Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East: Lessons from the 1991 Gulf War

GERALD M. STEINBERG

The principles of deterrence have always been an important component of military strategy, and for centuries, political and military leaders have repeated the dictum that in order to preserve the peace, a state must be prepared for war ("Qui desiderat pacem praeparet bellum). This principle is the logical response to the state of nature and anarchy.

The centrality of deterrence on strategic policy and intellectual discourse reached its maximum development in the Cold War. The intricacies of nuclear deterrence were and continue to be debated intensely, including its strengths and weaknesses, and the difficulties in measuring success (failure has more visible symptoms, but by the time these appear, the damage is done).

The debate has continued after the Cold War, particularly with respect to the central question of whether the deterrence policies followed by the US, and, to a lesser degree, the Soviet Union, were successful in preventing war, or as critics, such as Sagan, Lebow, and Stein claim, deterrence "was an accident waiting to happen". From the latter perspective, the world survived and avoided nuclear destruction despite the dangers posed by deterrence, rather than as a result of this strategy. However, no better strategic approach has been presented.

These questions have accompanied the proliferation of deterrence-based strategies to regional conflicts, particularly in South Asia and the Middle East. Following the 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and the Kargil crisis that followed, the development of deterrence doctrines is well under way. Similarly, in the Middle East, the importance of nuclear deterrence is growing, as Israel’s ambiguous nuclear monopoly is eroding, and being replaced by a multi-polar system involving Iraq, and, within a few years, Iran, and then many others.

Based on the Cold War experience, some analysts have claimed that the proliferation of missiles and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, can create a stable "balance of terror" in this region. Critics, in contrast, point to the ambiguous tenets of deterrence theory, and the difficulties in applying this theory in the context of intense ethno-national and religious disputes in the Middle East. Such conflicts are seen to emphasize the destabilizing aspects of the "competitive risk taking" that characterizes the deterrence process. Many also question the ability of Third World leaders to act with the rationality that is essential for stable and successful mutual deterrence.

THE PARAMETERS OF DETERRENCE

Deterrence may be the closest that social science comes to a natural law or description of behavior, with central and clearly definable elements that do not vary in time or with respect to participants.

Based on the vast literature of deterrence theory, four fundamental and universal factors can be defined in order to examine and compare specific cases:

1) The cost or damage that would be incurred in the event of war.

2) The credibility of the threat to use particular weapons;

3) The nature of the decision making process and the rationality of the decision makers;

4) The viability of the communication between the actors, and potential for distortion and misunderstandings;

In regional conflict zones, such as the Middle East or South Asia, these factors are no less important in developing and preserving stable strategic (nuclear) deterrence than they were during the Cold War. However, as will be discussed in detail in this paper, particular characteristics that are inherent in these contexts and conflicts, emphasize some particular issues more than others. In regions plagued by chronic instability, internal strife, fanatic commitments to ideology and suicide bombers, questions regarding rationality and the ability of leaders to make the careful rational choices necessary to avoid the mutual defection in the prisoners’ dilemma game, or a head on crash in chicken, are often raised.

In addition, when considering regional nuclear deterrence, there are difficulties in procuring and deploying survivable second-strike capabilities, leading to the possibility of strategies based on the destabilizing strategies of "launch on warning". This situation, in turn, creates a "mutual fear of first strike" and exacerbates the security dilemma. Concern regarding the efficacy of command and control systems also increases the problems posed by accidental, escalatory, and catalytic war.

THE ELEMENTS OF DETERRENCE

i) The "cost" or pain inflicted by nuclear retaliation

The basic premise of deterrence is that an enemy can be dissuaded from going to war if he can be convinced that the cost would be too great. The cost can take two forms; defeat on the battlefield with little to show for the attack (deterrence by denial), and the infliction of pain to civilian targets, which would make any battlefield successes irrelevant (deterrence by punishment).

In the case of nuclear weapons, deterrence by punishment is dominant. The threat of punishment and infliction of pain has reached an unprecedented level in the nuclear era. Despite the use of the label "weapons of mass destruction" in referring to chemical and biological weapons, and the horror that CBW can inflict, nuclear weapons, and thermonuclear weapons in particular, are of a much high magnitude, and can be considered to be "pure deterrence weapons".

Thus, the introduction of nuclear deterrence into a regional conflict changes the stakes significantly. This is certainly true for a small state, such as Israel or Kuwait, but it is also the case in considering Pakistan and India. Indeed, one the major criticisms of India’s decision to become a declared nuclear weapons state, triggering the Pakistani decision to follow suit, is that in the context of a nuclear confrontation, Pakistan, despite its much smaller area, population, and resource level, has reached parity with India in terms of threat level, thereby deterring India from conventional military actions it might have taken in the absence of his parity. The Pakistani moves in Kargil can be explained as an early effort to take advantage of this strategic parity.

ii) The credibility of the threat

Deterrence that rests on the threat of large-scale retaliation is not always credible, particularly when the other side is also capable of launching a devastating attack. For example, throughout the Cold War, the US sought to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe by threatening to retaliate with an attack on Soviet cities (extended nuclear deterrence). This credibility of this threat, however, was considered to be low, as such a policy raised the possibility of a Soviet nuclear counterattack against American cities.

Credibility can be increased by changing the nature of the weapons and their deployment, and through declaratory policy designed to convey a higher probability of response. In the mid-1950s, the United States sought to raise the credibility of its deterrence effort in Europe and other regions by introducing tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons were located in Europe, and created the possibility of a limited nuclear response at an earlier stage in the conflict.

Beyond using deployments and military exercises to extend credibility (the art of commitment, in Schelling’s terms), other techniques include verbal threats (a common feature in regional conflict situations), and lower scale military action to demonstrate credibility. In recent years, Israel has occasionally responded to Hizbollah guerrilla attacks in Southern Lebanon by bombing infrastructure in Beirut. This response is designed to deter Hizbollah and Syria, but more importantly, to reinforce the credibility of Israeli’s deterrence with respect to other threats in the region. In 1981, the Israeli attack against the Osiraq nuclear reactor complex in Iraq, conducted at a distance of hundreds of kilometers, was seen, in part, as a means of demonstrating the credibility of its long-distance retaliatory capabilities. In contrast, the Israeli decision not to respond to the Iraqi SCUD missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf war was seen by some analysts as having the effect of weakening the credibility of other retaliatory threats in the context of deterrence.

iii) The nature of the decision making process and the rationality of the decision makers

The strategy of deterrence depends on the rationality of the leaders and the nature of the decision making process. In this context, rationality in decision making is defined as the ability to weigh options on the basis of potential costs and benefits, consideration of the likely reaction to each move. In analyzing the history of nuclear deterrence between the US and Soviet Union, the rationality of the leaders is deemed to have played an important role.

Critics of deterrence theory, however, argue that rationality is inherently ambiguous and that history records a number of leaders who were "risk prone" and failed to act "rationally". Hitler is often cited as an example of a leader who was willing to order the deaths of millions, without any moral limitations, and chose suicide for himself, his regime, and German society.

Many questions have been raised regarding the decision-making processes and the application of rational choice to Third World leaders. Decision making structures in the Third World tend to be more haphazard than in the West, with less access to information, small or no professional staffs, and greater cultural insularity which prevents an understanding of the likely responses of adversaries with very different cultural norms. Nasser's military policies in the weeks prior to the June 1967, including the expulsion of the UN forces in Sinai and the mobilization of troops along the Israeli border, are often seen as having been taken without assessment of the risks, or preparation to respond to the likely consequences. Scott Sagan argues that in the Third World, the dominant role of the military and the behavior of military organizations, "display strong proclivities ... that lead to deterrence failures."

In addition, deterrence theory assumes that leaders calculate costs and benefits in terms of broad national interests. However, in many states, particularly in the Middle East, the central values of leaders are often restricted to a small sub-group, specific nationality or tribe, the ruling elite, or his immediate family. Costs and benefits to other groups are of no consequence. Calculated risks are taken, but the value system by which they are judged is different than in the first category.

However, a number of analysts have argued that the threat of massive destruction resulting from the proliferation of non-conventional weapons is forcing the leaders of these states to adopt more a cautious approach to decision making. Under the threat of mutual assured destruction, the US and Soviet Union avoided direct military clashes for over forty years, despite the conflicts over Berlin, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Analysts such as Waltz and Feldman claim that the with the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, Third World leaders, including those in the Middle East, will undergo a process of "socialization" to the realities of mutual deterrence, and will act rationally.

However, critics of this position note that this may be wishful thinking. A leader like Hitler who would be willing to risk nuclear retaliation in order to achieve his goals would not be affected by deterrence strategies.

Given the importance of rationality in deterrence theory, various psychological models and theories regarding decision-making have played an important role in this debate. Many analysts of decision making argue that the definition of rationality is high ambiguous, and therefore, so are the models and theories based on rational decision making. Others claim that "real decision-makers can achieve only the faintest approximation of the theory's requirements, and it is not likely that they do even that with an unusual (and hence infrequent) effort". As Lebow and Stein note, even nominally rational leaders can act irrationally or miscalculate the costs and implications of a specific policy, particularly in times of great stress. Under conditions of tension, fatigue, and other factors, distortions in rational decision-making processes can be expected.

International crises are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, and different people and personality types respond according to different patterns. Psychologists have noted that in confronting risk, some individuals are tend to focus on the possible gains, while others are more concerned about avoiding risks. Lebow and Stein argue that "The most serious challenges to deterrence most often come from initiators who are risk-prone but emphasize loss. Case studies indicate that outside threats have no effect on the calculations of this kind of initiator, or may make a challenge even more attractive." In many cases, the challenger will distort information about expected costs of military action, the probability of success, and the probability that the defender will retaliate.

Finally, a system based on mutual deterrence is based on the premise that the participants are status quo states, or at least prefer the status quo to the costs of warfare. However, Henry Kissinger noted that revolutionary states (France under Napoleon, Germany under Hitler, etc.) are difficult to deter, and see war or the threat of war as a means of altering the situation and improving their collective or individual positions and interests. Many decision-makers in the US viewed the Soviet Union as a revolutionary power, and thus, argued that the effectiveness of deterrence was limited, at best.

The hyper-nationalism and revolutionary goals of Third World leaders also can interfere with the establishment of stable deterrence. Analysts argue that the concepts of deterrence, "stability" and "unacceptable damage" are abstractions with little application in these regions.

Many states in the Middle East are not status-quo powers, and deep ideological hostility to Israel and the West seem to encourage risk-taking. In 1973, Israel failed to deter Egypt because Sadat viewed the status quo, and the continued Israeli occupation of the Sinai, as more costly than the risks of war. In the face of revolutionary objectives, and a willingness to accept significant civilian casualties and economic destruction in order to achieve these objectives, effective deterrence is difficult.

At the same time, the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons and the possibility of assured destruction resulting from a nuclear war might increase the costs to such a degree that even revolutionary powers can be deterred. Indeed, that is one explanation for the absence of nuclear warfare between the US and Soviet Union in the forty years of the Cold War. From this perspective, in the nuclear age, the distinction between status quo and revisionist powers has become ambiguous, at least with respect to deterrence. When the possible cost of reforming the international system is national destruction, even the most eager revolutionaries may be deterred.

iv) Communication, (Mis)perception and (Mis)calculation

The fourth central dimension of deterrence focuses on the process of communication. To be successful, a deterring power must communicate its "red lines", in order to allow for a careful consideration of the reactions which are likely to follow from any move. However, as many analysts have noted, misperceptions and misunderstandings are not uncommon in international crises and war.

In the Third World, and the Middle East in particular, the conditions for misunderstanding and other forms of miscommunication are greatly enhanced. The ethnic, national, religious, and linguistic divisions often lead to significant misperceptions. In many Arab and Islamic states, domestic politics is characterized by a high degree of rhetorical exaggeration, and the distinction between this internally directed rhetoric and externally directed policy is often confused. It is difficult to distinguish between externally directed challenges, and messages and threats designed to influence domestic political audiences. Some analysts claim that 1967, Nasser did not understand that the mobilization of troops along Israel's borders constituted an intolerable threat, and would force Israel to act preventively. Such misunderstandings and misperceptions in the context of a nuclear crisis would be disastrous. These factors also played a role in the Iraqi-Israeli deterrence relationship prior to and during the Gulf War.

ISRAELI NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY

Conventional deterrence has been a central part of strategy in the Middle East, and particularly in Israeli policy, for the past fifty years. As a status quo power threatened my states with much larger areas and populations, Israel had little resources for war-fighting. In the 1948 Arab invasion following the rejection of the UN partition plan, one percent of the Israeli population was killed. In the 1950s, the Israeli strategy in response to Arab raids and incursions from Gaza from the West Bank of the 1950s was based on the concept of deterrence. Similarly, as Arab leaders made preparations for the next round, in which their demographic and geographic superiority would be brought to bear, Prime Minister Ben Gurion began the development of the nuclear deterrent option.

The policy of nuclear ambiguity that was developed in the 1950s has not changed significantly since then. It is predicated on the perception that this deterrent is necessary to compensate for the small size of the Jewish state, the lack of strategic depth, the structural imbalances in the region, and vulnerability to conventional and non-conventional attack.

The wars, violence and terrorism that Israel has faced had a major impact on Israeli strategic culture. In this context, Israeli decision-makers view the threat of massive retaliation as necessary to prevent renewed attacks that threaten national survival. Despite the peace process and claims of basic changes in attitudes towards Israel, Iraq continues to possess both the capabilities and the perceived will to attack Israel with WMD and missiles, and Iran is moving to acquire these capabilities. In addition, many radical Arab groups still call for the destruction of the Jewish state. Arab leaders and intellectuals in Egypt and Syria couch acceptance of Israel as a temporary and reluctant acceptance of strategic reality, while rejecting the legitimacy of the Jewish state. They continue to refer to Israel as an "infringement of Arab territory and rights", which suggests that in the absence of Israeli defensive or deterrence capabilities, these "rights" could be reclaimed. In this context, Israeli leaders also see the nuclear deterrent option as the basis for Arab acceptance of the permanence of Israel, and the need to negotiate a resolution to the conflict.

Despite the achievements of the peace process, the threat of violence and the possibility of war continue. Egypt and Syria hold military exercises involving large ground and air forces near the borders with Israel. Even under the best of circumstances, the creation of a "New Middle East" without military forces capable of destroying each other will take decades. Until then, a deterrent of last resort against existential threats is central in preventing renewed conflict and in maintaining the peace process.

This position is widely supported by Israeli public opinion. Following the 1991 Gulf War, in which Israel was threatened with chemical attacks from Iraqi Scud missiles, polls showed that 88% of the population supported the current policy. Public opposition to this policy was very limited, with few demonstrations. Indeed, some leaders of the Left, such as Yossi Sarid (Meretz party) and Efraim Sneh (Labor Party) are strong supporters of this policy. The deterrent is seen as providing Israel with an alternative form of security, allowing withdrawal from areas captured in 1967 to proceed while limiting the risks of another full-scale attack. This was also the one security issue that was endorsed by the consensus of government and opposition leaders during the Rabin government (1992-1995). There is little support for Mordechai Vannunu, a former technician at the Dimona reactor complex who sold what he claimed were details of operations in the plant to the Sunday Times, and is serving a long jail sentence for espionage in Israel. Nuclear ambiguity is firmly grounded in policy and public support, and no better option has been found.

In response to the Egyptian campaign to press Israel to sign the NPT and to give up this deterrent, Israeli leaders note that "The main reason [that Israel will not sign the NPT] is that Israel is the only country in the world threatened by other countries with destruction. I mean mainly Iran, Iraq and to some extent also Libya. I don't see any reason why Israel must promise that they can try to destroy Israel. ... Their fear, or their suspicion, is our deterrent." Similarly, in 1995, Shimon Peres noted that "Israel is the only country in the world that another country is threatening to destroy physically, militarily and otherwise. Not only are they threatening, but they are trying to get a nuclear option and missiles to do so. So we do not feel that we have to come to the Iranians and say: Gentlemen, since we have learned that you want to destroy us, don't be worried, go ahead and do it. We feel that the Iranian suspicion is our deterrent. We do not see it in the connection of our relations with Egypt. Nobody is threatening Egypt." Ehud Barak, who had served as the IDF Chief of Staff, and became Foreign Minister in January 1996, declared, "Israel's nuclear policy, as it is perceived in the eyes of the Arabs, has not changed, will not change and cannot change, because it is a fundamental stand on a matter of survival which impacts all the generations to come." These explicit explanations of Israeli policy (and there were many more such statements) marked a major departure from the previous policy of silence.

CASE STUDY: DETERRENCE IN THE GULF WAR

Analysis of the role of deterrence in the interaction between Iraq and Israel, both prior to and during the war, provides a case study in which to explore these issues. There are many questions regarding the purpose of the Iraqi threats to Israel and their effects on Israeli policy. Were Saddam Hussein's threats and the development of chemical weapons designed primarily to deter Israel, or for use in war fighting? Were Saddam's actions and threats consistent with those of a "rational actor" capable of calculating costs and benefits? Did the Iraqi ballistic missile attacks against Israel, and the threat to use chemical warheads, demonstrate the failure of deterrence, or was the absence of chemical attacks a demonstration of successful deterrence? How did the differences in the destructive power between nuclear and chemical weapons influence the deterrence relationship? And what are the implications of the Israeli policy of "restraint" in the future?

The Uniqueness of the Israel-Iraq Deterrence Relationship

As noted, in responding to the military threat from the Arab states, Israeli leaders have relied heavily on deterrence, mixed with preemptive and defensive strategies. Israeli policy-makers have attempted to demonstrate both possession of this capability and the credibility of the retaliatory threats necessary to make attacks on its territory too costly to contemplate. In the past, the IDF responded to infiltration and terrorism with large-scale reprisals ("deterrence by punishment") designed to deter further attacks.

The Israel-Iraq case, however, is distinct from the others. Although Iraqi forces have participated in most of the major Arab-Israeli wars, (including 1948, 1967, and 1973), Iraq shares no border with Israel and, at its closest approach, is still some 500 kilometers from Israeli territory. Iraqi forces have joined Jordanian and Syrian forces in past wars, but by itself, Iraq did not pose a primary threat to Israel until the 1980s.

As a result, the history of the Iraqi-Israeli deterrence relationship is very limited. There have been decades of interactions between Israel and Syria, as well as Israel and Egypt, and the nature of the deterrence relationship, red-lines, etc. have been analyzed in great detail. In these cases, the sources of uncertainties, misunderstanding and miscalculation that can lead to accidental war and uncontrolled escalation have been somewhat ameliorated. In contrast, the direct deterrence relationship with Iraq was new and there is little experience to guide these confrontations and prevent them from growing out of control.

When the history of interaction is limited, and there is no track record by which to predict or understand behavior, the uncertainty and possibilities for misunderstanding or miscalculation increase. Israel had little direct knowledge of Saddam Hussein by which to assess his behavior and cost/benefit calculations, or to interpret his signals. Similarly, the Iraqi leadership had little direct knowledge of Israeli leaders, their behavior, concerns, and capabilities. Thus, the strong tendency towards misperception and miscalculation that are already present in all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict were exacerbated in this confrontation.

The Question of Saddam's Rationality

As noted, rationality in decision making and the weighing of risks and benefits are important requirements for successful deterrence. During the interaction between Iraq and Israel, beginning in the late 1980s (following the end of the Iran-Iraq war), there were considerable indications that Saddam was willing to risk everything, including his regime and life. In his invasion of Iran a decade earlier, and in the production and widespread use of chemical weapons, Saddam had already shown a proclivity for risk taking, and for challenging the status quo.

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the developing confrontation between the US and Iraq, Saddam seemed to be increasingly "risk prone" and irrational. During this period, his behavior could not be described as prudent. Throughout this period, in his public speeches as well as interviews with journalists and discussions with diplomats, Saddam seemed to be unaware of the limitations of his military capabilities. He greatly exaggerated Iraqi technological achievements, claiming that Iraqi had achieved independence, when, in reality, Baghdad's technological capabilities were dependent on external sources for materials and skilled manpower.

On April 2 1990, Saddam made an inflammatory speech that increased Israeli concern regarding Saddam's intentions and willingness to take enormous risks. He announced the development of binary chemical agents, and threatened to use them to "incinerate half of Israel". He called on the Iraqi people and his supporters in the Arab world to sacrifice themselves in a "Holy Jihad". These declarations received wide support, and the Iraqi leader's challenge to Israel and the West resonated throughout the Arab world.

As in the case of Nasser in the 1960s, this enthusiasm seemed to encourage Saddam to expand on these themes. On April 17, he threatened to strike "with all our missiles, bombs, and all our resources". As a result, Israeli analysts had reason to conclude that the distinction between the boastful rhetoric and the limitations of reality became blurred, and that Saddam believed his own propaganda. During this period, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir referred to Saddam as a "madman".

Given the brutality of his regime, it was clear that the interest of the Iraqi people was not the major factor in Saddam's calculus. He was willing to risk the bombing of his cities and destruction of the national economy to achieve his objectives. During the war, the bombing of cities and military targets, the destruction of major installations, and the risk of large casualties, did not seem to effecthis policies. The death of large numbers of Kurdish and Shia citizens was also not a major factor in his decision making.

However, analysts frequently asked what would happen if Baghdad was threatened by American troops, or if Saddam himself was threatened with disgrace, arrest and trial for war crimes, or death. This was the most dangerous time for the region, because at this stage, the Iraqi leader might use CW or any other weapons in his arsenal to preserve his regime. If Israeli leaders thought this likely, and decided that Saddam could not be deterred, and that an unacceptable Iraqi attack was highly likely or inevitable, they might well have chosen to execute a large-scale pre-emptive attack. Many analysts, particularly in Israel, argued that Saddam's actions and threats did not suggest the presence of a careful decision maker weighing costs and benefits in his actions, and their likely consequences. Thus, questions regarding Saddam's rationality, and whether there were limitsto his actions, were sources of dangerous instability.

The Iraqi leader's behavior in the last phase of the war and its aftermath, provided evidence he was not, in fact, irrational and suicidal, and could make the calculations necessary to save his life and regime. Although he adopted a high-risk strategy, he was able to take prudent steps in order to save his regime and himself. He did not use CBW or warheads, and did not mistreat prisoners, which could have led to arrest and trial for war crimes.

Indeed, the major turning point in Saddam's policies took place when the survival of the ruling elite was threatened. In mid-February, a US bomb exploded inside a bunker in Baghdad that held families of key personnel in the regime. A few days later, (February 15), Saddam provided the first indication that he might be willing to pull out of Kuwait. For the first time, the risks and the costs of war became large enough to cause a change in policy. Two weeks later, the American terms for a cease-fire were accepted unconditionally, thereby enabling Saddam to preserve his regime and began to restore his lost assets.

Confusion and Inconsistency in Iraqi Policies

As noted above, the absence of a track record in the Israeli-Iraqi deterrence relationship was a major source of confusion and misperception. These were exacerbated by the inconsistency and confusion that characterized Saddam Hussein's signals and threats. Many of his announcements and policy statements were contradictory.

In some cases, Iraqi spokesmen and policy makers sought to use the language of deterrence with respect to Israel. For example, in some declarations, the use of weapons of mass destruction was linked to retaliation in response to possible Israeli nuclear attacks. Iraqi analysts spoke of "rational calculations", second-strike weapons, and deterrence based on a form of mutual assured destruction. Iraq even used the language of "extended deterrence", and on April 22 1990, the head of the Iraqi Air Force declared that if Israel attacks Iraq or any other Arab state, the Iraqis will "not hesitate to destroy any target in Israel."

Similarly, the effort to acquire nuclear weapons was explained as a means of balancing the Israeli nuclear capability. On April 17 1990, Saddam Hussein declared that Iraqi atomic weapons are needed "keep the peace and prevent 'Israel' from using [its own] atomic bomb".

However, the Iraqi efforts to couch their military strategy in terms of deterrence were fundamentally inconsistent with the clearly revolutionary objectives that Saddam continued to pursue. Over the previous decade, the policy was visible in the invasion of Iran, the massive effort to acquire tremendous stockpiles of conventional weapons, chemical agents, missiles, and biological as well as nuclear weapons, the growing involvement in Jordan, and, more recently, the invasion of Kuwait. These actions all demonstrated a total rejection of the status quo.

This objective also applied to Israel. Iraqi spokesmen declared that chemical weapons, missiles, and the continuing nuclear effort were designed "to put an end to Israel's arrogance" and to stop the flow of immigrants from the USSR. Iraqi military activities seemed to indicate preparations for a first strike. The Iraqi Air Force conducted reconnaissance overflights along the Jordan River, and Saddam declared that "Iraq knows every inch of Palestinian soil. It knows every airport, every air base, industrial installation, and research center. We have succeeded in photographing all the targets we need within Israel." Iraqi ground forces were also involved in joint exercises with the Jordanian forces, and the new highway between Baghdad and Amman (on which Scud missiles, components, and fuel were transported during the war) was designed to carry hundreds of armored vehicles in a very short time to the Israeli front. Saddam declared that he would use "what we have of qualified air and missile forces to deal a blow to and defeat the enemy." These statements increased concerns of a potential Iraqi first strike.

Saddam Hussein's large-scale effort to develop nuclear weapons were also included in this equation. He declared that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would end the "opium that drugged the Arab mind" that dulled the fight to reject Israel's existence. In May, he pledged to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine. Thus, instead of deterrence, Israeli leaders had evidence to believe that the Iraqi CBW and nuclear weapons efforts were primarily designed to provide the basis for a military challenge.

Together, this evidence suggests that Saddam Hussein did not formulate "a theory of deterrence", and that the use of these terms was an affectation, and not a basis for policy. In invading Iran and, a decade later, Kuwait, Saddam's policies were active, and deterrence was not a major component of these policies.

The Iraqi responses to Israeli deterrence efforts were also inconsistent. Some Iraqi spokesmen credited Israel with an effective deterrent, stating that Israeli nuclear weapons "killed the spirit of rejection [of Israel's existence] and revolt, and murdered [Arab] thinking." This Israeli capability prevented the Arabs "from bold action". But other Iraqi military analysts argued that due to its small size, Israel is unable to adopt a second strike strategy. Thus, they claimed, Iraq possessed an advantage that could be exploited in an attack against Israel. Thus, policy pronouncements reinforce the impression that the concepts of deterrence, and the nature of the Israeli threat of massive retaliation, were not well understood by the Iraqi leader.

Confusion and Inconsistency in Israeli Policies

At the beginning of this interaction, Israeli leaders emphasized deterrence in responding to the threat from Iraqi chemical weapons. In March 1988, IDF Chief of Staff Dan Shomron sought to remind Saddam Hussein of this Israeli policy. "Of course, in 1973, during the Yom Kippur war, the Arab countries possessed gas.... But they never used it, and there is a reason for this. This type of weapon invites [a] very harsh reaction." In an interview with the Israeli daily Ha'aretz on June 22, 1988, Defense Minister Rabin threatened that if Iraq used chemical weapons, Israel would retaliate "tenfold". In a radio interview during same month, Rabin declared "One of our fears is that the Arab world and its leaders might be deluded to believe that the lack of international reaction to the use of missiles and gases gives them some kind of legitimization to use them. They know they should not be deluded to believe that, because it is a whole different ball game when it comes to us. If they are, God forbid, they should know we will hit them back 100 times harder."

However, after the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the emphasis on deterrence declined, as defensive measures were increased. In October 1990, the government decided to distribute gas masks to all Israeli citizens. After the first Iraqi Scuds fell on Tel Aviv, additional defense measures were taken, including the deployment of a number of American Patriot anti-missile batteries, the impact of which was more psychological and political than military-strategic.

There is an inherent tension and even contradiction between deterrence and defense, and the credibility of the preemptive and retaliatory threats are weakened by the availability of a defensive alternative. Indeed, for this reason, Defense Minister Arens and Chief of Staff Shomron opposed the distribution of gas masks (which, in any case, were of questionable effectiveness, and caused panic.) In other words, when Israel decided to devote greater resources to defense, this served as a signal that in some conditions, the decision-makers might be willing to absorb a chemical first-strike. (Similarly, during the 1960s and 1970s, while the US emphasized a strategy of massive retaliation to deter a Soviet nuclear strike, resources devoted to civil defense were minimal. Some strategic analysts argued that if civil defense were seen as a realistic option, it would weaken deterrence.) In preparing to absorb a chemical attack, Israel was also signaling a lower probability of preemption and massive retaliation. The overall result was one of confusion and inconsistency in Israeli policy.

Communication of Intentions: The Language of Threats

As noted above, the language of communications is an important element of the deterrence process. Language and its context can be a source of misunderstanding and misperception, which increase the probability of deterrence failure. This is indeed the case with respect to the relationship between Israel and Iraq during this period.

The specific language of Saddam's April 2 1990 speech, in which he declared that "we will make fire consume half of Israel" had a major impact. Given the history of Arab efforts to destroy the Jewish state, and the background of the Nazi Holocaust, the threat of chemical and gas attack is viewed with particular alarm in Israel. This, in turn, greatly increased the prospects of a preventive attack.

As tension in the region increased following the invasion of Kuwait, the language of Iraqi threats became more threatening. General Amid Shaaban declared that in the event of an American attack, Iraq would respond with "direct crushing blows to the dens of the Israelis". At the beginning of the war, following the first missile attacks on Israel, official Iraqi announcements declared that Tel Aviv had been turned into "a crematorium".

After the war began, and it was clear that the Iraqi military was unable to provide any defense against the allied air attacks, and that Israel would not be drawn into a response to the conventionally armed Scud attacks, the Iraqi government announced the existence of a "secret weapon" that had not been revealed before and that can "decide the fate of the battle." A few weeks later, Saddam dramatically asked "the people of justice" to forgive the Iraqis "for any actions that they will take". Many observers, particularly in Israel, understood this to indicate preparations for use of CBW or even nuclear weapons.

The impact of the language of these threats was reinforced by the Iraqi military actions and preparations. Iraq had already used chemical weapons and missiles against Iran, and had deployed and tested an extensive network for ballistic missile in the West, near the Jordanian border. By followingthrough on many of his past threats, including the warning that if the US attacked Iraq, missiles would be used against Israeli cities, Saddam had established a reputation of high credibility for his threats. (Before the war, he boasted of "secret mobile launchers that could not be detected" and, indeed, most escaped detection and destruction during six weeks of concerted efforts by allied forces.) The Iraqi leader was perceived to be in a desperate situation, and this perception reinforced the credibility of these threats. The very credibility of the Iraqi military threat increased Israeli concerns and instability in the relationship, and led to further discussions of a possible preventive strike.

Saddam Hussein's threats and the deployment and testing of missiles and other weapons in the western Iraq, forced Israeli leaders to develop a response. In general, there are two broad approaches for such situations; raising the stakes by meeting the threat with a counter-threat, or seeking to lower the tension by "de-escalating". The first option risks the possibility of an uncontrolled "conflict spiral", but the second option could be perceived as weakness and appeasement. Both paths are designed to increase deterrence, but either could also lead to war.

The statements made by Israeli policy makers during this period was inconsistent, combining elements of both approaches. As noted above, throughout 1990, including the final weeks before the American attack, political and military leaders made an effort to strengthen deterrence. At the same time, these statements and warnings were highly ambiguous. Science Minister Yuval Neeman warned that in the event of an Iraqi chemical attack, Israel could respond "with the same merchandise".

However, such an explicit statement was exceptional (perhaps an unintended slip), and in most other cases, no specific weapons were mentioned, leaving the impression that Israel might respond conventionally to missile and even CW attacks. As the January 15 deadline approached, Israeli leaders declared that in the event of an Iraqi attack, the response would notbe automatic, but would depend on the specific circumstances. The overall result was one of confusion.

In general, the Israeli response of restraint and the adoption of a "low profile" throughout the war can be characterized as de-escalatory. No blatant military moves were taken, no large-scale maneuvers were held, and no missile tests were announced. Gas masks were distributed and the population was prepared to deal with the possibility of a CW attack. The adoption of passive defensive measures reinforced the de-escalatory tendency of Israeli actions and policies.

During the war, as missiles struck Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan, the Israeli dilemma increased. On the one hand, the leaders were faced with pressures to respond, in a manner consistent with the Israeli policy of deterrence. As Eisenberg has noted, this marked "the first time an Arab country had succeeded in striking Israeli population centers since 1948, and the first time Israel had permitted an Arab attack to go unpunished."

At the same time, the Israeli leaders also understood that the purpose of the missile attacks was precisely to bring Israel into the war, in the hope of destroying the American-led coalition. Strategically, it made more sense for Israel to act with restraint, and allow the United States to destroy the Iraqi threat. In addition, given the scale of the coalition bombing, Israeli decision-makers realized that a limited response against military targets would not add significantly to the military damage, and if Israeli aircraft overflew Jordan, this would add to the instability and tension in the Hashemite Kingdom. Under these circumstances, Israeli deterrence options against attack by conventionally armed missiles were very limited. (In addition, the U.S. government’s firm opposition to Israeli military action, and a desire to avoid complicating the already strained relations with the Bush Administration were also factors in the Israeli calculus.)

The threat of chemical attack, however, continued, and Israeli threats to respond became more explicit, as noted above. In the period immediately prior to the beginning of the ground war, the possibility of an Iraqi chemical attack against Israel was deemed to be relatively high. At this stage, Prime Minister Shamir made one of his only public statements during the war, declaring that Israel was ready, if necessary, to intervene, and "we are ready for any eventuality". On television, Israeli military officials were shown against a background of combat aircraft on alert.

Throughout this period, the role of the Israeli nuclear deterrent remained "in the basement." Israel has been credited with a nuclear capability for many years, but there have been no public acknowledgement or tests. Most Israeli analysts have assumed that this situation is sufficient to provide a deterrent against "existential attacks" that threatenthe survival of the state.

The confrontation with Iraq raised some questions regarding the viability of this strategy. The threats to "make the fire consume half of Israel", to "direct crushing blows to the dens of the Israelis", and to turn Tel Aviv into "a crematorium" seemed to indicate that perhaps the nuclear capability was, in fact, too ambiguous to deter an Iraqi attack (or, as noted earlier, that Saddam was not deterable).

Nevertheless, the Israeli government did not make any explicit threat to use nuclear weapons, (but these were also not explicitly ruled out.) However, In this area, as well, the overall Israeli policy was confusing. Just prior to the war, IDF Chief of Staff Shomron made a statement that "Israel would not be the first country to use atomic weapons", and this was repeated by the Israeli Ambassadors in Washington and Brussels. This seemed to indicate a softening of the Israeli position, which had left the option of "first-use" demonstrably open, but later, government officials issued a correction, restating the entirely ambiguous policy that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons.

The possibility of a nuclear response to a large-scale chemical attack was discussed widely in the international press and in non-official Israeli sources. In a television interview on February 2, US Secretary of Defense Cheney was asked whether he thought Israel would respond to chemical attacks with nuclear weapons, and, while not providing a specific answer, he warned Saddam to be cautious. Although there is no evidence that this statement was coordinated with Israel, it served to reinforce the ambiguous retaliatory threat. In addition, this threat may have been reinforced when Israeli reportedly tested a Jericho missile in early January, a few days before the beginning of the war.

Miscalculation

As noted above, historically, the failure of deterrence has often been the result of a combination of a willingness to take risk, coupled with the miscalculation of the capabilities and intentions of opponents. Throughout the period before and during the war, Saddam Hussein appeared to miscalculate the capabilities of his own forces, and the probability, as well as the extent of the response. The Iraqi leader miscalculated Iran's ability to repulse the Iraqi invasion, miscalculated the nature of the American response to the invasion of Kuwait, and miscalculated the ability of the Iraqi military to inflict damage on the American andallied forces.

With respect to Israel, and perhaps in dealing with the United States, Saddam seemed to place a high value on the impact of his CBW capability. In his April 2 1990 speech, and again a few days later, the Iraqi leader threatened to use CW in retaliation for an Israeli attack, apparently attempting to deter attacks on Iraqi missile sites or CBW and nuclear weapons facilities. The official Iraqi press followed by declaring that chemical weapons could deter conventional Israeli attacks and that Iraq had reached the stage of strategic parity with Israel.

Most of the Iraqi CW capability was based on delivery by long-range bombers, or the use of artillery shells. For the former to damage Israel, the Iraqi Air Force would have had to penetrate Israel's formidable air defense system. To fire artillery shells into Israel, Iraqi ground forces would have to be deployed within Jordan. Neither provided a credible threat, particularly after most of the Iraqi heavy bombers escaped to Iran in the first days of the war, and Iraqi ground forces were deployed far away from the Western border.

Saddam did have increased-range, reduced-payload Scud-B missiles, (the Al-Abbas and Al-Hussein) that could potentially deliver an unknown and untested chemical warhead, as well as unknown biological and perhaps nuclear capabilities. The damage that could have been caused by CW delivered by these missiles was inherently low.

During this period, it was also possible to conclude that the Iraqi leadership did not comprehend the destructive power of the Israeli nuclear retaliatory threat. The construction of "radiation-proof" bomb shelters for the elite (that were penetrated by US conventional weapons), and many statements seemed to show that the regime (if not the rest of Iraq) thought it could survive a nuclear war with Israel. Evacuation exercises were conducted from some Baghdad neighborhoods, preparations against atomic attack were discussed. While it is possible that the Iraqis publicly denigrated the danger of nuclear weapons in order to lower the impact of the Israeli deterrence threat, miscalculation is consistent with the other examples cited above.

Once the war began, Saddam acted more cautiously with respect to Israel, and did not "miscalculate" with respect to either the use of conventional missiles or chemical weapons. The use of missiles armed with conventional warheads was designed specifically to bring an Israeli response, in the hope of forcing the Arab states to end cooperation with the United States and the other coalition members. Here, he miscalculated, but in a way that showed that the Israeli retaliatory threat was highly credible.

The Ambiguous Deterrent Provided by Chemical Weapons

The possibility of miscalculation was increased by the uncertainty that surrounding the use of chemical weapons. Deterrence is generally considered to be most effective when the threat of punishment is greatest, and in the case of nuclear weapons, and "mutual assured destruction", in particular. The use of such weapons would obliterate entire cities, and, in some circumstances, destroy the target states. Conventional weapons, in contrast, are generally linked to a strategy of "deterrence by denial", in which the military force is used to deny the challenger the ability to achieve his goals.

Chemical weapons do not fit neatly in this dichotomous model. The Iraq-Israel confrontation focused discussion on the role of CBW as "weapons of mass destruction" that can be used against civilian ("countervalue") targets to kill on a large scale. Relatively small amounts of material can potentially injure tens of thousands of people in densely populated cities and on the battlefield. CW attacks during World War I severely injured over one million. In the Iraqi chemical attacks on Halabja, over 5000 Kurds reportedly were killed.

There has been no effort to use CW in a strategic context, and estimates of the effectiveness of such attacks vary. The number of casualties that would result from a countervalue attack against civilians depends to a very great extent on the nature of the chemical agent, the altitude and form of the dispersal, the weather conditions, warning time, the protective equipment which is available, and post-attack treatment. According to published statements, Israeli policy was initially based on the assumption that a single chemical warhead detonated over Tel Aviv could cause "several thousand casualties", but these estimates were later reduced to the level of hundreds of casualties. This is an indication of the uncertainty that surrounds the deterrent effect of chemical weapons.

IMPLICATIONS

The 1991 Gulf War was, for all intents and purposes, the first Middle East conflict in the age of proliferation, and from the Israeli perspective, the role of deterrence was mixed.

On the one hand, Israeli deterrence efforts did not prevent the conventionally armed Scud missile attacks against Israeli population centers. This marked the first time in over 40 years of warfare that Israeli cities had been subject to extended attack. To a major degree, this can be attributed to the highly unusual circumstances of this conflict, particularly the American-led military coalition against Iraq. These circumstances explain, to a large degree, both the Iraqi missile attacks against Israel, and the absence of an Israeli response. (In this case, as in the 1973 Yom Kippur war, deterrence failed because the prospects of a military exchange with Israel were seen as the preferred option.) On the other hand, and most importantly, Iraq did not use chemical weapons in this war, despite the possession of CW warheads. As in other cases, the role of deterrence is difficult to ascertain with any certainty, but given the available evidence, it is possible to attribute Iraqi behavior to the credibility of the Israeli threats of massive retaliation. (Other explanations for Iraqi inaction exist, including questions regarding the effectiveness of the untested warheads, or the technical inability to launch them under the pressure of allied bombardment and the chaos of the war in Iraq.)

The Israeli Policy of Restraint

While the Israeli decision to adopt a defensive strategy, and the rejection of preemption or retaliation, resulted from the particular circumstances, there is concern about the long-term impact. Since 1948, the Israeli deterrent has been based on the policy of independent defense and large-scale retaliation. If the Arabs might conclude that Israel was no longer able to act independently, and the US could and would prevent Israel from responding to attack, the credibility of the deterrent would be undermined. For this reason, in the last week of the war, Israeli leaders such as Defense Minister Moshe Arens considered the possibility of a ground and air attack on Western Iraq. The impact of a strictly passive response to attack was considered to be dangerous in the long term.

The absence of a military response to the chemical threat and missile attacks was and continues to be very controversial. The basic "raison d'etre" of Israel is protect the Jewish people from the pogroms and mass murder of the Diaspora. In newspaper articles and radio discussions, many Israelis, including prominent intellectuals and those associated with the political left discussed the implications of the absence of a military response.

The Impact on Deterrence

In a broader sense, this war did not enhance stability and mutual deterrence in the relationship between Israel and Iraq. Although Iraq did not use chemical weapons, and that Israel did not react to the threat of such attacks, the particular circumstances of this case do not provide clear evidence for the claim that "the proliferation of chemically-armed ballistic missiles may not be as destabilizing and dangerous as many observers expect."

However, the events surrounding the war did show that although Saddam Hussein was willing to take very high risks, he was not irrational or suicidal, and was capable of stopping just short of complete catastrophe. His policies were marked by inconsistency and apparent miscalculation, and, like Nasser, Saddam seemed to be swept away by his own propaganda. The enthusiasm with which his exaggerations regarding Iraqi technological and military capabilities were greeted in the Arab world made it difficult for him to retreat, and once "out on a limb" the risks of war might have been seen as preferable to backing down.

On the Israeli side, no "red lines" were established, and there is reason for concern that, despite the unique circumstances, the credibility of Israeli deterrence has been undermined. Syria's President Assad may have concluded that Israel is vulnerable to threats of attacks from missile and CW, and Damascus has rushed to purchase longer-range missiles.

There are no clear answers to many of the questions that were raised, and there may never be. Deterrence, by its nature, is problematic and contains unavoidable risks, particularly under the conditions of the Middle East. In this situation, a strategy based strictly on deterrence is inherently risky, but the alternatives, including the adoption of a preventive or preemptive strategy are more uncertain and even more dangerous.

Given the problematics of deterrence, Israeli decision-makers are likely to conclude that if deterrence is to succeed in similar cases, it will be necessary to know and threaten the personal value systems of the decision-makers. General threats to retaliate against Iraqi military targets or the civilian population were apparently not effective, but more specific threats to the regime and to Saddam himself appeared to have been sufficient to cause a more careful assessment of costs and benefits.

The inconsistency that Saddam displayed, his high-risk strategy, and the propensity towards miscalculation, raises additional questions for Israel. As noted above, Saddam's actions prior to and at the beginning stages of the war even raised some questions regarding the deterrence value of Israel's still ambiguous nuclear capability. However, the evidence also indicates that the American military action had the effect of forcing Saddam to "recalculate", and eventually retreat, at least temporarily. Once it became clear that his policies threatened his regime, his family, and risked his own survival, and that he had little chance of achieving his goals, he reversed course and behaved rationally.

Large-scale military action is the result of the failure of deterrence. Given the tendency towards miscalculation of intentions and military capabilities, it is clear that alternative policies must be considered. For example, by raising the visibility and credibility of the threat, short of a direct attack, it may be possible to lower the probability of deterrence failure due to miscalculation of risks and technical capabilities, or the misunderstanding of the intentions of the other side.

Alternatives to Deterrence

As noted above, many Israelis are concerned that the "low profile" and inaction might be interpreted by Syria and perhaps other Arab and Islamic states as paralysis or the result of successful Iraqi deterrence. To nullify this impression, Israeli might act to strengthen the visibility and credibility of its deterrent in the future. If Israeli officials had concluded that Saddam did not comprehend the destructive power of nuclearweapons, they might have considered a demonstration explosion. (Obviously, the political cost of such a test would have been high with respect to Israeli relations with the United States, Egypt, and other states, but had the Israeli government been concerned about the possibility of an Iraqi CW attack, such costs would have been secondary.)

Deterrence is not the only available strategy. If there is a high probability that deterrence will fail, alternative strategies, based on preventive attack and defense will be adopted. Indeed, in 1967, Israeli decision-makers concluded that deterrence would not succeed, and that an Arab attack was imminent, leading to an Israeli preemptive attack. Similarly, in 1981, the Begin government concluded that deterrence was inadequate in dealing with the Iraqi nuclear weapons efforts, and therefore destroyed the Iraqi reactor complex.

In this case, it is possible and even likely that had Iraq not invaded Kuwait, and the US forces not attacked Iraq, Israeli leaders might have decided that the benefits of a preventive strike outweighed the risks of a possible Iraqi counterstrike. The Israelis were also aware of the real limits of current Iraqi military capabilities, including the relatively limited impact of chemical weapons.

In summary, the Iraqi-Israeli interaction helps to understand the complexity of the deterrence relationships in regional contexts, such as the Middle East and South Asia. In the case of Iraq, where one-man rule and totalitarian government prevails, this study demonstrates that the rationality and decision making capability of the leader is central. While Saddam Hussein's proclivity towards high risk policies was reinforced, his actions also demonstrated that the level of risks is limited and that he is capable of stopping short of actions that would endanger his regime and his own life. The particular circumstances of the war also make it difficult to assess the role of chemical weapons in the deterrence equation, but this case appears to reinforce the view that the threat of CW is not comparable in any way to the threat of nuclear retaliation.