"A Russian Re-Evaluation of the ABM Treaty?" - Author's Rejoinder

Let me now summarize some of the basic arguments made by Hoyt. One, the US policy and strategic community is only prepared for a "partial" deployment of the NMD system, which would entail only minor modifications to the ABM treaty. Two, the choice of Alaska as the preferred NMD deployment site would primarily target threats from North Korean and Chinese strategic missile attacks, and only pose minor interference to Russia’s ability to launch strategic-range missile attacks. Three, the US NMD-TMD deployment will either constrain the scope for Chinese policy activism and bolster Asian security, or threaten the fragile Asian balance of power, but not both. Four, the implicit linkage between TMD and NMD deserves fuller examination, both within the context of our discussion as well as for its wider policy implications. Five, Asia can and should be conceptualized more usefully in discrete slices (Pacific Rim, Southeast Asia, and South Asia) than as an aggregate unit. And six, the prospect of "proliferation" of TMD systems in Asia would in fact be more robust for regional stability than offensive arms racing.

I have some reservations about the first three arguments, and am in greater agreement with the latter three. Let us now address them systematically, although the individual issues cannot be as neatly disaggregated as one would like to, which is indeed partly a reflection of the multifaceted dynamic that we are addressing. Regarding the first two arguments, it should be acknowledged that the US Congress has not committed to funding a "total" NMD deployment plan or option. But that is not my argument. Rather, I state that the conception of threat assessment that drives the NMD argument forward in the US strategic discourse relies primarily on the worst case assumptions. Thus the proponents of the NMD discard the NIE report (1995) that posits little or no direct threat to the US territory before 2010, and instead embrace the Rumsfeld Commission report (1998) that such a threat is real and could come with little or no warning. The latter threat assessment includes growing range of missiles in the North Korean armory, while ignoring the tangible evidence on the ground that US (and South Korean) efforts have ensured that Pyongyang has little capacity to assemble nuclear or other WMDs in the near and medium term.

Similarly, threat of "rogue" countries "forward basing" their rudimentary WMD arsenal and launching them atop their rudimentary tactical-range missiles, is also overstated. First of all, such activity can be effectively monitored by the considerable US satellite surveillance capability. Second, there are several conventional, including preemptive, responses available to the US side. And third, such foolhardy step on the part of the "rogue" nation assumes their inability to calculate the considerable adverse fallout of their action on the politico-diplomatic as well as military axes. Such a threat assessment by the state with the most awesome conventional and nuclear weapons arsenal in the history of mankind seems a little paranoid, and is scarcely warranted.

More important, the decision to amend international treaties to safeguard national territory and assets, or promote national interests, undercuts the larger US effort to lead the global non-proliferation initiative. I agree, however, with the remainder of the argument that the Alaskan deployment will do less to worsen Russian power asymmetry vis-à-vis the United States than the technical and financial problems faced by its manifestly ailing economy. But then, that was never my contention to begin with. My argument in that context related to deploying space-based lasers or any other modifications (of site and number of interceptors) that would constitute violations of the ABM treaty, and the precedence it sets for subsequent unilateral US policy activism in this and other domains.

Next is the issue of ambivalence regarding Chinese actions and ambitions. My simple argument is that US policy toward China is one of "hope for the best but prepare for the worst." The efforts to bring China into a range of international treaties and institutions are geared toward constraining its scope for unilateral behavior in Asian and global affairs. But this is true of not just the US, but also of all relevant players on the Asian chessboard. So there is no "cognitive dissonance" in claiming that China will remain a critical component of the fragile Asian strategic balance while its efforts to bolster its own military arsenal and options make the region unstable, and NMD-TMD become relevant in this vexed equation.

The important point is that that while China is not a signatory to the ABM, US NMD deployments (especially in Alaska) erode its offensive ability to strike targets within the US territory. On the other hand, US TMD deployments in Asia erode Chinese offensive ability to strike targets within the territories where TMDs are deployed. At the same time, with these defenses intact, the US ability to strike targets within China will grow, subject to the technical momentum of the NMD-TMD systems and the finances committed to the enterprise. In both events, China will then be propelled into bolstering its defensive and offensive capabilities. While this will be geared to restore the strategic equilibrium in Asia in its favor, the fallout on the Asian theater will be much more complex.

On the one hand, Chinese actions will erode the offensive capability of states in the different sub-regions of Asia, leading to another round of costly arms racing. And on the other hand, the rapid growth in Chinese military power will further set back the prospects of arriving at a cooperative framework for security in Asia. In effect, the consequence of US TMD deployment could bolster the security of select states in Asia while making the others more vulnerable to either Chinese or US dominance.

This brings us to the last three arguments by Hoyt. To be sure, it is far better for countries to consider enhancing their defensive shields than bolstering offensive capabilities. But unless this is pursued region-wide in tandem, the net effect of select TMD deployment could easily mean further degradation of offensive as well as defensive capabilities of the other states. From a limited US standpoint, the logic of pursuing NMD and TMD in tandem makes perfect sense. One secures national territory and assets from in-coming missiles while the other secures the lives and assets of US troops and allies in regional theaters. But the overall impact of the resultant power asymmetry cascades down through the various sub-regions of Asia, with a host of unintended consequences. Thus, to conduct a "bounded" analysis, conceptualizing Asia in its various sub-regions is useful and appropriate. But in the case of TMD deployment and the fallout in Asia, with China at the core of this dynamic, the consequences are much more complex and inter-linked.