D.RAMANA  and  RUPAK CHATTOAPDHYAY

Indian rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 was based on both political and technical considerations. The Indian representative Ms. Arundhati Ghose responded to western pressure by declaring that India would accede –"not now, not ever" – to treaty that reinforced existing inequities in the international system, and offered little by way of commitments to disarmament. However, since the nuclear tests of May 1998, the Indian government has agreed in principle to eventually signing the CTBT. This paper explains how changed political and technical circumstances have led the Indian government to adopt a more flexible approach to the CTBT.

Technical Issues

Under the provisions of the CTBT, all signatories (even those outside the NPT) would have had forgo the option of testing nuclear weapons. However, existing nuclear powers would be able to continue refining their existing arsenals by through sub-critical tests. Therefore India’s main technical objection to signing the CTBT was that the treaty would foreclose the country’s nuclear option that had developed and nurtured over the years. Singing on to a blanket ban on testing would have severely undermined the credibility of the India’s arsenal. Simple warhead designs do not require testing, as was demonstrated at Hiroshima. However, testing was a pre-requisite for the validation of India’s sophisticated warhead designs. The technical aspects of the nuclear program were addressed when India conducted two series of tests on May 11^th and May 13^th, 1998 at Pokhran (POK-2). As explained below the 1998 tests allowed India to test updated warheads designed on experience gained from the 1974 (POK-1) test.

In an effort to build credibility soon after the tests, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) took the unprecedented step of releasing details of the design yields at a news conference (1). This was followed up with pictures of all the craters formed from the implosions. An evaluation of the seismic record was also presented (2). In the event that some western sources disputed the number and yield of the devices tested, BARC responded to this by presenting detailed analysis based on three different measures of the seismic records (3,4). These measures included yield determination based on magnitude of the seismic body wave (Mb), the magnitude of shear wave (Ms), comparison to 1974 test and close in ground accelerations. The radio chemical analysis of post shot drilling of the test shafts for Shakti-1 confirming the designs was also presented (5). Addtionally another report on the radioactivity measurements of the three sub-kiloton tests was made available (6).

Subsequent interviews to the Indian media by BARC scientists offered a broad insight into BARC’s capabilities and expertise in the design and fabrication of nuclear weapons. For instance, Dr. R. Chidambaram’s in his interview with the magazine Frontline, described the design for the Shakti-1 (thermonuclear device) as being ‘vintage 98’. He also described the sub-kiloton tests as the most noteworthy accomplishment of BARC’s nuclear weapons program (6). He also stated that the POK-2 tests gave India a capability to conduct sub-critical tests if required. India Today too carried a series of  interviews with the principal players of POK-2 test, who described in detail the various aspects of Indian nuclear program since the 1974 test (POK-1) (8). Indeed it was revealed that by 1981, India had developed lightweight version of the POK-1 device and had finalized boosted designs. This is corroborated by evidence available from western sources in the early 1990s. Vipin Gupta of Sandia Labs, presents press reports of suspicion of Indian intentions to test in 1982, 1983 and 1995 (9). These reports provide evidence of a long running program at BARC to refine and develop nuclear weapons and repudiate the view that the POK-2 round of testing was a flash in the pan.

Several western journals reported that the thermonuclear test of May 11^th 1998 failed and that fusion reaction failed to develop. BARC has since released sufficient evidence to refute these allegations. The radio-chemical data corroborates that, an event resulting from fusion took place. The radio chemical products measured show that they are the end result of 14Mev neutrons participating in the reaction. The Goa Herald details how they plan to achieve full yield by changing the mantle for the test device with a fissile heavy metal for actual deployment use (10). However, the thermonuclear device appears not to have worked as expected. Dr. P. K. Iyengar, former head of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) suggests that there was only a partial burn in the secondary stage of the thermonuclear design, so a full reaction did not develop (15). While indicating that the design was basically sound, Iyengar argues that further tests may be required to validate the two stage thermonuclear design. Further allegation put out in western journals was that either the sub-kiloton tests of May 13^th never took place, or if at all were the result of conventional explosives to fool an international audience. The tests were supposedly less than the CTBT monitoring detection threshold of 150 tons of TNT. However, radio-chemical data on the sub-kiloton confirms the presence of fission products in the shaft (6).

Technology involved

It is important to understand the range of technologies involved in the tests in order to obtain a better appreciation of the Indian capabilities. While being candid about yields and results, BARC has been quite reticent about the processes and technology involved in the tests. However, based on information released and numerous post-test reports, several interesting inferences can be drawn (11).

The above table presents a summary of our findings. It clear from the above that that BARC has obtained mastery over the fission and triggering processes. Based on the findings of the radio-chemical analysis, it is quite clear that BARC has the capability to produce a working thermonuclear device (5). Reliability, however, remains debatable. The following sub-section discusses this in greater detail. The results of the radio-chemical analysis further confirm that at one Uranium device (S-3) was tested. It is speculated that device S-4 was based on reactor grade Plutonium but there are no corroborating reports.

Reliability of limited tests

Given India’s unilateral moratorium on further testing, the issue of reliability of limited tests becomes an important one. The statistics (binomial distribution) for the reliability at various levels of confidence for five tests are summarized below. The reliability for a single test is also included. The values computed are from reliability tables for various confidence levels and are for the number of tests with zero failures. The first series for five tests, shows that within the context of a second strike doctrine the receiving can expect an unacceptable response. The second series for the three tests indicates that low yield weapons, which are deemed more usable in a regional context also, have high reliability again for the stated doctrine. If the sub-kiloton tests are considered as variations of same design, then, the second set represents the reliability of these weapons. The rather high figure of .79 for 50 % level of confidence provides some indication that India’s nuclear posture is primarily geared to address local and regional threats rather than far away (inter-continental) threats. These numbers are good enough for a second strike response. If other doctrines are contemplated, then more tests are needed. In other words, these tests are not sufficient for a first strike doctrine.

A curious feature of the post-POK-2 scenario is the Indian leadership’s insistence that India is a nuclear weapon state. Weapons normally require proof tests to confirm manufacturing process. This dichotomy can only be explained if the test articles are part of a batch of weapons already designed and manufactured. Press reports indicate that the device S-2 was from inventory (12). Neither BARC nor the government have confirmed if this is the case. Whatever the case may be, the need of the hour is to establish a stockpile stewardship program. In addition a rigorous program of testing the conventional side of the system- ordnance fuses, electrical sub-systems have to be taken up in order to infuse confidence in the deterrent posture.

There still remains a lingering question in some minds about Indian thermonuclear capabilities. These doubts would have been dispelled if India had tested the device S-1 at its full proof load. However, it is now understood that there were major constraints to this. The concerns of environmental effects on nearby hamlets being the most important of these. India had two further opportunities- May 13^th, and May 30^th, after the Chagai round of tests. By the later date, they had already announced a moratorium on further tests. The international community had accepted the seismic data, which was an average of 5.2 on the Richter Scale. It was only later that the reports of under performance of S-1 surfaced. The body of opinion holding this view remains limited, if somewhat vocal. The radio-chemical data and the seismic record indicate that the test was successful and there is no further need to re-examine the issue. From all the above it is clear that technical issues have been addressed by the POK-2. This, however, does not alter the hypothesis or recommendations advanced by P.K.Iyenger.  There remains the question of whether India can conduct sub-critical tests. This is essentially a political issue and will be examined as part of the following section.

Political issues

The politics of CTBT accession must also be understood at various levels. This section accounts for the changes in political considerations since the tests in May 1998.

Disarmament

Indian objections to the CTBT stem largely from the concern that it does nothing to advance the cause of disarmament. During the indefinite extension of the NPT, the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) pledged to work to ensure that the CTBT would be in place by 1996 and negotiations on concluding a successful Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) would be started as steps towards fulfilling the Article 6 provisions. The Indian apprehensions were vindicated when France and China conducted a series of tests to enhance their arsenals prior to signing the CTBT. The US has set up its stockpile stewardship program, which not only certifies old designs but can also develop new designs with out actual tests. Subsequently, the US, Russia and China have all started carrying out sub-critical tests. None of the NWS bothered even to pay lip service to Article 6 of the NPT.

Disarmament is not some esoteric Nehruvian concept. In fact disarmament and security are the two faces of the same coin. This is because fewer (or no) weapons, substantially reduces the chances of their being used in actuality or for coercion. At this juncture it is important to demolish another myth. The indefinite extension of the NPT has conferred special status on the five NWS and perpetuates their access to nuclear weapons. The May 1998 tests have created a new reality of states with nuclear weapons (SNW) as opposed to the NPT, which has the definition of five NWS and all those who have acceded to it. Only Israel is left out in this categorization. It has signed the CTBT though, indicating that it has no need to test. SNW were all outside the purview of the NPT, and that two of them chose to exercise their nuclear options is not a violation of any international obligations that they have undertaken. Any further breakout is a problem of violation of NPT which is not of India’s making. Also Indian doctrine states clearly that its posture is to deter other nuclear weapons only. The corollary is that so long as nukes are there, so long will the Indian posture be there. Together they can approach zero.

Inspection regime

The CTBT proposes an extensive intrusive inspection regime based on member complaints. Such a process is more extensive than any that India has ever been part of. Only the power plants supplied from abroad are under IAEA safeguards. All other Indian plants are out of bounds. It is possible that some interested parties can make an excuse and subject India to challenge inspections and proceed with malafide intent. That the inspection regime does not confine itself to declared test sites only is a possible source of agony in future. From the Indian perspective this remains a key concern.

Vienna Convention and the CTBT process

Under the Vienna convention on treaties, no state will be coerced into accepting a treaty to which it is not a signatory. In 1996 India rejected CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament. The treaty was subsequently put to a vote in the UN General Assembly and passed. It has provisions that it would come into force only when states which are not parties to it sign and ratify it. This is against the spirit of the Vienna Convention on treaties. An argument can therefore be made that India should not bring about the success of the very treaty that violates the spirit of free association and accession to international treaties.

US Senate rejection and issues

During the United States Senate debate on the ratification of the CTBT many issues were raised. United States, is a principal signatory state and its failure to ratify dooms the treaty from entry into force (EIF). The other principal signatories, Russia and China have not ratified and are unlikely to do so until their security concerns are addressed. What the US senate rejection implies is, there is need to keep the option of conducting nuclear tests for various reasons in the post-Cold war era. Some of these include - stockpile degradation, small inventories need high reliability of integrated systems. Another reason for not signing the CTBT in the Indian context is that testing could serve as a warning shot across the bows to ward off potential aggressors. This is especially relevant in enhancing credibility in light of some skepticism about the performance of S-1. The six-month withdrawal clause for supreme national interest is not sufficient to provide such capability. It is better to be able to test to prove resolve than to allow a breakdown of deterrence.

Virtual test ban moratorium

Since May 1998 (and despite the CTBT’s non-entry into force) there exists virtual national moratoriums on nuclear tests. Three states - US, Russia and China - are the only states who may have cause to break this. A US breakout would come if its stockpile stewardship program (SSP) leads it to the conclusion further tests are necessary. With the amount of money being spent on the program this is highly unlikely. Russia has changed its doctrine to include low yield weapons to account for the degradation of its conventional weapons. It also fears further attempts to dismember it via externally aided insurgencies. It would break out only if these come true. There appears to be little interest in the further disintegration of Russia as the fear of narco-terrorism combined with religious extremism is gaining ground. China has no need to break out as it has now access to US data as reported in the Cox Report and it has completed its round of tests. It could demonstrate resolve if there are attempts to degrade its security. There are only plans to engage and bring it into the community of nations and not constrain it. Perhaps the national moratoriums are the best outcome for the treaty and can be explained as satisfying the commitments made to the negotiating nations at the indefinite extension of the NPT.

Sub critical test issue

India stated that with the successful completion of its sub-kiloton tests it acquired the capability to conduct sub-critical tests. Sub-critical tests, incidentally, are not banned by the CTBT. However to date only three of the NWS have performed these tests and this would seem to imply that only the NWS have the right to perform these tests. The other NWS who do not have access to test sites have a data sharing agreement with the US. It is important that India conduct these tests, even if they are not needed to establish its de-facto nuclear status, prior to assenting to any treaties as a matter of establishing its legal rights.

Indo-US nuclear dialogue

Soon after the POK-2 tests India and the US begun a bilateral dialogue on nuclear issues. There have already been ten round of talks to date. It is relevant to recall that this is not the first such engagement. It started in the late sixties when the NPT was first being negotiated. US exerted great pressure on India not to reply to China’s test. The Vienna Convention on treaties and the peaceful explosion route and lack of aggressive moves from China were expected to provide enough leeway for India. Nixon’s engagement of China and subsequent US attempts to involve the former against India during the Bangladesh War in 1971 played a significant role in forcing India to exercise its nuclear option. Subsequently non-proliferation became a major plank of US foreign policy. Had this been accompanied by security assurances. it would have kept India in nuclear limbo. This engagement was revived continued immediately after end of the Cold War and the nineties. The London talks broke down in 1994. However there seems to have been a track two effort between the two countries. The details of the Rao-Clinton meeting in 1994 are not available, but one can draw inferences from the subsequent events. The Indians appear to have agreed to the following- not show up at the NPT renewal conference, co-sponsor the CTBT, and cap the testing and deployment of ballistic missiles. The US in turn agreed to drop references to human rights violations in Kashmir and renew the NPT for another fixed term. The indefinite extension of the NPT, therefore, came as a shock and surprise for India (13). It started re-appraising the nuclear option and started modifying its foreign policy accordingly. The preceding points are important to remind one of the impact that US policies have had on Indian ambivalence.

The current process of engagement also appears to be stalling as Delhi and Washington continue to issue contradictory statements. It appears that the US goal is to sustain the NPT architecture no matter what. This implies the non-recognition of India as NWS in any form. All other moves come from this core objective. India on the other hand appears to be anxious to appear as accommodating the desires of the US, except compromise on its nuclear capability. This morganatic arrangement is not suitable for the ultimate status that India desires. As a non-signatory, India refuses to accept as binding the arbitrary cut-off date set by the NPT. The reluctance is also tempered by the fact that India was a nuclear capable state at the time the NPT was negotiated. It could be argued that NPT rewards those states that have tested even though as the US demonstrated at Hiroshima in WWII, testing is not required. Hence Indian tests do not violate the NPT or any other treaty and cannot be seen as contributing to proliferation. Other states have signed the NPT and as such, break out by the signatories is a failure of the treaty and the security architecture of the New World order.

Indian debate on CTBT

It is now quite clear that the technical issues that prevented India from acceding to the CTBT have been by and large resolved. However, political and strategic issues have are far from being settled to India’s satisfaction. At the UNGA India had stated that it would not be in the way of the CTBT coming into force. It would accede if those signatories ratified without conditions. It has kept to this stand even after reports about failure of its tests coming from the US. With the US Senate’s failure to ratify the CTBT, whether India signs or not has become a moot point. It is not India, but the US, Russia and China who the principal states are preventing its from entry into force.

There is no political consensus in India on the issue of accession, though there is a broad consensus on testing moratorium (14). India is trying to dis-aggregate the process of accession to a three-stage minuet, but this is not right. The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution did not envisage this type of convulsive maneuvers for the process of treaty accession. It is improper to accede to a treaty, which one knows will not come into effect and would subject the nation to intrusive inspections. Moreover the Vienna Convention requires a signatory to accept the obligations of a treaty even if it does not come into force. It is possible that all these maneuvers are to get India to sign so that the Vienna obligations force it from further testing if ever. This is the same status for the five NWS right now. Further the reports of side agreements and classified MoUs exchanged between the NWS are disturbing and show the treaty to be a discriminatory one. India should be a party to these as well. A consensus or national opinion cannot be sought in bits and pieces. It is better to introduce a resolution in the Parliament and let there be an informed debate.

Where do we go from here?

Deterrence relies on credibility. Without the latter there is no deterrence. From an Indian perspective there are four alternatives available. First, base the nuclear posture on proven fission tests and rely on ambiguity for the fusion component. Second, realize that credibility is at the core of deterrence and announce a series of tests and proceed to provide credibility for the posture and finally join the CTBT. Third, do nothing and rely on ambiguity and accede to the CTBT. Lastly, give up on weaponization and join NPT and CTBT. The last two options are what US would prefer India choose. These are untenable for various reasons that will only be listed as they have been discussed interminably by more astute observers.

First, the NPT extension in perpetuity freezes the power equations and marginalizes India to a lesser role forever. China's propensity to proliferate has been proven by the Pakistani tests in May 1998. There is no law or treaty, which will can prevent it from acting in its perceived interests and transfer actual weapons to Pakistan. By no stretch of the imagination, except for the US State Department’s, does the Pakistani program have indigenous roots. The US is reluctant to confront the Chinese because it might jeopardize their relationship with China. In fact its pronouncements in Beijing seeking the Chinese help in constraining the Indian actions smack of appeasement akin to Munich. The Chinese are part of the problem in South Asia’s security calculus. To ask them to interfere is akin to asking Nazi Germany to play neutral between the Czechs and Sudeten Germans. Thus the last two options do not meet basic requirements of guaranteeing India's national interests and are unlikely to be exercised.

The first option of basing the posture on fission technology including boosted fission and ambiguity for the fusion-based systems (incorporating the lessons learned from S-1) has some pros and cons. Again ambiguity leads to a reduction in credibility. Worse yet, it indicates lack of resolve and could encourage further misadventures by neighbors. These are top-level issues. There will always be lingering doubts that India is not a complete power and its statements will be taken as being less than candid. Further more, option one increases the requirement for the number of weapons to cause sufficient damage to an aggressor. In other words India has to increase its fissile material inventory and the number of payloads. As the Indian inventory of fissile material is limited and the world community is interested in negotiating a FMCT as part of the NPT extension bargain, this would be at cross-purposes. This of course has a ripple effect on strategic balance of the nuclear powers and those are not addressed here as there are other issues tugging at that conundrum- ABMs, changes in doctrine, China's modernization etc. The cost of the posture goes up due to increase in survivable delivery vehicles with proper payloads. In addition as payloads are heavier as pointed out by P K Iyengar (800 kg versus 200kg), the delivery vehicles become more cumbersome and expensive. In addition the life cycle costs increase and these have reduced safety as he alludes to. The pro is that no further tests would be required before acceding to the CTBT and it would go down well with the US. There could be intangible benefits of being in the good books of the "do-gooder" elements of the domestic and international community. This would be one less stick to be used against India. However the accession to CTBT is ruled out to preserve the supreme interest clause to test the fusion weapon, as needed.

The second option, of announcing a series of tests to refine the fusion series of weapons and conducting these. All designs should be completed as announced without any misgivings. The dates would to be announced and the tests conducted on those dates. No last minute postponements. True, there will be a reaction but that is for diplomacy to take care of. This process will add credibility and demonstrate resolve, which are always at the core of the Indian national character. After the tests are conducted and the results are deemed satisfactory, India can formally accede to the CTBT. This option has as pros all the cons listed in option one. In addition it can utilize the fissile material efficiently and maximize Indian inventory. We conclude therefore that it is in the national interest for India to both enhance the credibility of its deterrent and subsequently join the international moratorium on testing. India should therefor announce a resumption of testing and follow this up by acceding to the CTBT. The alternative is to weaponize based on fission and its variant technology and revoke NFU and not accede to CTBT.

Notes and references

1. Frontline’ "Technological, scientific success" http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1511/15110130.htm. In addition refer to fas.org site which has an archive of crater pictures for the POK-2 round of tests at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/index.html
2. SK Sikka, Falguni Roy, G.J. Nair, V.G. Kolvankar and Anil Kakodkar, "Update on the yield of May 11-13, 1998 Nuclear Detonations at Pokhran"
3. S. K. Sikka, Falguni Roy and G. J. Nair, ") Indian Explosions of May 11, 1998: An Analysis of Global Seismic Bodywave Magnitude Estimates"
4. SK Sikka, F. Roy and G.J. Nair Comment on the paper "Monitoring Nuclear Tests" by Barker et al - Science 25 Sept. 1998.
5. S.B.Manohar, B.S.Tomar, S.S.Rattan, V.K.Shukla, V.V.Kulkarni and Anil Kakodkar, "Post shot radio-activity measurements on samples extracted from thermonuclear Test site ", BARC Newsletter, July 1999.
6. R. B. Attarde, V.K. Shukla, D.A.R. Babu, V.V. Kulkarni and Anil Kakodkar, " Question of yield", BARC Newsletter, September 1999.
7. Interview with Dr. R. Chidambaram. 'We have an adequate scientific database for designing ... a credible nuclear deterrent' Frontline, Vol. 16 :: No. 01 :: Jan. 02 - 15, 1999
8. Raj Chengappa. " The Bomb-makers", India Today, June 22, 1999, and http://www.india-today.com/itoday/12101998/cover2.html
9. Vipin Gupta, http://www.ca.sandia.gov/casite/gupta/index.html
10. Prakash Morasker. Goa Herald, May 5, 1999, "Atomic war and its holocaust".
11. There are numerous references for this information. For instance immediately after the tests a series of Indian press reports were published that talked about the technology involved. Dr. A. P. Kalam commented the trigger design aspects, on in his book India: Vision 2020 page 267. Dr. P.K. Iyengar in Indian Express speculated the S-3 design details in the aftermath of the tests. See also Ref. 1 and 7
12. S. K. Singh, C. Raja Mohan, "Proliferation Roundtable at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace India's Nuclear Policy After the Tests" CIEP November 9, 1998
13. Dinshaw Mistry, " Domestic-International Linkages: India and the CTBT", Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998. This has an excellent discussion of Indian views on CTBT through an analysis of Indian press reports. It charts the early views and change in attitude after the NPT extension process.
14. K.P. Nayar, " Threat of consensus", The Telegraph, Calcutta, Dec. 15, 1999. Discusses the lack of consensus in India and advises GOI to do what they feel is in best interests of the nation. It also charts how Rao govt. had withstood pressure from US to dismantle the nuclear program by using the elusive consensus but took decisive action without consensus when needed.
15. P.K. Iyengar, "Testing times", Times of India, Feb. 17, 2000. He suggests that there was partial burn of the secondary in Shakti-1 leading to under performance. By acceding to the CTBT India would be precluding the refinement of the design that could be detrimental to the MND.