JAIDEEP E MENON

At every step of Pakistan’s clumsy climb-down from its Kargil catastrophe, the leaders and spokesmen of that country have repeated ad nauseam that the military misadventure was a success because it "internationalized" the Kashmir dispute as never before. This was to be expected. The Kashmir refrain has been heard from Pakistan for so long that even Kashmiris in so-called "Azad" Kashmir, not to mention their brethren in the Organization of Islamic Conference, have begun to snigger at the hypocrisy it represents.

Still, to avoid the risk of a lie becoming the truth by being repeated often enough, let’s take a look at this business of Kashmir’s "internationalization". To begin with, we must agree on what "internationalization" means. Ironically, this may be the only point that India and Pakistan agree upon. From Indian and Pakistani official statements and rhetoric, it would appear that internationalization refers to any interference by a third party, either as mediators or intermediaries - through initiatives, proposals, programs, etc. - to influence the bilateral process in the Kashmir dispute, be that intervention overt or covert, direct or indirect, multilateral or unilateral. It goes without saying that India seeks to avoid the internationalization of the Kashmir question, while Pakistan wants to achieve the opposite.

What lies behind Pakistan’s latest claim to the "internationalization" of the Kashmir issue? First, there is the Kargil incursion and subsequent flare-up itself, which resulted in concerned statements from the G-8, the UN Secretary General, etc. Second, there is Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s trip to Washington where the "personal interest" of President Bill Clinton was expressed. Third, there is the reality that for about two months the issue of Kashmir once again got some attention in the global media. That about sums it up.

The various official statements from individual countries and multilateral groupings call on both countries to resume dialogue between themselves. As for the world media, even a cursory analysis will show that a majority of reports put the blame for the latest flare-up squarely on Pakistan. While support for India may have been adulterated with unsolicited advise on how to solve the Kashmir question, the overwhelming majority of governments did by and large concur that the problem would eventually have to be solved between the two neighbors – and this was broadly the line that media outlets took as well.

In reality, there’s no need for New Delhi to fear internationalization until the Kashmir question (a) goes up for debate on the UN Security Council against Indian wishes, or (b) the US alone, or together with its G8 allies, decides to do a Serbia on India after first putting forward "initiatives", "proposals", "talking points", perhaps even a "road map". Does anybody honestly see such prospects in their reactions to the Kargil flare-up? Apart from the calls for bilateral dialogue to be resumed, is there any reason to conclude from post-Kargil statements that the West is about to "gang-up" against India along the above-mentioned lines?

The answer is "No" on both counts. The extent of President Clinton’s "personal interest" has been clarified, and none too subtly just in case Islamabad misses the point again: he does "not want to get involved in the Kashmir mess". Since then repeated statements from the State Department have rubbed the salt in Pakistani wounds.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that an end to hostilities and the resumption of the bilateral Lahore process is exactly what India had demanded throughout the Kargil crisis. In this context, it is pertinent to say – as the Ministry of External Affairs has – that for the dialogue to resume, the violence must end, and that Pakistan must affirm the sanctity and inviolability of existing boundaries fixed by mutually concluded treaties. The fact that the major powers, except China, are stating very explicitly that the existing Line of Control is sacrosanct and inviolable does not constitute internationalization in view of the fact that it is merely a repetition of what is said in the Simla Accord, signed after East Pakistan was made into Bangladesh by Indian military action. In other words, we cannot expect a better response from the vaunted "international community".

It is also important to keep in mind that, even if by some miracle Kashmir gets dragged before the UN, we can lay down the letter of its own resolutions. Begin, for example, by pointing out that the premier resolution on Kashmir demands that Islamabad first withdraw its troops from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). In the meantime, we can emphasize strongly that, speaking in terms of civil and human rights, POK is not quite as "Azad" as Pakistan would have the world believe. A simply factual elaboration of the existing situation in POK, where the local people have been turned into little more than porters for the Punjabi plutocrats of Pakistan, should clear the cobwebbed minds at the UN a little.

Discomfort in the US and Europe

The Kargil crisis did internationalize something, however, and that too is evident from a cursory reading of the various official statements, media reports, and commentaries since late May. It highlighted the reality of Pakistan today, as a nuclear-armed state where a military establishment infused with an inflexible religiosity and an over-ambitious external agenda acts with reckless autonomy. Meanwhile, in the absence of a serious internal agenda, the prime minister uses the blunt instrument of his "heavy mandate" to concentrate political power in the hands of himself and his family members at the expense of national consensus and federalism.

Spreading seen and unseen through this faltering structure is the virus of extremist Islam, with militant activists subtly – but all too easily, given Pakistan’s sole raison d’être - manipulating the direction of national discourse. Thus we have a number of radical Islamic formations making up for the lack of democratically acquired power with the decibel level of their activism, while cleverly biding their time until the number of soldiers for Jihad churned out by their madrassas (religious schools) achieves critical mass. In the meantime, their tactics are tried out in the killing fields of Afghanistan.

This reality is not lost on the world. Pakistan itself has proudly trumpeted its radical Islamist credentials over the past two decades, albeit at Western behest during the 1980s. Its generals have been closely involved in the creation and expansion of the Taliban, perhaps the most barbaric force in the world today, the kohli-rimmed eyes of these "religious students" filled with a medieval malevolence that we in India still find incomprehensible – but we should not, for it is something our ancestors a thousand years ago would have known very well indeed.

With Bin Ladin fever in the air, and the US scrambling around for a working antidote, it is not surprising at all that responses to the Kargil incursion took the shape that it did. Europe, dealing none too subtly with its own problems of Muslim immigration, activism and expansion, is in no mood to let precedents be set and then to acknowledge them – perhaps because they have a more finely sharpened historical memory than we in India do. Letting the Taliban and their ilk mess around with their own in Afghanistan is one thing, but when Pakistan decided to reapply the Afghanistan Jihad’s "Bear Trap" tactics of "area domination" in Kashmir, using regular troops, antennae pricked up all over the Western world.

Why? Well, it should have been obvious to the Pakistani generals but, from their perspective, one must admit it’s hard to give up a good thing. It appears they really did not expect the responses that their stupidity generated – not the Indian response, not that of the Americans, or the Chinese, or even their fellow Islamic states let alone a hostile international media. Most importantly, nuclear-pumped Pakistan forgot that it is a "blue-eyed boy" only so long as it acts on the behest of others, not on its own cognizance. Launching the Afghan Jihad was one thing, there were American arms and Saudi money behind it; ditto the Taliban expansion (although here the Americans limited themselves mainly to a subtle acquiescence). But generally speaking, in the West and China at least, any appetite for a jihad in Kashmir was diminished somewhat after India demonstrated its Shakti in May 1998.

You see, Pakistan’s wily old dictator Zia Ul Haq was a scoundrel but he was no fool. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif by contrast is of limited exposure and intellect, which can be a fatal combination in a man with the attitude of a Lahore dada (neighborhood thug) with the perceived protection of wealth behind him. Mohajir Pervez Musharraf carries a boulder on his shoulder. When Zia and his ISI point man Gen. Akhtar very briefly pushed the Afghan jihadis close to Dushanbe in Tajikistan during the 1980s, that was considered too risky by their remote-controllers. The two men carefully tread the fine line of not getting Moscow riled enough against Pakistan to attack it directly.

However, in India, Kashmir weighs rather more heavily on the collective consciousness than the border regions of Tajikistan ever did on the Russian mind. So naturally, when the incursions with the intent of "area domination" (unlike in Tajikistan) began to be heavily publicized in India, and the air force went into action, the probability of a full scale nuclear bust-up edged higher on the scale and concentrated minds at Foggy Bottom. From there on, it was merely a few steps for the Americans to conclude where exactly the problem lay and how to deal with it; their allies followed smartly in lockstep. Pakistan may have overlooked the fact that the cold war was over a decade ago, but perhaps we must be thankful that Sharif was street-wise enough to know when he was in for a hiding and decided to put an end to General Aziz and General Musharaff’s excellent adventure.

Now, the question could be asked: so what if the problem of Pakistan is internationalized, how does it benefit India? Well, in the world today, "image" is almost everything. It is not sufficient if Pakistan is a "rogue" covertly, it must be seen to be one. Once that threshold is crossed, and it has been, it makes the work of India less difficult in pointing out the difficulties we face on a day-to-day basis from Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Should India depend on external perceptions to deal with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism? No we should evolve new tactics to match the fluidity of the ground situation as well as depend on our tried and tested methods, which have so far prevented Pakistan from achieving its objectives. But a favorable external perception of our predicament certainly helps, as the Kargil crisis demonstrated quite clearly.

The Problem of Pakistan

As External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh put it recently, the Kargil crisis also demonstrated what Pakistan "has become". And it is not a sight which the so-called "international community" wanted to see. Because, once seen, then the question must be asked: where will Pakistan go from here? Another question must also be asked: how will Pakistan be dealt with if it goes off on a dangerous tangent? Neither are questions that the "international community" wanted to ask, but they have been forced to do so.

To understand why they have been forced to ask these questions, we must go back to that seminal event in modern Indian history – the nuclear tests of May 1998 – because that is when the problem of Pakistan was first brought into the global spotlight. Until then, you see, Pakistan’s nuclear capability was a "dirty little secret" which nobody wanted to know about. Until then, only India had been obliged to face this problem directly.

But why was this a "dirty" secret? For two reasons, at least: (1) Unlike India, Pakistan’s nuclear capability hid uncomfortable issues about trans-border nuclear proliferation; and (2) Unlike India, Pakistan’s nuclear capability has transnational dimensions, i.e. the "Islamic bomb" angle, made more complex and uncontrollable by factors such as the Taliban, Osama Bin Ladin, etc.

By contrast, the Indian nuclear capability as it pertains to the defence sector is indigenous and is unblemished by suspicions of technology transfer overseas. Even if the label of "Hindu bomb" is attached, there are no associated transnational dimensions – i.e. the possibility of India waving about its "Hindu bomb" is less than that of Pakistan flashing its "Islamic bomb", simply because in view of concepts such as Muslim solidarity, support for the Umma, etc., there are more reasons for Pakistan do so.

For instance, such a situation is not inconceivable in the Middle East context. The temptation may be overwhelming for Islamabad to "balance" Israel’s nuclear capability in the event of another war between the Arabs and Jews in order to establish its status at the pinnacle of Islamic nations, to reaffirm its own identity, and of course to fill the perennially extended begging bowl. This possibility would considerably complicate the options available to the US and Israel.

When Pakistan’s nuclear capability was a "dirty secret" it could be denied, both by the West and by Islamabad. Now Pakistan has shown its hand. Can a future government avoid playing it, or at least declaring it once again, given the definite expectations of militant ideologues who are building up their power base through the madrassas? No one knows for certain even now, when "moderate" Sharif is in power. Consider the situation if Maulana Fazlur Rahman of Jamiat ul Islami becomes defence minister sometime in the not too distant future.

Through Kargil, the leaders of Pakistan has proven themselves to be irresponsible and unpredictable – even though they have a government with the heaviest mandate for decades, a military establishment supposedly under firm civilian control, and a nuclear capability that has virtually eliminated its fear of a conventional attack by India. What if a future government is more radically oriented Islam-wise, less sure of its grip on parliament, more dependent on populist action, and if the military behaves as it did over Kargil? Might the nuclear envelope not be pushed further then, perhaps to the very end?

As a nuclear power, Pakistan has already shown itself to be reckless and potentially suicidal – breaking the unwritten codes of conduct among nuclear powers. Islamabad has demonstrated that its calculations are based on the principles of force and blackmail (of the "classic nuclear" variety according to Ashley Tellis of Rand), exactly at a time when its "arch-enemy" India had demonstrated the opposite, by word (Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Lahore speech and visit to Minar-e-Pakistan) and deed (the Lahore accord and bus diplomacy).

When a nuclear power overtly adopts such principles, it immediately causes other nuclear powers and ambitious non-nuclear powers to more than take notice. It causes them to think of ways to adapt to the situation. The choice facing countries, including at the forefront India, that are affected by Pakistan’s rogue behavior is simple: (1) change the Pakistani mindset, or (2) change Pakistan itself.