Papers from the Indian Defence Review

Nuclear Policy

Article Author : Brig VIJAI K NAIR VSM (Retd)

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Assef Ahmad Ali. on a recent visit to Uzbekistan expatiated his country's declarator country’s policy underpinning its nuclear strategy. At a news conference, on 8 Jan 1994, he warned that nuclear war might engulf South Asia if his country's territorial dispute with India went unresolved - “Unless the Kashmir dispute is solved peacefully on terms of international law and UN resolutions, there cannot be lasting peace in South Asia and there is always danger of a fourth war in the region ….. And this time around, the concern of the world, the concern of regional countries is that if a war takes place in South Asia it might become a nuclear war....... It is very important for all countries in the region to recognise the immense danger to the world of a war in South Asia which could become the first nuclear war in the history of this part of the world".

The declaration by Assef Ahmad Ali, unlike past disclosures made by Pakistan's nuclear fraternity, diplomats or United States intelligence sources, is a direct and authentically articulated threat to the security of South Asia in general and India in particular. The Government of India and a - number of intellectuals have readily accepted the subsequent disclaimer by the Pakistan Government, that the Minister had been misquoted by the press. This low key reaction may be justified in normal diplomatese. But what needs to be grasped is that nuclear diplomacy has its own dynamics and is a totally different kettle of fish. Statements at press conferences in today's world are recorded. It is difficult to believe that all members of the Press would uniformly file an incorrect report. The ploy of making a public statement and following it up by a retraction is not new. But when we analyse the intricacies of declaratory statements in support of nuclear policy, it takes on a sinister hue.

Pakistan is a unique situation where its expansionist strategy to wrest Kashmir from India is being effectively stymied by India. The causes of frustration are :

Pakistani sponsored insurgency in Kashmir is taking an unprecedented whipping at the hands of the Indian Army. The inability of the Pakistani forces to bail out the militants has adversely affected their credibility, which in turn has loosened their hold on the dissidents in Kashmir.
Pakistan has been hovering on the brink of being declared a terrorist state by the United States under threat of international sanctions. The Government is showing signs of desperation to achieve their goats in Kashmir before the curtain comes down.
The stability of the newly elected PPP Government is threatened by internal dissension brought about by internecine contradictions in the Bhutto family and the Party's precarious dependence on its coalition partners. This forecloses Bhutto's options to negotiate with India on Kashmir.
With the materialisation of pro Independence bloc in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Benazir Bhutto's Government is being forced to take a virulent stand on Kashmir to demonstrate its bona fides in domestic politics. This leaves little, if any, room to develop a realistic policy that would ameliorate tensions in the subcontinent.
The insufficiency of conventional military means to force a decision in Kashmir has, to a large degrees. been responsible for Pakistan's compulsions to go nuclear.

These issues and the articulated threat cannot be wished away, ignored or procrastinated over. Such a reaction communicates a lack of political will and inability to appreciate and formulate National Strategy to defend India's vital National Interests leaving her open to diplomatic coercion and physical destruction. Therefore, it is imperative that the Indian Government makes an immediate and appropriate response.

The Indian leadership cannot but take cognisance of these statements for the following reasons:

The statement was made by the Foreign Minister and, therefore, constitutes a part of Pakistan's foreign policy;
It was delivered at a press conference in a foreign country, a pronouncement that cannot be made by such a high ranking personality unless cleared by Government;
It was made at a time when the Pakistan lobby in the United States was making serious attempts to have the Pressler Amendment modified to re-open military and economic aid to the ailing economy;
It was made immediately after the Seventh round of Foreign Secretary level talks recently concluded in Islamabad (1-3 January) following a gap of 17 months where all issues including nuclear non proliferation were reportedly part of the agenda;
It was made as a part of the concerted drive by Pakistan to internationalise the Kashmir issue to draw the United States into the controversy to overcome the militarily disadvantageous equation on the subcontinent;
Comes at a time when the United States has been making a number of anti-Indian pronouncements and initiatives to inveigle their way into the negotiation process on J&K.
The prime motivation of the statement flows from policies initiated by Prime Minister Qureshi, on the collapse of the Nawaz Sharief Government, directed towards highlighting South Asian security concerns overtly to sensitise international opinion.
Pakistan has deliberately developed nuclear weapons as an equaliser to off set its inferiority in conventional military power. She can be expected to initiate a pre-emptive nuclear strike in the event an Indian offensive threatens defeat.

Analysis of Factors

International perceptions notwithstanding, India cannot and will not predicate its nuclear strategy on the use of nuclear weapons to attain its objectives. Initiation of a nuclear exchange is a self- defeating stratagem which would destroy the socio-economic fabric of the nation state with no scope of achieving the desired political objective. A pre-emptive first strike is indicative of an inability to formulate and put into place a practicable nuclear strategy and infrastructural bankruptcy. Whatever else, Indian policy-makers would create a weapons capability contingent to having responsible, comprehensive and responsive infrastructure in place, which would make the Government accountable to its own people and collateral communities.

To date India has forsworn the right to exercise the nuclear option thus bringing about a dangerous nuclear asymmetry that could invite a pre-emptive strike by an irresponsible belligerent, such as Pakistan. A country that has based its very existence on an anti-Indian stand and directed its foreign policy accordingly. Pakistan's nuclear capability and strategy have been cautiously unveiled in a graduated manner so that global perceptions were contained at levels that would not precipitate political and economic fallout to unmanageable dimensions and would full India into a state of vulnerable complacency. Have we now reached that stage where Pakistan feels confident in its nuclear capabilities to express its intent so categorically as has been done by the Foreign Minister? What must the Indian Government do to safeguard its national security? The moral high ground is no protection against nuclear coercion. Lofty ideals or cerebral inertia, whichever is responsible for the dangerously asymmetric nuclear equation in South Asia, must give way to formulation of a pragmatic national security strategy corresponding to ground realities.

The present Government of Pakistan is, to an extent, dependent on the indulgence of the military. It is not clear who controls the nuclear arsenal, Is it with the military through General Arif (Retd) with the political leadership cut out of the loop? If so. it needs to be noted that the General wields extraordinary influence with the higher echelons of the Pakistani Army.

The Pakistani-initiated low intensity conflict in Kashmir has stalled with the militant cadres presently on the defensive, military materials running low and prospects of further reverses predicted in the next three to four months. Pakistan is endeavouring to:

Stem the collapse of the militant structures created in the Valley.
Buy time to put into place materials and men to rejuvenate their strategy in the Valley.
Upgrade the low level insurgency into a full-fledged guerrilla war in J&K. The need to buy time and circumscribe India's anti-militant operations has given impetus to diplomatic initiatives to compel the international community to intervene in Kashmir and reduce the pressure on the militants.

Blatantly specious efforts at linking Pakistan's aspirations to Kashmir with their nuclear strategy is aimed at heightening international security perceptions sufficiently to draw the United States into intervening in lndo-Pak relations.

Their protestations notwithstanding, the United States has a number of prime strategic interests in the Subcontinent.

The need for a suitable host country along the Southern flank of the Central Asian Republics to provide surveillance and military facilities to safeguard their interests in that explosive region. An independent and beholden Kashmir would fit the bill.
Creation of a viable and totally dependent State in the region for future initiatives to meet long- term objectives designed to destabilise China through Tibet and institute defensive measures against resurgent, recalcitrant Russia.
Pressure India to conform with the United States's national interests to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery means;
Disallow the emergence of another power centre (India) which would place a greater strain on an already hard pressed United States to maintain its pre-eminence in global power equations - even if it means the Balkanisation of India. The administration's attempts to modify the Pressler Amendment would allow the President to sanction. aid to Pakistan. even if it is in violation, of specific United States laws, if it is considered in the American security interests. It would be an interesting exercise to analyse United States security imperatives in the Kashmir region.

Pakistan would like India to believe that if the restraints being exercised by the latter in Kashmir were replaced by a more aggressive policy, the escalation could result in more direct military confrontation with serious repercussions on Pakistan. As the latter's military capabilities are unequal to the task of wresting Kashmir from India, the ensuing frustrations could lead to miscalculations that provide the basis for launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike against India, The likelihood of such an occurrence is expected to furnish grounds for pre-emptive intervention by external powers such as the United States.

India needs to communicate to Pakistan that:

If India were to actuate its nuclear option, it has the wherewithal to create an endurable weapon is capability to respond to a pre-emptive nuclear -strike by Pakistan. This would provide the necessary disincentive to any form of nuclear opportunism.
A nuclear retaliation by India on a geographically small and economically impoverished Pakistan could comprehensively destroy the socio-economic structure of that country.
On the other hand, with Pakistan's limited capabilities, while it could deliver a crippling blow through a pre-emptive nuclear strike, India has the geographic, economic, technological, industrial and structural endurance to survive and reconstruct itself.

lndia's Response

To ensure regional stability and reduce the scope for extraneous grounds for escalating the situation to nuclear exchanges, Indian diplomacy must be directed towards avoiding an outbreak of conventional war on in subcontinent - and neutralising the linkage of nuclearisation of the region with the Kashmir issue to offset western mind-sets.

However, any choice that India may have had vis-à-vis its nuclear policy have now been foreclosed effectively. The Government must, first and foremost, take firm measures to put into place a credible deterrent to forestall the eventuality of Pakistan taking the opportunity to initiate a nuclear strike as a fait accompli or, risk being destroyed without a whimper. Sufficient justification has been provided without India deferring to the opinion of other global entities.

Failure of the United States to dissuade Pakistan from its nuclear aspirations is a consequence of the former's political shenanigans in the closing stages of the Cold War. Emerging United States national interests notwithstanding, India cannot jeopardise its own integrity and sovereignty in obeisance to such geo-strategic convolutions.

This decision must be unambiguously communicated to Pakistan. The latter must be provided enough evidence that India:

Has the capability to respond with devastation to any pre-emptive nuclear stoke, so as to destroy the socio-economic structure of Pakistan,
Has the political will supported by viable nuclear strategy and infrastructure to safeguard its socio-economic well being and survival;
Has clearly defined national interests on which no compromise will be made.
Is determined to deal with Pakistan on a bilateral basis only and will not be rail roaded into multilateral negotiations on its territorial integrity, leave alone the Kashmir issue,
Has no intentions to initiate a nuclear exchange and that the underpinning strategy is predicated solely on retaliation,
And is willing to keep open clear lines of communication for mature management of the changed strategic configuration of the region.

At the same time the Indian Government should communicate this decision to all other states providing them the rationale for its nuclear policy. Thereafter, India would be best advised to provide verifiable guarantees that it would continue to adhere to the concept of the NPT in so much that it would:

Not transfer nuclear weapons or related technology and materials to any other country, be it a NWS or NNWS;
Not clandestinely import nuclear related technologies from other countries;
Conform to globally institutionalised treaties on nuclear testing;
Through open nuclear facilities, not associated with its security imperatives, to international safeguards;
And forswear vertical nuclear proliferation or a regional nuclear arms race by restricting the nuclear strategy to one of minimum deterrence with finite limitations on capability.

Finally, India should re-initiate its proposal to the United Nations for universal nuclear disarmament.

Conclusion

International relations in the contemporary world are experiencing divergent pulls and pressures depending on the global or regional magnitude of the players' aspirations. The United States has imperatives aimed a' retaining its global pre-eminence in the political, economic and military spheres. Pakistan's imperatives are limited to regional goals aimed at acquisition of Kashmir, attaining an equitable power balance vis-à-vis India and, becoming the predominant party in the Islamic configuration in the Middle East. Both global and regional issues play a major role in the development of China's foreign policy. China's internal anxieties in Sinkiang and Tibet demand a secure flank along its South Western extremities while it is occupied by its aspirations to great power status in global politics.

Indian policy-makers must accept these complexities and their convergence on India's security environment. Each of these states have their own compulsions in the Kashmir issue and nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The United States, having accomplished the dismemberment of the erstwhile USSR now faces several challenges to its position as the remaining super power. Loss of that status will reduce its capacity to control global events in keeping with its interests. One major threat emanates from China. Do the United States plans include dismantling the Chinese power quotient? If so, do they covet an Independent Kashmir, dependent on American largesse, which would give them access to the vulnerable underbelly of China? Is that the reason that China has taken the stand that an independent Kashmir is not acceptable?

Is there a nuclear threat to India, and if so, who is it from? How does nuclear proliferation correlate to the Kashmir question? Pakistan requires American intervention to assist it in its aspirations on Kashmir. The Americans are particularly concerned with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means in South Asia. Is Pakistan forcing the issue by creating a connection between Kashmir and the 'bomb'.

The bottom line is that Pakistan has finally articulated a direct and unambiguous threat of nuclear war and cited India as the correspondent. It is a significant benchmark in the ongoing lndo-Pak animosity which necessarily extends itself beyond the immediate region. India cannot ignore this and must take appropriate measures to make its position clear to the world at large and a specific response to Pakistan. Whether this is done in one package or through confidential and limited rejoinders to different players is a matter of detail that the Indian Government must decide. Finally, the Government must crystallise its nuclear policy and create the necessary infrastructure that would give the country the necessary deterrent and the armed forces the wherewithal to survive in combat in a nuclear environment.

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