Command and Control (C&C) is a critical issue in the formulation of a credible nuclear posture. C&C to the ability to sanction nuclear operations by authorized decision-makers. It also refers to the checks and balances in place that prevent theft, unauthorized use or accidental use. Threats to C&C include the inability to take decisions and issue commands. This may be due to a "decapitating attack" on major command centers or a failure of communications. The link between a credible nuclear posture and C&C relates to the ability "to realize in practice the threats implicit in weapons and strategy."

The authors analyze the various factors that affect a viable and fail-safe C&C apparatus. The review the situation in other Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and attempt to draw conclusions for India. They note that nuclear forces are under the firm command of political leaders in all NWS except Pakistan. Other aspects of C&C involve a chain of succession that is known to exist, even if the successors are not publicly known. Robust command infrastructure includes hardened or mobile command centers that are designed to withstand or evade nuclear detonations and withstand electro-magnetic pulses (EMP). Communication networks must be dense and provide redundancy. Negative control over nuclear forces pertaining to their misuse is generally addressed through a variety of means including electronic locks or codes and the multiple-person rules. Clearly, the greater the level of C&C, the lower the state of readiness necessary.

In the Indian context, the authors argue for the involvement of the military in nuclear decision making. They also argue for a reorganization of the Indian armed forces as well as the creation of a Strategic Force to be the fifth force of the Union. This reorganization has faced considerable resistance from the bureaucracy and the armed forces. The political will to push through these changes does not seem to exist now. The authors argue for the creation of a survivable command center. There is no indication that there is any such fixed or mobile command center at present. The creation of a chain of command and succession is also recommended. The essential aspects of this are the actual control over the weapons, the line of succession, the devolution of command, and the pre-delegation of authority. The last does not have to be made public as long as it exists. There have been suggestions that such a line of succession has been in existence for some time now. However, inferences of its constituents have been sketchy. In the Indian context, the key actors are the political, military and scientific masters. The authors do not discuss the role of the scientific actors in C&C, although it would seem plausible that they have a role given India’s history with chemical weapons.

This paper sets out to examine the concept of "rogue state" as the United States applies it today. It is written in two segments, with the first part focusing on the reasons why the US has come to view certain countries in such terms. The second part, titled "A Rogues Gallery", essentially lists the countries which in the past and at present fit into this category.

The author outlines the thinking that leads to the categorisation of a state as a "rogue" by the US. He suggests that while the labelling of rogue states is a recent phenomenon, the idea has antecedents going back at least to the early 20^th century. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the "Rogues Gallery" begins with the USSR, Nazi Germany, China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. Finally, the writer names Japan and Syria as two states that were "never quite" regarded as rogues, yet skirted close enough for inclusion in the "Rogues Gallery".

Defining a rogue state as "one that puts a high priority on subverting other states and sponsoring non-conventional types of violence against them", among other things, the writer points out that it is "virtually inevitable" that rogue states are repressive dictatorships. He adds, however, that from the US perspective such criteria by themselves are not sufficient. The US must also see the regime as "outwardly aggressive". Another essential point the writer makes is that policy success against rogue states must not be measured solely by the removal of the regime from power, but also by the prevention of such states from implementing their extreme agendas.

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury. "Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region". Maritime Studies. Issue 90, 1998.

Despite its importance as the transit way for a major portion of the world’s energy supplies, the study of the security and stability of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has received little importance. The IOR and its littoral areas are also among the most volatile parts of the world. In his article, Roy-Chaudhury offers us a systematic view of the challenges to maritime security in the IOR. The region is unique in that it is bounded by mainly by middle powers and has traditionally been an area of little interest to the superpowers. However, the demise of traditional superpower rivalry and the expansion of naval capabilities in the IOR have served to highlight the need for conflict resolution mechanisms in the region. Apart from threats to the stability of energy supplies, the IOR is host to a number of other problems – namely, the proliferation of piracy, drugs, and small arms. Quite apart from any impact these may have on energy supplies, the proliferation of drugs and small arms have the potential to destabilize states in the IOR littoral.

Security concerns have led to the establishment of a number of sub-regional forums (such as the Gulf Co-operation Council). However, a greater unified view of the challenges that confront the IOR appears to be missing. The author correctly argues that notwithstanding the common interests of most of the states in the security of energy supplies and trade, there remain a number of factors and issues that could threaten stability and increase tension in the region. In particular, major sub-regions seem to be sitting atop dormant or incipient maritime boundary disputes. If disputes in the Timor Sea (between Australia and Indonesia), or Arabian Sea (Between India and Pakistan) were to turn violent, there exists the potential to severely disrupt energy supplies. These disputes taken together with a recent upsurge in naval building programs and recent extra-regional (Chinese) interests in the Malacca straits complicates the already delicate security scenario in the IOR. In light of this, the article makes a very strong case in favor of the need for a multilateral (multi-regional) approach maintaining security in the IOR.

This multi-lateral approach should include regular interactions between the littoral states at both political and military levels. The latter would go a long way in alleviating immediate threats to the security and prosperity of the member states by tackling piracy and drug trafficking. Roy-Chaudhury argues that the current level of multilateral naval co-operation in the IOR presently is insufficient to constitute a credible confidence and trust-building mechanism. This is exacerbated by the absence of a unified perception of threat/uncertainties, or even an ocean-wide forum for the discussion of these issues, although considerable activity in this respect has begun recently. These factors, specific to the Indian Ocean, pose a considerable challenge to effective and sustained multinational naval co-operation in the region into the twenty-first century.