1971 WAR

A GENERAL OVERVIEW

K CHATTERJEE

I. Introduction

The expansion of the IAF, which had interfered with its performance in 1965, was over when war came in 1971. During the intervening years the IAF had received an infusion of large numbers of modern supersonic aircraft. The MiG-21 fleet which stood at half a dozen aircraft in 1965 had grown to eight squadrons. The Vampires of 1940s vintage had also been withdrawn.

Many squadrons of the Indian Air Force were over strength, since each squadron kept large numbers of maintenance reserves. The PAF had, in the meantime, added F-6 (Chinese MiG-19s) and Mirage IIIs to its fleet. The PAF expansion and modernization program lagged far behind that of the IAF's.

Pushpinder Singh et. al have find it puzzling that despite the favourable terms on which the PAF could have acquired F-6s and Mirage IIIs, it bothered not to do so. The order of battle for the two air forces in 1971, stood as follows;

Indian Air Force - ORBAT 1971

Pakistan Air Force - ORBAT 1971

Tables taken from Pushpinder Singh et al. FIZA'YA

II. Gnats: Drawing the First Blood

The IAF was engaged in war for quite sometime before an official declaration of war was issued by either side. By late October of 1971, in response to guerrilla activity in the erstwhile East Pakistan, Pakistani troops began shelling villages across the international border into West Bengal. This provocation elicited a counter response form the Indian government, as a result the Army was given the go-ahead to silence Pakistani guns that shelled Indian villages.

On November 21st, a Pakistani attack against the Mukti Bahini (Bengali freedom fighters) position's around Boyra (110 km east of Calcutta) forced the Indian response. In the ensuing battle the Pakistani Army lost 13 tanks against an Indian five.

The following day a Pakistani sortie over the area was picked up by Indian radar and four IAF Gnats, from No.22 Squadron, were scrambled from Dumdum airport. Within 7 minutes the interception had taken place. The result was that two PAF F-86 Sabres were shot down over India, the pilots being subsequently captured. A third Sabre was shot up and crashed into a village pond in Chaugacha, on the East Pakistani side.

Only one of the four Sabres got away. This had been a successful engagement and all four Gnats returned safely to Dumdum. The captured Pakistani aviators; Flt. Lt. Parvez Mehdi Qureshi (currently Air Chief of the Pakistan Air Force) and a Fg. Off., were subsequently produced before a press conference. The IAF pilots who instantly became national heroes were Flt. Lts. Massey and Ganapathy and Fg. Off. Lazarus.

With the coming of war, Gnats were engaged in flying CAPs and providing air defense over airbases on both fronts. In the eastern sector they not only provided close air support, but also flew as escorts with the C-47 Dakotas and Packets engaged in the Indian para-drop over Tangail. In the western sector the Gnats were to see more air-to-air action. On 11 December 1971, a Gnat of the IAF's No.23 Squadron engaged and severely damaged a PAF Mirage III over Pathankot.

The most memorable of engagements by Gnats in the west, was that by Fg. Off. Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon of No.18 Flying Bullets Squadron. Flying from Srinagar on December 14th, Sekhon single handedly took on six PAF F-86 Sabres. Although eventually overwhelmed and killed, he managed to take score hits on two of them. The Param Vir Chakra (the nation's highest gallantry award) was posthumously awarded to Fg. Off. N.J.S. Sekhon.

III. Hunters: The Victors of Longewala

The IAF's Hunter squadrons were completely engaged in the interdiction role on both the western and eastern fronts. The most spectacular successes of the Hunters were seen on the western front. Within hours of Pakistan's pre-emptive strike on December 3rd, Hunters went into action. The Keamri oil installations near Karachi harbor was struck twice by three-plane formations coming in low over the ocean, leaving the installations alight for night raids by bombers.

No.27 Squadron was heavily involved in close support missions in the Kashmir sector. Enemy positions around Poonch and Chhamb were continuously harassed. Meanwhile, Hunters from the No.14 Squadron in the east struck Chittagong harbor on the 4th December as a prelude to strikes from the carrier INS Vikrant.

Of the regular Hunter squadrons, the No.20 was to become the most accomplished. Three counter-air strikes on the 4th December by the No.20 against Peshawar, Chaklala and Kohat AFB left 8 aircraft (including at least 1 Mirage-III) destroyed on the ground, in addition to major damage to air field installations.

On the 5th, four aircraft from the No.20 Squadron struck Chaklala again destroying a C-130 and a twin Otter on the ground. Another four-shipper went for radar installations around Lahore and Walton. In a subsequent raid against radar site at Sakesar, two Hunters were lost.

On the 6th, Attock oil refineries were set ablaze in two strikes. Eventually No.20 Sqn claimed a total of 18 enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air, ten tanks, six railway engines, 40 wagons in addition to damages inflicted on fixed installations.

One of the most spectacular actions of the Hunter force was its role in the routing of a major Pakistani offensive across the western desert. On the 4th of December a Pakistani armoured thrust was launched against Jaisalmer, Rajasthan. A spearhead of T-59 tanks were fast moving towards an outpost held by one battalion of the 12 Infantry Division at Longewala. Early the following day a recon flight by four Hunters confirmed the magnitude and direction of the Pakistani offensive.

Three Hunter F.56s and one T.66 of the Armament Training Wing (ATW) flew 17 sorties in a single day in support of 12 Inf. Div. Given the size of Indian forces on the ground, this was an engagement between the Hunters and the T-59s. At the close of the engagement 38 tanks lay burning. At first light on December 6th, a further attack against Pakistani armor left another 40 tanks burning. By the end of the day Jaisalmer lay secure, while all the remained of the Pakistani offensive as 78 burnt out T-59s and the wrecks of numerous other soft skinned vehicles.

IV. MiG-21: Battling Fishbeds

The war in 1971 revealed the true capabilities of the MiG-21, altering perceptions that were held as a result of its disappointing performance in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Of eight MiG-21FL Sqns., five were kept in the western sector while three were sent to the east. The MiG-21s in the west served in the air defense role and those with the eastern command served in the strike/ground attack role.

The MiG-21s deployed in the west conducted frequent armed recon missions deep into Pakistan to lure its aircraft out. Baiting missions were conducted using older and slower flying aircraft, alas to no avail. All HF-24 Marut and Su-7 sorties were given MiG-21 cover. While there was no air-to-air action between the MiG-21 and enemy fighters in the northern sector, however MiG-21s within the SWAC's airspace had ample opportunity at air-to-air combat.

On the 12th of December a Jordanian F-104A, on loan to the PAF, was shot down by cannon fire from a MiG-21FL of the No.47 flying from Jamnagar. A HF-24 Marut strike against Naya Chor was intercepted by three Shenyang F-6s of the PAF on the 16th of December. In the ensuing dogfight one of the PAF's Shenyang F-6s was destroyed by cannon fire by one of the two IAF MiG-21 escorts from the No.29 Squadron.

No HF-24 Maruts or MiG-21s were lost. On the morning of the 17th a low flying F-104A of the PAF was destroyed by a K-13 missile fired by a MiG-21FL scrambled from Uttarlai. A few hours later MiG-21 escorts of a HF-24 Marut strike mission near Umarkot brought down a pair of PAF F-104A with their K-13 missiles.

In the east counter-air sorties against the air fields in East Pakistan were extremely successful. In their first raid, 4th December, carried out by four MiG-21s of the No.28 Squadron the runways at Tezgaon AFB near Dhaka were taken out. Three F-86 Sabres attempting intercept were taken out by a combination of cannon fire and K-13 missiles. Round the clock attacks on Kumritola and Tezgaon kept them non-operational for the remainder of the war. The exploits of six aircraft from the No.4 and No.28 Squadrons merit special mention.

On the 14th of December, within 15 minutes of a message interception by Indian Intelligence, a strike was lanced against Dhaka. Armed with tourist guide maps of the city, a precision rocket attack was made on the Government House in Dhaka where a meeting of the puppet government was in progress. The result was that the government quickly resigned thereby ending Pakistani civil administration in East Pakistan.

V. HF-24 Maruts: The Spirits of Tempest

Between them HF-24 Maruts of the Nos.10 and 220 Squadron flew 300 sorties during course of the war. Flying from bases in the Rajasthan desert, they struck targets upto 200 miles inside Pakistan on the first day of the war. In addition to counter-air operations, they also assisted the 11 Inf. Div's move against Naya Chor.

Between the 5th and 7th of December, HF-24 Maruts flew interdiction missions against rail yards at Sundra, Rohri, Mirpur Khas. On December 7th, a HF-24 Marut actually shot down a F-86 Sabre using cannon fire. Although no HF-24 Marut was lost to enemy fighters, 3 were lost to ground fire.

VI. Sukhoi Su-7: Fighting Fitters

The Su-7 squadrons were responsible for the bulk of IAF ground attack sorties., and they sustained losses to show for it. Flying about 2500 sorties, the Sukhois performed missions ranging from counter-air to close support.

In response to the PAF's pre-emptive strike, Su-7s from No.222 Squadrons struck Risalwala AFB while No.101 attacked Pasrur. The No.101 was also involved in providing support to the embattled 10 Infantry Division in the Chhamb and Sialkot sectors. Eventually over 60 tanks and a large number of artillery pieces were taken out by the Sukhois.

The Su-7s also flew in support of I and XI Corps in the Fazilka-Ferozepur sector. Between the 4th and 12th of December marshaling and railway yards in and round Lahore were continuously attacked by Sukhois flying from Halwara and Adampur. In the east Su-7s flew missions mainly in support for the Army.

On the December 8th, a Su-7 from the No.32 Squadron, piloted by Flight Lieutenant M.S. Malhotra, on a photo-recce mission, shot down a PAF F-6 with cannon fire. The intensity of Sukhoi involvement in the conflict is borne out by the fact that 25 of them were lost during the conflict (making it the single largest type lost).

VII. An-12: Strange But True

It may sound strange that something the size of the An-12 was good for anything other than ferrying cargo. Well, in early 1971, No.44 Squadron formed a flight of 10 An-12 bombers. These aircraft had specially designed bomb crates that allowed them to carry 6,000 lb. of bombs, which were delivered via that conveyer belt in the cargo hold.

The missions of the war were to be led by Wing Commander Vashist. Flying from Bareilly, six An-12s attacked Pakistani ammunition and supply dumps in the Changa Manga forests on the midnight of the 3rd/4th December.

On December 6th the area in the Haji Pir salient was bombed by the An-12s, destroying a Pakistani brigade which was preparing for an offensive. Later the same day, Pakistan's 18 Div.  HQ at Fort Abbas was bombed and strafed, as were installations in the Bahawalpur area.

On December 9th a four ship formation flying at 180 feet struck Pakistani installations across from Fazilka. On the 11th a three ship formation bombed the Jaydebpur Ordnance factory in East Pakistan. A pair struck the Rohri railway marshaling yard at dusk on the 13th.

The high point of the An-12's bombing exploits was the attack Sui Gas Plant in Sind. Flying out of Jodhpur three aircraft struck Sui on the 14th. They did such a through job that it took six months to restore Sui's production to even 50% capacity. All three aircraft were returned safely to Uttarlai. The last raid carried out by the An-12 were against Skardu airfield. A mixed formation, consisting of An-12s and Canberras, struck Skardu on December 17th.

Of the 36 bombs dropped by the An-12s, 28 bombs hit the runway, while two fell within yards of it (this was confirmed by a PR mission later that day). On their way back Vashist's aircraft was cashed by two Mirages IIIs, in order to evade these he climbed down to a valley and kept circling for 20 minutes until the Mirages IIIs gave up and left. The most amazing thing about the An-12 operations is that not a single one was lost during the course of the war, although many were peppered by ack-ack.

VIII. Canberras: The Lovely Ladies

As in 1965, the Canberras led the IAF's strike forces. Employed both in the eastern and western sectors, the Canberra's participated in everything from counter-air operations to interdiction. In the east, II Corps advance into East Pakistan was supported by carpet bombing sorties by the Canberras.

Flying from Kalaikunda AFB, the Canberras repeatedly struck Jessore eventually forcing the Pakistanis to abandon this major city on the road to Dhaka. In the west a force of 8 Canberra's flying lo-lo over the Arabian Sea raided Masroor AFB and strategic installations in the Karachi area on the night of the 4th/5th December and the following night.

The success of these missions being confirmed by the PR Canberras reporting the biggest blaze ever seen over South Asia. To break up the Pakistani offensive against Poonch, the IAF Canberras dropped about 28,000 lbs. of bombs on the enemy.

On December 11th they hit enemy artillery emplacements and tank farms with over 36,000 lb. of ordnance. Despite the damage done by the Canberras, at least 8 of the force were lost to ground fire. This led the IAF to rethink the role of bombers in future wars.

IX. Helicopter Operations

During the 1971 war, plans were made to helo-lift a battalion of 4/5 GR to seize Sylhet in December 1971. The HBO to capture Sylhet was launched on Dec 7th. With only nine helicopters available, it was possible to lift only essential elements of the battalion. Over the next few days, the main strength of the battalion was transported. It later transpired that the enemy had estimated the helo-landing of troops to be of brigade strength.

The capture of Sylhet bottled up a better part of the enemy there. On December 9th, the Meghna waterline was secured around Ashugung. Lieutenant General Sagat Singh now decided to make a dash towards Dhaka. Shortly after last light on December 10th, Mi-4s began their journey across the Meghna. In the next 36 hours, over 110 sorties were flown. The Mi-4, which normally carried 14 troops, now had 23 men on board.

The 311 Mountain Brigade was among the first units across the river, landing at Narsingdi. The 4th Guards with a detachment of artillery was flown to Narsingdi on December 9th. Two days later, the 10th Bihar was lifted to the area. The battalion secured the road and rail links over the local Brahmaputra the same day.

The next day, the 4th Guards were in control of Narsingdi. The area thus became a base for further operations against Dhaka by this date. The next hop for the helicopters was to Daudkandi. From here brigade HQ and two battalions moved to Baidha Bazaar on December 14/15th, without supporting arms and artillery.

The value of HBOs during the 1971 war was proved beyond doubt as they speeded up the pace of operations and surprised the enemy in many places. It is important to note that the success of HBOs in the 1971 war was facilitated by the air superiority achieved by the Air Force. (Excerpted from IDR referenced below)

X. The Final Score

It has been estimated that by Pushpinder Singh and others from PAF signal intercepts that the PAF lost at least 72 aircraft. Pakistan itself admits to the loss of 29 combat aircraft on the ground. Of the overall losses at least 55 were combat types. 16 aircraft were downed over Indian airspace and their crew became POWs.

At a minimum the following combat aircraft were lost;

Table taken from Pushpinder Singh et al. FIZA'YA and P.C. Lal's My Years with the IAF

Given the larger number of sorties mounted by the IAF in 1971, a larger number of aircraft were lost. To all causes and for all types the losses totaled 100 aircraft, of which 90 were probably combat types. In the Eastern sector the IAF flew 2000 sorties and lost 15 aircraft (a 0.75% loss rate). The PAF in the same sector lost 17 aircraft in 50 sorties (a 38% loss rate).

In the west the IAF flew 5000 combat sorties, losing 49 combat aircraft (a 0.98% loss rate). In the same theatre the PAF lost 33 combat aircraft in 2840 sorties (1.16% loss rate). The majority of IAF losses were due to ground fire and the IAF has subsequently criticized the Indian Army for calling in air strikes, when its artillery could have done the job as effectively.

Webmaster's Note: This article was first written in 1997. Please note that some of the information in this article is outdated due to more new information coming to light. As such no claim is made to the accuracy of the figures and facts mentioned in the articles. We request the visitor to bear with this and to email us in case more information or clarifications is needed.

References:

Hussain, Syed S. and Squadron Leader M. Tariq Quershi. History of the PAF. PAF Press, Masroor, Karachi 1981.

Kasturi, Bhashyam . "The Indian experience in the use of military helicopters." Indian Defence Review. Lancer International, New Delhi 1997.

Lal, Pratap Chandra. My years with the IAF. Lancer International, New Delhi 1986.

Singh, Pushpindar. Aircraft of the Indian Air Force, 1933-73. English Book Store, New Delhi, 1974.

Pushpindar Singh, Ravi Rikhye, Peter Steinemann. Fiza'ya: Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force. Society for Aerospace Studies, New Delhi 1991. Distributed by Himalayan Books.

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