This article, written in the early autumn of 1999, assesses the impact of the current dispute over the ABM Treaty on US-Russian relations. The author suggests that Yeltsin’s willingness to "reconsider" opposition to modifications in the ABM Treaty indicates a debate among Russians over how best to proceed on this sensitive issue. This debate may be continuing, despite loud Russian protestations about the status of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability.

The issue is a serious one. The U.S. will make a decision in 2000 about proceeding with deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system – a decision that will coincide with Presidential elections in Russia. The deployment of NMD represents a potential obstacle to arms control efforts, including the long-delayed START II treaty that has been held up by the Russian Duma for reasons including US compliance with the ABM Treaty.

The author argues that a new administration will likely be even more opposed to the ABM Treaty. He also argues that the US NMD system is essentially intended to create an impregnable anti-missile defense of the United States. Both of these assertions are arguable. While many Republicans are strident opponents of the ABM Treaty, the Congressional consensus is composed primarily of moderate Republicans and Democrats. This affects both the Congressional approach to the Treaty and NMD deployment. Similarly, there is no evidence now that Congress is considering funding the massive effort that a "total" NMD system would require.

Srivastava, while rightly recognizing the potential "grand scheme" of NMD advocates, probably overstates the case, while tacitly dismissing the clear linkage between theater missile deployment (TMD) in East Asia combined with an Alaskan NMD site. While far from leak-free, this would severely limit the utility of currently deployed North Korean and Chinese strategic missile forces, while posing only minimal interference to Russia’s much more abundant and sophisticated arsenal. In the longer term, the combination of defenses combined with continued arms control or de facto arms reductions forced by declining defense expenditures produces a less certain strategic future for Russia. This suggests a deteriorating strategic posture vis-à-vis both the US and China, regardless of the NMD question. In these circumstances, it is unfortunate that the author did not devote a little more time to the nuances of the possible Russian debate on the missile defense issue.

The author points out China’s remarkable finesse and diplomatic flexibility regarding strategic and regional issues in recent months. These efforts include the "bad cop" unveiling of the DF-31 and accompanying condemnation of efforts to modify the ABM Treaty. They also include the "good cop" efforts, including Beijing’s refusal to support Pakistan over the Kargil war and restrained response to the release of India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine in August.

Srivastava then argues that the US fails to recognize the fragility of the balance of power in Asia. He suggests that NMD-TMD deployment will alienate both China and Russia, both of whom are vital to Asia’s evolving security architecture. This is certainly true, unless the US proceeds with more diplomatic subtlety than usual. He also notes, however, that China is not currently a stakeholder in international stability, and is in fact currently involved in a "relentless ascension in the Asian strategic calculus." His argument that restricting deployment of NMD-TMD resolves these two apparently contradictory situations seems counterintuitive. The author notes that TMD will worsen the existing power asymmetry in the region, and promote arms racing. This is problematic – in fact, the power asymmetry favors China against all other East Asian players, who depend on the US to act as an extra-regional balance in the face of China’s superior manpower and nuclear forces. It is not clear that the introduction of TMD favors China. In fact, this becomes clearer if one makes the implicit linkage between NMD and TMD. If both are viewed as primarily Asia-oriented systems, both because of location and because of the public rationale given by the administration and NMD, a joint NMD-TMD deployment poses serious strategic difficulties for China. China will face the choice of expanding available strategic forces, both intercontinental and theater, or seeing a significant diminution of its strategic advantage in the region.

However, the author’s linkage between US efforts to deploy NMD-TMD and presumed arms racing throughout Asia again appears arguable. India has already announced its intent, on a number of occasions, to purchase S-300 and S-300V TMD systems – an act that is unrelated to US decisions on TMD. Similarly, China has procured S-300 TMD systems.

Part of the confusion is caused by the conceptualization of Asia. Viewing Asia as a whole from Pakistan to Japan and from Indonesia to Russia, this conceptualization overemphasizes the linkages between several relatively unconnected security zones – South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Rim. While these regions are contiguous geographically, they are not all part of one fragile balance of power. The acquisition of TMD by Taiwan, for example, only indirectly affects the security of Pakistan. Within these discrete security zones, however, the balance is much more dynamic. The procurement of TMD by India will promptly spur Pakistan to find a counter, for example.

Clearly, US decisions on TMD-NMD will affect Chinese, and possibly Russian, decisions on the posture of their strategic forces. This will cascade, gradually, down into the various security zones of Asia. India, in particular, must make choices in terms of responding to potentially greater levels of Chinese threat, which in turn will influence Pakistan. One issue that has not been adequately analyzed is the issue of TMD proliferation. Is it possible that missile defenses will be a preferable, more stabilizing, and more affordable option for states menaced by the nuclear arsenals of the Big Five (plus Two or Three) as opposed to seeking extended deterrence or a nuclear arsenal of their own?