Ballistic missile defenses, tactical nukes and intelligence

Thérèse Delpech. 'US Ballistic Missile Defence: A French View'. Disarmament Diplomacy. Issue No.44, 2000.

Thérèse Delpech is the Director for Strategic Affairs at the CEA, a French governmental agency that conducts civilian research but which also designs and tests that country's nuclear arsenal. Delpech has the advantage of moving both in academic and policy circles. Consequently, her views on the issues that Europeans in general and the French in particular must face on the subject of the American National Missile Defense initiative make for interesting reading. This article was written in 1999, and while events have moved rapidly since, the concerns she raised remain major sticking points between the US and the rest of NATO, Clinton’s appeals notwithstanding.

Like many others, the apparent lack of American concern, or awareness of the global strategic ramifications of NMD disturbs her. The headlong rush to test and deploy based on future technological promises and domestic American politics gives little time or space for deeper and more meaningful evaluation. Many of the questions she raises are practical ones. She wonders whether the current test schedule really gives the US administration the kind of information it needs to make a decision. Further, she wonders whether it will provide the kind of protection that is expected, when it is deployed. Delpech, while open minded, is skeptical of the answer to the latter question. She suggests rather interestingly that an affordable and most importantly a workable system, coupled with an unwavering American commitment to deploy might actually swing the rest of NATO around to support the plan. This would be a blow not so much to the Russians who hold the advantage in the form of the ABM treaty, but to the Chinese.

However, this piece differs from many others in that she urges Europeans to consider seriously the American imperatives that drive NMD. The Transatlantic relationship is mutually beneficial, but she points out that unlike Europe the US has global commitments which means that the US must deal with threats that Europe has the luxury of ignoring. It may be necessary for Americans to address their vulnerabilities to properly maintain and renew their commitment to Europe, or indeed its allies anywhere else in the world. American threat perceptions can not be simply wished or argued away. None other than Zbignew Brzezinski (former National Security Advisor) has echoed this conciliatory attitude on the other side of the Atlantic in his article "Living With a New Europe" in the recent issue of The National Interest. There, he recommends that the US delay deploying NMD until some sort of consensus with its major European partners can be reached. It is indeed heartening to see that at least some involved in the debate are looking beyond the NMD itself to the far greater priority of preserving and strengthening the Alliance.

J. Price

Overt nuclearization brings, in its wake, a number of questions that must be adequately addressed to preserve the value of overt nuclearization. These issues include credibility of deterrent, command and control and the doctrine of use. The issue of tactical nuclear weapons is one that strikes to the heart of these issues.

The author discusses the distinctions between the various types of nuclear weapons. These are typically classified as strategic, theatre, and tactical nuclear weapons. The article describes the lack of significant technical differences between these weapons and the overlap in terms of weapon range, yield, location, type of delivery systems, target location, and readiness of weapon. The author concludes that strategic use of nuclear weapons are those uses against counter value (i.e., major enemy cities and industrial centers) or counter force (i.e., enemy’s nuclear assets). Non-strategic uses of nuclear weapons are those used to accomplish tactical or theatre goals. In this context, the author rightly concludes that the phrase, "tactical use of nuclear weapons," is more accurate.

The author then explores the tactical use of nuclear weapons from a warfighting standpoint. The tactical use of nuclear weapons can only be a rational option if it precludes escalation to more destructive levels of warfare. The inability to preclude this led to the elimination of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons from Europe. The disadvantages of weapons that may be used in tactical situations include the cost of manufacture, cost of maintenance, logistics support, the decentralization of command and control necessary for tactical use of nuclear weapons, and ultimately their degradation of the threshold for nuclearization. The author, however, does not advocate a freeze on Indian research and development of fractional-kiloton weapons (which are likely to only find uses in tactical situations), terming this "a strategic capability."

The author finally addresses the Pakistani and Chinese doctrines that Indian strategic analysts must plan for. The Indian army doctrine calls for "fighting the war in enemy territory." The author points out that many Indian analysts believe that Pakistan’s First Use doctrine, designed to prevent a comprehensive military defeat, calls for the early use of nuclear weapons, as a defensive measure, on Indian armor on Pakistani soil. This doctrine is designed to negate India’s conventional superiority over Pakistan and limit Indian retaliation for proxy wars conducted by Pakistan. The author is clear that forestalling any Pakistani nuclearization of a war with India must include a declaratory policy that an attack on Indian troops even if they are in enemy territory will be construed as an attack on India. This opens the door to an Indian retaliatory counter force and counter value strike. If India does not consider such an attack to necessitate a nuclear riposte, and then India runs the risk of substantial loss of military, civil, and national morale.

The Chinese context is considerably more ambiguous. Over 90% of China’s nuclear weapons are non-strategic in nature and of relevance only to its immediate neighbors. This is consistent with China’s nuclear doctrine that permits the use of nuclear weapons on what is considered Chinese territory. In the context of an ill-defined border, and continuing border conflict with China, the Chinese doctrine towards India is highly unstable. The author emphasizes that a declaratory policy that calls for strategic nuclear retaliation is the only stabilizing option in the face of the threat of tactical use of nuclear weapons.

These issues are critical to the continuing credibility of the Indian deterrent, and the protection of the territorial integrity and security of the Republic of India.

The author presents a historical analysis of the lack of a strategic security culture in the Indian political leadership as well as the civil bureaucracy manning the various ministries concerned with India’s national security. He also reviews the attempts by various governments, especially the one by the current government headed by Vajpayee, to establish a formal National Security Council (NSC). He regrets how the current NSC, in spite of the fanfare with which it has been launched, fails to meet certain critical functions associated with national security strategies. He suggests remedial measures to make the NSC function like a well-oiled machine, which effectively meets India’s national security requirements.

The author first addresses the traditional scorn showed by the Indian political and the bureaucratic establishment towards the evolution of an efficient NSC. In view of the numerous military conflicts that India faced right from its independence, formation and evolution of the NSC should have been a natural phenomenon. However, this did not happen. In addition to this, the Indian armed forces have been deliberately and completely isolated from decisions affecting national security, right from independence. Another factor that stifled the NSC is the fear-psychosis of the civil bureaucracy towards the "emergence of a rival elite with direct access to the political leadership."

The author laments how even the 1962 debacle could not motivate the Government to evolve a NSC. It was not until the V.P. Singh government that a formal NSC was constituted. However, the short life of this government meant that the NSC was dead on arrival. Subsequently, the Narasimha Rao government made some half-hearted attempts towards this end. The Vajpayee government, by far, took seemingly the strongest steps to establish a NSC. However, the author shows how even this effort is just "old wine in new bottle", suffering from the same old lack of strategic thinking and the lack of integral involvement of the military high command in the decision making. The National Security Advisory Board, which is a part of NSC, is dominated by bureaucrats, thus depriving it of independent strategic think tanks. In addition, the current National Security Advisor (NSA) holds the additional responsibility of being the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. The author cries out for the need for an independent NSA, for national security is not a part-time job.

The author studies the need for India’s NSC to learn from the wealth of experience that the National Security Councils (NSCs) of western democracies, especially USA and France, possess and adapt it to the unique strategic needs of India. The author also recognizes the importance of institutionalizing the current NSC by an act of parliament much like the other successful NSCs. This will, hopefully, prevent the NSC from becoming a prey to the whims and fancies of the various governments and political instability. In the form of all the above suggestions, the author makes a strong pitch for shedding the ad-hoc policies adopted by the government towards national security. The author advocates making the armed forces an integral part of the national security decision making.

In an article titled "Chinese Nuclear Doctrine," IDSA research fellow Savita Pande offers an overview of the growing literature on Chinese military policy. The author follows up a quick introduction to the Soviet roots of China's nuclear program with a detailed examination of the changes in the military doctrine of China over time. The original doctrine of "People's War" employed by Mao with devastating effectiveness against the Japanese was replaced in 1959 by "People's War under Modern Conditions" as nuclear weapons entered the picture and Sino-Soviet relations began to cool. Both variations of this doctrine propounded strategic withdrawal against a superior foe allowing the army to trade space for time while mobilizing the masses for combat, and eventual victory.

As China emerged from political turmoil in the 1970s and initiated its modernization program, Chinese military leaders began to reevaluate their military doctrines. Admiral Liu Huaqing proposed a forward defense strategy that was officially accepted by the government in 1985. The doctrine of "Active Defense in People's War under Modern Conditions" rejected trading space for time since that would result in the abandonment of the critical industrial centers vital to the war effort. Active defense now called for offensive, mobile operations in China's periphery against weaker opponents, even as "People's War" remained the only feasible response to a superpower attack.

The author explains that the current doctrine of "Limited Local War under High Tech Conditions" combines Chinese technological advances with an even greater focus on peripheral conflicts. This includes limited engagements with more powerful states such as the United States. Chinese strategy is now focused on a smaller number of well-trained offensive forces equipped with advanced weapons systems, seeking to strike preemptively at enemy forces.

Where does China's nuclear doctrine fit into this picture? In contrast with the evolution in its military doctrine, the author (drawing from Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston and others) describes how the nuclear doctrine of China has remained remarkably stable over the decades. Faced with overwhelmingly superior nuclear rivals, China has sought to develop a basic secure second-strike capability against enemy population centers. Existing Chinese ballistic missiles lack the accuracy for counterforce targeting, and Chinese strategists have prudently stuck with a "minimum deterrence" doctrine.

The author also describes the more ambitious doctrine of "limited deterrence" that China appears to have recently adopted, in which a spectrum of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is being develop to permit a proportionate response to any nuclear attack. The basic concept draws from Thomas Schelling's "manipulation of risk" logic where deterrence works by threatening to push an opponent down the slippery slope of nuclear escalation. Although Johnston and other analysts have termed "limited deterrence" more of a wish-list than a presently feasible doctrine, there is little doubt that the next decade will see China deploying newer and more accurate missiles and warheads with some counterforce capability. The solid-fuel mobile DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile and the new Type 094 ballistic missile submarine will dramatically improve the survivability and effectiveness of the Chinese nuclear force.

The author also discusses the Chinese adoption of a no-first-use policy and its arms control policy, echoing Banning Garret and Bonnie Glaser's earlier analysis. She concludes her section on the future of Chinese force modernization by observing that the speed of the nuclear modernization of China will depend on American progress in theater missile defense (and, presumably, mini-Star Wars).

This article provides a very useful collation of contemporary Western and Chinese analyses of China's nuclear weapons program, especially for those readers who are unfamiliar with the topic. However, this reviewer would have preferred the author to relate Chinese nuclear doctrine to India, especially since much of the information provided is already available from the sources cited in the detailed footnotes. How did the evolution of Chinese nuclear doctrine influence the pace of India's nuclearization, if at all, and what will the impact of the recent changes be? The Indian tests are said to have been driven by a fear of China; connecting Chinese developments to Indian behavior over time could have shown how.

Vijendra Singh Jafa. 'Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Use & Abuse of Military Force'. Faultline. Vol.3, October 1999: 79-129

This article centers on what the author feels is the inappropriateness of most current counter-insurgency (COIN) philosophies and tactics for a democratic nation such as India. He focuses on the genesis of these tactics, in colonial wars such as the French in Algeria, or foreign interventions such as the United States in Vietnam. He provides brief summaries of American, British and French experiences, as well as a short background to the theoretical and historical development of insurgent tactics in the 20th century. Special attention is paid to the United Kingdom (UK) because of its impact on Indian COIN operations. In particular he looks at the effect of the Indian Army’s use of a village relocation program (1967-69) during the Mizo hills insurgency. This policy was heavily influenced by British successes against Chinese Communists during the Malayan 'Emergency'. Jafa also implies that the best means to defeat terrorism and insurgency is through the democratic process itself. He advocates bringing ‘moderate’ separatists into the legitimate polity, rewarding them with the benefits of political power, while marginalizing extremists and denying them essential support. This was a strategy successfully pursued by Indira Gandhi and her Congress (I) party in what became the state of Mizoram.

While this article provides much food for thought on the subject of terrorism and the liberal state, this reviewer has serious reservations regarding many of the author’s arguments and conclusions. Too much is made of individual tactics rather than looking at them within their contextual philosophical framework. The issue of village relocation is a case in point. It was used as a means of making far-flung rural populations more easily defensible from terrorist depredations. It made it easier to control terrorist access to food, shelter, and intelligence from civilians thus reducing the strains on limited security resources. However, this is merely one tactic whose utility has to be judged in terms of conformity to one’s COIN philosophy, and whose application has to be adjusted for local conditions. One of the reasons that the programs of village consolidation and food denial to terrorists worked so well in Malaya was that the new villages represented a quantum improvement in living conditions for Chinese squatters. This is in contrast to the Mizos whose centuries old villages were both quite prosperous and of great emotional importance as they represented ‘home’. It is understood that a policy of forced relocation would be far more disruptive and resented by the locals, and require greater coercion on the part of security forces to implement. The question is not whether relocation or food denial is valid tactics, but whether they were suitably modified.

Jafa's suggestion that the British would be unwilling to apply a similar tactic on those of European descent is untenable. The first modern use of these tactics was in the Boer War against the 'Commandos' at the turn of the century. As in Mizoram the tactic, while militarily successful caused resentment because of the hardship the civilian population endured. However, it must be noted that the scale of Boer suffering was far worse than anything the Mizos encountered. While it could be argued that no such program has been applied in Northern Ireland because applying such tactics may not be acceptable to the British public today, that was not necessarily the case up to twenty five years ago, so long as suffering was kept to a minimum. More importantly, it would make no sense as the IRA and INLA did not separate themselves from the population to operate out of the Bush as in Kenya, Malaya, and South Africa. In addition, the populations involved were far larger and in many cases heavily urbanized. Such programs are work best with small, scattered populations in a rural setting. It would have been be more consistent of Jafa to argue that the litmus test for applying such tactics in the India ought to be the opinions of the Indian public, its practical utility in combating the insurgency, and the effect on ordinary civilians.

The secondary thrust of his argument was that the village relocation program was designed and implemented by the Army, rather than executed in aid of civil authority. This is something worth thinking about. He points out that unless extraordinary individuals such as KPS Gill emerge from the police or paramilitaries, the Army will inevitably take the lead role in fighting insurgencies in India, and that this may not necessarily be a good thing. Unfortunately, he does not discuss what exactly could be done to produce and place similar individuals in positions of responsibility.

His championing of the 'political settlement' is one that bears serious questioning. KPS Gill has argued vociferously against it many times, for example in his Endgame in Punjab article reviewed in the last issue of the Monitor. Such tactics while successful in Mizoram have failed to end the insurgency in Nagaland, Manipur, and Tripura. Like any other COIN tactic it can not be regarded as a panacea, but something that must be appropriately modified to fit into the overall center-state, civil-military plan.