DR. TIMOTHY D HOYT

Pakistan’s invasion of Kargil last May represents a new stage in the Indo-Pakistani conflict – a conflict that is notoriously misunderstood in the United States and the West. India and Pakistan fought a war, resulting in over a thousand fatalities, which lasted longer than almost any previous conflict in the subcontinent. The nightmare scenario for supporters of nonproliferation in the subcontinent always starts with either an escalation of the insurgency in Kashmir or a direct conventional conflict across the Line of Control by the regular forces of India and Pakistan. India exercised extreme restraint throughout the crisis, carefully tailoring military operations to political objectives and taking sincere measures to avoid the possibility of escalation. Pakistan was forced to withdraw under heavy military and international political pressure.

As more information becomes available, the lessons of the conflict will undoubtedly be assessed in great detail. What follows is a preliminary analysis, based on open source accounts from South Asia and the U.S.

How did Kargil happen?

The Kargil crisis, in the broad scope, resulted from a combination of several recent events on the subcontinent. The first, and perhaps most important, is the end of nuclear opacity. The missile and nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in April and May of 1998 changed the threshold of conventional military operations in the subcontinent. Pakistan’s opaque nuclear posture was evident as early as 1987, constraining India’s potential for escalation with superior conventional forces. The combination of a demonstrated nuclear capability and a delivery vehicle that could reach major targets in the Indian interior, however, posed serious limits to Indian conventional options to Pakistani operations or support for insurgencies in Kashmir. Some Western analysts and scholars argued in the early 1990s that nuclearization, either opaque or overt, would stabilize the rivalry in the subcontinent. Kargil provides no evidence to support this contention.

In fact, Pakistan used overt nuclearization to provide cover for a tactical infiltration. It is not currently clear when exactly this operation was planned, or by whom. It is evident, however, that the operation was being carried out as the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan were meeting to exchange symbols of peace and friendship in Lahore, early in 1999.

The objectives of the infiltration are also not clear. By seizing strategic mountain heights in the Kargil sector, Pakistani forces (certainly including, if not entirely, members of the Northern Light Infantry and the Tenth Corps) provided spotters for artillery fire from the Pakistani side of the LoC against the strategic Srinigar-Leh highway. It is possible that Pakistan intended to unofficially annex this territory – if so, initiating military operations against Indian forces in the region changed the nature of the operation, provoking a fierce response from the Indian armed services.

Pakistan used a subterfuge, stating that the infiltrators were "Kashmiri insurgents." This provided both diplomatic cover from accusations of direct Pakistani involvement and also raised the possibility of international intervention. While it is unlikely that Pakistan expected any foreign state to intervene militarily, Pakistan’s foreign policy has periodically attempted to focus international attention on the Kashmir issue and gain support for its own stance. An armed confrontation between "insurgents" and Indian military forces in a new sector of Kashmir might accomplish that mission relatively cheaply. The threat of escalation and heightened tensions could provoke an international backlash, especially given the region’s newly demonstrated nuclear capabilities. At a minimum, this could serve to undermine the Simla Agreement and re-insert international organizations into the Kashmir equation.

What Pakistan was practicing, in fact, was an excellent example of asymmetric warfare. The Kargil operation plays to Pakistan’s relative strengths while avoiding both Pakistani weaknesses and areas of major Indian advantage. The limited nature of the operation and the new conditions of nuclear deterrence largely neutralized India’s significant edge in conventional forces. The terrain and operational conditions limited, but did not prohibit, India’s use of sophisticated high-technology weapons and armor. Instead, India was forced to fight an infantry-dominant battle – the branch of the ground forces where, on a tactical level, India and Pakistan are most evenly matched. The costs, for Pakistan, were relatively inexpensive, minimizing the impact of India’s much larger economic base. The drain on Pakistani military forces and stockpiles was also mild – the infiltrators were well-supplied with heavy weapons and ammunition, but Pakistan produces most of this equipment domestically. Finally, skillfully played, this operation offered the potential to cast India in a poor light internationally, and to again raise support for an international solution to the Kashmir problem – providing Pakistan with resources to gain a better resolution to a problem it cannot solve alone.

Pakistan’s efforts to re-cast the Kashmir situation and the Indo-Pakistani conflict failed. After some initial setbacks, India determined that the appropriate course was to isolate the fighting on the Indian side of the LoC, publicize the conflict internationally, and rely on superior firepower and a war of attrition to reestablish the status quo. This robbed Pakistan, over time, of the benefits of the asymmetric attack, as the involvement of Pakistani regular forces became increasingly apparent. India’s restraint also undermined Pakistani efforts to escalate the conflict diplomatically. Overseas visits to the U.S. and China failed to secure support for the Pakistani position, and were ultimately a grave disappointment.

What are the political lessons of Kargil?

Clearly, the Indo-Pakistani relationship remains India’s primary security concern, despite efforts to redefine Indian security in a larger perspective. The Kashmir dispute will remain a running sore in Indo-Pakistani relations – one that, in the short term, is insoluble. This will affect military procurement, doctrine, organization and planning (see below). Kargil casts the health of Pakistani democracy in a very poor light indeed. Either PM Sharif did not know about the Kargil operation, in which case the military is capable of risking war on its own, or he did, in which case Pakistani pledges to India cannot, for the short term, be taken seriously. In either case, assumptions that democratization will somehow bring peace to the subcontinent appear to be as faulty, or premature, as predictions that nuclear deterrence will bring stability.

The Kargil episode suggests strongly that both India and China intend to pursue broadly accomodationist policies with one another. India’s public announcements that China is not considered an enemy, at a minimum, provided no incentive for China to intervene diplomatically or militarily on behalf of Pakistan. China’s refusal to speak out in favor of the infiltrators, by the same token, does not suggest that China’s hostility towards India has increased or that Chinese support for Pakistan is limitless and immediate. On the other hand, the discovery late in the crisis of a North Korean vessel shipping missile blueprints and components to Pakistan suggests that China remains an important ally and arms supplier for Islamabad.

Most interesting, from my own perspective, are the implications for U.S.-Indian relations. The U.S. acted with considerable restraint and understanding. By directly pressuring Sharif to withdraw across the LoC, the U.S. continued a relatively under-noticed shift in policy on the Kashmir issue. The unfortunate comments of Robin Raphel aside, throughout the 1990s the U.S. has gradually moved towards a policy of accepting the LoC as the tentative, and possibly future, international boundary and to support for the Simla Agreement as a framework for resolution of the Kashmir issue. This represents a stark contrast to the Cold War, when the U.S. supported internationalization and, at least in the 1962-64 period, strongly urged a bilateral solution modestly favorable to Pakistan at a time of Indian military and political weakness. International opinion, for the most part, also supported India, and refrained from calling for internationalization of the Kashmir issue.

Similarly, the U.S. continued a trend towards a more sophisticated response to crises on the subcontinent. In 1947-48, and again in 1965, the U.S. levied sanctions on both India and Pakistan as soon as conflict broke out, attempting to remain neutral in a conflict between two states the U.S. had friendly relations with. In 1971, the U.S. made the infamous "tilt towards Pakistan," interpreting a largely regional conflict as an indirect U.S.-Soviet confrontation. In 1990, the U.S. attempted to play an honest broker and communicator, providing assurances to both sides in an effort to defuse what some saw as an incipient accidental nuclear crisis. Even the sanctions of 1998, responding to a major blow to U.S. international security policy, attempted to play evenly to both sides, reassuring neither and nearly causing economic collapse in Pakistan. In contrast, in 1999 the U.S. opposed Pakistani aggression, insisted on a return to the LoC as the border, expressed support for the Simla Agreement as the framework for resolution of the issue, and offered its services if necessary.

In the post-Kargil environment, there are new opportunities for limited cooperation and agreement between India and the U.S. U.S. actions should reassure India that the Kashmir question is not likely to be a major barrier in U.S.-Indian relations, nor a serious sticking point in security discussions. Additionally, U.S. recognition that Pakistan committed an act of aggression and, perhaps, remains committed to a revisionist policy provides further opportunity for U.S.-Indian discussion and understanding of each others’ security perception.

What are the military implications of Kargil?

The security debate in the U.S., in particular, and the West in general focuses on rather esoteric issues, such as the likely progression of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the need to intervene in ethnic conflicts for humanitarian reasons. Kargil has some much more immediate ramifications, both for the West and for the subcontinent. To begin with, as stated above the Kargil operation constitutes a nearly classic example of an asymmetric conflict – a very common topic in U.S. security debates. In addition, Kargil has implications for discussions of nuclear and conventional deterrence (both of which, arguably, failed in the Kargil case), use of high-technology aircraft and munitions in a mountainous environment, high-altitude conventional operations, and a host of other topics. Kargil should be studied closely by security analysts. Whether it will or not remains to be seen.

For India, there are several immediate implications. Kargil demonstrates, as mentioned above, that Pakistan remains India’s primary security concern. The military implications of this, given the ongoing conflicts in Kashmir and Siachen, and Pakistan’s apparent willingness to resort to low-intensity conflict and large special forces-type operations, are that India will probably have to remain an Army-dominant, infantry heavy military force. Counterinsurgency operations require "boots on the ground," whether in the form of conventional military forces or paramilitary units like the BSF. These units are manpower-intensive, increasing personnel costs, and require fairly specialized training. In addition, requirements for patrolling remote and isolated mountain borders on both the Chinese and Pakistani frontiers increase the need for infantry.

This has important implications for Indian military modernization. The Army will continue to demand, and deserve, the predominant portion of the budget. However, these resources will be strained to fulfill the continuing, and possibly increasing, demands of the infantry and to modernize and mechanize the ground forces. Will tanks have greater priority than towed artillery, given the limited role they played in Kargil, not to mention Sri Lanka or Siachen?

Increased prioritization for the manpower-intensive ground forces will also impact on modernization and re-equipment of the Air Force and the Navy. The Chiefs of both services made exaggerated statements in August which a cynical observer might construe as thinly-veiled efforts to increase their budget share, claiming that their service efforts contributed disproportionately to Pakistan’s defeat. The Air Force, at a minimum, can argue that its most expensive and sophisticated aircraft (Mirage 2000) played a critical role in Kargil, utilizing expensive advanced munitions in difficult conditions. Indian military exercises and writings bear some similarities to the U.S. "Air-Land Battle" doctrine, and an argument can be made that increased investments in aerospace technology will enhance security at a number of levels, including conventional warfighting, nuclear deterrence, and detection and interdiction of low-intensity operations.

The Navy has a more difficult argument. The role of the Navy in the Kargil crisis was, at best, psychological – its presence influenced Pakistan, although its forces played only a minimal role in the actual combat. But the Navy has many requirements for force modernization – new aircraft carriers or air defense ships, replacement of aging frigates and submarines, possibly a role in the strategic deterrent force postulated in the draft nuclear doctrine, and perhaps (as in all navies, a relatively low priority) a need for both amphibious shipping and logistic support vessels to increase blue-water and force projection capability. None of these were demonstrated during the Kargil crisis, and they will be difficult to fund, in the presence of competing Army and Air Force needs and in the absence of additional funding for defense.

Another new drain on funds will be the requirements for the draft nuclear doctrine. While some assets may be dual-use, such as tactical aircraft, there are already reports of the IAF acquiring specially configured nuclear capable Mirage 2000 aircraft from France. Agni II missiles, or their longer ranged equivalents, will hardly be deployed in a conventional role unless acquired in massive numbers. The nuclear powered submarine (ATV) will be one of the most expensive projects ever undertaken for the Navy (perhaps the most expensive, depending on the carrier replacements), and Sagarika missiles have yet to be tested, much less deployed. An operational strategic triad is a very expensive investment – one reason France has disbanded its IRBM force, and is considering selling nuclear capable Mirage 2000s.

One answer to these dilemmas may be improved information technology. Communications can be a significant force-multiplier, allowing units to react more quickly and cooperate more effectively. Near real-time tactical intelligence capabilities, such as UAVs, are already available to the Indian armed forces at relatively low costs. Computerization offers significant potential as a force multiplier, and recent U.S. military exercises have examined its effectiveness in urban warfare and other counter-insurgency tasks.

The cost of these new technologies, however, is substantial in both economic and training terms. Computer literacy, for instance, is an acquired skill. It may come easily to a youth brought up playing Nintendo and working on an IBM PC or its equivalent, but a young jawan from Bihar (or West Virginia) may require substantial training to even begin to master the capabilities of a computer. Military services, in addition, tend to undervalue communications and support equipment relative to major weapons systems and "state of the art" weaponry, not to mention existing force structure. Sensors, while relatively cheap and efficient, may not be as great a priority as maintaining existing divisions or brigades. The trade-off for technology, ultimately, is either increased military budgets or decreased personnel costs (manpower cuts). An additional organizational cost is paid, as "teeth-to-tail" ratios decrease, and more existing personnel are placed in noncombatant or support roles relative to combat units. Given India’s ongoing requirement for manpower-intensive infantry forces, it may be very difficult to shift over to an information-intensive ground combat arm. Funding limitations may, in turn, constrain the ability of the Air Force and Navy to pursue ambitious communication, information warfare, and RMA-based programs.

Ultimately, the lessons learned from Kargil will be seen in three areas - the Indian defense budget, Indo-U.S. relations, and Indo-Pakistani relations.

Conclusions

The lessons India’s political elite learned from Kargil will be observed in the defense budget. Despite the unpleasant surprise of the Kargil infiltration, the Indian armed services dealt with the invasion with reasonable rapidity at fairly low cost (less than 500 fatalities in a 9-10 week campaign). Although the surprise and casualties are currently being debated as part of the political campaign, it remains to be seen if Kargil will have a lasting impact on the Indian defense budget. In the aftermath of the nuclear tests, both the space and nuclear programs (and, presumably, the nuclear weaponization and missile production components) received substantial increases, but spending on conventional military forces received only modest increases. A significant increase in spending for the Army, or an across-the-board increase for all the services, would suggest that Indian political leaders are responding to post-Kargil reassessments of Indian security requirements. On the other hand, incremental defense increases for the conventional forces would suggest that Indian leadership is comfortable with the current military balance and Indian capabilities to deter or defeat both conventional and asymmetric assaults..

Indo-U.S. relations remain guarded and full of misunderstandings. While the strong personal ties between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott are likely to continue, barring a very surprising Congress electoral victory, there is no evidence that the U.S. is planning on lifting sanctions in the near future - the major barrier to significant Indo-U.S. cooperation. Still, Pakistan’s blatant aggression at Kargil undermines longstanding sympathy and support from some U.S. circles. In this case, Pakistan was not the underdog or the aggrieved party, and the clear strategic linkages between Kargil, Siachen, and Kashmir further undermine Pakistan’s claims of non-involvement in the Kashmiri insurgency. Newspaper reports in the U.S. made these linkages quite clear, although generally falling short of outright condemnation. Links to Taliban and to terrorist groups (including bin Laden) do little to re-create goodwill between the U.S. and Pakistan, and the government’s willingness to undertake risky military adventures at a time of enormous economic instability and heightened nuclear danger cannot reassure the U.S. about Pakistan’s ultimate intentions.

All that said, however, ties between the U.S. and India will only grow at the margins - but that growth could be quite significant. On the key issues for the U.S. (arms control, non-proliferation), there remains broad disagreement demonstrated by the recently released draft nuclear doctrine. However, Kargil and the revelations of the North Korea-Pakistan "SCUD Connection" demonstrate to the U.S. that some of India’s security concerns are quite real. In addition, it may be possible to link these newly verified concerns with activity elsewhere in Asia, where North Korea remains unstable and threatening, and China and Taiwan trade insults and veiled military threats.

The most important ramifications, regrettably, will be seen in Indo-Pakistani relations. Despite the promise of improved bilateral relations at Lahore, it is apparent that confrontation remains, for the moment, unavoidable. Kargil represents another phase in Indo-Pakistani military confrontations. On an optimistic note, the trend appears to be positive - from the large conventional and joint conventional/insurgency operations of 1965 through the limited conventional operations on Siachen Glacier to a "deniable" low-intensity infiltration in 1999. Pakistan’s lack of external support and economic woes are clearly curtailing, but not preventing, its offensive options. On the other hand, low-intensity conflict circumvents the dilemma posed by nuclear capabilities on both sides, and imposes disproportionate costs on India. Further such infiltration can be expected, as General Musharraf recently stated that low-intensity operations would continue even if the Kashmir dispute were settled.

This raises several important questions for Indo-Pakistani relations. Is there a means of compelling Pakistan to give up this option? Short of conventional escalation, which invites international intervention and raises the possibility of nuclear exchange, it is not clear what options exist. Policy options including cross-border strikes (whether on Pakistani regular army sites or insurgent training camps) and conventional escalation, or even more drastic policies such as retaking POK or attempting to fragment the Pakistani state, may have unacceptably high costs. As a status quo power living in what Jaswant Singh calls "a very dangerous neighborhood", India has to tread a fine line between not responding, and inviting further Pakistani adventures, and responding too aggressively, inviting international intervention and fulfilling at least some of Pakistan’s objectives.