It is now quite clear that President Clinton will spend "a few hours" in Islamabad on his way back from India. The irony of the whole situation is that President Clinton will not only be legitimizing the overthrow of democracy, but will also re-affirm faith in the Pakistani military by touching down at a military airfield. The Pakistani rationalization of the need for a presidential visit is undergirded by a curious logic. It also raises several questions. They have argued that a snub from the US President would send a clear signal that Washington had severed ties with Islamabad, further constraining the ability of the General Musharraf's administration to reign in the forces of separatism and religious fundamentalism. Is that possible? Under what circumstances should Washington distance itself from a non-representative set up in Pakistan? What has the United States received from engaging the Musharraf administration since it took over the reigns of power last October? Halt to cross-border terrorism in India? Cooperation in apprehending the hijackers of the Indian Airlines craft? Cessation of material and diplomatic support to separatist groups in Central Asia? Covert nuclear and missile cooperation with North Korea and China? A timetable for restoration of democracy in Pakistan?

This strange Pakistani logic is matched by equally pretentious statements from the White House. In the past few months, statements by President Clinton have included: "before I end my term, I would like to have a crack at the Indo-Pak dispute;" or "I would like to solve the Kashmir dispute before my term is over." Noble intentions, no doubt. But exactly how does President Clinton intend to do so? By ordering the combatants to drop their arms, so that the process of healing and reconciliation can begin? It is high time Washington recognized that it takes two to make peace but it takes one to make war. Pakistan is in the firm grip of a mindset wherein the success of its foreign policy, even the raison d’ etre of its existence, is predicated upon a solution to the Kashmir problem. And this solution does not entail a pragmatic assessment of the historical record or ground realities, or even a frank negotiation with India on the practical modalities of a durable solution that involves give and take on each side.

The unfortunate reality is that notwithstanding Washington’s energetic intentions to "intercede on behalf of peace," the South Asian strategic environment will get much worse before it can get any better. The bitter truth is that the Kargil conflict, the shooting down of the Atlantique surveillance aircraft, the hijacking of IC 814, the incessant cross-border terrorism, and the increased intensity and scope of terrorism on Indian soil, are mere symptomatic incursions of a much deeper malady. This malady is founded upon the very formulation of the Pakistani national identity in the past two decades. Its attempt to forge a "pro-Islamic" identity has met with limited success, while the "anti-India" identity can only deliver negative outcomes if it succeeds. Pakistan has never truly invested in crafting a "pro-Pakistani" identity, one that harmoniously reconciles its ethnic-religious cleavages with the immutable geographical mooring of being a South Asian entity. The result is that Pakistan’s national identity, and the concomitant foreign-security policy, is dangerously flawed. Jinnah’s "Two Nation Theory" justified the creation of Pakistan by arguing that Muslims would not be safe in a Hindu-dominated India. And yet, compared to Pakistan, an equal or higher number of Muslims live in India and Bangladesh (and Indonesia), both of which states, coincidentally, are included in the US President’s trip. And in each case, Muslims enjoy at least an equal Constitutional status with all other religious groups, and particularly so in India.

It has become conventional wisdom in Pakistan and abroad to state that relations with India will improve drastically once the "core" issue of Kashmir is resolved. What about Siachen, Sir Creek, Wular Barrage/Tulbul Navigational Project, and other disputes? Are they all amenable to solutions within the auspices of the bilateral Joint Working Groups? If indeed they were, one must ask why is there not much evidence of progress on them?  Furthermore it must be asked how would this "core" problem of Kashmir be eventually solved? Pakistani leadership routinely requisitions the services of the international community to intercede on its behalf. On the other hand, the Simla accord explicitly stipulates that India and Pakistan will solve "all outstanding bilateral disputes …without outside interference." Where then is the locus standii of this Pakistani demand? Or indeed the status of possible US mediation efforts? India should educate global and US public opinion that the Simla accord was not a dictated peace treaty. Rather, it followed the most convincing Indian victory over Pakistan, after which it unilaterally released vast tracts of captured territory and about 93,000 prisoners of war, the highest POW release since World War II. Further, while it was in a position to dictate the terms of settlement of all disputes, including on Kashmir, it chose to pursue them in a bilateral framework.

Pakistan frequently raises the issue of the UN-supervised plebiscite to settle the Kashmir dispute. But is it prepared to create the antecedent conditions for the plebiscite, which includes preserving the ethnic and demographic profile of 1948 on its part of the disputed territory? If not, then the plebiscite demand is scarcely more than a ploy to perpetuate the crisis. The real losers in this interminable battle are the Kashmiri residents on both sides of the border, to which each side owes an apology and an expeditious end to the conflict. After 52 years, the only feasible solution is to make the LOC as the de jure boundary. Re-drawing of international boundaries to accommodate the right of self-determination, as it obtains in such fluid circumstances, will result in more cases like Kosovo, the Czech republic, or Eritrea. Similarly, since the UN-authorized British Mandates Commission created Israel in 1948, should the Palestinians have the right to demand the abolition of Israel and to re-examine the entire issue afresh?

In light of the above, Washington needs to fundamentally rethink the effectiveness of its South Asia policy. It is strange how fallible it is to Islamabad’s fears and foibles. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan used its "front line" status as a "strength" to force the United States to equate it with India. This included efforts to develop nuclear weapons as the "Great Equalizer" to the obvious conventional weapons superiority of India. This was supposed to enhance strategic stability in the region but did not happen despite the overt nuclearization of the Subcontinent and Pakistan possessing the "Great Equalizer." It is ironic indeed that Pakistan is able to use its internal instability as the "weakness" to justify receiving Washington’s policy attention!

Exactly what strategic role can Pakistan play within the US calculus? A moderating influence on the Muslim republics of Central Asia? The ISI’s support to the Uighur Muslims in the Xinjiang province of China, military training and arming of Uzbek rebels, and the recent hosting of the Chechen rebels, have not qualified Pakistan as the ideal candidate for such a role. There are far more direct and productive channels for the United States to engage with the respective states in the region. Can Pakistan deliver bin Laden or bring the Taliban leadership to the negotiating table? Not likely, because it has lost effective control over the jehadi outfits. It has gradually become a vortex of bilious religious irredentism in the region, creating a "Frankenstein" that it cannot control.

So what exactly does Washington hope to achieve by the President’s visit? Guarantees that the regime in Islamabad will be able to "control" or "restrict" the activities of the jehadi outfits vis-à-vis Kashmir? The current military administration in Islamabad, and its appendage the ISI, authored the script of the Kargil conflict. They are neither willing, nor indeed able, to deliver on such promises. As if further proof was needed, last week Benazir Bhutto stated in an interview that during her second term of premiership, she had rejected a plan similar to the Kargil offensive.

Clearly, the current leadership in Pakistan has staked its legitimacy to the "solution" of Kashmir according to its own terms, and is no mood for reconciliation. The time has come for Washington to isolate the current regime, and force it to walk away from its incendiary policies and postures. The United States should recognize that coddling a military dictatorship runs counter to the democratic norms of international conduct, and will have the perverse impact of weakening the prospects of an early return to some form of democratic representation in Pakistani political life.

The most fundamental need is for a new US strategic paradigm toward South Asia. If US policy has to move beyond the "zero-sum" to a "positive sum" game in the region, it should purposefully separate its policies vis-à-vis India from whatever its policies vis-à-vis Pakistan. The Indian leadership has its task cut out in effecting this policy transition. This requires, at a minimum, the following steps.

First, India should recognize that Pakistan will search for any means to achieve strategic parity in a fundamentally asymmetric dyad in South Asia. As exprience has shown, this includes external support, low-intensity insurrectionary warfare, and any other resources at its disposal. Underestimating these dangers, or expecting external understanding for its predicament, would be counterproductive. Instead, hard and practical decisions are needed. If India wants Pakistan to be designated a state-sponsor of terrorism, it should be the first one to do so. It should also follow it up with lowering of its diplomatic offices in Islamabad. A case in point is the swift Israeli demotion of its diplomatic relations with Austria, although Jorg Haider is not even part of the federal coalition government.

Second, India should pursue a steady and proactive policy toward Pakistan. When India conducted the Pokhran tests, it stated that Pakistan was not the reason for its decision. Yet, when Pakistan followed suit, Mr. Vajpayee stated that our "concerns have been vindicated." This has also been true of the Indian response to the missile tests by Pakistan. This deliberate, however unwitting, equating of itself with Pakistan must stop.

Third, the Indian leadership must learn to honor its public statements on sensitive subjects. The government promised to release "incontrovertible" evidence of Pakistani complicity in the hijacking case. Yet, nothing was released in the public domain. Last July, the government seized 177 containers worth of cargo aboard a North Korean ship that allegedly contained missile subsystems and materials destined for Pakistan. Last week, the ship was released after North Korea agreed to pay the demurrage charges. While India had apprised the United States of the investigation, no information of any kind has been released to the public. Similarly, no information about the Atlantique aircraft had been released. New Delhi needs to become more sensitive to the value of garnering favorable public opinion. Information sharing does not have to compromise national security. It can be pruned to provide the interested audience the salient conclusions without divulging sensitive details. This is an obligation in a participatory democracy, and in turn serves to dispel "misinformation" that often becomes the basis for "tainted" analyses within the unofficial strategic discourse.

Fourth, the Indian leadership should not be defensive about pursuing or safeguarding its national interests. Every state has the sovereign right to make a technical assessment of threats to its national security, and then take appropriate steps to meet them. This right does not absolve it of the obligation to consider the impact on regional stability, or national commitments to the international regimes that it is a party to or has agreed to abide by their guidelines. But national policy positions should emanate from the above assessment, and not appear ad hoc in their public formulations. A case in point is the report on the "Strategic Defense Review" that has been recently submitted to the government. While the broad contours need to be spelt out in an official policy brief, its salient conclusions should inform the government position on national security.

The most obvious touchstone of this approach relates to the CTBT. The government should clarify once and for all whether the Pokhran-II series of tests validated the operational parameters of all weapon designs tested. If so, then the technical requirements to creating the credible minimum nuclear deterrent (CMND) have been met and there should be no reason to delay signing the CTBT. On the other hand if more tests are needed, the government should openly state the timeframe and possible number of tests necessary for the CMND. In the ultimate analysis, any obfuscation or indecision would complicate operationalizing the CMND and creating the necessary command and control networks, erode the confidence of the domestic armed forces, and erode the credibility of this deterrent in the eyes of the adversary. If this decision would create adverse external reaction, then it must be dealt with as indeed was done in May 1998. In either case, technical and not political reasons should guide the Indian decision, regardless of what decision is taken by the US Senate or any other State Party to the CTBT. Clear exposition of the government stand would generate a more durable national consensus and (grudging) international acceptance than any political gamesmanship or posturing can.

And finally, the Indian leadership must consolidate its recent accruals in the international system. This includes a more nuanced appreciation of the Indian position by France, UK, Japan, Israel, Russia, and to an extent China. This positive diplomatic initiative deserves to be supplemented with renewed efforts to deepen and widen the strategic engagement with the United States. The recent meeting of the joint working group on counter-terrorism is a positive step in this direction. The Indian side should also highlight the natural areas of mutual convergence with the United States. This includes cooperation in the exploration of hydrocarbon reserves, nuclear energy, technology-embedded capital investment in computer software and electronics, and the development of the Indian infrastructure. Removal of the "entities list" of Indian enterprises that are banned from receiving US technology, pruning of the "dual use" technologies list, and select resumption of defense cooperation (via the Defense Policy Group and Joint Technology Group) are other areas where incremental progress should be pursued.

In much of the above effort, the government should make better use of the articulate and influential Indian Diaspora to leverage its gains. But over and above that, it devolves upon the domestic leadership to re-calibrate its strategy and enunciate a foreign policy that is commensurate with the aspirations of the country in regional and global affairs. In its consultations with the United States but also other countries, it should highlight that Asia is likely to remain the hub of economic and technological dynamism for the next few decades. Given the higher growth rates, returns to invested capital would be higher in the region than almost anywhere in the world. Indeed, the volume of private and institutional finance invested in this region has grown consistently, and is likely to intensify.

As such, it is imperative to devise a stable architecture of Asian security. In this regard, the role played by Russia, China, Japan and India will be vital. If the United States wishes to maintain and enhance its strategic relevance to the Asian strategic theater, it should perceive and pursue its relations with India within this larger paradigm. Its policy toward Pakistan should be to encourage it to walk away from the manifestly adversarial posture toward India, and instead approach it as only one of the South Asian neighbors that it must engage within the institutionalized framework of the SAARC. The real measure of the success of the Indian foreign policy would not be during the forthcoming trip of the US President, or whether he decides to visit Pakistan, but on how much its future strategic policy toward Asia converges with the new Indian policy trajectory.