the US while keeping in operation the processing factories in the North West Frontier Province and on the Afghan side of the Durand Line, is one example. Another example is the manner in which terrorists linked to Bin Ladin, several of whom somehow end up in Pakistan, are arrested and turned over to the US while the groups that offer them logistics and training are freely operating in the country.

There is a more generous reading of Musharraf's actions, which is not wholly implausible. Perhaps Musharraf did view the HM ceasefire offer as a possible route to the settlement of the Kashmir dispute in a manner that does not appear to be a defeat for Pakistan. However, extending that line of logic leads to a dead end. Musharraf had the chance to jump at the ceasefire opportunity and bless it, which would have made it impossible for India to not invite the new-and-improved Pakistan into the discussions, at least as an observer. Musharraf could even have requested Western help in rehabilitating all the unemployed mujahedin, and the US, if not the IMF, would have weighed in with a few billion dollars to revive the Pakistani economy. It would have been a great diplomatic victory for Pakistan, since no Indian Prime Minister would have been able to resist the up swell of optimism in India, let alone the world, demanding that the government grab the opportunity for lasting peace.

Instead what came from the Musharraf government were weak and diluted statements that Pakistan would be pleased if the dispute was settled according to the wishes of the Kashmiris. This was odd enough, considering that Pakistan main argument now is that it is one of the parties to the Kashmir dispute. More tellingly, there was no explicit statement of support for the ceasefire offer, nor any indication that Pakistan would assist in seeing it through.

A less altruistic motive in allowing the ceasefire proposal to be made might have been that the HM had become a liability to the ISI. The generals could well have allowed the HM to think they were backing the ceasefire proposal, knowing that it’s collapse would undermine the HM’s popular base. In this sense, the have succeeded because the collapse of the ceasefire has seriously damaged the credibility of the HM, in favour of groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Harakat-ul-Mujahedin and Jaish-e-Mohammed. In effect, this is a repeat of what happened to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front in 1989, when its pro-independence stance (as opposed to pro-Pakistan) was regarded by the ISI as undesirable. There is irony in the fact that the HM was initially created in order to marginalize the JKLF.

How was the ceasefire sabotaged?

The answer to this question is very simple: the Pakistani military leadership, by errors of omission and commission and finally by deliberate intrigue, ensured that the ceasefire offer by the HM never really had a chance to be implemented.

There were several reasons why the ceasefire was predestined to be stillborn. One is that the other radical groups in the Muttahida Jihad Council (MJC) were kept out of the loop. The only group that could have brought them into the loop ahead of the offer was the military establishment. Alternatively, if it was necessary to keep them out of the loop to prevent premature publicity and failure (given these groups’ sentiments on the issue), then the military establishment was the only entity that could have controlled their response after the offer was made.

It is clear that the MJC was neither brought into the loop, nor controlled once the ceasefire was announced. There is no indication of even an effort being made to control these groups after HM’s ceasefire announcement. On the contrary, various leaders were freely blasting the ceasefire decision as a betrayal. There were both vague and specific threats of an escalation in J&K, which were soon to be carried out. The irony of it was all the more telling because HM Supreme Commander Salahuddin was the chairman of the MJC until July 26th, when the HM was expelled from the MJC.

Given the well-publicised agenda of these groups, i.e. jihad in Kashmir until its "liberation", it would be the height of self-delusion to assume that the military establishment for some unknown reason judged that the MJC would support the ceasefire. And given the track record of the Chief Executive in submitting to the demands of the Islamic parties - often supported by the "bearded generals", notably CGS Gen. Mohammed Aziz Khan – it would be the height of optimism to believe that Musharraf felt he could whip the jihadis into line once HM declared the ceasefire.

Equally important, the Pakistani government did not commit itself to the dialogue process. It took what was essentially a neutral posture, i.e. that it would agree with whatever the Kashmiris wanted. This demonstrated a curious ambivalence about the ceasefire offer, considering that the main plank of the HM is accession to Pakistan, a position it has not rescinded and was not asked to do so by New Delhi. (This in itself is a clear indication that New Delhi was prepared to work outside constitutional parameters).

In sum, all the developments since the ceasefire was announced point to the strong possibilities that (a) Musharraf had gone along with the budding peace process primarily to satisfy the US and international donors, fully recognising it would be sabotaged in short order (b) DG ISI Ahmad was a participant in this charade playing a behind-the-scenes role leading up to the ceasefire offer, and (c) CGS Gen. Mohammed Aziz started playing his role after the offer was made by using his control over the jihadi groups to orchestrate the massacres.

For Musharraf it was convenient that the Mujahideen immediately stepped up their jihad activities in J&K. His purpose had been served. He had appeared to the US as someone willing to compromise on Kashmir, or at least to countenance a peace process that did not involve direct Pakistani involvement to begin with.

The condition that Pakistan be involved in tripartite talks did not come from a government official but from Salahuddin, on July 30, on the sixth day after the ceasefire offer. The massacres in J&K followed on July 31st and August 1st. These killings serious affected the generally pro-negotiation public opinion in India, but not enough to derail the process or to give pause for thought to the Vajpayee government. In fact, Vajpayee insisted that India would not give in to terrorism and the talks would be held; and they were, on August 3rd.

In all probability, this turn of events caused panic among the military leaders in Pakistan, because the Indian response to the massacre of over a 100 people was likely not anticipated. Thus they were forced to show their hand: while the first round of talks were being held between Indian and HM representatives in the Nehru Guest House near Srinagar, the final nail on the coffin of the ceasefire proposal was hammered in, with the issue of an ultimatum from Islamabad by Salahuddin that India must agree to tripartite talks involving Pakistan by Aug. 8. (The manner in which Musharraf miscalculated the Indian response to the ceasefire offer parallels his miscalculation of the Indian response to the Kargil gamble in 1999).

There were reports that, in the meantime, Salahuddin had been put under house arrest by the ISI and that he was under intense pressure to issue the ultimatum. One unconfirmed report said his residential telephones had gone dead and that his house was surrounded by ISI agents⁴⁰. He then wrote to foreign missions in Pakistan urging them to apply pressure on India to involve Pakistan in the talks. For the first time, Islamabad’s Foreign Office joined in by issuing a statement that it must be involved in the talks.

Yet Dar, in Srinagar, did not insist on Pakistani involvement in the talks, at least not until Aug. 7. In an interview with the BBC’s Urdu Service on Aug. 7, he refused to make any statement on Salahuddin's ultimatum saying merely that it would be decided upon by the Command Council. For his part, Salahuddin avoided giving a direct reply to the BBC when asked why he had to be the one to issue the ultimatum given that Dar had declared the ceasefire. Hours before the ultimatum expired on Aug. 8, Salahuddin withdrew the ceasefire.

Can Pakistan's "CEOcracy" survive peace?

No matter how one cuts it, the developments leading up to and after the ceasefire declaration by the HM suggest that the Pakistani military leadership played a critical role in its collapse. Some might argue that Gen. Musharraf was genuinely interested in positive movement on the Kashmir question, and that the real saboteurs (in varying degrees) were CGS Gen. Aziz Khan and DG ISI Gen. Ahmad. But one should remember that Pakistan is a military dictatorship that came to power through a coup in which Musharraf, Aziz and Ahmad were the three main players.

Some recent developments in Pakistan might be taken to indicate dissent and suspicion in the senior Army officer corps, notably the reshuffle at the highest ranks of the military; both Gen. Aziz and Gen. Ahmad have been shifted. However, the authors of this paper do not believe that to be the case. There is every possibility that the reshuffle may, once again, be designed more to buttress the military government’s image building exercise in the US; note that the reshuffle was effected just five days before Musharraf’s departure for the UN General Assembly gathering of heads of state in the US. While there has reportedly been a growing rift in recent months between Gen. Aziz and Gen. Musharraf, there is not yet sufficient evidence to suggest that they have come to the point of a serious rivalry.

It is important to note that the relationship that Musharraf has with both Aziz and Ahmad goes back many years. There is room to doubt the general perception that Musharraf is far more liberal than the pro-Islamic Aziz. While Aziz, a Kashmiri, is certainly regarded as the "Mullahs' general"⁴¹, Musharraf is by no means Pakistan's "Ataturk", at least on questions of religion. His frequent and vigorous defence of jihad – a term equated with terrorism in the West – is only one of several pointers in that direction. He was also known to be particularly close in the 1990s to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (formerly Harkat-ul-Ansar), a group labeled as a terrorist organization by the US. 

Moreover, Musharraf has replaced Aziz as CGS with Gen. Mohammed Yusaf, someone who is of the same mould. Both Aziz and Yusaf are known to detest the media glare, and both have identical views on security and internal affairs. The two men also had an affinity for the deceased dictator Gen. Zia ul Haq as well as for former ISI chief Gen. Hamid Gul, whose anti-India and anti-US views are well known. Yusaf and Aziz are also said to be equally close to Musharraf⁴².

(Yet it cannot be ruled out that a rift is developing between Aziz and Musharraf, perhaps partly because the latter appears more sensitive to US perceptions than the outgoing CGS. If the reshuffle and Aziz’s posting as Corps Commander at Lahore is the result of that rivalry, then it means a major blow has been struck by Musharraf. But it would by no means be the first political tussle between the two as friction between them is said to have intensified since Clinton’s visit to India and Pakistan in March⁴³. Whether this will develop into something more confrontational remains to be seen).

Ultimately, the Pakistan military acted to prevent peace. They may well have remained silent at the beginning to see if India walked into the trap of committing to talks, then being forced to call them off by a set of vicious attacks on civilians. When India refused to derail the talks, even after the massacres, this scheme, not unlike Musharraf's elaborate Kargil invasion in its audacity, unraveled in disarray. New conditions were imposed: first that India agree to discuss items outside its Constitution, then the naked "ultimatum" to include Pakistan in the talks, followed by a hasty repudiation of the ceasefire.

Why is the Paki military afraid of peace? The answer is obvious. With its economy essentially destroyed, its upper middle class leaving the country in droves, its lower middle class reduced to seeking construction jobs, and its youth unemployed, under-educated and increasingly looking to jihad as the only way to earn a buck, Pakistan depends on the arms, drug and bigotry trades to bring wealth to its leaders. Money collected by the terrorist organizations from receipts of the drug trade in the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe and the US forms a significant part of the Pakistani economy today, running into billions each year. This compares with Pakistan’s total foreign exchange reserves, reported to be under $500 million in late August 2000.

The recent circus act in which the government advertised rules for public sales of material and equipment for the nuclear industry – which caused raised eyebrows worldwide - is an example of the chaotic nature of policy planning and economic decision making in Pakistan today. In this environment, the Kashmir cause is all that the "CEOcracy" has to hang on to in order to maintain some legitimacy. Moreover, peace in Kashmir would destroy the two-nation theory based raison d'etre of Pakistan in general, and of its generals in particular.

1. The ceasefire originated in the India-based wing of the HM, which was in touch with the people of Kashmir. Their "grassroots survey" told them that support for terrorist violence was very low among the people, and they saw their chances of ever entering the mainstream of political power in India disappearing.
2. Salahuddin, the commander of the Kashmiri faction of the HM inside POK, was persuaded by his India-based operations commander Majeed Dar and some of his subordinates to agree to a ceasefire and talks. He had little choice, because he depends on the support of these commanders to maintain his position as nominal head of the HM, in the face of stiff competition from the Punjabi faction.
3. The GoI had known of the impending ceasefire offer for a long time, with RAW having played, and continuing to play a big role in the negotiations with various parties.
4. The ceasefire with the local wings of the HM may still be in force. Those who offered the ceasefire have not outright rejected it, and several of their followers may well have surrendered to IA units. Reports of killings of HM fighters in J&K in recent weeks are most likely the results of actions against a few HM units that opposed the ceasefire.
5. Rivalries and power struggles in the terrorist movement have come out in the open, as JeI (POK) has taken direct control of the POK wing of HM.
6. The Musharraf government saw some advantage in not heading off the ceasefire announcement. Having realized that a ceasefire had been announced, they expressed cautious, noncommittal support for "the will of the Kashmiris" (not Pakistan’s own support for the peace process), even as they set the wheels in motion for the brutal massacres that followed. When they saw India was ready to continue talks despite the massacre, then they showed their hand by getting Salahuddin to issue an ultimatum and then to withdraw the ceasefire.
7. More than 130 innocent civilians died, and thousands more may die, because Musharraf, his military and the Jihad cannot afford to have the peace which a ceasefire would bring.

As a concluding remark, the authors wish to point out that there is one basic assumption in this paper, i.e. that Musharraf knew about the ceasefire offer before it was made. However, it is important to note that even if somehow, against all understanding of the way in which the Pakistani military establishment operates, he was surprised by the HM offer, the analysis of who killed the nascent peace process still stands. The only difference would be that in the case of foreknowledge the abortion of the ceasefire is equivalent to premeditated murder.

[3] Sahni, Sati, Slaves Have No Eid...The concluding part of a series on the Hizbul-Mujahideen, the largest militant outfit in Jammu & Kashmir, The Rediff Special, August 2, 2000. http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/02hizb.htm

[7] Sreedharan, Chindu, I Want To Die An Indian…Confessions of a Pakistan-trained Militant, The Rediff Special, September 1997. http://www.rediff.com/news/sep/05ptm.htm

[8] Anon., War Fatigue or True Quest For Peace? The Times of India News Service, July 25,2000. http://www.timesofindia.com/today/25hzbl4.htm

http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/01hizb.htm

[22] Haider, Ejaz, Pakistan and Hezb's Surprise Move, in the Pakistani weekly The Friday Times, July 28-August 3, 2000.

[23] Anon, On Autonomy Issue. Greater Kashmir ,June 26, 2000. http://www.greaterkashmir.com/editline.htm

[26] Jillani, Anees, The Launch of Two Scuds, in the Pakistani daily The News International, August 1, 2000. http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2000-daily/01-08-2000/oped/o2.htm

[37] Anon, Pak Economy Needs Western Help: Time. The News International, August 6, 2000. http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2000-daily/06-08-2000/main/main19.htm

[38] Anon, Agencies Ordered to Check Practice: Shujaat, Dawn, October 8, 1999. http://www.dawn.com

[39] Nooruzzaman, Syed, How Pakistan’s ISI Funds its Proxy War, Tribune India, http://www.tribuneindia.com/99nov28/head6.htm