Major General Arjun Ray. Kashmir Diary: Psychology of Militancy. Manas Publications, New Delhi 1997.

There are several books on the military and political history of post-1947 Kashmir. However, none have attempted to map the psychological dimensions of militancy or portray the extent to which information warfare dominates modern conflicts pertaining to India. The effort is all the more pertinent since it comes from a serving officer. The book was published in 1997 when the most of the violence, in Kashmir, was due to a local militant movement. Since then, cross-border terrorism has become the principal driver. The author's observation that merely neutralizing the militants can not solve militancy remains true.

Throughout the book, the author emphasizes that the goal of anti-militant operations is to win the hearts and minds of the local populace, rather than merely killing militants. The first section of the book is devoted to examining the causes of militancy and the psychology of militants. The author provides both a philosophical as well as historical perspective on militancy and terrorism, drawing from sources as diverse as Sartre, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and South American and Middle Eastern militant movements. A clear distinction is made between anarchist movements that merely seek to topple existing institutions, and militant movements aimed at securing specific political objectives. The origins of militancy in Kashmir are related to the broader picture, but the author is hamstrung by his inability as a military officer to discuss the history of political mismanagement, back-stabbing, and rampant corruption prevalent in the valley. The chapters on psychology of militants are eye-opening - the author argues, with the help of convincing statistics about captured militants, that militants are not psychopaths, fanatics, or psychologically abnormal in any respect. Another important insight is that for local Kashmiri militants, the major reasons for taking to the gun were political alienation (45.5%) and coercion (44.5%) with religion a distant third (10%).

In the second part of the book, the focus shifts to the means employed by the militants and their Pakistani sponsors. The goals of the militant movement are: to encourage the local populace to oppose the "occupation government", to communalize the militancy by provoking a Hindu backlash, to wear down the Indian government and people through a war of thousand cuts, and to mobilize international opinion in favor of the secessionist movement. This war is not conducted through bullets and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) alone - the author the information war fought in the media, madrassas, and masjids. Media management policies adopted by the central and state governments are shown to negatively impact the anti-militant operations by playing into the hands of the militants. Blunt, even cynical observations are directed towards national and international media. For media-persons, information is a commodity to be sold, and the increasingly competitive environment forces nationalistic and even ethical considerations to take a lower priority. The author acknowledges that these trends cannot be reversed by a confrontational policy, so he advocates befriending the media instead. The reasoning is that if information is provided in an open, credible and timely manner, then the media can be trusted to report it faithfully.

The last part of the book is devoted to the psychological impacts of anti-militancy operations on the army. The author contends that the need to fight and befriend the same people produces a cognitive dissonance among soldiers. He recommends a revision of traditional training and personnel policies, as well as the operating styles of military personnel at all levels of command. Recommendations include training curricula that emphasize greater study of general political and cultural history, and counter-insurgency policies that incorporate a thorough appreciation of the psyche of the people, ideological inclinations of local political parties, and doctrinal aspects of fundamentalist movements. The author also cautions military commanders against falling into the trap of body counts, and to resist the temptation of going beyond the law to achieve objectives.

Perhaps the most important message of the work is one that the author implies strongly, but is constrained from stating explicitly: in the final analysis, militancy is a political problem, and it can never be solved by military means alone. For the author, the military remains the last resort, when all other political and administrative alternatives have broken down. The suggested reforms are drawn form hard lessons learned from combating militancy, but again, the author clearly has more than counter insurgency in mind. He recognizes that total wars are becoming increasingly obsolete due to realities of global trade and nuclear deterrence, in the subcontinent and beyond. Counter-insurgency operations offer a paradigm for low intensity conflicts in general, where the ground rules are very different from conventional wars, and where losing the information battle can convert tactical victories into strategic defeats. India must learn these lessons, and take them to heart. Otherwise, as the author quotes, India shall be condemned to the fate of the United States, whose generals believed; "The solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm. Till the other side cracks and gives up."

D. Kotwal .'Dynamics and Unending Violence in Assam'. Strategic Analysis 24 (3) June 2000.

This article looks at the dynamics of Assamese politics in the last two decades with a focus on the insurgencies in the state. It does not attempt to find a solution for the problem, rather to detail the facts. The two major protagonists described here, are the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of the Pakistani Government. ULFA is a left wing entity that seeks the independence of Assam from India, along with goals that are more global. It was, like the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) a product of the All Assam Students Union (AASU) of the late 1970s. It was formed as a reaction against the changing demographics wrought by illegal immigration from Bangladesh. The nexus between the ULFA and the political parties is extensive.

The AGP viewed the ULFA as a "second line of defence" despite its avowedly anti-constitutional foundations. The AGP government resulted in ULFA sympathizers proliferating in the government, police, and bureaucracy. The years of AGP rule terminated in Presidents rule in 1990, at which time the Union Minister of State for Home noted that: "The whole state machinery is with the ULFA." The Congress Party is believed to have been supported by the ULFA in the 1991 elections, which the Congress won. The Congress government released all the ULFA cadres who had been arrested by the Army and Police action preceding the elections. This resulted in ULFA gaining strength.

The author notes that while the scale of violence has changed quantitatively, the ground situation remains the qualitatively the same. This suggests that the continuing ULFA hold over the government machinery. He also notes that the ULFA has changed its tactics, going after "hard" government and military targets in the recent past. It is unclear if the ISI has any role in these changed tactics. The role of the ISI can be traced back to the 1960s, when Bhutto insisted that the districts of India adjacent to East Pakistan should not be permitted to remain quiescent. The influx of illegal immigrants from East Pakistan and now Bangladesh has continued unabated since the late 1960s. The author does not explicitly state the demographic constitution of the illegal immigrants, but comments about the increasing Muslim population suggest that the immigrants are predominantly Muslim. Further, the author is unable to demonstrate a Bangladeshi/East Pakistani policy of changing the demographics via illegal immigration. He is, however, able to show the Union Government’s complicity in abetting the illegal immigration. This strongly suggests that the real solution to the problem does not require any agreement with Bangladesh, per se, but strong implementation of existing rules and laws.

The recently reported nexus between the ULFA and the ISI is baffling, given their mutually contradictory long-term agendas. Indeed, reference to L. K. Advani’s "White Paper on the ISI" indicates that the ULFA is the ISI’s principal ally in India. Nevertheless, the formation of such an alliance to obtain short-term goals is deleterious to the peace process in Assam. These should have been explored in some detail. Finally, the author does not explore why the ULFA camps in Bhutan continue to exist, given the close relationship between Thimpu and Delhi.

D. Kotwal. 'The Naga Insurgency: The Past And The Future'. Strategic Analysis 24 (4) July 2000.

The author seeks to examine the Naga issue from a mainstream Indian perspective. He documents the history of Naga nationalism; Naga ties to India, the various insurgent organizations, the international aspect of the Naga issue and the current peace process. The author does not critically examine the insurgent demands, the Government of India conditions, the relationship between the politicians, the insurgents, and the sticking points in the current negotiations. Nonetheless, the historical study is valuable for those seeking to understand the problem, or those seeking to propose a solution for it. The Naga issue may be considered the first separatist movement of independent India. This has much to do with the lack of effective British control over the Nagas before Indian Independence; the British plans for a "Crown Colony;" and the ham fisted approach of the Government of India towards the aspirations of the Nagas. The Naga National Council (NNC) under Angami Zapu Phizo was initially the premier entity representing the Nagas. They set up a Federal Government of Nagaland in 1956, but were party to the Shillong Accord in 1975 where they agreed to a solution under the Constitution of the Republic of India. This resulted in their supercession by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980.

The NSCN’s primary factions belong to the Myanmarese S. S. Khaplang and the other led by the Myanmarese Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah who is from Manipur. The NSCN (Isak-Muivah) faction is indubitably the dominant insurgent entity in Nagaland today. The NSCN is a religiously based socialist entity that aims for the formation of a Greater Nagaland (Nagalim) homeland for all Nagas, from present day Nagaland to those in Manipur, and in Myanmar. They also believe in accelerating the disintegration of India to liberate "discontented peoples and nationalities." In practice, this has meant that the NSCN has numerous front organizations claiming to fight for other, even unrelated, ethnic or religious groups. The NSCN obtains financial support from the Chinese Communist Party, the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and various shell terrorist and criminal entities that work for it. In addition to their insurgent activity, the NSCN (I-M) has succeeded in internationalizing the Naga issue including at the United Nations.The current peace process involves the NSCN (I-M), the NSCN (K), and the state government in addition to the Government of India. The article does not describe the charter of the peace process or possible compromises that might be on the table. Given the shell organizations that the NSCN (I-M) operates, it is possible that the cease-fire is a means to stockpiling weapons, while keeping the situation hot through its proxies. The Naga demand for a Greater Nagaland has the possibility of creating a Bosnia-like ethnic situation where majority and minority groups in non-contiguous areas become targets of ethnic cleansing.

Israel’s nuclear policy, ever since it became the sixth country to possess nuclear weapons, has been one of opacity. This policy has extended to the press - with a military censor forbidding any discussions on the subject - and to the Israeli parliament which, barring stray remarks, scrupulously avoided any mention of the country’s nuclear weapons. Israel has however been under foreign pressure, particularly from the U.S., to be more forthcoming on this issue. This resulted in various public statements by Israeli leaders for the ostensible purpose of assuring their neighbors, while retaining the cloak of opacity. The statement by an Israeli leader that it will not be the "first nation to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East", was for instance, creatively parsed by both sides during a U.S.-Israeli meeting as being reflective of the truth, while being reassuring to other countries at the same time. Indeed, by the time of Nixon’s presidency Israeli opacity on nuclear matters and an American acknowledgement of the same came to characterize their relations on the subject.

A recent motion to debate the nuclear issue filed by a left-wing member broke parliamentary silence on this subject. Avner Cohen in his opinion piece takes this as an indicator and argues for changes in the nuclear policy. Though the motion for debate was quite hastily overturned in a vote, Cohen (also the author of "Israel and the Bomb") – while acknowledging to the policy’s appropriateness in the past - denies any current and future validity for the opacity doctrine. The objections are on two fronts – external and internal. The notion that any transparency on the part of Israel would affect relations with the U.S. and result in possible sanctions is rejected. It is argued that the old understandings on opacity have run their course, necessitating newer ways of addressing the problem. Israel’s posture is also seen as holding back progress on arms control talks with Egypt, which naturally insists on clarifications on Israel’s nuclear status. Cohen views the ostrich-like attitude of the parliament and silent acquiescence of the press as violative of Israel’s democratic character. He calls for parliamentary and public debate in the Israel of the 21st century. It is hard to disagree with his view that internal reasons for a change in Israel’s public posture regarding nuclear weapons are even more important than external reasons.

In the present piece Cohen does not detail ways in which the Americans could accommodate a more transparent posture by Israel while still holding on to their non-proliferation ‘concerns’. This could be particularly interesting after the South Asian tests, given the fervent back-room maneuvering conducted by the U.S. to assuage Arab (and particularly Egyptian) concerns about Israeli nuclear weapons at both the NPT Extension of 1995 and the NPT Review Conference of 2000.

Rajesh Rajagopalan, 'Deterrence and Nuclear Confrontations: The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Border War'. Strategic Analysis 24 (3) June 2000.

The author follows up his study of nuclear doctrine for states with Small Nuclear Forces (SNF). In his earlier article, was reviewed in BRM , he had explored the various doctrines followed by the Nuclear Weapon States. Here, he examines the conditions under which deterrence has worked. He, rightly, suggests that this is a difficult subject to study as there is little by way of published literature on this subject. He restricts his analysis to cases where literature is available. This restricts him to two known confrontations between declared nuclear powers to examine what deters.

The first case study is the Cuban missile crisis. The author concludes that the US was deterred by the fact, as Bundy puts it, "We had to assume that in any nuclear exchange, no matter who started it, some of these missiles and bombers would get through with megaton bombs. Even one would be a disaster. We had no interest in any nuclear exchange other than to avoid it. The fact that our own strategic forces were very much larger gave us no comfort." In the final analysis it was the possibility that it could be attacked by at-least, a megaton bomb is what deterred. Other lessons from the Cuban crisis are: "That deterrence worked despite all these hurdles should be a cause for comfort, and suggest a different way to look at the crisis that the constant reiteration of how close the world had come to a nuclear holocaust. Another lesson from the Cuban missile crisis is that aggressive nuclear declaratory policies should be treated with greater circumspection." In other words having aggressive policies and doctrines could lead to problems, being unrealistic in the face of crisis. The second case studied is the confrontation between Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China during the Ussuri River clashes. Here the literature is very sketchy despite 'glasnost' and needs more time for all the facts to be released. The essence was that nuclear rhetoric increased in quasi-official media and the US was concerned that an exchange could take place. However, there is no definite information from Soviet sources of their plans or from Chinese sources of whether they felt threatened. However, in the balance, the Soviet Union did not make good its threats and it can be inferred that it was the rudimentary Chinese weapon capability that deterred.

Actually, the former is a study of confrontation between a democratic power confronting a totalitarian power. It shows the value of deterrence despite numerical superiority. The second case is a study of confrontation between two totalitarian states. Deterrence appeared to work in both cases. The assured delivery capability and political will/resolve clearly played a role, but are not examined by the author. The author should have explored further venues of thought. For example in his study of thermonuclear weapons, he has not studied the role of low-yield weapons employed in a strategic role. He does discuss the issue of tactical weapons. He finds them destabilizing and inherently escalational. Rather than being of deterrent value, they were potential candidates for de-stabilization. He also has not explored the fact that "Moscow was worried that Chinese recklessness might lead to a direct nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the US, a confrontation in which Moscow had little interest. If Beijing was disappointed by Soviet pusillanimity, Khrushchev was alarmed by Mao's refusal to understand the implications of a nuclear war." There are sub-continental contexts for this line of thought. One could make a case that it was the US MAD doctrine and posture, which prompted Soviet Union to be circumspect about its junior partner's propensity to take risk. A similar line of action should be examined for the Sino-Pakistani nexus. The deterred power has to have stakes in its survival and some times, it is difficult to understand what the stakes are. This could be crucial in breaking the umbilical for the Sino-Pakistani nexus. He could also have studied the vast literature on crises near home - Operation Brasstacks and the 1990 imbroglio. Here there were two undeclared nuclear states in a war of words. Both have been subjects of seminars and papers in the West.

Baker Spring. Beware of a US-Russia Deal on Missile Defense. Heritage Foundation.

It is probably fair to say that the article under review encapsulates the views of American conservatives on the subject of missile defences and treaties. The title says it all -- "beware of a deal" on missile defence, as if the reader were being warned about a coming plague or foreign invasion! In fact, the article is published by the Heritage Foundation, a well-known conservative think-tank in Washington, and American conservatives have always been suspicious of any treaties or arms deals with "The Evil Empire", as they were wont to refer to the former Soviet Union (FSU). The FSU is no more, but suspicions about the Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans and other evil foreigners have not abated, in the American conservative mind. American liberals, and generally the Democrat Party, have traditionally been more favourably inclined to consider anti-missile treaties as being good for America, and for the world. Conservatives, on the other hand, have traditionally considered this a "zero-sum game", i.e. any gains for American security must necessarily come at the expense of the rest of the world, and vice versa. Therefore, any treaty that is "acceptable" to Russia, China and the European Union must necessarily be bad for America.

The above synopsis, then, explains the title and theme of the article under review. The author is afraid that Bill Clinton, in search of a "theme" for his presidency, will "do a deal" with Russia and sign an agreement that is acceptable to Russia and is therefore ipso facto harmful to America's security interests. The author claims that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States is no longer valid, since the Soviet Union has collapsed, end of story. America can now go ahead and do as it pleases in the field of missile defence, subject only to the limitations of technology. However, the Clinton Administration, the Democrat Party and most of the rest of the world (Britain being a notable exception) believe that missile defences affect world stability sufficiently that the ABM Treaty should be preserved in fact, if not in law. In 1997, a US delegation led by Secretary of State Albright signed three agreements in New York that relate to the achievement of this aim. These agreements, involving the US and four FSU states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazhakstan) require ratification by the US Senate, prior to implementation.

The author lists several objections to the 1997 agreements. In summary, all the objections claim that the agreements severely hamper America's ability to deploy any meaningful missile defence -- theatre or national. He then proceeds to list the characteristics that an American missile defence should have, and which would contravene the 1997 agreements. He stresses that the the US Senate should inisist on these provisions, and refuse to ratify the 1997 agreements as they currently exist. The author's reason for urging strong vigilance by the Senate is that he fears that President Clinton is so keen to get Russia's agreement on any treaty, that he will even accept a bad treaty.