DR. SANJAY BADRI-MAHARAJ

In late June 2000, the American news network, NBC, ran a story suggesting that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was far superior to India's. A number of claims were made. However, none of them were supported by evidence. As might be expected, critics within India and disgruntled 'hawks' were quick to seize upon this report. Some even went so far as to support it without critically examining the facts. In this article, we will examine the claims made.

Pakistan has 25-100 nuclear weapons

The fissile materials at Pakistan's disposal are Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium. Leonard Spector (in "Nuclear Ambitions") estimated that Pakistan's facility at Kahuta could produce 50 kg of HEU per year. Estimates for maximum production capacities for Kahuta range from 45-120kg of HEU per year. It is also apparent that the Kahuta plant would not operate at maximum capacity since ultracentrifuges are difficult things to run and tend to suffer from many mechanical problems. Indeed, Kahuta was shut down briefly in the 1990s for maintenance.

For a stock of 100 weapons and assuming a sophisticated design using 15 kg of HEU, Pakistan would need at least 1500kg HEU. If the production capacity of the Kahuta plant is taken at the high end of the spectrum (120 kg per year), the plant would have needed to run at full stretch for over 12 years. The plant only started producing HEU in 1986. India estimates Pakistan's nuclear weapons materials stockpile as being sufficient for 30-50 weapons. This is in accord with a more accurate assessment of Kahuta's performance. This means that Pakistan has the annual production capacity for enough HEU for 3-5 weapons, and it has had this capacity for a period of 10 years. Regarding weapons design, China is widely believed to have proliferated to Pakistan the design from China's fourth nuclear test. This is not a particularly sophisticated design of a 1250kg weapon using 25kg HEU. The M-11 missiles supplied to Pakistan have a maximum payload of 500kg. Now, it is possible for Pakistan to have nuclear warheads for the M-11s - and India has long assumed this - but this would require considerable work in re-engineering the basic design provided by China. The results of the Chagai tests of 1998 do not clarify doubts in this regard.

The other possibility is a Plutonium based design. Weapons grade plutonium stocks in Pakistan are very low. Even if we assume that the reactor at Khushab is operational, and that the Plutonium reprocessing plant is working, it remains unclear if enough Plutonium for more than 2-3 weapons are available in Pakistan. Normally, a period of 2 years is allocated to permit radioactivity to decay. The reprocessing plant is certainly not working to full capacity. It is, therefore, highly likely that the HEU reserves provide a more accurate assessment of weapon capability available to Pakistan.

India has only five weapons and no nuclear missile capability

It is difficult to know exactly how many 'weapons' India has actually produced. However, weaponization has certainly taken place. Full mock delivery trials were actually completed by 1994. A rudimentary system was in place from 1986-88. The Indian Air Force has conducted a number of experiments to find the most suitable aircraft. The Jaguar was initially selected - the MiG-27 fleet, though equally suitable, was earmarked for Offensive Air Support (OAS) operations - but two things counted against it:

• There was a somewhat inadequate ground clearance. This is confirmed by Chengappa (in "Weapons of Peace"); and
• With a heavy centerline payload, two drop tanks and two R-550 AAMs, the Jaguar's performance is somewhat sluggish.

The latter appears to be the reason for the selection of the Mirage-2000 as the primary strike aircraft.

Weapons have been available for air delivery since 1986-88. It is believed that these are 12-15kT fission weapons. Furthermore, there are at least two hardened sites for the storage of nuclear weapons. One is located somewhere in and around the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), the other is located in central India. There are apparently others, but these have not been independently confirmed. It is highly unlikely that this level of infrastructure has been created for five weapons.

We will next examine India's fissile material production capacity. At peak performance, CIRUS can produce 9.6kg weapons grade Plutonium/year while Dhruva can produce 24-25kg/yr. Now, over the last 25 years, CIRUS has operated at an average of 40% capacity, while Dhruva has worked at 60% capacity for the last 10 years. This suggests that India has stocks of weapons grade Plutonium for at least 50 weapons. After accounting for the 1998 tests and the FTBR and we may reasonably expect stocks sufficient for 40+weapons. It is unclear how many of these are likely to be assembled weapons.

The previous estimation excludes the fissile material from power reactors. Using 8kg of reactor grade plutonium and using gas-boosted primaries, these can be rendered viable. This implies that there is likely to be enough Plutonium for over 300 weapons. There is little doubt that India has tested gas-boosted primaries in the 1998 tests. Even without gas-boosted primaries, reasonably experienced weapons teams can make reliable weapons from reactor grade plutonium.

In addition, CANDU reactors produce plutonium that is more suitable for nuclear weapons, since they contain much less of the troublesome Pu-238 isotope. This reduces the need to design the weapon so that the heat produced by the decay of this isotope does not cause an unacceptable temperature rise.

As far as the development of missile warheads is concerned, in 1982, India was ready to test a 12-15kT weapon weighing only 170-200kg. Weight was never India's problem when making a nuclear missile warhead. India possessed a fully viable and operational nuclear warhead capability for an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) from April 11, 1999 with the 'Agni-2' test. The importance of the Agni-2 test was that as part of its payload, a nuclear weapons assembly, minus its plutonium core, was mounted. This was to test whether all systems, including the safety locks would work. It has been independently confirmed that India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) had been working on such a system since late 1996. Chengappa confirmed that this system was tested. Prior to the test, Indian scientists were reported to have had problems a high voltage arcing problem (causing premature triggering of the device) when the warhead was subject to severe vibrations. The test was intended, among other things, to confirm whether or not this problem was solved. The April 11 test telemetry records showed all safety locks worked and that the problem of premature triggering had been addressed.

As far as Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) go, regardless of the Indian Army's official pronouncements, the 'Prithvi' was always intended to have a secondary nuclear role. In 1996-97, after clearance from the Gowda government, India actually began work into mating nuclear warheads to missiles. A former artillery officer has independently confirmed this in 1997. Mating the warheads to the missiles required modifications in safety locking systems and validating its ability to withstand high-G forces. Two tests for the mechanism to mount and trigger warheads were conducted on Prithvi SS-250 missiles before formally deploying them in September 1997.

Chengappa indicates that four nuclear-armed Prithvis and one Agni were deployed for retaliatory nuclear strikes during the Kargil War. This has also been confirmed independently.

Pakistan's missiles are 'tested' systems while India's are not

IRBMs:

The Agni has been successfully tested 3 times - not twice - as claimed in the report. The first two tests were of the Agni-1 and were quite successful, and only one Agni-1 test was unsuccessful. Considerable telemetry data was collected. The final Agni-1 test, on 19 Feb. 1994, was tested to a range of 1450km. The missile had an actual range of 2500km. The trajectory of a missile can be lifted or depressed to simulate a longer range. The Agni-2 was tested to around 2100 km. It also sent back much telemetric data. Its actual range is some 3000km with a 1000kg payload. This is intended for the 200kT boosted-fission warhead that has been prepared for the Agni.

Pakistan's IRBM - Ghauri - is based on the Nodong-1/-2 families. The Shaheen, which is believed to be a Chinese M-9 system, has not demonstrated any performance beyond 6-700 km. The Nodong has never been tested beyond 800-1000km. According to CDISS, the Nodong appears to have had its first test in the Sea of Japan on May 29, 1993 in somewhat unusual circumstances. A total of four missiles were launched from mobile launchers during this test, and sources agree that only one or two of these were Nodongs, the others being Scud-Cs. Whereas previous test missiles had been launched to the South, these were launched eastwards towards Japan itself, at a point where the Sea of Japan is only 800 km wide, making a full range Nodong test impossible. At least one of these missiles flew for 500 km into an area where two North Korean ships had been moored for several days (presumably to observe the terminal phase). Moreover, none of the missiles sent back any telemetry data. This would suggest either that the North Koreans were attempting to disguise the Nodong tests by firing them with Scud-Cs, or, as some analysts have suggested, that they were a demonstration for an Iranian delegation rather than a proper technical evaluation. Reports that another Nodong test was to be carried out surfaced in October 1996, but no test occurred. Then in May 1997, it was revealed that up to ten Nodongs had been deployed. Sources at the time indicated that three mobile Nodong Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs) were sighted along the northeastern coast of the country, and another seven launchers were said to be seen at a facility near Pyongyang. This means that the North Koreans deployed the Nodong after only 1-2 tests, without any telemetric data being collected. It is unclear why the Nodong is claimed to be a reliable delivery vehicle.

Typically, once the technical parameters of the missiles are proved, only batch testing is done for reliability every few years. The Americans, however, tend to be a bit more thorough. The Indian press tends to make a lot of noise regarding the Agni tests and has quoted the Russian Topol-M as an example. However, here is some interesting information regarding Russia's latest ICBM.

Work on the Topol-M began in 1993. The first flight test took place on 20 December 1994. In December 1997, two Topol-Ms were put into service. One combat regiment consisting of 10 Topol-Ms was said to be deployed as of December 1998. Two more regiments are expected to be put in service in 2000-2001. Now, by December 1997, only three Topol-Ms had been tested - one test ended in failure. The Russians had an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on the system with only two successful tests. The remainder of the tests were only reliability checks.

The Agni design has been successfully tested 3 times - two Agni-1 tests and one Agni-2 test. This is not perfect, but it is no worse than the Nodongs. Indeed, it is a shade better since the missiles were heavily instrumented and provided a great deal of telemetry data. An IOC on the system is achievable at present and the system can be deployed. Some sections of the press disparagingly dismiss Dr. Kalam's words, but Kalam always said that batch testing for reliability would be needed from time to time.

With respect to the Ghauri itself, if Ghauri is indeed based on the Nodong 1, then the following follow:

• The system has been tested at most 3 times - never to maximum range.
• The range of the system is only around 950km

In a detailed analysis cited in the May 2 edition of The Hindu newspaper, Professor S. Chandrashekar concluded that a solid fuel missile carrying between 13 and 16 tons of fuel would not achieve the range achieved by the Ghauri. Thus, it can be assumed that Ghauri is a liquid fuel system. Chandrashekhar also noted that if the Ghauri was indeed developed from the North Korean No Dong 1, its propellant may consist of unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) and nitric acid. He calculated that such a combination could be expected to give the Ghauri a specific impulse of some 235 seconds. Given the launch weights quoted above, the missile would achieve a range of some 950km. Even the Ghauri-2 has a proven range of less than 1500km; it is unclear if it ever left the atmosphere. If it did not, then its proven range is 1000km. Verifying the performance upon re-entry is critical. Clearly, it is hard to see how Pakistan is actually 'superior' to India in terms of IRBM class delivery systems.

SRBMs:

The Prithvi SS-150 and SS-250 versions have been successfully tested 18 times. This makes for quite a high degree of reliability. During 1995, two missiles were fired at targets on Wheeler Island from pre-surveyed launch sites. The Circular Error of Probability (CEP) of these missiles has been independently verified to be 10 metres. The missile does have the drawback of being liquid fuelled, though. However, this does not impose the level to tactical limitations sometimes cited by 'experts'. Pakistan's M-11s have also been quite extensively tested, but their accuracy, even from pre-surveyed launch sites, is uncertain.

As far as nuclear warheads go, as mentioned earlier, it appears that between 1996-97, India developed the capability to mount nuclear warheads on the Prithvi. Pakistan may have been able to put nuclear warheads on its M-11s somewhat earlier, but this is a moot point now.

Any assessment of the Air Defense Ground Environment Systems in both India and Pakistan would lead to the conclusion that Pakistan's airspace is vastly more vulnerable. The Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) systems currently employed on Indian MiGs, Jaguars and, most importantly, Mirages give them an advantage that is neglected in the article. Although this is not widely known or publicized, the Indians field one of the most advanced Air Defense networks in Asia. It has over 20 squadrons of interceptors, thirteen of which will soon be equipped with 100km range Air-to- Air (AAMs). Additionally, it has 38 squadrons of heavily upgraded Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) backed up by thousands of radar directed AD guns and MANPADS.

Pakistan in contrast has a well coordinated, but limited AD network compared to India and lacks the multiple layers of redundancy built into the system. Pakistan's F-16s are early -A models without Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles. Its Mirages, F-7s and F-6s have no BVR capability whatsoever. In addition, Pakistan has only nine squadrons of SAMs - eight of which are short-range Crotale systems.

The H-bomb test, Subramanyam, Singh and the Maximalists

The issue of the thermonuclear test of 1998 has been discussed to exhaustion by many people - some 'experts', others who actually know what they are writing about. At worst, the test achieved roughly a 10-33% thermonuclear burn. The 45kT device used a 15kT boosted fission trigger and a 30kT fusion stage. It appears that the device achieved around 8-10kT of the 30kT fusion stage. If the primary stage was 20kT boosted-fission stage - as Dr. P.K. Iyengar claims - then 5kT instead of 25kT was achieved in the fusion stage.

However, recent re-assessments of the seismic data, radiochemical analysis and many other factors, have given reason to believe that BARC was accurate in its assessments of the yield of the thermonuclear test. This test does mean that India does have an H-bomb capability - just possibly not one that achieved its full design potential.

K. Subramanyam and Jasjit Singh argued for years that India did not need to test under two conditions. First, if the weapons were to be used as strictly retaliatory systems. Second, if India would be satisfied with weapons yields between 12 and 200kT - relying on fission and boosted-fission weapons. General Sundarji and the military shared this view. The thermonuclear test in 1998 was done at BARC's prompting. To criticize Subramanyam and Singh in support of the aggressive statements made by the maximalist school is extremely unfair and is a 'reactive' rather than 'rational' approach.

The Indian maximalists are now in vogue thanks to the NBC report. These hard-line positions are known to have severely hampered the discussion on the operational aspects of a nuclear arsenal in India by the old National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). It behooves all professionals to view this NBC report logically and not emotionally. The report has provided nothing new regarding Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. Regarding India's capabilities, the report is clearly inaccurate. One is reminded of a US State Department Representative's comment: "We don't know much about other countries' weapons programs. We only pretend we do."

One must examine the facts objectively. India is not a massive nuclear power, but it is not 'backward' in either weapons or delivery systems compared to Pakistan.