DR AMIT GUPTA

The old adage is that the losing side learns the most from a war. While the Kargil conflict was not a full-blown war it was a use of force that led to major political repercussions for both Pakistan and India. In Pakistan's case the consequences were disadvantageous and suggested a serious miscalculation of both the international community's response as well as of India's will and determination. This has led to a post-mortem in Pakistan that may well lead the losing side to learn the most lessons. The Kargil conflict has provided India, as the winning side, with a window of strategic opportunity to achieve three goals: reshape the international setting of Indian foreign relations; redefine relations within the Asian region; and establish a new set of rules to deal with Pakistan. Internationally, it has provided India with a window of strategic opportunity to redefine Indo-U.S. relations and to reassert India's role in the world. Regionally, it has shown that India's attempts at a rapprochement with Pakistan are futile. What is necessary, therefore, is to think of ways to manage the rivalry between the two states in a way conducive to Indian interests. And third, in the Asian continent Kargil has provided the opportunity to rebuild the China-India relationship.

Lessons from Kargil

For the past decade Pakistan's security policy has been based on trying to bleed India white in Kashmir by fomenting the insurgency in that state. Various reasons have been given for this policy: avenging Bangladesh, keeping Indian forces committed to internal security duties and, therefore, unable to launch a military strike on India, and asserting Pakistan's role as the champion of oppressed Islamic minorities. Coupled with the Kashmir policy has been the perceived advantage of nuclearization. Nuclearization it was believed could not only be used to press issues like Kashmir-and deter an Indian response-but it was also useful in regime maintenance. The West, fearful of the proliferation consequences created by a disintegrating Pakistan, would shore up the regime in Islamabad both politically and economically. Pakistan's ability to get an International Monetary Fund loan in 1998, in a post-test environment that called for sanctions, was viewed as proof of the new Western, especially American, commitment to Pakistan's stability.

In the Kargil conflict Pakistan sought to internationalize the Kashmir issue banking on its nuclear capability to restrict the Indian response. The belief was that just as in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, the West, once faced with major fighting would be forced to intervene-at least diplomatically. Instead, the United States's response was to ask Pakistan to terminate its aggression and to withdraw from Indian territory. The Pakistani government's mistake lay in not understanding the United States's approach to nuclearization in South Asia and to intervening in international crises. The United States has accepted that India and Pakistan will have nuclear arsenals but this acceptance is contingent on their behavior as mature states in the international system. The United States views the South Asian nuclear arsenals as providing a deterrent to both countries but it does not expect either side to use its nuclear capability to engage in coercive diplomacy or brinkmanship. Instead, Under

Secretary for State Strobe Talbott argued that, "Having India and Pakistan stabilize their nuclear competition at the lowest possible level is both the starting point and the near-term objective of the U.S. diplomatic effort. . . . The Clinton Administration does not expect either country to alter or constrain its defense programs simply because we have asked them to."

At the same time the United States would like both countries to unconditionally sign the CTBT, join FMCT negotiations, and commit themselves to not transfer nuclear and delivery system related technology. The United States while accepting a policy of deterrence wanted it to go hand in hand with arms control negotiations that stabilized the nuclear option in the region. The Kargil conflict, because it always had the potential of escalating into a full-blown nuclear exchange, was not the end result that the United States wanted in South Asia.

The second miscalculation on Pakistan's part was not recognizing the conditions under which the United States was willing to intervene. U.S. intervention policy as well as its policy of counter proliferation has been devised to tackle threats emerging from authoritarian states. They were not devised to intervene in, or counter, nations that were democracies. Thus the United States's approach to the nuclearization of South Asia was qualitatively different from its response to the efforts of Iraq and North Korea to obtain weapons of mass destruction. The United States's response was one of engaging in constructive negotiations with both nations. Intervention was equally unlikely because of the distinction the United States makes between democracies and non-democracies. The United States is unlikely to commit troops in a clash between democratic states and especially in one where a large nation like India is involved. U.S. military force would be used where its vital interests are concerned or in a genocidal situation. The latter was the case in Kosovo and Bosnia. It is not the case in Kashmir, however, where the Indian government has held democratic elections and where an elected government is in place. Nor have the type of ethnic cleansing pictures that emerged from Kosovo been beamed out of Kashmir. It thus became a case of the Pakistan Army seeking to use military force to create a political solution for the Kashmir problem.

Coupled with the United States's stance was China's reluctance to take a more forceful diplomatic position to favor Pakistan. Two interlinked explanations are suggested to explain Beijing's behavior: it was preoccupied with NATO's actions in Kosovo, particularly the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; and in an international system where China was being projected as the United States's next global rival, Beijing did not want to antagonize a regional power like India that could potentially serve as a regional ally. The message to Pakistan from the international community was a clear one. The use of nuclear weapons for coercive diplomacy would not be tolerated and Islamabad would be asked to withdraw from such actions. The question is whether Pakistan has learnt the right lessons from this crisis.

While Pakistan miscalculated, it is important that India learn the crucial lessons of the Kargil crisis. The international community sided with India because Pakistan was carrying out a clear case of aggression. Further, India did not widen the scope of the conflict by opening up a second front in an area where Pakistan was more vulnerable. There may also have been, though the evidence is insufficient, the belief that India is a pivotal state in international affairs and therefore, the United States came down on its side rather than on Pakistan's. The fact that the United States subsequently expressed concern about the espousal of an Indian nuclear doctrine and its adopted a neutral position on the issue of the downed Pakistani patrol aircraft would suggest that relations have not moved to completely favor India. But the Kargil crisis was not viewed as a justification for the buildup and deployment of a major Indian nuclear force. Nor was it a declaration that the Kashmir issue had been resolved by an acceptance of the status quo.

Based on this analysis India should pursue the following policy options. First, seek to redefine its relationships with the major powers. Second, move away from a policy of engagement with Pakistan to one of establishing the ground rules for maintaining an adversarial but non-hostile relationship-in other words establish a cold peace with Pakistan. International Opportunities A window of opportunity has been created to establish a long term and mutually fruitful relationship with the United States. In doing so India will be able to pursue its twin objectives of isolating Pakistan in the international system and of building up its own status.

Post-Cold War Indian foreign policy has been faced with a major dilemma. The United States is the remaining power in the international system and despite Indian policy makers hopes no alternative power or alliance has emerged to counter it. Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, no longer has the global reach or capacity to challenge the United States. Japan has been mired in its own economic crisis through much of the 1990s and continues to remain under the United States's defense umbrella. The European Union displayed its ineptitude in the Bosnia and Kosovo crisis and in both cases American leadership and commitment of military power was necessary to bring about their resolution. In this American dominated international system India's ambition of being counted as a major power have not been achieved. The United States and the west have not named India as a declared nuclear weapons state. Nor have they made a move to admit India as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Finally, the Pakistan has not been reduced to the level of international insignificance that Indian policy makers would like. Indian policy, therefore, needs to recognize that to build a new relationship with the United States it has to be based on sharing a strategic view of the next millennium. By doing this it can make a significant contribution to establishing a more secure international order. It would also enhance its own security and prestige.

The key is to understand U.S. concerns about nonproliferation. In the next millennium proliferation will continue to be a central concern of U.S. foreign policy. There are several reasons for this. The old international regimes like the NPT and the MTCR are only partially valid for the changed realities of the international system. The U.S. will have to face the problem of what to do with friendly states that seek to proliferate. Taiwan, for example, may chose to take the nuclear path because of its desire-at least of the present administration-to establish state to state relations with China. Israel, similarly, is unlikely to give up its nuclear arsenal. But any significant arms control negotiations with Syria would have to involve some degree of transparency of the Israeli nuclear arsenal. In either case the United States will be unable to go with its past nonproliferation policy. Further, it is likely that potential regional powers like Iran will seek nuclear weapons because it is easier to develop such weaponry rather than advanced conventional weaponry. Third, there is the genuine fear of American cities being targeted by long-range ballistic missiles or being the victims of terrorist attacks. To prevent such attacks the United States is particularly concerned about the illegal transfers of weapons technology. This is an interest that coincides with Indian ones because the Indian government has not contemplated the transfer of WMD systems to other states.

On the other hand there is a genuine concern that Pakistan might transfer such technologies-the so-called Islamic Bomb scenario. India could, therefore, unilaterally announce that it would not transfer sensitive technologies to other states. Not only would this be in keeping with Indian policy but it would also show that the country shares a strategic vision of the next millennium and is a mature and status quo state. Second, Indian analysts have to move away from the nationalistic and exaggerated rhetoric that followed Pokhran-II and declare that the country will have a modest nuclear force. After the tests there were calls for numerically large nuclear forces with one analyst, Bharat Karnad, calling for an ICBM capability. Coupled with this approach on weaponization is the Indian approach to arms control as espoused by K. Subrahmanyam and other security analysts in the country. Subrahmanyam has for long argued that arms control is meaningless unless made part of a plan for overall disarmament. Thus he has suggested that India only go in for global disarmament when the other nuclear powers reach force levels that are the same as India's.

Such a policy lacks credibility at the international level and, in fact, may be harmful to India's plans for nuclear weaponization. The policy lacks credibility because it suggests that the west would be willing to give up its power differential and reach force levels that are comparable to those of third-tier nuclear states. That is unlikely to happen as all the major nuclear powers view the possession of such weapons still providing security in the new international system. The United States security dilemma has been mentioned above but one needs to remember that even second-tier nuclear forces, like those of France and Britain, have been reconfigured to target rogue states in the non-western world. The second thing to remember is that these countries have only conditionally accepted the nuclearization of South Asia. A full-scale development of the Indian nuclear forces without a corresponding policy of arms control would only serve to antagonize the international community and potentially lead to the imposition of sanctions. Going in for arms control would not only serve to reassure the international community but it would also provide the necessary breathing space to allow India to systematically develop a credible nuclear deterrent.

To elaborate on this argument, if New Delhi was to suggest a series of arms control measures to Pakistan it could direct the course of its nuclear buildup. The lesson to be learnt here is from the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) in its first and second versions. Neither SALT I or SALT II sought to disarm the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor was it correct to term these two agreements as arms control because both treaties enabled the buildup of both countries nuclear forces-both quantitatively and qualitatively. Instead the process was one of directed growth. Both sides agreed upon the extent to which their nuclear forces and delivery systems would grow. This removed uncertainty about the other side's intentions. India would not, therefore, be sacrificing its force structure and legitimate security interests to western pressure as many Indian security analysts fear.

Arms control would also be acknowledging a reality that jingoistic nationalism tends to disregard. India's economic condition and national security interests do not warrant the high levels of expenditure that would be required to maintain a first or second tier nuclear force. In security terms India's principal threat remains Pakistan not China. The Vajpayee government has suggested at various times that China is a threat to the country but it would be a time-consuming and extremely expensive effort to develop a minimum credible deterrent against China. The Indian nuclear submarine program is not at an advanced stage of development and Indian aircraft do not have the range to attack China's eastern seaboard-its economic and political heartland. Further, it would be comparatively much easier for China to increase its force levels than for India to build a range of new systems to have a credible deterrent.

If Pakistan is the principal threat then a modest nuclear force that is subject to arms control makes sense. Destroying Pakistan does not require the type of varied and large nuclear force that the United States and the Soviet Union had in the Cold War. It does not even require the 300-400 nuclear weapons that the Israelis are estimated to have. To have a credible deterrent India should be able to destroy Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi-Pakistan's three principal cities. A post-nuclear Pakistan that lost these three cities would have faced unacceptable damage and would find it difficult to survive as a nation state. A nuclear force of less than one hundred bombs would suffice for such a deterrent strategy and it would allow the government to practice arms control in the region. Both ballistic missile defense and civil defense are difficult against a force of such size and neither India nor Pakistan has the economic resources to create a defensive system that would counter a nuclear attack. Assured destruction, therefore, would become an existing condition in South Asia.

Based on this strategy both governments could establish an agenda to implement arms control and direct the growth of nuclear weaponry in the region. To not attempt arms control discussions is to disregard the power structure of the international system. Even if India were to build the type of force structure that a hawk like Bharat Karnad would like, it would only make India a second-tier nuclear power in a nuclear order where the United States, Russia, and China predominated. Instead one needs to go with the argument that Sisir Gupta put forward in the 1960s. Gupta argued that going nuclear was not enough because all it would do was to make India the seventh, tenth, or twentieth nuclear state and the country would have the status of a minor power. What mattered was coming up with plans to restructure the international system. Gupta suggested that if India did not use its nuclear weapons but instead used the influence gained by possessing them to push for disarmament, then its role would continue to be one that was both moral and moderating in the international system. This could be achieved, he argued, by, ". . . taking steps to advance the world to a higher level of international order and collective security."

What sort of steps, therefore, could be taken to achieve these goals? The idea of directed growth in arms control has already been discussed. Another way would be to espouse preventive arms control. There is an entire range of weapons technologies that India could seek to avoid in the near future. India could propose to Pakistan that neither side deploy nuclear weapons in space thereby cutting off a particular weapons development that would take India many years to achieve anyway. India could also suggest not installing Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) on South Asian ballistic missile forces. To go into these areas of weapons development is unnecessary given India's current threat environment and by forestalling it the country would be preventing potentially expensive avenues of the arms race from opening up.

Coupled with the movement on nuclear issues there is the need to engage the United States in a set of ongoing negotiations on a range of lesser security issues. Indo-U.S. cooperation and potential bilateral arrangements should be created in the following areas that are of concern to both countries. Formalized means should be adopted to combat the spread of drugs, to pass information on suspected terrorist activity, to check the spread of international crime, and to ensure the security of computer networks. None of these issues compromise Indian foreign policy concerns and would actually work to enhance India's own security interests. Most importantly it would help cement the relationship with the United States and potentially lead to a broad-based security relationship.

Dealing with Pakistan

The central concern for Indian security policy remains how to deal with Pakistan. The way to approach this issue is to recognize certain basic truths about that country. First it is unlikely that a significant diplomatic breakthrough can be achieved with Pakistan. It is a country that remains committed to an adversarial relationship with India. In over fifty years it has not given up the Kashmir issue. It continues to project itself as the champion of South Asian minorities. It has also sought to use the Taliban to assert its influence in both South and Central Asia. Pakistan's security dilemma does not come from Kashmir or territorial issues. It comes from India's size, from its success at maintaining a multi-ethnic democracy, and the fact that in the international assembly of nations it will almost naturally occupy a seat at the table of big powers. The Pakistani scholar Aslam Siddiqui argued it best when he said that if a small nation existed next to a big nation the bigger one was bound to dominate the smaller one. The relationship of Mexico and Canada with the United States is a case in point. Both nations have essentially showcase armies that have little military utility and depend on the their survival for the security umbrella provided by the United States.

Pakistan cannot commit itself to that kind of situation vis a vis India because that in one sense would undo the meaning of partition. For Pakistan to be truly secure India must be fragmented into several states. Further, Pakistan really does not learn from its mistakes. The Pakistani elite should have learnt by now that you cannot achieve military solutions to the political dispute with India. And every time Pakistan tries, as Shivaji Ganguly points out, it has severe domestic repercussions. In 1965 Pakistan failed to detach Kashmir. This provided enough ammunition for Ayoob Khan's opponents to launch a successful campaign to remove him. The defeat in the 1971 war led to fall of the Yahya Khan regime. And the failure of the Kargil conflict has given encouragement to Nawaz Sharif's opponents to launch a major campaign against him. The only astute Pakistani leader in this regard was the late and much maligned General Zia. When Rajiv Gandhi rattled sabers with Operation Brasstacks in 1987 the General defused tensions by coming to Jaipur to watch a cricket match. That is why it took an air crash to end the General's rule. Even after the failure of the Kargil strategy the Pakistani media continues to talk of the martyrs of Kargil and how the government abandoned them.

The Indian government, therefore, must realistically expect that Pakistan will yet again try to use force to resolve outstanding political issues with India. Lastly, the Indian political leadership needs to move away from the North Indian cultural obsession with Pakistan. Pakistan is not part of Indian culture and better relations will not lead to the free flow of people and ideas across the border. It is naïve and ineffectual politicians like Inder Gujaral with their emotional ties with pre-partition India that create this problem. It is time to understand that Pakistan is a hostile foreign country that wants to destroy the territorial integrity of India. This does not mean that one has to engage in continuous warfare with Pakistan or, as the more fanatical right would suggest, remove Pakistan from the map. Instead, it means that India must work to have a Cold Peace with Pakistan. What I mean by this is that India must spell out to Pakistan that it does not expect to develop a cooperative and friendly relationship with that state. It also expects the tensions in the relationship to continue for a fairly long time. But it will specify the minimum code of behavior it expects Pakistan to follow in the India-Pakistan relationship. This minimum code of behavior would have the following elements in it.

First, Pakistan must be explicitly told that any attempt to use force-covert or overt-to try and resolve territorial disputes will be met by the Indian use of force. The Israelis stated this explicitly to the Arab states and the latter learnt it the hard way. Second, India should make it clear to Pakistan that it is willing to engage in arms control talks that lead to both directed growth and preventive disarmament. Third, India should also make it clear to Pakistan that it will not keep retaking Indian territory. The United States does send out its troops every five years to reestablish its position in Alaska or any other state. Nor does any other serious nation in the world. Pakistan has to respect this fact. India should make it clear that it is committed to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. A territorially unraveled Pakistan would pose a long-term security problem to India. This is the best India can expect from Pakistan in the near future and nor should it attempt to go beyond this level of relationship.

The Relationship with Pivotal States

India must also use its foreign policy to establish strong relationships with pivotal states. This would not only enhance Indian security but also isolate Pakistan. The three pivotal states are Russia, China, and Israel. The India-Russia relationship is one of three strategic relationships that has survived the demise of the Cold War-the other two being the U.S.-Israel and U.S-U.K. relationships. One does not need, therefore, to discuss it in depth. The India-China relationship does need to reevaluated. India's relationship with China has been constrained by China's strong ties with Pakistan-which constitute a fourth strategic relationship-by the inability to resolve the border dispute, and by the fact that as one of two major powers in Asia, India will one day have to confront China. But the China relationship can be salvaged.

China's strategic worldview is being forced to change by two factors. First, the Chinese now recognize that their path to global power status is likely to be blocked by the United States. In this setting, hostility with a nuclear India only heightens China's security concerns. As the late Raj Krishna put it in the 1960s India did not need a large nuclear force to deter China. Instead, given China's hostility with the United States, India could engage in deterrence through a division of labor. Even a few Indian bombs would add to China's security concerns that were already high due to the challenge of countering the United States. India would, therefore, achieve deterrence at a much lower cost. The BJP has tried to sell the same scenario with little success to Washington but it is one, if implemented, that would trouble the Chinese government.

An improved relationship with India would help alleviate this concern. Second, like Russia and India, China now faces the threat of Islamic insurgents. This leads to the need for a more cooperative relationship with both India and Russia. India's future relationship with China has to evolve from a security concern about Islamic fundamentalism. China's recent efforts to plan joint strategies with Russia, Kazhakstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgystan show that India can in the near future at least move to improve relations with China. It is imperative to carry out a comprehensive security dialogue with China that leads to at least a concerted India-China policy on the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism.

The relationship has also to be expanded in areas like scientific cooperation and trade. Indian scientists, for example, could cooperate with their Chinese counterparts by sending a joint expedition to the Antarctic. An easy way to upgrade the relationship would be to develop border trade. Officials in New Delhi estimate that unofficial trade (smuggling) has probably twice the volume of official trade. This is one area, therefore, that could be better exploited by both countries.