New Chief for CISF
(The Hindu, 31 January 2002)

The Director General of Police, Andhra Pradesh, H.J. Dora, has been appointed Director General of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). A 1965 batch IPS officer, Dora had been in the race for the post of CBI Director. L.C. Amarnathan, belonging to the 1967 batch of the Orissa cadre of the IPS, would take over as Chief of the Bureau of Police Research & Development (BPR&D). Mooshary, also from the 1967 IPS batch and belonging to the Kerala cadre, was appointed as Director General of the National Security Guards (NSG), official sources said. The post of NSG chief fell vacant after R. Rajagopal was repatriated to his parent cadre in Tamil Nadu recently. He could serve as NSG chief only for a few months. The three senior-level posts would be filled by the new appointees within a few days, the sources said. It is learnt that the Home Ministry is inclined to manage the affairs with two Special Secretaries and do away with the post of Secretary (Internal Security) which was held by M.B. Kaushal till recently and had been upgraded for him.

Bangladesh Army Chief postpones India visit
(Times of India, 30 January 2002)

Bangladesh Army Chief, Lt. Gen. Harun-ur-Rashid has put off his official visit in New Delhi starting from 03 February 2002. Lt. Gen. Rashid, heading a high-level Bangladesh defence team, was to have began his five-day visit from February 3rd to hold extensive talks on boundary and other related issues. He was due to have meetings with Defence Minister George Fernandes, Home Minister L.K. Advani and National Security Adviser (NSA) Brajesh Mishra. The visit of the Bangladesh Army Chief was significant in view of New Delhi's concerns over growing anti-India activities from Bangladesh soil, particularly activities of pro-Pakistan terrorist groups. No no new dates for the visit have yet been fixed, officials sources in New Delhi said.

Change of Guard in Army Ordnance Corps
(Press India Bureau, 30 January 2002)

Lt. Gen. Vijay Lall, Director General Ordnance Service and Senior Colonel Commandant of the Army Ordnance Corps bids farewell to the Arms on 31 January 2002. Lt. Gen. Vijay Lall during his service spanning 40 years has been decorated with Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM), Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM) for distinguished service. The General has held various distinguished Instructional, Staff and Command appointments including the command of a Foreign Army Unit and as Dean, Jabalpur University. His civic work towards improvement in Garhwal hills and immediate sustained humanitarian contribution to bring relief and succour to the victims of Latur earthquake won him accolades. Lt. Gen. T.J.S. Gill will be taking over from Lt. Gen. Vijay Lall.

Jawans from the BSF's Camel Corps stand guard while army bands play marshal music in front of the Rashtripati Bhavan in New Delhi on 29 January 2002 during the annual 'Beating the Retreat' ceremony. [Image © India Times]

Pak Army, terrorists conducting pre-war manoeuvres in J&K
(Hindustan Times, 29 January 2002)

In a bid to create a Kargil type situation of intrusions, terrorists of Laskhar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad have constructed several bunkers and blown up small bridges in high altitude areas in south of Pir Panjal range as part of a plan reportedly worked out by the Pakistan army. Several pucca bunkers have been constructed in Kakahills, Darhal, Manjakote, Gambir, Mendhar and Behramgala areas in the sensitive Poonch-Rajouri sector since the army build up on the Indo-Pak border in the last few weeks, according to highly placed intelligence sources. The bunkers, which are strong and that can withstand mortar gun fire, have been put up for use in the event of any war, the sources said.

The hideouts of the Pak-backed militants have also been fortified in the renewed building activity by militants in the Surankote-Darhal belt in the area, the sources said. "The simple aim of militants acting as per direction of the SSG unit of the Pakistan Army is to completely wipe out ground support for army and district authorities as pre-war tactics," they claimed. Over 3,000 tonnes of explosive and several truck loads of weaponry including rocket launchers, mortar guns, missiles and flame throwers were also believed to be dumped by the Pak Army through the militants. All structures vacated by the Rashtriya Rifles troops at high altitude posts have been set on fire by the militants, the sources said, adding that these were destroyed within hours so that the CRPF personnel who were deployed in place of them cannot occupy them.

The sources said as per some intercepts officers in a special cell of the Special Service Group (SSG) of the Pak Army were regularly contacting the top cadres of LeT and JeM and giving directions for their subversive activities. Militants have so far set afire 93 such structures in the last one month, they said. The ultras are also snapping road links by blasting bridges with IEDs and targeting army informers and Village Defence Committee (VDC) officials and attacking security personnel. So far militants have snapped four road links by blowing up small bridges in Darhal-Surankote belt and nine IEDs kept under bridge links were recovered and defused, the sources said. Similarly, militants have eliminated seven Special Police Officers (SPOs), five army informers, nine VDC members and 14 civilians since the build up, the sources said.

Not only this, militants have carried out 13 attacks on army camps, police posts and VDCs besides on private vehicles on Rajouri-Poonch highway killing nine people, including a judge and two doctors, the sources said. Over 2000 to 3000 jehadis are currently located or operating in this belt with the sole aim of doing another Kargil in this belt, the sources said. The strategic Pir Panjal hills with an area of about 500 sq km between south Kashmir and Badgam districts of Kashmir valley have been eyed by Pakistan right from 1947 when the tribal invasion took place, the sources said. During 1965 Indo-Pak war, most of top heights were occupied by Pakistani infiltrators who established mock governments in Darhal-Surankote-Budhal areas of the twin sensitive border districts, they said. Pak Army's main thrust is again on this strategic ridge, the sources said.

Lt. Gen. N.C. Vij takes over as Colonel of the Dogra Regiment
(Daily Excelsior, 29 January 2002)

Lt. Gen. N.C. Vij, Vice-Chief of the Army Staff (VCAS), took over as tenth Colonel of the Dogra Regiment and Dogra Scouts from Lt. Gen. Surjit Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command on January 28th. An alumni of National Defence Academy (NDA), the General was commissioned in the Dogra Regiment on 11 December 1962. He is a Graduate of Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) and attended prestigious higher command and National Defence College (NDC) courses, an official MoD release said. In a chequered career spanning 40 years, he has held all important staff and command appointments, including command of a brigade and corps in counter-insurgency operations. The General Officer was Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) during the Kargil conflict. He has the unique distinction of commanding two Army Corps, one of which was a Strike Corps. He was GOC-in-C of Southern Command before taking over as VCAS.

CDS to get the Field Marshal room in South Block
(Rediff, 29 January 2002)

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the military advisor to the government whose appointment is expected soon, would occupy the historic Field Marshal room in South Block. If the room is merely symbolic, the strategic force, which would handle country's nuclear weapons, would make the CDS a powerful entity that would have a crucial role in any future war, according to senior military officials. The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) Lt. Gen. Pankaj Joshi, who is overseeing the setting up of the CDS structure, has already taken possession of the room that has been kept ready for Field Marshal S.H.F.J. Manekshaw ever since he was appointed Field Marshal.

The room has remained vacant for the Field Marshal, for consultations that he might want to conduct with the three services, but Field Marshal Manekshaw has rarely used it. In fact, in the recent years he has rarely come to South Block. In South Block, which houses the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs and the Prime Minister's office, rooms are in great demand. A senior military official says it is because of this space constraint that the room, which is close to the offices of Army and Navy top brass and next to the War Room, has been taken over for the CDS. Another room would be located for the Field Marshal in South Block, even though it may hardly be used. But customs and traditions demand a room for the Field Marshal.

In independent India's history there have only been two field marshals - former Army Chiefs K.M. Cariappa and S.H.G.J. Manekshaw. On the eve of this year's Republic Day, the government honoured the legendary Air Force Chief of the 1965 War, Arjan Singh, with the post of Indian Air Force's first Marshal, which is equivalent to a Field Marshal of the Army. Sources said though the CDS appointment is yet to be cleared by the government, the entire structure, which would lead to integration of the three services and ultimately to theatre commands, is fast taking shape. The CDS has already designed its own flag, in blue colour, and its senior officers are already sporting it on their vehicles and in their offices.

What would make the CDS immediately powerful would be the strategic force, which would control the nation's nuclear assets. According to sources, the strategic force would have a separate chain of command and an independent secure communication network. The first Chief of the Strategic Command would be an air force officer of the rank of Air Marshal. Sources said the strategic force would be raised as an independent force. It could, in the future, become the fourth force, after the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The Strategic Command would report to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS), who in turn will report to the CDS. Vice Admiral S.C.S. Bangara was recently appointed as country's first DCDS (Operations).

At present, India has one joint command at Port Blair, but the air force and the army are yet to increase their deployment there to the required levels. Earlier, the Port Blair command was a naval command with elements from air force and army attached to it. Depending on the success of the Port Blair command, the other commands would also be integrated, sources say. The CDS structure would also soon have the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), a tri-service intelligence agency, to which independent intelligence agencies of each service would report. A Lieutenant General would take over as the first DIA Chief.

Army tank gutted in Rajasthan
(Hindustan Times, 27 January 2002)

Within a month of a devastating blaze in an oil depot at Udasar which gutted 60 ammunition-laden trucks, a fire broke out in another Army area of Rajasthan on January 26th destroying a tank in Ramgarh in Jaisalmer district, police said. The fire probably broke out when a battery was being fitted into the tank and engulfed it within seconds, totally destroying it, they said. There were no reports of any casualty. Police also denied any sabotage as the cause of fire. They said the fire could have been more devastating than the Udasar blaze with two densely populated areas close to it, but for the timely action of fire tenders from Ramgarh gas station which were immediately pressed into service.

Pak, US and India discussed border issue
(Hindustan Times, 24 January 2002)

Foreign diplomatic sources confirm discussions among the US, India and Pakistan in the run-up to events leading to the replacement of Lt. Gen. Kapil Vij as GOC of 2 Corps. They say that troops and tanks of the Ambala-based strike corps did not cross the International Border with Pakistan, but came dangerously close to it in the Ganganagar sector. "The matter was discussed between the US and Pakistan," the sources admitted. "We assume that the forward movement was done without orders," they added. However, the Indian Army in an official statement on January 22nd described Lt. Gen. Vij as a professionally competent officer who enjoys the complete confidence of his superiors. As part of an unofficial understanding, the Army keeps its armoured elements east of the Indira Canal, which by and large runs parallel to the border. The Pakistani armour keeps a similar distance on its side of the border.

Reports defy military logic, but strongly suggest that 2 Corps elements penetrated this buffer, moving up to a distance of just 2 km short of the border. The Indian Army has not denied the forward movement of the strike corps. Although this has to be read in the context of the current military posturing, such a position of a strike corps is interpreted as readiness to declare war. As per an understanding between India and Pakistan, strike corps formations are generally kept about 150 km away from the border. An official statement from Army Headquarters denied external pressure or directions from the PMO as reasons for the replacement of Lt. Gen. Kapil Vij. Defence Minister George Fernandes said Lt. Gen. Kapil Vij had been transferred and not removed. "Though I am not well aware of circumstances, as far as my information goes he has been transferred and not removed," said Defence Minister Fernandes when asked about shifting of Lt. Gen. Vij under controversial circumstances. However, the Defence Minister refused to elaborate on the issue.

Republic Day shorter by 15 minutes
(Newindpress, 24 January 2002)

Here's what's in and what's new at the scaled-down Republic Day parade this year: DRDO's Nishant UAV, and the Sarvatra mobile bridging system, which can bridge any gap up to 75 metres in a span of 100 minutes. And what's out: tanks, infantry combat vehicles (ICVs) and marching columns of soldiers. The Nishant is still in the final stages of trials before its induction into the Army. The army is presently using Israeli-made Searcher UAVs. The Agni-II missile, which can engage a target more than 2,000 km away, will also be on display. The absence of tanks, ICVs and marching columns will cut down the parade duration by 15 minutes. There will be just four helicopters at the start of the parade, and a lone fighter jet fly past at the end. Usually, the Il-76 and An-32 transport aircraft carry out formation flying, followed by a Jaguar fighter fly past and the victory roll by the state-of-the-art Su-30 multi-role combat aircraft.

The Nishant UAV during a R-Day dress rehearsal

This year, only one Su-30 will fly past the dais at Rajpath. While the Ashok Chakra, the highest non-wartime gallantry award, will be conferred by the President this year, the details still haven't been worked out since Defence Minister George Fernandes returned from a six-day-visit to the United States and United Kingdom only on January 23rd. There will be 28 tableaux on display this year. While Gujarat's theme is the rehabilitation that followed last year's earthquake, Jammu & Kashmir will showcase religious co-existence. The parade will also take a different route in view of the heightened threat perception. It will skip Chandni Chowk and head straight for Red Fort after Tilak Bridge at the ITO crossing, said a ministry official.

A jawan keeping vigil from an armoured vehicle outside Bakshi stadium, the venue of main Republic Day function in Kashmir on 23 January 2002. [Image © India Times]

Anti-aircraft guns for R-Day security
(Times of India, 23 January 2002)

In the wake of the December 13th terrorist attack on Parliament, security agencies have chalked out an elaborate plan to thwart any possible terrorist strikes on the 52nd Republic Day parade. The arrangements include an unprecedented aerial surveillance to thwart any attempt by militants to use a toy plane or an unmanned aerial vehicle, and deployment of the elite National Security Guards (NSG). Sharp shooters and elite NSG commandos will keep an hawk's eye on the movement from high rise buildings and vantage positions all along the parade route as also around the place where VVIPs, including President K.R. Narayanan and Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, will be seated.

Police was also looking for a Lashker-e-Toiba squad that has reportedly sneaked into the capital with the intention of carrying out subversive activities, the sources said. Eight anti-aircraft guns have been deployed in and around the capital. These guns will work in tandem with four radars installed at strategic places. Two mobile medium machine guns will also be placed at strategic locations to thwart any suicide attempt by militants, the sources said, adding that security personnel of Delhi Police and ITBP commandos have been provided with AK-47 rifles and MP-5 sub-machine guns in place of carbines. A tight security cordon was thrown around the parade venue with security personnel frisking each and every person, besides adopting access control measures.

Lt. Gen. Vij not shifted under pressure
(Rediff, 22 January 2002)

The MoD termed as totally baseless reports that Lieutenant General Kapil Vij had been shifted from 2 Corps due to "external pressure or at the direction of the Prime Minister's Office." Describing Lt. Gen. Vij as a "professionally competent officer", a MoD spokesman said the Corps commander had completed his normal tenure and had requested for leave citing "pressing personal reasons." The spokesman said in view of the prevailing security environment, it was not desirable to keep the strike formation without a General Officer Commanding. Therefore, Lt. Gen. B.S. Thakur had been asked to head 2 Corps, now mobilised in the western sector border with Pakistan, pending formal approval of his posting from the MoD. Reports of change in command of 2 Corps are speculative and totally incorrect, the spokesman said, adding that on return from leave, Lt. Gen. Vij would be due for next tenure.

Key commander was shifted at US behest
(Hindustan Times, 22 January 2002)

Lt. Gen. Kapil Vij, GOC of 2 Corps was removed from his post after the US expressed concern over the forward deployment of the strike formations under his command. Government sources confirmed that the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) issued instructions that the General be shifted. Consequently, the Army asked Lt. Gen. Vij to proceed on leave. He has been replaced by Lt. Gen. B.S. Thakur, Chief of Staff of the Army Training Command, Shimla. The Army had said that Lt. Gen. Vij had gone on leave for personal reasons.

Last week US satellites picked up the movement of the Ambala-based 2 Corps of which Lt. Gen. Vij was the General Officer Commanding. The satellite images apparently showed that some armour columns of 2 Corps had moved into strike areas from their concentration areas, which are generally at a safe distance from the border. Forward movement of strike corps can be construed as a threatening stance. "The information was also made available to Pakistan. The Americans discussed the issue with Pakistan during US Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to Pakistan last week. Following this, the US expressed its concern to India," said sources.

The US reportedly confronted India with the images. But the government apparently professed ignorance, and denied that it had instructed the strike formations to move to forward locations. "The PMO immediately asked the army to take action against Lt. Gen. Vij," a senior officer revealed. Army Headquarters complied by asking the Corps commander to go on leave. One of the three strike corps of the Indian Army, the 2 Corps is trained, equipped and tasked to launch offensive operations inside enemy territory. A strike corps has a substantial armour (tank) component. All three strike corps, including the Mathura-based 1 Corps and the Bhopal-based 21 Corps, have been mobilised in the ongoing Operation Parakram.

Sources in the army admit that it is improbable for a strike commander to issue movement orders without the approval of his seniors. Lt. Gen. Kapil Vij's immediate superior is Lt. Gen. S.S. Sangra, GOC of the Western Army Command. An Armoured Corps officer, Lt. Gen. Vij has earlier commanded 31 Armoured Division from Babina. He was promoted to Lieutenant General in June 2000, and was given command of the strike corps, a prestigious assignment. Army Headquarters said that the replacement of Lt. Gen. Vij is no reflection on his professional competence. In the current build-up, 2 Corps is a crucial formation. It was this corps which was to conduct an exercise to display India's armoured might. However, as a conciliatory measure, India has decided not to hold the exercise.

General Padmanabhan assures nation
(The Tribune, 19 January 2002)

Chief of Army Staff, General S. Padmanabhan, assured the nation that although there was some tension in the air but people should not be worried and should not get deflected from their normal tasks. "We are passing though critical days and there is a certain amount of tension in the air. But we must address ourselves to our tasks and should not get deflected by this temporary change in the atmosphere," General Padmanabhan said while addressing the NCC cadets who are in New Delhi to participate in the Republic Day parade. The Director General of the NCC, Lt. Gen. B.K. Bopanna said later that the political tension would not make any difference to this year's parade and the country's borders were being taken care of very well. Lt. Gen. Bopanna said as 1800 NCC cadets from across the country and 48 cadets from five friendly countries participated in the Republic Day camp in the capital.

Army fights for our tomorrow
(Times of India, 19 January 2002)

Lt. Colonel (retd.) P.K. Sethi

The war clouds hovering over the India-Pakistan border have brought back memories of the 1965 conflict. leaving me wondering about the futility of winning enemy positions. In that war, Dogras and Sikhs had captured two formidable mountain positions, 'Raja' and 'Rani', near Haji Pir, to eliminate the enemy's domination of the vital Uri-Poonch link after paying a heavy price. The Pakistanis also suffered heavy casualties. Yet, after the Tashkent agreement, India returned both positions. The memories of the brave soldiers, who climbed through the hail of bullets and laid down their lives on those steep slopes, still haunt me. I was a young regimental medical officer with the 3rd Dogra Regiment. In August/September, we were caught unawares by Pakistan's infiltration. A few successes encouraged their leader to send a message to our brigade commander that in two days their leader would have breakfast with him.

The 3rd Dogras and 2nd Sikhs were asked to capture Raja and Rani. The Dogras first attacked Raja but had to retreat in the face of stiff enemy opposition and the fact that the position was located at a considerable height. Word went around that the mighty Dogras had lost their nerve. Our commanding officer (CO), Lt. Col. R.B. Nair, was so upset that he did not eat food for two days. Other officers asked Lt. Col. Nair to give them another chance. Lt. Col. Nair agreed. After performing a havan, I and the 2nd Sikh's CO, Lt. Col. Khanna, wished each other luck. That was the last I saw him alive. We traversed up to 7000 feet. The Dogras started moving up towards Rani picket through thickets while the Sikhs started moving towards Raja braving mines.

At night, our artillery in Poonch started pounding the positions to soften the enemy located on top of the mountains. The atmosphere was soon rendered with war cries. The Dogras charged and reached the pickets. Hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Pakistanis fought bravely. The Dogras got the picket. The Sikhs, however, lost their nerve and started retreating, angering their CO, Lt. Col. Khanna. With his revolver out, he started marching up. A stray bullet killed him. At this, the Sikhs were enraged. They once again attacked the picket, and captured it. The casualty evacuation started. A Captain had received bullets shattering both his thighs. A jawan's jaw was shattered with lower jaw hanging out. Soon, there other injured soldiers, a total of 200 soldiers, came one after another. Soon, we ran out of morphine injections. But the day was saved by Poonch's civilians, who came with cots to carry the wounded down. This was the first major victory in this sector. But at what cost? We had suffered heavy casualties.

Live ammunition found in Udasar localities
(Times of India, 19 January 2002)

A large number of live ammunition have been found during mopping up operation in Udasar cantonment area, where 60 ammunition laden trucks were gutted at an oil depot last week. Official sources said 40% of the ammunition recovered from about 100 localities during a week long operation, were live and have been defused. Residents have been asked to inform police in case they find any artillery item. The Army is probing the fire which while gutting the ammunition trucks set off splinters, missiles and other explosives which hit a number of residential areas and a hospital killing two people and injuring 11 while shattering window panes and damaging two houses.

1965, 1971, 2002?
(The Pioneer, 17 January 2002)

Abhijit Bhattacharyya

Assuming that an India-Pakistan military confrontation owing to Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism is round the corner, it is time to make assessment of the combat ground realities. It is also time to throw light on the escalating violence because of Pakistan's peculiar brand of Islam based on distortion, fundamentalism, misrule and terrorism. It is also time to recall the 6th century B.C. Chinese philosopher, General Sun Tzu: "War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." It is an unprecedented recognition that armed strife is not a transitory aberration but a conscious act of unforeseen consequences which in turn makes it susceptible to rational analysis based on cold facts and figures.

Question, therefore, is: What could be the nature of India's anti-terrorist war against Pakistan on Kashmir? The answer is: It could be anything about aerial and land warfare but without any role for the Indian Navy. This is unlike America's anti-terrorist and anti-Islamic fundamentalist war in Kunduz, Kabul and Kandahar. Going by cold statistics, India today (like in the past) is superior to Pakistan both in terms of men and material. The Indian Army is 1,100,000 strong to Pakistan's 550,000; India's 12 Corps is matched by 9 Pakistani Corps; 34 Indian and 19 Pakistan Divisions; 3 Armoured Corps each for both the adversaries; 3,414 main battle tanks of India are arraigned against 2,300 Pakistani tanks; 53,000 strong Indian Navy versus 25,000 Pakistani Navy; 110,000 men and 774 combat aircraft of the IAF and 45,000 men and 353 aircraft of PAF. The problem, however, starts beyond the number of men and material. The crux of the matter lies in the complicated interaction between geography and history; religion and fanaticism; polity and culture of neighbours separated at birth owing to congenital enmity supplemented by unbridled ambition and adventurism of Pakistani leaders.

Let us see the deployment of the Pakistani Corps formations, which normally consist of at least two divisions (each division consists of 16,000 to 18,000 soldiers). In Pakistan's Punjab, there are X Corps in Rawalpindi (3 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armoured Brigade and 2 Infantry Brigades); I Corps in Mangla (with 1 Infantry, 1 Mechanised and 1 Armoured Division and 1 Armoured Brigade); XXX Corps in Gujranwalla (with 2 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured and 1 Mechanised Brigade) and IV Corps at Sialkot (with 2 Infantry and 1 Armoured Division and 2 Infantry Brigades). In Sind too, there are stationed II Corps at Multan (with 1 Infantry and 1 Armoured Division); XXXI Corps at Pano Aqil (with 2 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured and 1 Mechanised Brigade) and V Corps at Karachi (with 2 Infantry Divisions, 2 Armoured and 1 Infantry Brigade). In the North West Frontier is deployed 2 Infantry Divisions with the XI Corps Headquarters at Peshawar and in Baluchistan's Quetta is stationed XII Corps (with 2 Infantry Divisions).

Compared to Pakistani Army's Corps Headquarters position, the Indian Command Headquarters, according to the Military Balance 2001-2002 of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), have the following composition: "Northern Command's 3 Corps with 8 Infantry and 2 Mountain Divisions; Western Command's 3 Corps with 1 Armoured, 5 Infantry and 3 RAPID Divisions; Central Command's 1 Corps with 1 Armoured, 1 Infantry and 1 RAPID Division; Eastern Command's 3 Corps with 1 Infantry and 7 Mountain Divisions and Southern Command's 2 Corps with 1 Armoured and 3 Infantry Divisions." A remarkable characteristic of the Pakistani army deployment is that none of its Corps Headquarters is located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). India, however, owing to the Pakistani attack in October 1947 and its three subsequent misadventures of 1965, 1971 and 1999, today has its Northern Command in Udhampur along with 3 Corps Headquarters stationed in Kashmir. It is interesting to see this divergence in deployment tactics. Why doesn't Pakistan station at least one of its corps in PoK? To this writer, it appears to be a two-fold Pakistani policy of direct diplomacy and indirect destruction.

Directly, Pakistan wants to show to the diplomats that its army does not have any sizeable presence in the disputed Kashmir unlike India; and indirectly Pakistan resorts to destruction of all types from this area through training camps for Islamic terrorists assembled from all over - Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, South East Asia, Chechnya, Bosnia, etc.; all in the name of Islam and under the guidance of Islamic Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. This has resulted in the loss of trained soldiers for Indian Army and paramilitary forces. For Pakistan, however, it is a loss of Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists of all variety, who are a mixture of Pakistani and foreigners. Thus, war or no war, the diabolical variety of Pakistani Islam fights its jihad against the kafir army of Hindu India through criminals, crooks, even mentally unbalanced and AIDS patients, whose death in suicide missions fetches money for their family from ISI and martyrdom in the eyes of their ilk. In fact, the unethical methods of Pakistan have resulted in considerable losses to both non-fanatical Indian soldiers and the Islam-indoctrinated Pakistani soldiers, whose Generals still believe that one Pakistani soldier is equivalent to five Indian soldiers, notwithstanding the fact that Pakistani defeat in all the wars and the humiliating surrender of its entire army in Dacca on 16 December 1971, to the Indian Army.

Whether it is war or peace in Kashmir, Pakistan wants to raise the pitch and rate of Indian casualty to an unacceptable level with a minimum loss to its own army. In other words, the Pakistan-sponsored cross border terrorism resorted to by Muslims of all variety form a cheaper forward defence for Pakistan. This defends Islam and Pakistan. It also ensures Pakistan to become a sanctuary for the radical Islamists (including the just defeated Taliban) and a base for the Muslim guerrilla fighters as well as the suicide squads. What should be the Indian posture? Should the LoC be crossed? Although the Government of India reserves its sovereign right to do what it wishes to in matters pertaining to war, perhaps it would not be incorrect to remember that unlike Pakistan, India faces threats from more than one front. India can ill afford to create a military vacuum in North, East and the North-East.

Although India's problems are genuine, no Western country would ever encourage or support India's crossing the LoC. That would upset the West's economic, geopolitical and strategic designs. The West, though it doesn't confess it, is fighting Islamic terrorists. India too is fighting it. Possibly, peace in Kabul would imply increased violence in Kashmir. But India can afford to play and pay with the lives of its surplus manpower. But how can the West fight a body-contact war with a force of deficit manpower and newly recruited female soldiers? Any war on terrorism by India, therefore, has to be within the LoC. The West will never allow it to do otherwise. The West wants liberalisation for Indian markets. But it cannot be liberal with India fighting terrorism. The Indians too partly deserve to be held responsible for the sorry state of affairs. For too long they have pampered Western interests and given an impression of being weak, soft and corrupt. How can India change overnight to be strong, hard and honest? Pakistan for the West is a geographer's delight and historian's counterbalance against a rising India. "Cross border terrorism serves India right," lip service of the West notwithstanding.

Chinese General warns India
(Economic Times, 16 January 2002)

The Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army General Fu Quanyou urged India and Pakistan to ease the current military stand-off and cautioned New Delhi that it should not practice hegemony in the name of anti-terrorism. "No country is allowed to practice hegemony in the name of anti-terrorism," General Fu Quanyou told Pakistan's Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Muhammad Aziz Khan. General Fu, who held official talks with General Khan, said China hoped Pakistan and India would ease the current tension, seek solution through dialogue, and maintain regional peace and stability. He said the military ties between the two sides is an important component of the Sino-Pakistani relations and also a key sector for an all-weather cooperative partnership between the two countries. Sino-Pakistani ties will be strengthened under the utmost care of the leaders and the joint efforts of the two peoples. General Fu said that terrorism has posed a serious threat to the world's peace and stability, and all the people in the world are now joining hands to combat it.

Limited strikes by Army inside Pakistani territories
(Deccan Herald, 16 January 2002)

Amidst heaviest troop deployment on the western borders since the 1971 war, the Indian Army has carried out limited covert strikes inside the Pakistani territories as a punitive action against terrorists and their sponsors and seeks to continue the same in the immediate future despite the ongoing process of de-escalation at the political level. According to well-placed sources, strikes were carried out by special contingents even today (January 15th) in the Jammu sector, marking Army Day, and is poised to carry on limited strikes in the coming weeks. "The three Strike Corps have been deployed on border facing Pakistan which is done in the rarest of rare cases that is war," the sources said adding that "it would be highly unusual that they would be pulled back in a huff. Strike Corps are not moved unless the situation was deemed to be of extreme nature."

The unprecedented deployment of the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force on the western borders has been real and intended to mount maximum pressure on terrorists and Pakistani army to stop infiltration from the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu & Kashmir. The LoC and the International Boundary (IB) all along J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat have been sealed with mine fields, live wire and water trenches while troops and para-military forces had been requisitioned from the eastern and north-eastern sectors and re-deployed on the western side. J&K itself would be hosting army and other security forces to the tune of around 400,000 personnel. Though open conflict on the borders is still a distant possibility, the Army has set up 'War Prisons' in Kashmir, giving last touch to their preparations.

"Apart from withdrawal of STD and ISD facilities from the valley, restricted movements of civilians...troops have been enforcing the shoot at sight orders with more severity in J&K," source said. The killing of the two Dutch nationals apparently taken as terrorists in Srinagar on January 13th by the BSF is a reflection of the heightening of war tempers in the valley. Sources rule out withdrawal of extraordinary deployment on the borders before another month even if political or diplomatic breakthrough is reached between the two sides. "The current strategy was not only limited to mounting pressure but also to give pro-active response to Pakistan, if so required," they said without explaining further.

Desert is where the big guns will boom
(Hindustan Times, 16 January 2002)

Unlike in 1965 and 1971, large-scale manoeuvres to gain major chunks of territory will be attempted in the desert. Surprise attacks in J&K and Punjab are ruled out due to heavy deployment on both sides. Recalling the 1965 war, a retired Lt .General says that it was like two novices slugging it out with inadequate troops, equipment and uncertain aims. Besides the initial skirmish in the Rann of Kutch, most action in 1965 was limited to the Sialkot-Lahore sector. There was some action in the Suleimanki-Fazilka sector of Punjab and a few attacks and counter attacks in the Khokharapar-Munabao area, about 170 km east of the Pakistani town of Hyderabad. In 1971, the major action was in the east. In the west, besides Kashmir and north Punjab, there was some action near the Sutlej river in the Hussainiwala-Ferozepur-Suleimanki sector. Pakistan also planned a half-hearted advance towards Jaisalmer in Rajasthan, which fizzled out due to lack of air support. India captured about 5,000 square miles of Pakistani desert territory in south Punjab and Sind.

Both sides have been preparing for a major desert battle. Though the Indian Army has been carrying out exercises in the desert, lack of adequate training of its armour formations due to involvement of troops in low intensity conflicts in J&K will show. Whether the Indian Army has adequate logistics back-up, particularly during the planned penetrations in the desert, remains to be seen. Unlike in earlier wars, where the paucity of ammunition and spares forced both sides to wrap up early, this time both may be able to slug it out longer. While India went in for a major purchase of war stores during and after Kargil, a lot of Pakistani ammunition is produced in its ordnance factories. Compared to India it has also carried out fewer exercises and field firing practice.

Pakistan is unlikely to reinforce its failure in Kargil by re-launching its misadventure there. Similarly, the upper reaches of Kashmir are unlikely to witness any decisive action because of snow. The Kashmir Valley too could tie down some troops. Says Lt. Gen. (retd.) B.S. Nalwa, former GOC 3 Corps: "While earlier the situation within J&K was a cause of concern, now it is a matter of considerable worry." Besides the 36 battalions of Rashtriya Rifles, it may be difficult to pull out certain reserve elements of the Leh-based 14 Corps and Srinagar-based 15 Corps for use elsewhere. Another officer who served in J&K hopes the exercise done in 1995-96 to review rearguard security in the state has since then been updated. What else has changed since 1971 war? There has been a qualitative and quantum jump in technology and weaponry. For instance, Indian artillery strength has increased nearly 1½ times since 1971.

Explains a senior artillery officer: "For the first time, effective use of artillery tactics like creeping barrage (which provides a curtain of fire to advancing infantry) and sudden fire (amassed artillery opening up without notice) would come into play in South Asia. Actions like the one in the Battle of Belgorod in 1943 where the Russians pounded the German Army with nearly 3,000 guns on every mile of the 19-mile front would be seen." By raising artillery divisions, both India and Pakistan have created an entity that can be decisively applied by military commanders (see box) at the critical juncture in battle. Besides heavy armour, strike formations on both sides have an array of anti-tank surface-to-surface missiles. Area weapons like India's SA-6 which can neutralise a 40-km area will also raise the pitch of battle. Should the two sides fire strategic missiles like the Hatf and Prithvi both of which have a range of 150 km plus, the war will cross an altogether different threshold. These missiles can be armed with both conventional and nuclear warheads. Since Partition, the two armies have charted different courses. The Pakistan Army is more Islamised, while the Indian Army is more nationalistic reflecting the country's multi-religious and multi-linguistic character. The present military leadership on both sides - being post-Partition - is somewhat oblivious of past bonds. Having been blooded in the past two wars, they may seek to settle things once and for all.

Artillery Rules

Should the two countries clash, it will be the first time that the two armies would be led in war by officers commissioned in the Regiment of Artillery: General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and General S. Padmanabhan of India. Genearl Padmanabhan commanded 7 Infantry Division in the Punjab sector and the Srinagar-based 15 Corps. General Musharraf commanded an Infantry Division and was Director Military Operations, before commanding the Multan-based strike Corps. He is known to take risks, which could be attributed to his stint in the Special Services Group (SSG). During 1965, both Field Marshal Ayub Khan and his Army Chief, General Muhammad Musa were infantrymen and the Indian Army Chief, General J.N. Chaudhuri was an Armoured Corps officer. In 1971, the top commanders were all infantrymen - General (later Field Marshal) S.H.F.J. Manekshaw for India and President (General) Yahya Khan and General Abdul Hamid Khan of Pakistan.

Poet-Prime Minister's ode to poet-soldier
(The Pioneer & Hindustan Times, 16 January 2002)

In a rather unusual gesture, poet-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on January 15th stood up to applaud a poet-soldier. Even as it rained heavily, to the surprise of all present at the Army Day reception, the Prime Minister and President K.R. Narayanan came out to the porch of the Army House and asked the Artillery band to replay the song for the Indian soldier - "Dharti Ambar Parbat Sagar Pawan Pe Hai Adhikar, Hindustan Ki Sena Karti Garv Se Pukar." With boots not clicking in Army cantonments in the morning and the rain gods coming down heavily in the evening, it was feared that the Army Day celebrations this year would prove a damp squib. The guests arriving at the Army House residence of General S. Padmanabhan were accommodated in hastily-put up tents as the heavens opened up. As the tarpaulin carpet was completely soaked and there was not enough space indoors, many felt that the VVIPs would decide to give the occasion a go-by.

Some 'Burra Sahib' Generals even went to the extent of suggesting that given the atmosphere - diplomatic and meteorological - it would be prudent to cancel the event. In the midst of such talk and lashing rain, the buglers suddenly sounded the alarm to announce the arrival of the Supreme Commander of the Armed forces, President K.R. Narayanan, and Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee. Suddenly, the faces of the players from the Artillery Regiment bands in a corner lighted up. They played the ceremonial National Anthem and waited for the crowd to clear up. But given the heavy rain, every inch in the three tents continued to be occupied. An announcement made about the song of the Indian soldier, composed by a serving artillery Colonel, was generally lost on the crowd. As the bands played the song, people began to tap. It was unusual to see a Colonel wielding the conductor's baton with utmost passion. The song ended, people clapped and not many thought that it would have reached the ears of the Prime Minister indoors.

But a while later as the crowd thinned, out came the Prime Minister, accompanied by the President and Mrs. Roopa Padmanabhan, wife of the Chief of Army Staff. As if mechanically, the band players picked up their instruments to play the National Anthem once again, to mark the end of the function. It was Mrs. Padmanabhan who intervened and sprang the surprise. "There is a request for a replay of the soldier's song...Would the crowd please clear up to allow a view of the band?" she said. The composer, Lieutenant Colonel Ashok S. Naik, was once again at the podium. The replay began. Prime Minister Vajpayee stood with his eyes closed and the President in rapt attention. The fast, tacky number had a clear message to the aggressors - Keep Off. It had the soft rendition of a soldier having left his family behind in the custody of the nation. The song ended; the conductor bowed. The crowd could not move.

The Colonel was summoned to the VVIPs, which left him totally dazed. As he shook hands, he could barely manage "Thank You's." He could not figure out what to do next, as the Army drill does not permit one to show his back to VVIPs. It was the Prime Minister who relieved him of his discomfort - by asking him to stand between him and the President. As the Army cameras started shuttering, Mrs. Padmanabhan suggested, "He must travel to the borders and sing the song for our soldiers." The Prime Minister nodded in affirmative. Yes, he must chip in to keep the morale of our Army high as the build-up continues on the border, opined the 'Burra Sahib' Generals. The dark clouds were beginning to recede.

Army on song with new tune

The military stand-off at the border has inspired what is being called the Army Song. It is called 'Hindustan ki Sena', which was premiered at the Army Day reception on January 15th before the President and the Prime Minister. By all accounts, they loved it. The song reflects the mood of the world's fourth-largest army, which is evidently raring to knock down the country's enemies. Copies of the lyrics were in demand at the premiere, as Ajit Das of the Artillery Band sang to a transported audience. While all regiments of the Army have regimental songs, there is yet no Army Song. But if the appreciation it received at the premiere is any indication, Hindustan ki Sena looks likely to be the new Army Song. The song is definitely more martial than some of the other popular 'patriotic songs' and is expected to inspire the listeners, particularly the Army, to patriotic fervour, the need of the hour. "Himmat na karna kabhi is mulk ko choone ki, bhoon ke rakh denge hum, cheer ke dushman sabhi," the song warns. As bandmaster Lt. Col. Ashok Naik said, "It was the occasion, and the mood of the moment, which inspired the song."

The moving force behind the song is Mrs. Roopa Padmanabhan, wife of Army Chief General S. Padmanabhan, known for her musical talents. Lt. Col. Naik, an artillery officer, was drafted to write the lyrics and the music. The operation took two weeks. The result was a combination of a brass band and a string band. Subedar Major S.G. Prakasham, who has played before Queen Elizabeth II, says this was a greater experience. "Both the President and the Prime Minister personally asked for the printed score," he said. Asked if this would be the new Army Song, General Padmanabhan said, "It'll be one of the most popular Army songs." On January 11th, when General Padmanabhan was asked what the Army wanted (to settle the Indo-Pak crisis), he had said, "I want to say what the Army wants, but I won't." Perhaps the refrain of the song is what the General had wanted to say: "Sunlo ae jagwalon, hamse na takrao, hamse raho hoshiar."